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Abstract	  
How is virtuality represented in fiction, and what does that say about our 
anticipations and fears about what the virtual is and will be? This text, a poetics of 
virtuality, explores fictional representations of virtuality, primarily in movies and 
literature, but also in media productions done by the author.  The aim is to study 
the dream of virtuality. What are we promised? What do we anticipate? What do we 
fear? This is why the study has focused on fictional virtualities, where the storyteller 
is somewhat free to represent the virtual, and let cultural ideas emerge, untethered 
by the technical constraints that govern real-life virtuality technology. 
The study has two methodological approaches. One is the analysis of a large 
number of fictional narrative texts representing virtuality, primarily movies but also 
a few novels and short stories. The other is the study of the author’s own work 
producing media products involving virtuality. The chosen research design utilizes 
the author’s position as both an academic and a computer graphic artist. The 
studied fictional narratives have been analyzed using semiotics, a method to study 
signs and sign production. A self- and auto-ethnographic approach has been used 
to observe the author’s media productions. 
The contribution of this study is a deep and detailed understanding of how 
virtuality is represented in fiction, presented as a poetics of virtuality. Seven 
topologies of virtuality are presented: #surrealism, #containment, #engineered 
space, #artificial light, #immateriality, #control, and #virtual artificial intelligence. 
In summary, the results show that: 
•  It was advantageous to combine film studies with auto-ethnographic 
observations, but also highly time consuming 
•  Fictional representations of virtuality are largely based on real-life technology, 
especially older computer technology 
•  Fictional representations of virtuality are quite highly constrained by 
production circumstances and storytelling requirements 
•  Volumetric displays are highly anticipated, but the need to use augmented 
reality to implement the vision might surprise us 
•  Virtuality is often thought of as being in opposition to the real and the natural; 
it is also often thought of as being a lesser copy of the actual 
•  A major theme is breaking out of the virtual, and this falsely promises that 
there can be an escape from the virtual, and from technology. 
 
Keywords: augmented reality, computer games, computer graphics, movie making, 
production culture, science fiction, Stephen Baxter, virtual reality, virtual worlds, 
virtuality, William Gibson 
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On the use of copyright protected images 
This research text, being a PhD thesis analyzing and discussing commercially 
produced movies and other media, is complemented with still images from the 
studied movies. These images are used to facilitate the discussion of the visual 
aspects of the movies, aspects that are critically analyzed and reflected upon. It is 
the author’s interpretation that the use of these images is legal according to the 
Swedish limitation to Copyright called “right to quote” (citaträtten), see the 
Copyright Act 22 §. It covers the right to quote both text and images. This is 
similar to but not the same as the American “fair use” doctrine. For an overview of 
the similarities and differences between right to quote and fair use, see (Eriksson, 
2013). 
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ASKING FOR A POETICS OF VIRTUALITY 
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Figure 1. A science fiction pulp magazine cover. 
 
Yuri Gagarin became the first human to enter outer space on April 12th 1961. Space 
travels had been part of Western culture’s dream about the future since the start of 
the twentieth century, and after Gagarin’s orbit around the Earth the dream went 
into overdrive, not to lose momentum until the culmination of the Moon landings 
in 1969. Look at Figure 1 above, showing a science fiction pulp magazine cover. 
This was the dream we were sold. Exploration. Drama. Winged Buck Roger space 
ships. This dream helped to justify the cold-war Moon race, the space shuttle, and 
the ISS space station, all prohibitively expensive. The Russians built their Buran 
shuttle, so expensive that it helped bring the Soviet Union to its knees. It flew once. 
The dream of space was fueled by narratives such as H G Wells 1865 novel From 
the Earth to the Moon and later by the fiction of Robert Heinlein, Arthur C. Clarke, 
and many others. Would we have spent all these resources without the alluring 
dream of space conquest? 
This illustrates how fiction influences real-life technological development. The 
summer of 1969 will be remembered for the spectacular finale of the Moon race. 
The same year a computer was quietly brought into service as a part of the 
ARPANET project. It was the first router of what would become the Internet, and 
gradually the dream of outer space gave room for a new dream of another space, 
cyberspace. Now, in the dawn of the twenty-first century, we live much of our lives 
online, on the screen, but the vision of virtuality beckons us to go further. Are 
these visions driving us down blind alleys, yet again? It is time to stand back and 
reflect over what we anticipate from this new space. This is my aim and my 
contribution: to investigate our dreams and our anticipations for this virtuality we 
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are building around us. This is what makes this poetics of virtuality necessary, the 
need to investigate the clash between dream and deception. Dreams of technology 
can be misleading, as illustrated by Mark Stefik’s (1996) analysis of the information 
superhighway metaphor and Laura Watts’ (2012) investigation of the failed 
videophone idea. 
The virtual that we are building – worlds, environments, and objects – is a new 
kind of reality, and the dreams about the virtual are exciting, fresh and spectacular. 
Are we using huge resources yet again without thinking it through properly? Are we 
even building artifacts that are based on erroneous design ideas? We shape our 
tools, and then they shape us.1 We shape our stories about who we are, our views 
of the world, and then they shape us. Building the virtual is a design project, just 
like building cities. Design choices are often done in haste, and ad-hoc. No matter 
how haphazard the choices once were, they soon become “seemingly self-evident” 
(Benedikt, 1991, p.132), built on “absent paradigms and hidden assumptions” 
(Heuser, 2003, p.196). The future becomes “foreclosed” (Watts, 2006, p.35). Jaron 
Lanier (2010) warns against the tendency to take for granted the design choices and 
worldviews on which virtuality is built. He writes that “these designs came together 
very recently, and there’s a haphazard, accidental quality to them. …there’s a 
danger that you will become entrapped in someone else’s recent careless thoughts” 
(p.22). Hayles (1999) express a similar warning, and emphasizes that “the best 
possible time to contest for what the posthuman means is now, before the trains of 
thought it embodies have been laid down so firmly that it would take dynamite to 
change them” (p.291). My aim is to study these recent careless thoughts. How we 
dream about virtuality manifests in our representations of the virtual. Therefore, a 
poetics of virtuality becomes vital, a treatment of the form and aesthetics of the 
virtual. 
This is not the first analysis of the virtual. Important research has been done by, 
for example, Michael Benedikt (1991), Howard Rheingold (1991), Michael Heim 
(1993), N. Katherine Hayles (1999), Sabine Heuser (2003), Lisbeth Klastrup 
(2003a), and André Nusselder (2009). Several of these investigations belong to a 
first wave of academic treatments on virtuality, mainly focused on understanding 
the cyberspace and virtual reality hype of the 80s and 90s.  Much has happened 
since then. We have left the concept of cyberspace behind. Instead we have seen 
the establishment of other implementations of the virtual, and indications of things 
to come. A revised poetics of virtuality is needed. 
How is virtuality represented in fiction? 
Not only is there a need for a general poetics of virtuality, but earlier work has also 
not given enough attention to fictional representations of virtuality. Larry McCaffery 
(1991), Brian McHale (1992), Sabine Heuser (2003), and Svante Lovén (2010) have 
made interesting contributions, but they are mostly limited to cyberpunk literature. 
A wider look at virtuality in mainstream culture and visual culture is needed. 
                                         
1 A phrase formulated by Father John Culkin, when he was writing about Marshall McLuhan 
(Culkin, 1967). 
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Therefore, I have studied how virtuality is portrayed primarily in fictional movies. 
The primary focus of my study is not real-life virtual worlds (such as computer 
games, virtual realities, or for example Second Life). Rather, the focus is on fictional 
representations of virtuality. A canonic example would be the virtual worlds 
depicted in movies such as The Matrix (Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999) and Tron 
(Lisberger, 1982). I have primarily studied movies, but included some literary texts 
as well. I have studied virtuality in fiction because in fictional narratives storytellers 
are more free to represent the virtual, and let cultural ideas emerge, untethered by 
the technical constraints that govern real-life virtuality technology. Fictional 
narratives are not “bound by technical difficulties” (Heuser, 2003, p.70). My aim is 
not to study virtuality per se; my aim is to study the dream of virtuality. What are we 
promised? What do we anticipate? What do we fear? The primary purpose of 
science fiction is not prediction (Määttä, 2010). On the contrary, the visions of the 
future in science fiction usually get it wrong, and that is interesting – in what way 
they get it wrong. In this poetics of virtuality, I will use science fiction studies as a 
means to an end. It is not a study of science fiction per se. It is a study of the 
dream of virtuality. 
Media and popular culture can be regarded as a mirror, reflecting our views, 
thoughts on and relationships to real life. By looking in the mirror, we can see how 
it reflects aspects of society and ourselves; what do we tell in our stories? What do 
we look at? Our cultural expressions – myths, arts, popular culture, and so on – can 
highlight our fears and our expectations. The mirror that we see through also 
changes while we are looking, through the act of looking through it. The interplay 
between fictional depiction of technology and real-life technical development is 
complex, and even though specific cases rarely can be identified, more subtle 
examples of inspiration are often claimed (Butz, Endres & Schmitz, 2008; Disch, 
1998; Flichy, 2007; Holmberg, 2010; Nilsson, 2010; Noessel & Shedroff, 2012). 
Oliver Grau (2001, p.227) claims that 
the history of technology has always included a history of its utopias and myths that 
reveal human desires, and serve to express proto-rational points of reference. Myths 
do not lose their relevance by virtue of being ancient. They are about how we view 
the world, and as such may be outside of ordinary time. They drive history. 
Specific influences are often illustrated by examples from mobile phone 
development (Butz, Endres & Schmitz, 2008; Watts, 2006; Watts, 2012) and how 
William Gibson’s vision of cyberspace inspired Internet visionaries and virtual 
reality developers (Flichy, 2007; Godhe, 2010a; Hayles, 1999; Laurel, 1993; Lovén, 
2010). Flichy (2007) mentions the “ideological framework within which emerging 
technologies evolve” (p.6) and Kearney (1998) describes how utopian visions can 
first disrupt traditional thinking and then our thinking “relaxes its critical guard, … 
its future images becoming just as dogmatic as the ideological images of the past it 
ostensibly seeks to dismantle” (p.167). My intention is to study these frameworks 
and ideological images, and my research question is therefore: 
•  How is virtuality represented in fiction, and what does that say about our 
anticipations and fears about what the virtual is and will be? 
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Poetics as an exploration of theory and practice 
The result of my work should be read as a poetics of virtuality. A poetics could be 
described as a theoretical treatment on a specific creative genre or art form, such as 
a poetics of poetry, drama, film or photography (Klastrup, 2003a; Laurel, 1993). 
The first and most influential poetics is the approximately 2 300 years old Poetics by 
Aristotle. Poetics relates to aesthetics (Bordwell, 2006; Klastrup, 2003a), and even 
though poetics and aesthetics are set apart they still tend to supplement each other, 
when one falls out of grace and becomes unpopular the other seems to take over 
(Hansson, 2004). The author of a poetics speaks about rules, forms and 
conventions, not in a prescriptive way (it does not tell you how to do movies, for 
example) but rather in a descriptive way, describing how a specific creative or 
artistic way of expression works (Bordwell, 2007; Klastrup, 2003a; Laurel, 1993). A 
poetics can be seen as an interface between theory and practice, and between art 
and craft. It is production focused, investigating processes as much as it 
investigates artifacts. The production process is studied, with a focus on the 
“choices within a craft tradition” that are made (Bordwell, 2007, p.15). The 
construction principles of media productions are analyzed, and not only the final 
artifact (Bordwell, 2006; Hansson, 2004). Practice is discussed from a theoretical 
and historical perspective (Bordwell, 2007). Aristotle’s Poetics was, as with most of 
his writing, quite practically oriented (House, 1956). However, it is not an account 
of how media artifacts are made. Rather, it is a theoretical reflection on the 
relationship between production and product (Russell, 2000). It “studies the 
finished work as the result of a process of construction” (Bordwell, 2007, p.12). 
Aristotle’s Poetics had the intention to see poetry as an integrated part of society, an 
art by which we are “educated and controlled” (House, 1956, p.21). The aim with a 
poetics of virtuality is to describe this educating and controlling connection. 
The delimitations of a specific poetics is often related to a genre, acknowledging 
the idea that each genre or each kind of artistic expression has a specific nature that 
can be described (Hansson, 2004). But a poetics can also relate to a specific media 
or mode of expression. For example, David Bordwell wrote a Poetics Of Cinema in 
2007, Tzvetan Todorov wrote The Poetics of Prose in 1971, and Boris Eikhenbaum 
edited the Russian formalist anthology Poetika Kino in 1927. Poetics does not deal 
with individual texts primarily; rather, it concerns “what literature can be rather 
than what it is” (Todorov, 1977, p.33). According to Bordwell (2007), a poetics can 
have three different objects of study: stylistics, narrative form, and thematic. The 
later “considers subject matter and themes as components of the constructive 
process”, and the researcher may study themes “as effects of constructive 
principles” (p.17). This poetics of virtuality is primarily thematic. 
Virtuality and the anticipation of transcendence 
Why is it important to study the virtual, and why now? It is important because it is 
a central part of an ancient and nowadays intense trend to rebuild both our 
environment and us. There are visionary discussions about the posthuman and the 
post-physical, ranging from skeptical sobriety to implausible futurism (Clark, 2003; 
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Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1993a; Hayles, 1993b; Hayles, 1999; Moravec, 1988). A 
common premise in this debate is that technology enables us to reshape ourselves, 
to evolve into something more or other than the traditionally human. 
Posthumanism anticipates a physical reshaping of the body by means of mechanical 
and electronic augmentation of the biological body or through rewriting our DNA 
code. But posthumanism can also call upon technologies that extend our mind 
non-physically. This non-physical extension anticipates our gradual move into the 
virtual, the post-physical. Are we re-building our environments and ourselves in 
profound ways, gradually removing ourselves from physical, material, actuality? 
One important aspect of this re-construction is the development of more and more 
advanced virtual environments and virtual representations of ourselves 
(Badmington, 2004; Hayles, 1999; Heuser, 2003; Hurley, 1995; Toffoletti, 2007). A 
posthuman viewpoint can be used to argue that our construction of a post-physical 
existence is one of the most profound steps in human evolution. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable and relevant to investigate our dreams and fantasies in relation to 
this post-physical existence. 
The following quote from Michael Benedikt (1991, p.131) illustrates a typical 
stance towards what is at stake in such an investigation, and the ideas that need to 
be critically investigated. 
The design of cyberspace is, after all, the design of another life-world, a parallel 
universe, offering the intoxicating prospect of actually fulfilling – with a technology 
very nearly achieved – a dream thousands of years old: the dream of transcending the 
physical world, fully alive, at will, to dwell in some Beyond – to be empowered or 
enlightened there, alone or with others, and to return. 
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BACKGROUND 
describing the origin and essence of virtuality 
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This chapter gives a background to the concept of virtuality and its 
history, as others have described it.  
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The virtual explained 
Virtuality is an elusive concept with multiple interpretations. Nowadays, virtuality 
has a distinct connection to computer technology, but virtuality also has deep 
historical connections to representation, philosophy and religion. Digital virtuality 
is related to cyberspace, virtual reality, digital, online, and virtual environments. 
Some of these concepts partially overlap; others have almost the same meaning. 
Others have fallen out of grace. The term cyberspace stands out specifically – once 
a hot promise of the future, now left behind, outdated (Guynup, 2002). 
Almost as if 
The word virtual, as well as the concept, has a complex origin, predating the 
current technological virtuality by hundreds of years. In everyday usage, the virtual 
is often opposed to reality, so that something is either real or virtual. But a more 
accurate description is needed where the virtual is a sub-set of the real. The modern 
literary meaning of the word virtual is almost as if. The American philosopher, 
logician, and mathematician Charles Peirce writes, “a virtual X … is something, not 
an X, which has the efficiency (virtus) of an X” (Peirce, 1902, p.763). Michael Heim 
(1993) defines virtual as “a philosophical term meaning ‘not actually but just as if’” 
(p.159). The virtual is not actual, but it has the essence of the actual. A virtual 
button on a touch display is almost a button. It looks like a button. It has the same 
function as a button. But it is not a button in the same sense that a material, 
physical button is. Even though this poetics of virtuality will discuss technical 
virtuality, the general concept of virtuality is an ontological property, and not a 
media or technology specific property (Friedberg, 2006). 
The essence of the virtual comes in different flavors, as in the example of a 
virtual button. A virtual button holds two aspects that mimic the actual: function 
and appearance. Turkle (1995) suggests that one step towards technical virtuality 
was the early development of graphical user interfaces (GUI’s) and the WIMP 
interaction (Windows, Icons, Menus, Pointer). Particularly the launch of the 
Macintosh interface introduced the concept of hiding the earlier, code-based 
command line interface behind an illusionary system of button, icons, sliders and 
such. The Macintosh interface introduced the desktop metaphor to a wider 
audience in 1984, and even though it was a flat representation of a simple desktop 
it can be seen as one of the first technical virtualities. The use of windows and how 
they could overlap created a partial depth for the virtual desktop (Friedberg, 2006; 
Mossberg, 2006). The digital transformed from lines of code to a spatial place. The 
virtual gave abstract code the appearance of something that it actually was not – a 
space. 
The virtual can be regarded as a model of the actual. A model is an abstract, 
simplified cutout of a segment of the actual (Johansson & Winter, 2009). Virtual 
reality and computer graphics started out as a simple simulation of the actual 
(Nusselder, 2009), and have since then radically evolved into more and more 
advanced virtual worlds, worlds in which complex models simulate gravity, 
collisions, perspective, light and shadow. But the model still only holds what we put 
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into it, the slice of the actual that we choose (Lanier, 2010). Gelernter (1992) 
compares a typical virtual world to a Zen garden, since the Zen garden is also 
conceived as a model of the real landscape. The model’s slice of the actual can have 
different scope. It can be monolithic, an object, such as the virtual button that has 
been discussed previously. You walk around such an object. The model can be a 
small environment, a worldlet, such as a single room or a building. You walk through 
an environment. And finally, it can be a full world, with a spatial extent that cannot 
be overviewed in its entirety and a complexity that mimics a universe. You walk in 
such a world. 
Virtual but with an actual effect 
The example with the virtual button illustrates that even if the virtual is mimicry to 
some degree, it can nevertheless have substantial effect. Failing to realize that the 
virtual can have actual effect was a common misunderstanding when the public 
started to explore simple virtualities such as MUD’s and online discussion forums. 
A general idea was that online was not real and therefore you were allowed to do 
anything; it was a lawless country, and whatever you did could not hurt people. The 
understanding of the contrary has slowly settled in, even though contemporary 
public debates about online harassing suggest that there is still an amount of 
unpreparedness concerning the fact that the virtual has a real effect. 
The way the virtual has actual effect is complex. As Jaron Lanier (2010) puts it: 
“guns are real in a way that computers are not” (p.27). A virtual bullet can’t kill you, 
but a hacker can empty your bank account. It is not that causality is missing 
between the virtual and the actual, but that causalities are different. Michael Heim 
(1993) goes quite far in claiming that the virtual has real effect, even using it as one 
of the characteristics of virtual, writing that “virtual reality is an event or entity that 
is real in effect but not in fact” (p.108). One reason why the virtual has an effect is 
that it is experience related, and that it concerns how people relate to each other. If 
someone behaves offensively or dismissively online, the experience is similar to 
being offended or dismissed in a face-to-face situation. This is related to the 
phenomenological stance provided by Merleau-Ponty (1962, p.337) that our 
experience is always true from an internal viewpoint.2 
Everything is, then, truth within consciousness. There can never be illusion other 
than with regard to the external object. A feeling, considered in itself, is always true 
once it is felt. 
He illustrates this with the emotion of love. Lisbeth Klastrup (2003a) and Sherry 
Turkle (1995) discuss the phenomenological experience of love and sex as well, but 
in relation to events in the virtual, and they bring up the matter of abuse and 
infidelity. Can you be raped online? Can you be unfaithful online? Is cybersex 
similar to actual, physical sex? Janet Murray (1997) discusses kissing and infidelity in 
the context of the fictional holodeck virtuality in the TV series Star Trek: The Next 
                                         
2 Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that emphasizes that we experience the world 
while being embodied in it, and that we can never analyze the world from an outside. 
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Generation. Turkle describe the different attitudes concerning this based on her 
interviews with early online users of chat rooms and online forums. It seems clear 
that most people experience an actual effect – an actual sense of being cheated – 
when their spouse has engaged in online infidelity. Turkle asks if infidelity is an 
event “in the head or in the body” (1995, p.225)? Knudsen (2004) reports “a 
symbolic kiss between two physically separated extended bodies was found to be 
perceived as having the same significance as a real kiss by the participants” (p.44). 
This illustrates how the virtual has an effect on the actual. The observation that 
abstract and immaterial models or concepts can have strong effects on the actual is 
not unique for the virtual. Consider for example economics. Even though most of 
the world economy is an abstract game of moving representational values back and 
forth it nevertheless has very severe effects on our lives. Several academics have 
suggested that economy can be regarded as a kind of virtuality (Bryant & Pollock, 
2010; Baudrillard, 2002; Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007; Nusselder, 2009), but 
economics is quite different from the technical virtuality that I will discuss. Most 
importantly it lacks the interaction with a user and the simulated spatiality, and if 
we included economics in the discussion the scope would be heavy-handedly broad 
and confusingly diffuse. 
The etymological roots of virtual and cyberspace 
The contemporary meaning of virtual is quite new. The word and the concept have 
come together quite recently, but both the word and the concept have roots that 
stretch far back into antiquity. The word virtual has its origin from the Latin virtus, 
meaning skills, power, agency, and efficiency (Friedberg, 2006; Klastrup, 2003a; 
Mossberg, 2006; Willim, 2006b). The word virility shares the same origin. 
The thirteenth century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas used virtual 
(virtualis continentia) as an equivalent to Aristotle’s potentiality, as in how a seed 
contains the essence, the potential, of a plant. The plant is so to speak virtually 
present in the seed. This usage of the word virtual opens up for the meaning it has 
today. According to Heim (1993), the contemporary meaning of virtual – almost as if 
– emerges in the thirteenth century in the writing of philosopher John Duns Scott. 
In 1938, the poet, playwright and surrealist Antonin Artaud combined the words 
virtual and reality for the first time in his essay The Alchemical Theater, forming the 
phrase “la réalité virtuelle” to describe the illusion of theater (Artaud, 1958). The 
phrase virtual reality appears again in 1982, this time in Damien Broderick’s science 
fiction novel The Judas Mandala. The phrase entered mainstream consciousness a 
few years later when virtual reality pioneer Jaron Lanier used it in the late 1980s to 
describe the then emerging technology with head mounted displays and data glows. 
This established the popular, contemporary meaning of virtual reality; the 
technology that is used to experience virtual environments through immersive 
projection and 3d tracking. 
Another word that stretches back into antiquity is cyber. It comes from the Greek 
word kybernan referring to steersman, pilot or rudder, and today the term 
cybernetics refers to control of complex systems. Norbert Wiener introduced it in 
its contemporary meaning in 1948 in his book Cybernetics: Or Control and 
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Communication in the Animal and the Machine, where he formulated cybernetics and its 
theories on feedback and regulatory systems (he actually borrowed the word from 
the French mathematician André-Marie Ampère who used the term cybernetique a 
hundred years earlier, in 1845). In cybernetics, feedback between different parts of 
a system is seen as a flow of information, which means that information and 
communication become tightly connected to the control of information flows 
(Hayles, 1999). Cybernetics joins biology and technology since they both can be 
part of the feedback flow of information and control. William Gibson coined the 
term cyberspace in 1982, the same year that Broderick used virtual reality. Both of 
these phrases became catchwords during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Eventually 
they became inflated and started to dissolve into all sorts of pop culture 
connotations, and academics scrambled to escape from the overblown hype of the 
word itself (Laurel, 1993). Cyberspace became more or less equivalent to the 
Internet. During the 1990s, the need for fresh concepts (and a shift in focus to 
online communities and online games) initiated the emergence of new phrases such 
as virtual communities, virtual environments and virtual worlds (Guynup, 2002; Klastrup, 
2003a; van Dijk, 1997). 
The term virtuality is credited to Theodore Nelson who used it in 1980 to 
describe the design of interactive software. Nelson (1980, p.56) describes it as 
follows: 
By the virtuality of a thing I mean the seeming of it, as distinct from its more 
concrete "reality," which may not be important. ... I use the term "virtual" in its 
traditional sense, an opposite of "real". 
The “seeming of” is close enough to Peirce’s “almost as if” and the idea that the 
virtual has the appearance of reality. However, there are problems with how 
Nelson describes the virtuality. The virtual should be seen as a subset of reality, and 
not opposed to reality. Since Nelson first used the term virtuality, the meaning has 
diversified, and I will use it in the sense of meaning of a virtual environment or 
virtual object. 
Virtuality – a definition 
The general meaning of virtual as almost as if is the starting point for the definition I 
will use in this poetics of virtuality. The technical virtuality that I have studied could 
be defined as follows. 
Technical virtuality is a technology-sustained simulation of perceptual and spatial 
presence. 
In the following I will discuss different aspects of this definition, starting with a 
historical retrospect over non-technical proto-virtualities, eventually arriving at the 
modern technical virtuality. 
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Previous studies of virtuality 
This is a short presentation of the scholars that I will primarily relate to in my 
poetics. They are ordered chronologically based on the publication year of their 
most important work concerning virtuality. 
•  Michael Benedikt, at the University of Texas at Austin School of Architecture, 
edited one of the first influential anthologies on cyberspace in 1991, Cyberspace: 
First Steps. He makes a theoretical proposal for building cyberspace 
architecture, claiming that cyberspace is a whole new universe to build and live 
in. Similar to Heim and Nusselder, he connects cyberspace to religion and an 
ancient desire of transcendence. My poetics of virtuality does not build directly 
on Benedikt; rather his work is included as a steppingstone in the evolution of 
our ideas of the virtual. 
•  Larry McCaffery and Veronica Hollinger edited Storming the Reality Studio: A 
Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodernism in 1991, a collection of writings about 
cyberspace and cyberpunk. Hollinger’s Cybernetic Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and 
Postmodernism discusses science fiction studies, posthumanism and 
postmodernism.  These texts have helped me understand the cyberpunk genre. 
•  Michael Heim’s 1993 book The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality describes virtuality 
and its characteristics in a comprehensive manner, connecting virtuality to 
religion, transcendence, the city, and philosophers such as Leibniz and Plato. 
He lists seven essences of virtual reality, such as immersion and interaction. In 
the chapter The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace he suggests that users of technology 
have a strong drive to merge with technology. My own poetics of virtuality 
builds on Heim’s philosophical view of virtuality. 
•  Sherry Turkle does research on social and psychological aspects of our 
relationship with and through information technology. In Life on the Screen 
from 1995 she puts a human and social perspective on the virtual, partly based 
on interviews with people using MUDs. She pioneered the idea that the virtual 
is just another layer of reality, and that we inhabit the virtual and thereby 
construct stories together. Turkle’s description of online communities and 
computer game worlds is an important track running parallel to my own more 
general poetics of virtuality. 
•  N. Katherine Hayles is an American postmodern literary critic. How We Became 
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics from 1999 
discusses the posthuman, cyborgs and our relationship to information 
technology, affording a general social context to my own writings on virtuality. 
•  Sabine Heuser, at Phillips University Marburg in German, wrote the book 
Virtual geographies: cyberpunk at the intersection of the postmodern and science fiction in 
2003, presenting a thorough analysis of the cyberpunk genre in general and the 
idea of cyberspace specifically. She shares my focus on William Gibson’s 
writings, and my poetics expounds upon her analysis of Gibson’s fiction. 
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•  Lisbeth Klastrup is a Danish scholar of new media, who studies the emergence 
of stories in multi-user game worlds. Similar to Turkle, Klastrup focuses on 
real-life virtual worlds and how they are used from a social and storytelling 
perspective, especially concerning online gaming and worldliness. In 2003, 
Klastrup defended her PhD thesis Towards a Poetics of Virtual Worlds – Multi-
User Textuality and the Emergence of Story, a work that parallels my own poetics. 
•  André Nusselder is currently at the University of Amsterdam, and in his book 
Interface Fantasy from 2009 he uses Lacanian psychoanalysis to investigate 
virtuality. I will not follow his psychoanalytical investigations, but similar to 
Heim he connects virtuality to religion and an ancient desire to create illusions, 
and he also discusses the virtual as an immaterial, mental realm. 
•  Svante Lovén has been at the University of Gävle, Sweden. In his 2010 book, 
Also Make the Heavens: Virtual Realities in Science Fiction, he thoroughly analyses 
illusion and virtual reality in science fiction literature. He deals with twentieth 
century science fiction up to and including William Gibson’s Neuromancer. 
Lovén’s work and my poetics complement each other well, since I have mostly 
focused on science fiction from William Gibson and later, and on science 
fiction movies. 
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The first virtualities 
Before discussing modern technical virtualities we will look back more than two 
millennia and consider the long history of proto-virtualities. To a big extent this is 
the history of visual illusions, since these technologies and concepts eventually 
evolved into contemporary full-fledged virtuality. It is also the history of a long 
period of striving for a post-physical existence. 
In his Allegory of the Cave, Plato envisioned that the material world had an 
underlying mechanics, the perfect world of forms and ideas.3 The idea is that 
material objects are mere shadows of the perfect forms that exist at another level of 
existence. Some aspects of this theory of forms remind us of our contemporary 
virtuality, a level of existence that is immaterial or intangible, and based on forms 
and ideas.4 Plato’s theory of forms is just one example of a range of similar ideas. 
Pythagoras, predating Plato (he lived circa 570-495 BC), reasoned that mathematics 
governed material reality, and that the essence of reality lay in immaterial numbers 
(Wertheim, 1999). Such ideas developed into the concept of the music of the 
spheres and fueled Johannes Kepler’s fruitless attempts (two thousand years later) 
to describe the structure and movements of the solar system by imagining celestial 
spheres and other geometrical shapes as the underlying structure. 
Erik Davis (1998) has described what he calls techgnosis, a general connection 
between religious myths and information technology concepts. The connection 
between virtuality and an ancient desire for post-physical transcendence has been 
emphasized (Benedikt, 1991; Crang, Crang & May, 1999; Farnell, 1998; de Fren, 
2009; Grau 2001; Hayles, 1993b; Klastrup, 2003a; Laurel, 1993; Nusselder, 2009; 
Pope, 2008; Rheingold, 1991; Wertheim, 1999), and cyber-gnosis, the idea of 
escaping into cyberspace, is the latest incarnation of this desire. Benedikt (1991) 
claims that cyberspace is the continuation of thousand of years of magic, myth and 
legend – our “desire to will the world into action” (p.226). Characteristics that are 
shared by both religious transcendence and posthuman transcendence are 
immortality, hostility towards the body and the longing for another existence 
(Fielding, 2009). Christianity has had a strong tendency to “deny the world and 
denounce the body”, just as some cyberspace evangelists do (Slouka, 1995, p.21).5 
                                         
3 In his dialogue The Republic from around 380 BC. Lovén claims this is “the first fictional text 
that explores the notion of an artificial or virtual reality” (Svante, 2010, p.32). 
4 It is common to connect Plato’s cave with virtual reality. However, Plato was highly skeptical 
towards poetry imitating and rivaling the actual, and would probably have been highly skeptical 
towards virtuality. According to Plato, the actual world is a copy of the world of form, and 
therefore poetry (representations) is two steps removed from truth (House, 1956). Plato’s cave 
concerns the nature of reality, suggesting that there is a hidden mechanism we don’t see. Many 
similar ideas of hidden mechanisms have been suggested, from Renee Descartes evil demon 
(Erion & Smith, 2002) to Hilary Putnam’s brain in a vat (Putnam, 1981). Indirectly these ideas 
connect Plato’s cave with the plot of movies such as The Matrix, where the hidden mechanism 
proves to be a simulated virtual world, pretending to be the actual world, thus imprisoning 
humans. 
5 However, Wertheim (1999) claims that medieval Christianity did not hold contempt towards the 
physical body. 
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In religion, the belief in the supernatural offers the promise of an immortal soul 
and a heaven. In technocratic posthumanism, the hope is justified by the belief that 
a perfect scan of our brains would provide us with digital souls that could live 
forever in the virtual. 
Michael Benedikt (1991) has expounded on the concept of the Heavenly City, 
connecting it with cyberspace urbanity and conceptual architecture. The Heavenly 
City has become “a religious vision of cyberspace” (p.16). His argument is that 
there has been an established image of the radiant city in Western culture, first in 
religion, then in science fiction, and conceptual architecture. Thus he envisions 
how a cadre of cyberspace architects will scramble to build visionary and 
conceptual post-physical architecture in cyberspace. He claims that the image of 
many religious or fictional cityscapes share common attributes: weightlessness, 
radiance, cleanliness, and palaces upon palaces. Wertheim (1999) also mentions 
weightlessness and radiance as common attributes for both the Heavenly City and 
cyberspace. With the help of 3d modeling and virtual reality, we can now create 
buildings that are truly immaterial. The facades of such buildings literally have no 
thickness and construction details such as nails and joints are not needed (Mitchell, 
1998). But, cyberspace architects have not shown up to the extent that Benedikt 
predicted. Designers of online computer game worlds came instead, and in most 
cases the landscapes and cityscapes of these worlds are surprisingly conventional, as 
pointed out by Frances Dyson (1998), Andrew Vande Moere (1998), Margaret 
Wertheim (1999), as well as Janet Murray (1997). From the medieval towns of 
World of Warcraft to the American city clones of Grand Theft Auto there is an 
apparent lack of imagination. A minority of computer games step away from this 
pattern of merely exaggerating real world architecture (Klastrup, 2003a). The game 
environments in Ilomilo, Fez, Volume and the Time Trail mode in Mirror’s Edge are 
examples of abstract environments with geometrical, floating structures. In the 
fictive short story True Names, Vernor Vinge (1981) writes about the “romantic 
convenience” of using magic spells instead of computer code commands in the 
virtual world of the story. This fantasy inspired aspect of the virtual world becomes 
a representation for the different actions that can be taken. The familiar and old-
fashioned (magic spells) are pulled in front of the new and foreign (computer 
code), as an interface. Similar romantic conveniences are often seen in real-life 
software, referred to as skeuomorphism (Hayles, 1999). Virtual objects such as 
buttons, knobs and surfaces imitate the look of the actual objects, even though 
their function might be to send a command, change a value or filter data output. 
Our design of post-physical existence seems to have a tendency to re-create 
conventional, physical existence. 
A history of illusions – from cave paintings to virtual reality 
Technical virtuality has two foundations: the technical construction of illusion as 
well as simulation, and the philosophical framework that describes this simulation 
as another existence. Both foundations have deep roots. The desire to create 
illusions, especially the illusion of presence, is ancient (Biocca, 1997; Mossberg, 
2006; Murray, 1997; Nusselder, 2009; Robinett, 1992; Svante, 2010). The 
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development of computer graphics was instrumental in enabling the immersive 
technologies we have today, but the first steps were analog. Making images is a 
truly ancient technology, stretching back at least 30,000 years. During most of these 
30,000 years, our ability to generate images and illusions was highly limited, and it 
was only recently that our abilities to create advanced and realistic imagery really 
came unbound. 
Renaissance painting saw extensive development in our image making 
capabilities, largely helped by the invention of methods to construct perspective in 
images. Wertheim (1999) mentions Giotto di Bondone as one of the most 
important painters who tried to simulate physical space. It became very popular in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century to create trompe-l’œil paintings, and the intent 
was often to convey technical mastery (Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007). The 
invention of perspective enabled the trend of constructing painted architecture, an 
early imaginary, virtual architecture (Liljefors, 2006). The walls of physical rooms 
were decorated with paintings that created the illusion of false portals into other 
imaginary rooms, or windows looking out across imaginary landscapes. One of the 
most well known examples is the Sala delle Prospettive painted in 1515 by 
Baldassare Peruzzi, in the Villa Farnesina. A common type of illusionary painting in 
more public spaces is the ceiling panorama of Baroque churches that were popular 
in the sixteenth century. One of the first ceiling panoramas is the faked oculus 
(circular opening) in the Camera degli Sposi, in the Italian Ducal Palace, painted 
between 1465 and 1474 by Andrea Mategna (Grau, 2003). 
These painting techniques eventually evolved into the 360-degree panoramic 
murals of the nineteenth century, which became especially popular in the 1860s. 
The first such panorama display was opened for the public at Leicester Square in 
London, 1793. An ingeniously constructed room with walls covered by realistic 
paintings gave the impression of being surrounded by an actual environment, based 
on a perspective drawing technique patented in 1787 by Robert Barker (Grau, 
2003; Liljefors, 2006; Lovén, 2010). These panoramas attracted a large number of 
visitors, and poised as they were just before the invention of cinema it was a way to 
experience art “from within” (Ljungar-Chapelon, 2008, p.34).6 The panoramas were 
usually public entertainment facilities since the panoramas and the buildings that 
housed them were expensive to build. The military showed some interest in the 
capability of depicting landscapes, and this military interest for convincing 
depictions continued during the twentieth century and into the development of 
computer graphics. After the panoramas of the nineteenth century came 
astronomical planetariums, and planetariums later evolved into Omnimax theaters. 
Planetariums and Omnimax theaters provide immersive illusions, but it is 
nevertheless unreasonable to consider them to be proper virtual reality. The 
interaction is severely limited, and this as well as the seating arrangement makes for 
                                         
6 The idea of enclosing the viewer in an illusion actually predates the nineteenth century 
panoramas, going back to examples such as Villa dei Misteri in Pompeii from about 60 years 
B.C., and to Chambre du Cerf from 1343, with its painted scenery covering the walls of a whole 
room (Grau, 2003). 
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a lean-back, cinematic experience, and not the lean-forward, interactive experience 
of virtual reality. 
The gap in time and technology between the panoramas of the nineteenth 
century and the virtual reality of the twentieth century was bridged by different 
constructions that gradually pushed the capabilities of immersive simulations. 
Examples include the Stereopticon (1894), Cineorama (1900), and Cinerama (1939), 
all being different attempts to project still images or moving images in an 
immersive environment (Grau, 2003). Parallel with these practical construction 
attempts, theoretical proposals were published in the early twentieth century, asking 
for an evolution of theater into a more immersive and interactive form. The 
futurist painter and scenographer Enrico Prampolini suggested a polydimensional 
stage in 1924, the photographer and Bauhaus professor László Moholy-Nagy 
suggested a Totaltheater in his 1924 essay Theater, Zirkus, Variete, and Walter 
Gropius, one of the founders of Bauhaus, suggested a similar idea in 1927. Another 
parallel development towards immersive illusions came via the camera – when the 
recording media of the photosensitive emulsion was invented, photography and 
then cinema were born. However, even if cinema shares some illusionary aspects 
with virtual reality, it is a different cultural phenomena (Lavery, 2001). Both 
simulate events and experiences, but the virtual offers levels of interaction and 
immersion that surpas that of cinema. 
The Sensorama by Morton Heilig was a mechanical, analog simulator built in 
1962. As early as 1955, Heilig had published plans for this experience theater, as he 
called it (Grau, 2003; Rheingold, 1991), acknowledging the task theater has had for 
centuries in providing “multisensory illusionist effects” (Svante, 2010, p.13). Heilig 
also patented, in 1960, an idea for a head mounted display with small TV screens 
for each eye. The Sensorama resembled an arcade game with its seat, handles, and a 
canopy enveloping the head of the user. Inside, a stereographic movie projection 
was combined with sound, smell and touch in an attempt to create an experience 
of, for example, taking a bicycle ride. It was intended as an entertainment device for 
arcade halls, contrasting with the military application that the first actual virtual 
reality displays would have. Rheingold has speculated (1991) that if Morten Heilig 
had succeeded, virtual reality could have been entertainment driven decades earlier. 
But Heilig was not skilled in computer technology, which might have contributed 
to Sensorama becoming a dead-end. The development of computer graphics in 
general and virtual reality specifically during the twentieth century instead came to 
be mostly driven by the military industry, with occasional alliances with art and 
entertainment (Grau, 2003; Lovén, 2010; Rheingold, 1991). 
The development of computer graphics 
The pre-digital attempts to construct analog virtual reality were clumsy and limited 
in their capabilities. It was digital technology, computers, which put the 
development of technical virtuality on a fast track. Virtual reality is strongly 
dependent on the visual, and thus on the development of computer graphics. Much 
of the early research – from the 1950s to the 1980s – on computer graphics and 
later on virtual reality was funded, just as the Internet, by the American military via 
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DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Crogan, 2010; 
Rheingold, 1991; Taylor, 2004). This militaristic background comes in contradiction 
to the idealistic development of the personal computer and its associations with 
counterculture. These three paths of development – computer graphics, the 
Internet and the personal computer – were to a large extent taking place in San 
Francisco, the city that also became the apex of the counterculture movement. 
Early work in interactive computer graphics and virtual reality was also taking place 
at the University of Utah (Hafner & Lyon, 1996), and on the American East coast, 
primarily at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where Ivan Sutherland wrote 
Sketchpad, a revolutionary graphical drawing software (Grau, 2003; Rheingold, 
1991). The developments in computer graphics and virtual reality were quite 
militaristic and utilitarian and it was not until much later – one milestone being 
when Pixar launched Toy Story in 1995 – that the engagement between 
entertainment and computer graphics became solid. Despite this, artists-in-
residence and technicians-turned-into-artists performed early experiments with 
computer art. They used mainframe computers that they where granted access to 
(Kerman, 1992), establishing a troublesome alliance between “capitalistic 
instruments of war” and art (Montfort et al., 2012, p.139). Charles Csuri – maybe 
the most influential of the early computer artists – started his computer graphics 
work in 1964. During the 1960s, many others artists and technicians experimented 
with geometrical shapes, procedural processes and linear art using computers, for 
example John Whitney, Pierre Hebert, Herbert Franke, and William Fetter. Early 
computer art was conceptualized as an exploration of a new frontier, a new world 
(Taylor, 2004). Computer artists saw the virtual as a frontier even before the 
Internet opened up what came to be thought of as a lawless, frontier land similar to 
the Wild West of North American history. These artists also expressed a rather 
anti-authorial stance. The experimentation with randomness that several early 
computer artists engaged in can be thought of as a reaction against the 
industrialism, rationality and empiricism they saw in modernism, the Industrial Age 
and in the two World Wars (Montfort et al., 2012). 
Another development was the first computer games. These were the fruits of 
creative spare-time work in the military funded computer graphics research labs, 
just as early computer art was. Spacewar! was made in 1962 by Stephen Russell, 
Martin Graetz and Wayne Wiitanen at MIT (Klastrup, 2003a).7 A decade later – in 
1972 – the well-known and likewise ultra-stylized Pong was built by Nolan Bushnell 
and it is now heralded as the ancestor of modern computer games. 
Yet another development was the first usage of computer graphics in movies. A 
precursor was the title sequence of Vertigo from 1958, which used analog computer 
graphics – a kind of oscilloscope effect made by Saul Bass and John Whitney. The 
first use of digital computer graphics came in Westworld from 1971 and the first 
three-dimensional computer graphics in Futureworld from1976. One year after, Star 
Wars premiered (1977) and stylized computer graphics – glowing lines on black 
                                         
7 Klastrup (2003a) brings up a claim from Steven Poole (2000) that William Higginbotham had 
created a two-player tennis computer game in 1958. 
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bottom – illustrated the rebels’ attack on the Death Star space station. The movie 
was a milestone in applying computer graphics in movie making. Gradually, graphic 
rendering capabilities evolved and enabled shaded surfaces, self-shadowing and 
more complex and organic shapes. Tron (1982) was a tour de force for several of 
the largest companies in the budding computer graphics industry with its lengthy 
and numerous 3d animation sequences (Montfort et al., 2012). Commercial 
applications of computer graphics at the start of the 1980s were otherwise highly 
geared towards short commercials and in 1985 the seminal Sexy Robot commercial 
was broadcasted, boosting character animation using a rotomation technique, 
smooth shadows and shining specular highlights (Flueckiger, 2008). The future of 
modern, spectacular 3d animation could be glimpsed in the feminine movements of 
this gleaming robot. 
The development of virtual reality 
The development of virtual reality – interactive, immersive computer graphics – 
was initiated in the late 1960s by Scott Fisher and Ivan Sutherland at MIT, and by 
Tom Furness at the US Air Force (Benedikt, 1991; Grau, 2003; Rheingold, 1991). 
Another pioneer was Myron Kreuger, who also did work as a computer artist 
specializing in interactive installations. Kreuger experimented with wall projections 
that immersed the user and the concept was later developed into the CAVE virtual 
reality system. Sutherland took another path: the head-mounted display (HMD). 
The head-mounted display have its roots in the 1960 proposal, by cinematographer 
and multimedia specialist Morten Heilig, to put small TV monitors in front of both 
eyes of the user. A fundamental component, missing in Heilig’s proposal, was 
added in the late 1960s; head tracking was developed, which made it possible for 
the user to look around in different directions in the virtual reality environment. 
Sutherland realized this idea as actual hardware in 1968 when he led a team of 
researchers at MIT in the construction of the gangly Sword of Damocles. A 
competing head-mounted display was first used in 1970, at the University of Utah 
by Daniel Vickers, who claims that the first virtual object he displayed was a 
wireframe cube (Marenka & Watkins, 1994; Rheingold, 1991). 
Since these early steps, virtual reality has remained mostly confined to research 
labs and advanced product development, initially deemed as being too expensive 
and with a quite narrow range of applications. Not even gaming applications have 
caught market shares, but it might be that the launch of the low-price Oculus Rift 
will change this and bring virtual reality goggles to the broad public. In the 1990s, 
different attempts were made to implement a simpler version of virtual reality: 
desktop VR. Desktop VR uses conventional computer screens and allows only 
limited movement through a spatial environment or the rotation of an on-screen 
virtual object. The typical application was a display of merchandize at web shops, 
ranging from wristwatches to cars. In the 1990s, desktop VR was usually displayed 
using web browsers with browser plug-ins such as QuicktimeVR, Shout3D and 
Cult3D. At this time, the VRML mark-up language was developed and promised to 
be for 3d Web what HTML was for the Internet, a common protocol for 
constructing virtual environments. The primary application of the first 
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environments built on VRML was educational or social, and even if the VRML 
language became quite abandoned, the early worlds eventually evolved into Active 
Worlds and Second Life, and finally the computer game worlds of today. Advocators 
of VRML envisioned how the World Wide Web would become a three-
dimensional environment, the 3d web, transforming the flat sheet of web pages 
into spaces, and places, essentially the cyberspace that William Gibson described. 
But, this has not yet come to be. From a usability and interaction design viewpoint 
there are good arguments for why the user in most cases do not need the third 
dimension, and why it usually makes the interface more difficult to use (Nielsen, 
1998; Nielsen, 2006). It might be that the vision of a 3d Web will remain confined 
to the science fiction stories of William Gibson for a long time.  
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Popularizing cyberspace 
On June 25th, 1982 the feature film Blade Runner was released in the US. William 
Gibson went to the cinema to see it. Gibson was then an upcoming writer, having 
succeeded in getting a few short stories published, and he was working on his first 
novel. Allegedly, he leaves the cinema without seeing the movie to the end. The 
claimed reason is that the fictional world he saw in the movie reminded him so 
much of the atmosphere and settings of his coming novel, that he was afraid of 
being too deeply influenced by this competing vision (Heuser, 2003; Landon, 1992; 
Tatsumi, 1986). 
Gibson continued working on his novel, and at the Armadillo Con in October 
1982 he read the opening chapter of his work-in-progress. The novel Neuromancer 
was published almost two years later, on July 1st, 1984. It became one of the 
canonical works of the cyberpunk genre, and became widely known for being the 
novel where Gibson popularized cyberspace. The first occurrence of cyberspace 
was actually in Gibson’s short story Burning Chrome, published two year before 
Neuromancer. The word cyberspace is used only once, describing the console that 
the hackers use as a “cyberspace seven”, and the virtual environment itself is 
referred to as “the matrix”. The canonical status of Neuromancer gives the 
appearance that Gibson’s ideas were unprecedented, but of course he built on 
previous works and real-life technologies. In an interview (Gross, 1989) he 
describes his influences. 
So that rather than having to look at a television set and put on the earphones, you 
simply plug yourself into something that makes you feel that you’re in the 
environment that the media producer has generated. So taking that as a given, and 
that’s an old idea from science fiction, in the fifties they called that ‘feelies’ in science 
fiction. Taking that as a given, I’ve coupled that with computer technology to try to 
imagine a world in which computer operators enter into what I’ve only ever been 
able to describe as a ‘consensual hallucination’. 
The feelies he refers to comes from Aldous Huxley who vaguely hints at an 
immersive, multisensory recording technology in his Brave New World (1932). That 
novel was published in 1932, fifty years before Burning Chrome. 
In interviews, Gibson has also claimed that he was inspired by watching teenage 
gamers at arcade halls (Csicsery-Ronay, 1992; McHale, 1992; Turkle, 1995), as well 
as a poster advertisement for an Apple IIc, and a conversation he had heard about 
“something ... called the Internet” (Wallace-Wells, 2011, p.217). Turkle (1985) 
offers the following description from Gibson of how he was inspired into creating 
the concept of cyberspace (p.265): 
Video games weren’t something I’d done much, and I’d have been embarrassed to 
actually go into these arcades because everyone was so much younger than I was, but 
when I looked into one, I could see in the physical intensity of their postures how 
rapt these kids were. It was like one of those closed systems out of a Pynchon novel: 
you had this feedback loop, with photons coming off the screen into the kids’ eyes, 
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the neurons moving through their bodies, electrons moving through the computer. 
And these kids clearly believed in the space these games projected. 
Here the concepts forming the word cyberspace – cybernetic (feedback loop) and 
space – connect to the arcade hall. The arcade hall was also the inspiration that 
director Steven Lisberger has claimed he had for the movie Tron. Gibson has also 
mentioned The Shockwave Rider, a 1975 novel by John Bruner about a computer 
hacker, as inspiration (Whittle, 1996). 
Science fiction has a “long tradition of questioning the fundamental nature of 
reality” (Gunn, 2003, p.73), and the concept of cyberspace actually had precursors 
in different stories, especially in the short story True Names by Vernor Vinge (1981) 
(Hayles, 1993b; Wertheim, 1999), in Web of Angels by John Milo Ford from 1980, 
and The Veldt by Ray Bradbury (1950). The latter is mentioned as predecessor by 
Gibson himself in an interview (Wallace-Wells, 2011). Svante Lovén (2001; 2010) 
thoroughly accounts for three sets of precursors to Gibson’s cyberspace narrative. 
•  Dystopias investigating the implications of magical artificial realms – Torquato 
Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered from 1575 and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene 
from 1589.8 Lovén describes Jerusalem Delivered and The Faerie Queene as “the 
first texts in Western literature which consider the multi-sensory illusion or 
imitation as inherently problematic” (2010, p.43). 
•  Physical counterfeit environments – J. K. Huysmans’ À Rebours (Against nature, 
from 1884), and Frederik Pohl’s The Tunnel Under the World from 1955. 
•  Virtual environments assumed to be created by if not computers then at least 
some electronic device – E.M. Forster’s The Machine Stops from 1909, Laurence 
Manning and Fletcher Pratt’s City of the Living Dead from 1930, James Gunn’s 
Name Your Pleasure from 1954, Daniel Galouye’s Simulacron-3 from 1964, and 
John Varley’s Overdrawn at the Memory Bank from 1976. 
Philip Dick is best mentioned on his own due to his extensive investigation of 
political, religious and philosophical implications of simulations and simulacra. 
Dick is often vague with technical explanations, sometimes referring to drugs as a 
means of creating the illusions, which emphasizes that the simulated worlds he 
describes are a plot device, and not a theme in itself. These stories by Dick include 
Eye in the Sky from 1957, Time Out of Joint from 1959, The Three Stigmata of Palmer 
Eldritch from 1964, UBIK from 1968, A Maze of Death from 1971, Flow My Tears, the 
Policeman Said from 1974 and I hope I shall arrive soon from 1979. Most of these 
predate public awareness of computers, and therefore their depictions of 
simulations are mostly inspired by television (Lovén, 2001). 
Many of the stories mentioned by Lovén – most notably À Rebours, City of the 
Living Dead, The Machine Stops, and Name Your Pleasure – feature more or less explicit 
warnings about being trapped in illusion and rejecting nature and body, themes that 
still prevail in modern texts (Willim, 2006a). Movies such as The Matrix borrow 
                                         
8 Note how these artificial realms are explained by magic, since at the time of these writings there 
existed no technology to create them, not even imaginary technology. 
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many themes and tropes from these pre-cyberpunk novels and short stories. 
However, two aspects that made both True Names and Neuromancer revolutionary at 
the start of the 1980s were how they depicted a computer network as a spatial 
environment, and how the artificiality was neither an imprisonment nor an attempt 
to simulate the actual world. The cyberspace that Gibson envisioned instead 
“announces its artificiality” (Lovén, 2010, p.189). 
What is cyberspace? In the short story Burning Chrome, Gibson explains it as 
an abstract representation of the relationships between data systems. Legitimate 
programmers jack into their employers' sector of the matrix and find themselves 
surrounded by bright geometries representing the corporate data. Towers and fields 
of it ranged in the colorless non- space of the simulation matrix, the electronic 
consensus hallucination that facilitates the handling and exchange of massive 
quantities of data. 
The explanation is essentially the same in Gibson’s novel Neuromancer, repeating the 
term “consensual hallucination”. This fictional cyberspace was gradually 
reconceptualized when academics and the general public started to adopt the 
concept (Grau, 2003; Klastrup, 2003a), and Gibson’s fictional ideas inspired real-
life work on virtual reality and the Internet (Hayles, 1993b; Hayles, 1999; Willim, 
2006a). Benedikt (1991) reformulated Gibson’s description into a less poetic, more 
precise interpretation of what cyberspace became: “a globally networked, 
computer-sustained, computer accessed, and computer-generated, 
multidimensional, artificial, or ‘virtual’ reality” (p.122). Nusselder (2009) calls 
cyberspace “the mental realm of the human-computer interface that turns us into 
cyborgs” (p.5), and continues to define it as “the ‘electronic space’ that came into 
existence during the 1960s through a joining together of various computer 
networks” (p.11). It is characteristic that these cyberspace descriptions emphasize 
the network, thus including both the Internet and virtual reality. This echoes the 
anticipations for the 3d Web that were apparent during the 1990s. Gibson’s 
fictional cyberspace was adopted as a term for the budding Internet (Flichy, 2007). 
This is an important difference between cyberspace and virtuality. Virtuality is not 
directly associated with the Internet, even though the Internet plays an important 
factor in some virtual worlds such as in massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games. 
Gibson himself has described the term cyberspace as an “evocative and 
essentially meaningless” buzzword (Neale, 2000, at 55:07) and claims that its actual 
invention was quick and serendipitous. He started out with the term infospace but 
tried other variants since he wanted a catchier phrase (Heuser, 2003; Wallace-Wells, 
2011). In the poetic essay Academic Leader (published in Benedikt, 1991, p.27), 
Gibson writes: 
Assembled word cyberspace from small and readily available components of 
language. Neologic spasm: the primal act of pop poetics. Preceded any concept 
whatever. Slick and hollow-awaiting received meaning. All I did: folded words as 
taught. Now other words accrete in the interstices. 
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He seems to suggest that the word was an empty container later filled with meaning 
by others. 
Cyberpunk – a dubious movement 
In the November 1983 issue of Amazing Science Fiction Stories, the short story 
Cyberpunk by Bruce Bethke was published. The story – about a gang of teenage 
hackers – had been written in 1980 and is credited as being the first to use the term 
cyberpunk. Bethke claims that his intention was to illustrate the juxtaposition of 
punk attitudes and high technology with a memorable word, a word for the 
criminal and computer skilled youngsters that he saw coming (Bethke, 1997; 
Bethke, 1998; Collins, 2005). Gardner Dozois popularized the term and was the 
first to describe it as a new literature sub-genre (Collins, 2005; Heuser, 2003; Olsen, 
1992; Schneider, 1996). The delinquent of Bethke’s short story symbolically takes 
his father’s online life by erasing all traces of him (including his certificate of 
employment and bank savings) in a rebellion mimicking the murderous children in 
Bradbury’s The Veldt, the proto-cyberpunk short story from 1951.  
William Gibson’s Neuromancer is a central work in cyberpunk, along with the 
sequel novels that make up the so called Sprawl trilogy (Count Zero, 1986 and Mona 
Lisa Overdrive, 1988), and the novels of the Bridge trilogy (Virtual Light, 1993, Idoru, 
1996, and All Tomorrow’s Parties, 1999) (Benedikt, 1991; Crang, Crang & May, 1999; 
Csicsery-Ronay, 1992; Disch, 1998; Godhe, 2010b; Gordon, 1992; Guynup, 2002; 
Hayles, 1993a; Heuser, 2003; Hollinger, 1991; Kerman, 1992; Lacey, 2000; 
McCaffery, 1991; Rheingold, 1991; Lovén, 2010; Turkle, 1995). As described by 
Olsen (1992), William Gibson was viewed as “the godfather of cyberpunk” and 
academics spun a “critical industry around him” (p.1). There are other writers that 
are important as well, especially Neal Stephenson, Bruce Sterling, Rudy Rucker, 
John Shirley and Pat Cadigan (Heuser, 2003; McCaffery, 1991; Olsen, 1992; Smith, 
2014), and cyberpunk also included movies such as Alien (Scott, 1979), Tron, and 
Videodrome by David Cronenberg (Bukatman, 1997; Collins, 2005; Crang, Crang & 
May, 1999; Hanson, 2005; Kerman, 1992; Lavery, 2001; Olsen, 1992). The most 
central cyberpunk movie, rivaling the importance of Neuromancer, is the feature film 
Blade Runner (1982), directed by Ridley Scott, written by Hampton Fancher and 
David Webb Peoples, and based on Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? (Boşnak, 2001; Bruno, 1987; Bukatman, 1997; Godhe, 2010b; Hayles, 
1993a; Heuser, 2003; Lacey, 2000; Landon, 1992; Marder, 1991; McCaffery, 1991; 
Neumann, 1999; Schroeder, 2001; Lovén, 2010). With its visual aesthetic of dense 
urban sprawl, a narrative that combines the world-weary and the romantic, and 
with its themes on human identity and the dissolving border between man and 
machine, Blade Runner is the epitome of cyberpunk. It has the archetypical film noir 
style (Heuser, 2003; Crang, Crang & May, 1999), but it is a cyberpunk movie 
without the cyberspace (Clute, 1995; Lacey, 2000). Computers have a presence, and 
the Esper machine that can deconstruct a two-dimensional photograph into a 
three-dimensional reconstruction evokes both Google Street View and Adobe 
Photoshop, but the computers are just screens. There is no space behind the 
screens, and there is no hint of a global network. The contrast between Neuromancer 
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and Blade Runner in this respect is striking. But considering Blade Runner’s focus on 
human identity, and considering the novel was written the year before the birth of 
Arpanet, 1968, it is not strange that Dick and subsequently Scott used computers as 
devices rather than environments. 
When William Gibson talks in interviews about what have influenced him, he 
summons the movie Escape from New York (Carpenter, 1981), and the writing of 
William Burroughs (McCaffery, 1991; Olsen, 1992; Tatsumi, 1986), as well as the 
dense and complex writings of Thomas Pynchon (Olsen, 1992; Wallace-Wells, 
2011). McCaffery suggests that the novel Naked Lunch by William S. Burroughs is a 
predecessor to Gibson’s cyberpunk texts, and emphasizes that the collage writing 
style – “cut-up methods and quickfire stream of dissociated images characteristic” 
(ibid, p.264) – is similar for Burroughs and Gibson. Another author with a similar 
style is J. G. Ballard, mentioned by several academics as an influence for cyberpunk 
(Disch, 1998; Hollinger, 1991; Kerman, 1992; Lacey, 2000; Olsen, 1992). One of 
Ballard’s most well known novels – Crash from 1973 – definitely has themes similar 
to cyberpunk in its violent clash between eroticism and car crashes, and between 
yearning flesh and disrupted machinery. Disch (1998) compares Ballard’s writing to 
surrealism, especially in the juxtaposition of the banal and the highly iconic, which 
is noteworthy since surrealistic juxtaposition is one of the topologies of virtuality I 
will discuss in my own findings. There is also a tendency to think of Philip K. Dick 
as an important influence to cyberpunk (Lacey, 2000; Lovén, 2010; Olsen, 1992), 
much because Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is the novel that was adapted into 
the movie Blade Runner, and because of Dicks’ obsession with the blurred line 
between reality and illusion. But according to McCaffery (1991), Olsen (1992), and 
Wershler-Henry (1989), Gibson has claimed that he did not read Dick before he 
wrote Neuromancer. 
Cyberpunk has occasionally been referred to as a movement. However, its 
popularity as a sub-genre grew quickly during the 1980s, and its key storytellers 
eventually denounced it as a silly marketing strategy (Collins, 2005; Csicsery-Ronay, 
1992; Gordon, 1992; Hollinger, 1991; McCaffery, 1991; Olsen, 1992; Siner, 1992; 
Tatsumi, 1986). Gibson is one of the writers that are dubious about the cyberpunk 
label. In an interview he says “all that really happened was that a bunch of work by 
some new authors landed on some publishers’ desks at the same time. People 
didn’t know what to make of us, so they gave us this tag” (McCaffery, 1990, p.145). 
Farnell (1998, p.462) describes how 
the novum of cyberspace had moved from potent narrative device to cynical 
marketing technique and commodified hyperreality, thereby attaining an escape 
velocity which transported it from the realms of sf and text and into the mainstream 
media-hype of techno fetishistic desire. 
However, it remains an effective label for a specific sub-genre of science fiction, 
collecting a range of themes and aesthetics under one roof. One advantage with the 
cyberpunk label is that it signals a break from previous tradition in science fiction. 
Previous science fiction was often optimistic, set in far of futures and among the 
stars. William Gibson has claimed the following concerning his own writing: 
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“When I write about technology, I write about how it has already affected our lives; 
I don't extrapolate in the way I was taught an SF writer should” (McCaffery, 1990, 
p.140). Granted, previous science fiction had had its share of dystopia – 1984 by 
George Orwell, Brave New World by Aldous Huxley and The Time Machine by H. G. 
Wells being prime examples – but cyberpunk was special in its method of setting its 
stories in a close dystopic future (McHale, 1992). The newsletter Cheap Truth, edited 
by Bruce Sterling, was an informal outlet for the early cyberpunk movement, and 
Sterling and others writing under pseudonyms expressed vehement critique towards 
the stale state of science fiction in the early 1980s. An important contrast between 
earlier utopian science fiction and cyberpunk is that cyberpunk thematises the 
actual state of our own society, and not what might happen eventually (Bruno, 
1987; Diggle & Ball, 2014; Olsen, 1992; Siner, 1992). A focus on electronics and 
bio-technology pervades the genre. Characters are described as cyborgs, humans 
augmented either by physical, mechanical extensions such as artificial camera eyes 
and extendable metal claws, or by virtual, cognitive extensions of the mind into 
cyberspace (Gordon, 1992; Heuser, 2003; Springer, 1996). This “technological 
transcendence of human limits” (Grant, 1990, p.45), this breakdown of the 
dichotomy between the artificial and the natural, is romanticized, and at the same 
time often depicted as grotesque. According to Siner (1992), the cyborg theme in 
cyberpunk goes deeper than just a superficial merging of flesh and metal. Gibson’s 
stories usually have a humanistic and emotional aspect going in parallel with the 
futuristic transcendence through technology; Gibson’s characters often have a drive 
to transcend the self (Grant, 1990), to become someone else, to re-program their 
own wiring. These ideas parallel Donna Haraway’s cyborg manifest (Haraway, 
1991) proclaiming that by seeing ourselves as constructed entities we can 
reprogram ourselves and our culture. This and other postmodern cultural 
commentaries reverberate in cyberpunk, suggesting that cyberpunk is the literary 
expression of postmodernism (Landon, 1992; Lovén, 2010; Olsen, 1992; Springer, 
1996). 
But where does the punk in cyberpunk come in? The sub-culture and music 
genre punk emerged in the mid-1970s and it seems obvious that cyberpunk strived 
to become the science fiction equivalent of punk music. Bruce Bethke was a 
wannabe musician in the early 1980s when he coined the term cyberpunk. William 
Gibson has acknowledged that cyberpunk “certainly wanted to be” (Diggle & Ball, 
2014, p.99) the literary equivalent of rock music, and in an interview (Wallace-
Wells, 2011) he claims that Bruce Springsteen’s album Darkness on the Edge of Town 
from 1978 was an influence when he wrote Neuromancer. Gibson describes the 
album as “very noir” and he wanted Case, the protagonist of Neuromancer, to have 
the same “American hopelessness” (p.219). However, what makes cyberpunk a 
punk style genre is its fierce criticism of technology and society from within. In 
another interview, William Gibson claims that he made a union between the 
“personal computer and Bohemian attitude” (Belkom, 1998, p.142). Counterculture 
proposed leaving the city and technology behind, and engaged in colorful and 
joyful aesthetics. Cyberpunk writer Sterling characterizes counterculture as “rural, 
romanticized, anti-science, anti-tech” (Sterling, 1991, p.3); counterculture dreamed 
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of a better world. Punk, on the contrary, has given up without giving up. Punk 
accepted the city, the darkness, the hardness, and the technology, but then used it 
for its own aesthetic. It was as if the 1960s contradictive divide between technology 
and counterculture – contradictive since counterculture supported the personal 
computer and embraced the aesthetic of the electric guitar – finally closed on itself 
to form punk in the late 1970s, and this integration between counterculture and 
technology surfaced in cyberpunk narratives and aesthetics (Olsen, 1992; Smith, 
2014). Punk – literally meaning rascal, bad boy, good-for-nothing – became the 
representation of a working class betrayed by the failure of technology. Punk rose 
from street culture and embraced the socially marginalized (Hollinger, 1991). Punk 
used anger in the form of noise and destruction to assimilate dystopia and make it 
cool. Cyberpunk worked in the same way (Heuser, 2003; Lovén, 2010). The typical 
cyberpunk protagonist is an outcast, a working class man or woman trying to make 
it, trying to get a break (Gordon, 1992), like the hackers in Gibson’s Burning Chrome. 
Punk is explicitly about revolt, and cyberpunk criticize centralization, 
industrialization, technology and large-scale solutions. Punk also sport an anti-
system, anarchist stance favoring a do it yourself attitude (Collins, 2005; Heuser, 
2003; Schneider, 1996). Cyber relates to control and to technology invading our 
body, mind and lives. Punk “refers to a protagonist seizing the tools of this invasion 
to fight back against the invasive forces” (Pope, 2008, p.9). Punk fashion exhibits a 
cyborgian fascination with reshaping the body, piercing it and adorning it with 
sharp metal. The music is aggressive, disharmonic and characterized by amplifier 
dissonance and electric guitars. Cyberpunk parallel this with its violence in the form 
of dense visual or textual chaos (Gordon, 1992). Aesthetically, cyberpunk overlaps 
with punk fashion: black leather clothes, mirrorshades, neon lights, rain, and 
surfaces of chrome and concrete are all features of both punk and cyberpunk 
(Heuser, 2003).9 
When comparing counterculture and punk, it is interesting how well the 
differences in aesthetics reflect the differences in essence. Where counterculture 
used soft shapes, gaudy colors and bright flowers, (cyber)punk uses chromed 
sharpness, black leather and neon lights. Counterculture wanted to escape 
technology, to rewind the technological civilization. Cyberpunk celebrated 
technology, in a way (Gordon, 1992; Hollinger, 1991). The vistas painted by 
Neuromancer and Blade Runner are scary and cruel, but presented in a way that was 
exciting and luring, a kind of “Pop Despair” (Disch, 1998, p.220). The message is 
that the apocalypse has come, but it is livable, at least for the individuals that have 
the right skills. It shows, in the words of Sterling, a ”boredom with the 
Apocalypse” (1987, p.xi). William Gibson explains it as the result of an ambivalence 
towards technology, a feeling of “ecstasy and dread” at the same time (Diggle, 
2014, p.133). Another characteristics of cyberpunk are its locations; dystopic 
cityscapes and electronic, virtual spaces (Bukatman, 1997; Crang, Crang & May, 
                                         
9 Karen Collins (2005) also describes close connections between cyberpunk and another musical 
genre; industrial. She mentions bands such as Einstürzende Neubauten, Ministry, Prodigy, 
Rammstein, Front 242, and suggests that William Burroughs influenced both cyberpunk and 
industrial music.  
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1999; Hollinger, 1991; Schneider, 1996). This is archetypical for cyberpunks 
approach to science fiction storytelling – it does not invent a new and utopian 
future, but it extrapolates the present day situation into a dystopic future. This 
showcases an “aesthetic of decay, exposing the dark side of technology, the process 
of disintegration” (Bruno, 1987, p.210). The city portrayed in cyberpunk is not an 
ultramodern city; instead, it is the postmodern city. 
Cyberpunk has been criticized for being too stylish and self-aware. Nicola Nixon 
(1992) suggests that cyberpunk is not radical at all and that “its slickness and 
apparent subversiveness conceal a complicity with” conservatism (p.1). It is also 
noteworthy that the anti-authoritarian stance in cyberpunk generally engages issues 
related to capitalism, surveillance and such, primarily targeting criticism at 
governments and corporate structures. Patriarchal power hierarchies and other 
gender issues are seldom addressed. There are strong and capable female characters 
such as Molly in William Gibson’s literature and Trinity in the Matrix franchise, but 
these characters merely offers a quite superficial approach to highly complex 
gender issues. It can also be argued cyberpunk it did not bring anything new to the 
debate on technology and society – as suggested by Svante Lovén’s extensive 
survey of pre-cyberpunk works (2010) – and that cyberpunk swiftly became a 
bloated marketing device before collapsing when real-life technology surpassed the 
typical ten-minute-into-the-future cyberpunk settings. After all, William Gibson’s 
cyberspace seems outdated when we now look back, and standard cyberpunk 
themes such as hacker attacks, global surveillance, climate change saturate everyday 
news reports. However, the questions that hide under the glossy-gritty surface – the 
critique against systems from within these systems, and the investigations of the 
human/technology boundary – are still important. Thus, cyberpunk is both of 
historical importance – it marked a point of increased awareness about the benefit 
and hazards of technology – and a stance that still asks questions.  
The end of cyberspace and the future of the Internet 
In May 1994 the First International Conference on the World-Wide Web was held 
at CERN in Switzerland. At this time, a typical web page was a light grey, flat sheet 
filled with long lines of mono-space text, occasionally adorned with not so 
successful graphics. But Gibson’s cyberspace vision hade reverberated through 
society, and dreams of a more visual and spatial web ran high. At the conference a 
paper entitled Extending WWW to support Platform Independent Virtual Reality by Dave 
Raggett was published (1994), and it outlined the markup language VRML (Virtual 
Reality Markup Language, later Virtual Reality Modeling Language). VRML was 
used to display 3d models and 3d environments in a 3d web browser. The dream 
was obvious; the Web would be transformed into a spatial environment. The fusion 
of the two spawns of the cold war, the Internet and virtual reality, was highly 
anticipated. 
But, the Internet did not become cyberspace. Instead the 3d web vision would 
develop in another direction; a direction started already in 1969, the same year that 
ARPANET was founded. This year Rich Blomme rewrote the game Spacewar! into a 
version that could be played over the network on the PLATO computer system at 
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the University of Illinois (Klastrup, 2003a). Online gaming continued to develop on 
the PLATO platform during the 1970s, with titles such as Star Trek, Airflight and 
Avatar (an early dungeons and dragons game), as well as a budding online 
community. These two trends, online gaming and online communities, would co-
evolve. Online communities developed further via CommuniTree (a computer 
network accessible for the public via telephone modems, launched in 1978 with a 
name referring to the ecological tradition of counterculture) and The WELL (an 
acronym for The Whole Earth Lectronic Link, and launched in 1985 by two former 
hippies, Steward Brand and Larry Brilliant) (Flichy, 2007). The next vital step in 
online gaming was the text-based adventure game ADVENT, written in 1976 by 
Will Crowther (Klastrup, 2003a). This inspired Rob Trubshaw and Richard Bartle 
to write the first MUD (Multi-User Domains, or Multi-User Dungeons) in 1978. At 
the start, MUDs provided a virtual environment, albeit in textual form. They were 
online communities where the inhabitants described the environment, events and 
their own actions using typed descriptions and typed commands. They were 
narratives co-authored by the users, “a new form of collaboratively written 
literature” (Turkle, 1995, p.11), where “users are both authors and audience” 
(Flichy, 2007, p.147). The constructed events were part fictional, part real-life. 
MUD’s and MMORPG’s (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game) are a 
combination of reading, acting and living (Aarseth, 2007). Concerning early online 
role-playing, Svante Lovén (2010) highlights that Rad Bradbury, in Fahrenheit 451 
(1953), very early foresaw a kind of fictional virtual reality that incorporates role-
playing. This stands in contrast to other proto-cyberpunk stories that emphasized 
the degenerative passivity and imprisonment of counterfeit or virtual environments. 
The online game worlds of today are spawned both from VRML and virtual reality 
technology, and from text based online communities (Damer, Gold & Bruin, 1999). 
The historical description of the emergence of these – as well as the Internet – is 
strongly dominated by the US, and especially San Francisco. Parallel development 
did take place, most notably the Minitel network in France, launched in 1978 and in 
service as long as 2012. The available services included chat rooms and message 
boards. 
The first visual and spatial, albeit two-dimensional, online community was 
Lucasfilm’s Habitat that launched in 1985 (Klastrup, 2003a). Ten years later, the 
three-dimensional Active Worlds was launched in its first beta version, AlphaWorld. 
Active Worlds is one of the first “massive multiuser online environments where 
millions of people live out a collective fantasy existence” (Castronova, 2007, p.5). 
The fascination and appeal of meeting other people online fueled the development 
of online communities, and is exemplified by Sherry Turkle’s claim that “when we 
step through the looking glass, other people are there as well” (1995, p.9). A series 
of virtual worlds were launched, with bigger and bigger populations; Blaxxun3D 
launched Colony City in 1997 (a population of many thousand users) and in the same 
year, Ultima Online was launched and would become the first large virtual world 
with 200 000 users (Klastrup, 2003a). EverQuest started in 1999 (400 000 users). 
Second Life started in 2003 and became one of the largest virtual worlds, but was 
soon rivaled by the massively popular World of Warcraft, launched in 2004 by game 
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developer Blizzard Entertainment. World of Warcraft is a MMORPG, a Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game. Active Worlds and Second Life were largely 
peaceful environments where the main occupation was text based chatting, building 
or just roaming the huge environment. Different institutions, such as governments 
and universities, have attempted to build a presence especially in Second Life, and 
there are numerous cases of higher education learning activities taking place in the 
virtual world (Educause, 2006). World of Warcraft is quite different. Here the users, 
or gamers, gang up into clans and make warfare on each other or enemies, 
emphasizing the game aspects of the world. This is what happened to cyberspace; it 
became online games and social habitats.10 This is the way in which William 
Gibson’s consensual hallucination of millions of users actually turned out. The 
contrast with the cyberspace of Neuromancer is striking. Instead of a minimalistic 
environment intended to give access to humanities’ accumulated knowledge and 
services such as banking, the real-life virtual worlds are visually dense simulations 
of environments with trees, mountains, clouds and skies, and they use role-play and 
narrative plots to engage the inhabitants in battles. 
The diversity of game-based virtual worlds is broad. Just because a game is three-
dimensional and can support simultaneous gamers, it is not necessarily a virtual 
world – not in the more strict definition used by for example Klastrup (2003a; 
2003b). For example, a large number of First Person Shooters do not have 
persistent environments or characters. For each game session the environment 
opens up unaffected by what ever happened in the previous game session. Also, the 
line between simulations and games is confused, as pointed out by Louise Peterson 
(2011). She points to The Sims as an example of a virtual world that is marketed as a 
game, but without any clear stated goals. These sandbox games/virtual worlds are 
more focused on the simulation of a world and on allowing the user to explore and 
build the world. 
Allucquere Rosanne Stone (1991) summarizes the emergence of virtuality back 
through the development of modern media, suggesting four epochs. The start of 
each epoch is characterized by a change in how humans communicate: 
•  Epoch One – text (mid 1600) 
•  Epoch Two – electronic communication and entertainment media (1900) 
•  Epoch Three – information technology (1960) 
•  Epoch Four – virtual reality and cyberspace (1984) 
Online communities characterize epoch three, and the emergence of the epoch is 
symbolically marked by the first BBS (bulletin board systems), which eventually 
developed into newsgroups, discussion groups and todays social media. Stone 
characterizes epoch four by emphasizing the canonical importance of Neuromancer, 
and how it symbolizes the “three-dimensional inhabitable cyberspace” (ibid., p.95). 
We might be on the verge of a fifth epoch, characterized by the merging of virtual 
                                         
10 A remark that also has been made by Margaret Wertheim (1999) and Svante Lovén (2010). 
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and actual, further discussed in the chapter Breaking the screen – how the virtual 
bleeds into the actual, page 197. 
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Characteristics of technical virtuality 
After the previous chapters’ framing of virtuality in a historical and cultural 
perspective, we will now consider different characteristics of contemporary 
technical virtuality.  
Immersion and presence 
An important aspect of the “almost as if-ness” of virtuality is the sense of being 
somewhere, the phenomenological experience of being immersed in an 
environment or standing in front of an object that almost is there. This is referred 
to as presence and immersion, two deeply entwined and overlapping concepts. 
Presence is the feeling of existing in environment other than the actual place that 
the physical body is, of extending, projecting somewhere else. The concept has its 
origin in research on telepresence, where mediating technologies such as video, 
audio and tactile feedback create the sensation of being in a remote, actual 
environment. Often the presence is two-way, so that the user is apparent in and has 
influence on the remote location, for example people at the remote location can see 
the user of the system on video screens, and the user can manipulate objects with 
waldos (remote manipulators). Immersion is the feeling of being surrounded by a 
responsive and high fidelity environment, giving the illusion of transcending into 
another environment. Immersion is a fundamental concept to describe virtual 
reality systems, and a main feature is the physical immersion of the user in a veil of 
sensory stimuli, such as fully immersive displays and surround audio. 
Presence and interaction 
Presence is the sense of projecting into an environment that seems believable, 
realistic and engaging (Daniel, 2013; Slater, 2002). According to Witmer and Singer 
(1998) presence is the “subjective experience of being in one place or environment, 
even when one is physically situated in another” (p.225). Further, presence can be 
defined as a “technologically mediated experience" (Robinett, 1992, p.230) and as 
“the experience of presence in an environment by means of a communication 
medium” (Campanella, 2001, p.27). It is a synthetic experience that makes it 
possible to perceive “a representation or simulacrum of something ... rather than 
the thing itself” (ibid., p.230). Limited telepresence has been provided by pre-digital 
technologies such as the telescope, the telephone, and television (Goldberg, 2001). 
Even though presence often means telepresence, we can also speak about a 
virtual presence (Zeltzer, 1992), a “feeling like you are present in the environment 
generated by the computer” (Sheridan, 1992, p.1). The important difference is that 
telepresence is distal – it brings remote locations closer – while virtual reality is 
simulacral – it simulates locations as if they where actual (Goldberg, 2001). 
Several attempts have been made to determine the components of presence. 
Robinett (1992) describes a number of dimensions, such as superposition, scale of 
time and space, and causality. Lombard and Ditton (1997) propose five aspects: 
social richness (intimacy and immediacy through self-expression and the presence 
of othes); social actors (interactive agents); realism (seemingly accurate 
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representations); transportation (the feeling of being somewhere else); and 
immersion (perceptual and psychological). Steuer (1994) emphasizes two 
dimensions: vividness (“the ability of a technology to produce a sensorially rich 
mediated environment”) (p.10) and interactivity (“the degree to which users of a 
medium can influence the form or content of the mediated environment”) (p.11). 
Sheridan (1992) lists three determinants of telepresence: the extent of sensory 
information; spatial translation of sensors; and the ability to modify the remote 
environment. Finally, Zeltzer (1992) contributes three salient components: 
autonomy (a simulations ability to react to stimuli); interaction (the degree of 
control the user can have over the simulation); and presence as a bath of 
sensations. Clearly, there are many concepts that are repeated in different form in 
these listings – most notably different aspects of richness and interaction – and 
there is common ground to find among all these suggestions. Another aspect, the 
presence of other users, will be discussed further on as a component of worldliness. 
Interaction is a fundamental aspect of virtuality, as well as for presence and 
immersion. Interaction means agency, and there are different levels of agency. One 
of the most basic is looking around. In a virtual reality environment the user can 
turn her head and this matches what the user can see, just as in an actual 
environment (Robinett, 1992). This, combined with the panoramic view, can be 
very powerful in order to achieve immersion (Grau, 2001). Secondly, the user can 
move through the environment, providing a spatial interaction between user and 
world, mimicking what we expect in an actual environment (Lovén, 2001; Murray, 
1997; Robinett, 1992). Thirdly, the users’ agency in the world, the interaction with 
objects in the world, partly determines the level of immersion and presence. To 
what level can the user change aspects of the world, and get perceptual feedback 
confirming the change (Dreyfus, 2001; Goldberg, 2001; Lovén, 2001; Murray, 
1997)? 
Our sense of presence could also depend on the degree of synchronization 
between perceptions of the environment and the minds mental model of that 
environment (Sjölie, 2013). Recent research on cognition describes the brain as an 
organ that specializes in mental simulations (Barsalou, 2008) with the intention of 
predicting the (immediate) future; this is referred to as the prospective brain 
(Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007). If I grab an object, the brain predicts that my 
hand will sense the object I grab for, and when this will happen. If the subsequent 
perception of this projected outcome is missing, or out of synch, my sense of 
presence is lowered. This means that one way of regarding the experience of 
virtuality is that there are two simulations that interact and occur side-by-side; the 
brain’s simulation of what will happen to the user, and the computer’s simulation 
of what will happen to the user.  
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Immersion and richness 
Immersion is a highly subjective experience, suggesting the feeling of being 
surrounded by the environment, as if it closes up around you like a shell.11 Brooks 
(2009) and Murray (1997) compare immersion in a virtual environment with 
plunging into the ocean, and “the sensation of being surrounded by a completely 
other reality” which “takes over all of our attention” (Murray, 1997, p.98). Zeltzer 
(1992) also speaks about a bath of sensations, and divides sensorial input into two 
aspects: the number of senses involved, and the fidelity of each sensory stimulus. 
The extent of the sensory stimulus is also important, especially for vision. The goal 
is usually to cover the entire field of vision and dissolve the frame of the screen 
entirely (Grau, 2001; Lovén, 2001; Lovén, 2010; Nusselder, 2009). The desktop 
interface to virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft, Minecraft and The Sims can be 
conceptualized as a window through which we observe the virtual world, a window 
established by the WIMP interface (windows, icons, menus, pointer). When instead 
a semi-spherical or fully spherical display is used, physically and spatially enveloping 
the user, it becomes more than a screen; it becomes an environment. The user that 
wears a head-mounted display or steps into a CAVE based virtual reality is not 
looking into the world, she is looking around her at the world. 
There are two types of immersion that are discussed in virtual reality: technical 
immersion and phenomenological immersion (Bricken, 1990). Technical immersion 
is largely quantitative and investigates issues concerning the fidelity of the sensory 
input. Phenomenological immersion is the qualitative, subjective sensation that is 
the result of technical immersion. It is described as the sense of “being in and of 
the world” (Campanella, 2001, p.29), “an impression suggestive of being there” 
(Grau, 2003, p.7), and by how it “takes us inside the world through the impact on 
the physical senses” (Klastrup, 2003a, p.46). 
The implementation of immersion and presence range from the technically 
simple to the utterly complex. A low-tech approach is narrative immersion, where 
good storytelling gives a sense of being present in the events of the narration 
(Murray, 1997). As pointed out by Sheridan (1992), this has been “stimulated by 
authors and artists for centuries” (p.1), and Zeltzer (1992) agrees that “storytellers 
have sought to involve our senses and imaginations” (p.131). A compelling story 
can immerse us so deeply that the papers of a book or the cinema theater fades 
from attention. Brooks (2009) describes a double immersion in virtual reality; the 
user can be immersed both by the sensory display and by the narrative. The first is 
primarily technical and sensorial, while the latter is primarily phenomenological, 
even though the relation between these concepts is more complex than a one-to-
one connection. For example, phenomenological immersion emerges both from 
sensorial stimuli as well as narration. Narrative immersion is technically very simple, 
printed words on a page or a well edited movie is all the technology you need, but it 
has its limitations of course; there is no sensorial immersion and there is no 
                                         
11 Even though immersion is subjective, it can be measured. Two popular methods are threat 
response and socially conditioned response (Sheridan, 1992). Do you duck for a virtual danger? 
Do you wave to a virtual character? 
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simulation to interact with. When attempts are made to achieve full immersion with 
advanced technology, the challenges eventually become daunting. Full audio 
immersion has been more or less accomplished, and full visual immersion with 
perfect visual fidelity is within our reach; algorithms for physics simulations and 
rendering are steadily reaching the goal of a visually perfect simulation. However, 
when it comes to the other senses, such as touch, vestibular sense and kinesthetic 
sense, technical solutions are still cumbersome and inefficient. A simple experience 
such as pressing your hand against a wall while you walk along the wall – including 
the irregularities of stone against your finger tips, the rigidity of the stone when you 
press against it, and the locomotion alongside it – is almost impossible to simulate 
well and feed as sensorial stimuli to the body/brain. A major obstacle is the nature 
of these senses; they involve the whole body, and not only small entrances such as 
the eyes or ears. Robinett (1992) suggests that a full-body exoskeleton might be the 
best we can do, and Zeltzer (1992) states that perfect immersion might be 
impossible without neural interfaces, circumventing the messy and cumbersome 
body of flesh and bone, and feeding sensory stimuli directly to the brain. However, 
the implementation of neural interfaces might face huge technical obstacles; 
interacting with the brain seems even more complex than interacting with the full 
body. 
Avatars and the subject/object boundary 
One aspect of presence and immersion, related to human and computer 
interaction, is the subject/object boundary. The subject/object boundary defines 
where the line between your actual physical body and the virtual environment is 
drawn. When using a head-mounted display, the line is drawn around your head 
since the helmet envelops your head. In the CAVE room you stand inside a room 
with walls covered by the projected virtuality, so here the line is the wall of the 
room. The most obvious difference is that in the first you do not see your actual 
body anymore (but you might be given a virtual avatar body), while in the latter you 
can see your actual body. In fictional scenarios, the line is often drawn more tightly 
around you; in movies such as The Matrix, the experience of the virtuality is 
implanted straight into your brain. You do not even use your eyes or ears. This is 
not possible yet, but it might be feasible in the far future considering technological 
development in brain-machine interfaces. 
A related question is what to do with your body. In the CAVE virtual reality 
mentioned above, this is not an issue; you bring your meat body with you into the 
virtual environment. When accessing virtual worlds on a desktop, your physical 
body is cropped out, being situated outside the frame of the computer screen. In 
most virtual reality systems and online virtual worlds you are provided with a 
virtual body, the avatar. The avatar is important for achieving presence. You 
experience your avatar by actually seeing it in third-person perspective or you 
implicitly experience it by seeing from its viewpoint in first-person perspective. 
Michael Heim (1993) claims that virtual reality emerged when the first 
representation of a datagloved hand appeared on a computer screen, when the 
human was given digital form. It could also be argued that the human is given 
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virtual form even in MUDs, where the presence of players is signified by their 
screen name. Avatar is originally a Sanskrit word meaning the incarnation of Hindu 
gods, as a material manifestation. Incarnation literally means embodied in flesh or 
taking on flesh (Doyle, 2009; Nusselder, 2009). The modern use of avatar appeared 
in the 1980s, especially in the online role-playing game Habitat (Baxter, 2012), and 
this usage of the word was coined by Neal Stephenson in his 1992 novel Snow Crash 
(Lovén, 2010). The avatar can be of quite different qualities; it can be iconic, 
indexical or symbolic, it can be in 2d or 3d, and it can be a still image or a moving 
image. The image from your web camera in a videoconferencing system is for 
example indexical, 2d and moving. The typical avatar in online games such as World 
of Warcraft or Minecraft is non-indexical, iconic, 3d and animated. 
An avatar is like a mask we take on, a role we act (Murray, 1997). The avatar 
splits us into two. The meat body is left behind, and we project our attention and 
our viewpoints to the virtual world (Canny & Paulas, 2001). This mimics Cartesian 
mind/body dualism, a dualism carefully disputed and dismissed by 
phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and now 
frustratingly resurrected by technology (Dreyfus, 2001; Wertheim, 1999).12 The 
avatar has a double nature (Doyle, 2009). In relation to the user’s actual body, the 
avatar is an immaterial body, just as the rest of the virtual environment is 
immaterial. But in relation to the virtual world, the avatar is an embodiment, since 
it gives us a body in the virtual world. The avatar splits our lived, biological body 
and adds a phenomenological virtual body (Morie, 2008). Hayles (1999) emphasizes 
how our subjectivity seems capable of holding (at least) two coexisting foci, and 
describes us as cyborgs built by a biological, material body and an artificial, virtual 
body. 
The avatar is personal; it is my body, but it also connects me to others, since I 
can be seen. Even if it is technically easy to have a user being presented in different 
ways for different co-users, practical and social reasons make it obvious that the 
user conventionally is represented in one coherent way. The ability to be seen by 
others takes for granted that there is a unifying concept of same time and same 
place, a concept tied in closely with the concept of worldliness. 
Worldliness – the virtual as a world to inhabit 
One of the most fundamental aspects of the virtual environment is whether it is 
spatial or not. Spatial environments are usually visual – images convey the 
experience of a space, either in two dimensions or three dimensions. Non-visual 
environments can also be spatial to some degree; tactile interaction via haptic 
displays as well as surround audio can give a sense of space, and text-based MUD’s 
use verbal description of space. Video conferencing, as well as game environment 
where the movement occurs along a horizontal axis, are two examples of two-
                                         
12 Descartes dualism originally split the world in res extensa (extended material reality, explained by 
rationality) and res cogitans (the thinking soul, explained by religion) in order to reconcile science 
and religion, but later merged with older Judeo-Christian ideas about body and soul, and was 
popularized as a mind/body dualism (Nordin, 2012; Wertheim, 1998; Wertheim, 1999). 
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dimensional spatial environments. A three-dimensional virtual world usually lets the 
viewer move through the world, which is highly important to give a sense of being 
in the virtual world. 
When Michael Benedikt wrote about cyberspace he characterized it as being not 
a technology, nor a simulation, but an actual place (1991). Lisbeth Klastrup 
describes the worldliness of a virtual world as “the possibility of synchronous 
interaction between users and between user and world within the framework of a 
space designed as a navigable universe” (Klastrup, 2003b, p.101). In this 
description, the word interaction is central; there is a connection between 
interaction and worldliness. Interaction is characterized by causality – actions result 
in change – and that it is a relation between two agents, either a subject and an 
object (I open a door) or two subjects (I talk to you) (Klastrup, 2003a). We can 
watch a world and experience it with a certain level of immersion – that is what we 
do in non-interactive fiction – but interacting with the world gives us an active 
presence in a distinctly different way. We inhabit such a world. We are embodied in 
the world through our avatar and through our interaction with the world, creating 
an embodied narrative (Doyle, 2009), and participating in a theatrical and 
performative space (Klastrup, 2003a, Klastrup, 2003b; Murray, 1997). The presence 
of others gives the world even more worldliness, and once again interaction is a key 
word since it is the interaction with others that makes the world appear inhabited. 
A fundamental component of inhabitation is simply knowing that others are there 
as well (Gunnarsson, 2002; Klastrup, 2003a), and Lovén (2010) reminds us that this 
is reminiscent of the consensual experience that Gibson envisioned. Inhabitation of 
virtual worlds creates a narrative. The participants in online virtual worlds live and 
create and tell a story together (Klastrup, 2003a; Klastrup, 2003b; Turkle, 1995). 
Klastrup calls it “story-living rather than story-telling” (ibid., p.104), and Benedikt 
(1991) claims that “cyberspace is poetry inhabited” (p.229). 
For a virtual world to have worldliness and not just be an environment, it needs 
persistence. Persistence means that the world has a continuous, autonomous 
history. When a user is not present the world nevertheless continues to evolve and 
change; the other users are persistent as well. You meet the same individuals next 
time you participate. The early text based MUDs were technically simple but they 
nevertheless exhibited this aspect of persistence. We can summarize the 
characteristics of different actual virtual worlds as follows. 
 
Virtual world (persistent). A full-fledged virtual world is persistent in time and 
extended in a three-dimensional spatial space, with such a large scope that it cannot 
be explored at a glance. It mimics or simulates many aspects of the actual, such as 
gravity, sky, animals and plant life. Usually the participant interacts with both the 
world and the other inhabitants. 
Virtual environment (impermanent). A virtual environment is a spatial 
environment but usually limited in scope, realism and most notably it is not 
permanent in time. Usually the participant only interacts with the environment 
itself, not other users. 
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Virtual community (social, not spatial). The typical virtual community is a 
metaphorical “place” without space, such as a chat room, newsgroup or discussion 
group. Usually the participant interacts only with other participants, and not the 
environment itself. 
  
These categories are re-adapted from Lisbeth Klastrup (2003a; 2003b), and 
Klastrup defines a virtual world as an online representation that is persistent, 
inhabited, provides interaction with the world and its other users, and is navigable. 
Virtual communities – or online communities – are often characterized as a social 
space, an online, non-physical place where participants with a common interest 
meet repeatedly and evolve emotional ties (Agre, 1998; Gupta & Kim, 2004; Jones, 
1998; Klastrup, 2003a; Lee, Vogel & Limayem, 2002; Rheingold, 1993; van Dijk, 
1997).  
There is a confusing similarity between the virtual and the fictional. If the virtual 
means almost as if, then could a feature film telling a fictional story be virtual? 
After all, the imagery on the screen looks very similar to the actual, almost as if 
what we see on screen is the actual. And, the virtual worlds that do exist are often 
fictional per se, and adapt typical fictional genres, such as the fantasy game World of 
Warcraft or the science fiction world of Star Trek Online (Aarseth, 2007). Many 
online virtual worlds and computer games are transmedial narratives, involving a 
diegetic world that also exists in non-interactive media forms such as movies and 
literature (Klastrup & Tosca, 2004), Star Wars and Lord of the Rings being obvious 
examples. Both fiction and virtuality make beliefs.13 But virtuality is more than a 
narrated sequence of events; it is a phenomenological, interactive experience. A 
parallel is the debate in game studies concerning whether computer games are 
narratives or something else, a debate that in the early 2000s was quite frantic 
between narratology and ludology (Heidbrink & Knoll, 2014). A few years later, the 
debate became less polarized and it was argued that some media artifacts could be 
both games and narratives. Bo Kampmann Walther (2003) has pointed out that 
games and cinema share several aesthetic attributes, such as movement, space, 
visual culture and characters. There are however two characteristics that distinguish 
virtuality and fiction: interaction and worldliness. With interaction, the virtual 
mimics the actual in a way that conventional fiction does not. As expressed by 
Sandy Stone (1991), the spectator becomes the participant and interaction is the 
modality “that distinguishes the computer from the cinematic mode of 
engagement” (p.192). The virtual usually mimics the causality we encounter in 
everyday life. We interact with the virtual (Heim, 1993; Moere, 1998; Nusselder, 
2009). We create, move, change and delete objects. We interact with other 
inhabitants of these places. Concerning the debate between narratology and 
                                         
13 Lana Wachowski, one of the directors of The Matrix, give voice to the claim that movies and 
virtualities are similar when claiming during an interview that “all movies are matrixes. You go in 
and you kind of plug-in, and they cuddle you and swaddle you and they tell you what to feel and 
what to think. They tell you where to be, where to be emotionally, they’re always constantly 
informing your understanding and belief of this world that is in front of you, that is projected in 
front if you on the platonic cave wall” (Hardwick, 2012, at 37:55). 
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ludology, Jesper Juul (2005) has suggested that computer games can be regarded as 
simulations happening now, while storytelling always look back at past events, 
separating the reading act from the diegetic acts inside the story. Narratives are 
realized actions, while games are framed events (Waltherm, 2003). Also, 
simulations, as well as computer games and virtuality, have multiple outcomes 
depending on the player/participant. A narrative is characterized by having a 
beginning and an end (Metz, 1974), something that a virtual world does not 
necessarily need; the inhabitation in and interaction with, for example a MUD, or a 
sandbox game, can run its course as long as the simulation plays. 
Conventional fiction does not provide these levels of interactions. Fiction, in the 
form of literature and movies, always ends in the same way. There have been 
experiments with interactive fiction, such as hypertext both online and in paper 
form (where the reader jumps or switches between different threads of action), and 
the movie Switching by Morten Schjødt is one of the very rare examples of an 
attempt at creating an interactive feature film. But the complex, non-linear and 
palpable interaction with virtual objects and environments goes much further. 
There is no clear line between linear and interactive media; there are crossovers 
between games and movies, but interaction nevertheless, clearly separates a 
conventional feature film or novel from virtuality. Interaction not only separates 
virtuality from narrative, but it also separates technical virtuality from all the 
previous virtualities back to Plato. Virtuality is the first “interactive version of 
virtuality” (Nusselder, 2009), the first fantasy that can be inhabited. The worldliness 
through interactivity makes virtuality the first post-physical existence. 
Virtual as representation or (post-physical) existence 
Is the virtual representation or is it existence? Klastrup (2002) suggests that a virtual 
world both tells the story of a world, thus being a representation, and functions as a 
(virtual) world. Crang, Crang and May (1999) claim that “simulacra do not re-
present anything … they are acts, events, and happenings” (p.266). One possible 
viewpoint is that the virtual is a representation that has become so powerful that it 
turns into a (simulated) existence. Such a simulation is no longer a representation; it 
has become a post-physical existence. A house built in a virtual world is not a 
representation of a house; it is a house (Lanier, 1992). Another viewpoint is that the 
virtual can be viewed as both existence and representation, balancing between these 
two (Flichy, 2007). Janet Murray (1997) described virtual reality as “foremost a 
representational medium” but also “a theater” (p.284). We inhabit the virtual as if it 
exists, at the same time we watch ourselves perform the events of the virtuality 
(Heidbrink & Knoll, 2014; Klastrup, 2003a). Consider a virtual laboratory used in 
chemistry teaching. The virtual lab has an immaterial but albeit real existence. Its 
high level of realism and interactivity gives it an existence that is fundamentally 
different from a drawing in a textbook. But since the virtual lab mimics an actual 
laboratory exercise, it can be said to represent – stand-in for – the actual laboratory. 
There are many such examples in educational applications of virtual worlds, for 
example in Second Life where study visits are arranged to virtual replicas of actual 
places, or where role-playing is used to create situations and scenarios that are 
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difficult or dangerous to perform in actuality (Educause, 2006; Educause, 2008). 
The same reasoning can be applied to other virtual environments that mimic actual 
environments, such as the sandbox game Grand Theft Auto. The game Minecraft, 
however, does not represent any particular reality; it is a computer game world that 
has a different aesthetic and logic than the actual world. If Grand Theft Auto is a 
hyperreal representation of Los Angeles – a copy that occludes its original – then 
Minecraft could be seen as a simulacrum, a copy without an original. Granted, there 
are levels of representation in Minecraft; things like trees, the sun and pigs behave 
partially as if they are actual objects, but the correspondence with the actual world is 
weak. The low fidelity aesthetics and the surreal logic of the world suggest that this 
is a copy that does not need to glance at an original, at least not as much as, for 
example, Grand Theft Auto does. 
The concept of simulation is brought up frequently when we discuss the virtual. 
It relates to many different facets of the virtual: the virtual as existence or as 
representation, the virtual as a game, and the virtual being based on the actual. A 
simulation is a dynamic model of a slice of actuality, predicting some of the 
behavior of this slice; it is a system that predicts the behavior of another system 
(Frasca, 2003; Grau, 2003, Lovén, 2001; Robinett, 1992). The different parts of the 
model and the interaction between these parts mimic the corresponding aspects of 
the actual world. Superficially, this is reminiscent of representation, where the 
signifier stands for the signified. However, a simulation acts out processes and 
events, predicting an outcome that corresponds to what happens in actual 
processes. These are then represented for the viewer (Zeltzer, 1992). A car crash in 
a computer game or a simulation of an exploding star illustrates this; objects such 
as cars and roads are mathematically defined in the model, and interaction such as 
gravity is calculated between objects. The outcome – a crashed car or a supernova 
remnant – is then visualized, represented, for the user. According to Aarseth (2007) 
this separates a computer game from a narrative, and simulation from 
representation. A narrative is only representation, while a game is a dynamic model 
and its representation. The virtual is also based on a simulation (Rheingold, 1991), 
and the same argument can therefore be used to differentiate between virtuality and 
narratives. Benjamin Wooley (1992) claims that the virtual is “a mode of simulated 
existence resulting from computation” (p.69).14 He stretches the concept far, 
describing how a computer simulates a wide variety of tools, from a drawing pad to 
a movie studio. It is a valid point; because of algorithms and programming, the 
computer can be seen as a universal tool simulating and replacing other tools, and 
in everyday language we talk about virtual cinematography or a virtual bank. 
However, this makes the concept so broad in scope that it tends to lose its 
meaning, and therefore I do not stretch the concept of virtuality as far as Wooley. 
Everyday language seems to mirror this, since we tend to use the word online, and 
not virtual, for services such as online shops, online banks and online communities. 
                                         
14 Note that a simulation in itself does not have to be based on digital technology or computers. 
As Frasca (2003) points out, scientific models in general are simulations, as are some toys and 
board games. 
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Online then means available on the Internet while virtual means an environment or 
object that is characterized by a simulated, interactive existence. 
Information, space, and place 
MUD’s are an interesting example of virtual worlds that can be considered either 
spatial or non-spatial. They are completely text based, so there is no direct 
perception of actual space. The user does not see a world. But the text nevertheless 
describes a space. Opening up this concept, we see that online forums in general 
are social places/spaces (Benedikt, 1991), places to go to that have limited and 
post-physical spatiality. Our concept of space has evolved from primarily being a 
Cartesian, Newtonian geometrical space, to a much more fragmented concept of 
space, involving different mathematical spaces, as well as social spaces (Lefebvre, 
1991). Cartesian space is now supplemented with a multitude of information spaces 
of varying size, varying solidity, varying entanglement with the actual world, and 
different numbers and kinds of dimensions. 
Newtonian space is material in the sense that we see it as an empty box 
stretching eternally in all three dimensions, and that we can fill this box with 
physical objects; physical objects move through this space, defining it. Virtual space 
is post-physical. It lacks the material physicality of actual space; instead it is based 
on information; data move through this space, defining it. It has an existence, but it 
is a space that does not reside within the Newtonian space (Wertheim, 1999). The 
overlap between actual and virtual space is complex. Virtuality can be seen as a 
dematerialization of material actuality; the materiality of the actual is reduced to 
information. Virtuality is also a materialization of mental space; information is 
given shape and spatial extension. The Cartesian coordinate system is a conceptual 
bridge between geometry and algebra, between space and data. Descartes both 
“’algebraized’ geometry and ‘geometrized’ algebra” (ibid., p20). The reason why 
space can be used in this fluid and flexible way is that space is fundamentally based 
on relations, at least according to seventeenth century mathematician and 
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who perceived it as a relational system, a 
mathematical structure (Nusselder, 2009). Space is not necessarily physical. Space is 
created when different objects or data values are related to each other, but 
separated. If there is no relation between objects or data values then space does not 
appear. Borgmann (2001) suggests that in virtuality “distances are irrelevant, but 
connections and continuities matter” (p.94), and Wertheim emphasizes that both 
on the hardware level and the community level, “the very essence of cyberspace is 
relational” (p.299). Note that William Gibson emphasized this relational aspect of 
space in his first explanation of his fictional cyberspace; in Burning Chrome he writes 
that cyberspace is “an abstract representation of the relationships between data 
systems”. 
The concept that there is some kind of space behind the computer screen has 
become ingrained in our conception of the computer (Kerman, 1992; Nusselder, 
2009; Turkle, 1995). The graphical user interface of a conventional desktop 
computer is clearly a space, even though flat and abstract. Novak claims that 
cyberspace is “a completely spatialized visualization of all information … 
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processing systems” (Novak, 1991, p.225). The idea that information can be 
manifested as an information space has been further emphasized by work in 
information visualization that often employ spatial aspects, for example the 
influential work of Muriel Cooper who combined graphical design, architecture and 
information visualization. Nevertheless, many academics emphasize that virtuality 
can be, but does not need to be, spatial. Heim (1993) writes that cyberspace only 
“seems to take place within the framework of real space” (p.131). Nusselder (2009) 
describes cyberspace as a mental realm and later he claims that “the mind does not 
have an extension” (p.57) – therefore cyberspace should be fundamentally 
nonspatial, but spatiality can be added at will. Media theoretician Lev Manovich 
(2001) has used the term spaceless space to describe cyberspace. 
Virtuality is essentially a post-physical information structure. It is not only 
information, and not all information structures are virtual. Rather, the virtual is an 
effect of a particular kind of information structure. Information is claimed to be 
separate from materiality. In 1948, Claude Shannon defined information 
mathematically, describing it as a pattern without dimensions or materiality, 
separated from any substrate that carries it (Hayles, 1999). In 1994, Alvin Toffler 
and others (1994) made the hyperbolic claim that “the central event of the 20th 
century is the overthrow of matter” (p.1). However, N. Katherine Hayles (1999) 
contest this, claiming that all information structures are in some way grounded in 
materiality. We must remember that even virtuality is grounded in physical 
materiality; there is always hardware that scaffolds the software, and we experience 
the virtual through our material bodies (Cleland, 2009; Hayles, 1996; van Dijk, 
1997). Maybe we should see information, and thus the virtual, as a pattern that 
even if materially grounded, can, with modern information technology, swiftly and 
with little effort move and transform. This ease gives the impression of 
immateriality. There has been a major shift from technology that primarily 
manipulates matter to technology that primarily manipulates mathematical 
algorithms and coded data (one illustration of many is the move from editing 
movies by cutting and pasting strips of celluloid to changing time-code data in a 
computer file). This shift to a technology that manipulates immaterial information 
and not matter, opens up for the ability to perform transformations (Murray, 1997; 
Nusselder, 2009). Since the virtual is based on information and algorithms, the 
presentation of objects is not pre-determined; information and its form are 
separated (Grau, 2003). The separation of form and content is a prevailing concept 
for the interaction with computers in general (Bardzell, Bolter & Löwgren, 2010). 
Virtual objects are, in the word used by Manovich, liquid (2001). As Nusselder 
(2009) asks rhetorically, “what is supposed to be the right form for a ‘package’ of 
zeros and ones” (p.48)? Computers use algorithms to manipulate information. As 
long as something can be broken down into a sequence of procedures, it can be 
programmed. This aspect of the computer – it being an almost indefinitely flexible 
multi-purpose machine – is so taken for granted that we tend to forget it, but it is 
what makes computers capable of producing such deep changes as the ones we see 
in society. Thus, one of the characteristics of the virtual is plasticity. 
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Almost virtual – Baudrillard’s simulacra and simulation 
The connection between Baudrillard and virtuality seems obvious, it has even 
manifested in mainstream popular media; the movie The Matrix famously include a 
scene where the protagonist Neo hides cash in a hollowed out copy of Jean 
Baudrillard’s book Simulacra and Simulations. This inclusion has been debated at 
length – see for example Rovira (2005), Lovén (2001), Constable (2006), Merrin 
(2003), Chan (2008) and Zagorac (2009) – and it might be that it has been given 
too much attention. The reference to Baudrillard is brief and not dwelled upon in 
the movie (even though the character Morpheus later uses the term “desert of the 
real” which is a direct quote from the Baudrillard text). 
A simulacra is as a copy without an original (Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007; 
Hayles, 1993b), an apparent representation that is not really a representation 
because “the original no longer even exist” (Baudrillard, 1981, p.99). Baudrillard’s 
thoughts on simulacra are initially described in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a) 
and in Simulations (1983). Baudrillard’s further claims that when a mediation 
becomes too perfect, and especially too dominant, then it replaces the original, and 
becomes hyperreal (Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007), a “self-referential system of 
signs and images” that dominate our understanding of the world (Lovén, 2001, 
p.9). The hyperreal develops “its own referential process” (Chan, 2008, p.5), so that 
it primarily refers to itself instead of its original, circulating “in an endless play of 
simulation” (Kearney, 1998, p.7). Famous places, such as Los Angeles, the Grand 
Canyon or the Eiffel Tower, make excellent examples of hyperrealism. Media 
consumers in the western world are continuously exposed to images of, for 
example, Los Angeles. This image becomes more important for us than the actual 
Los Angeles, and if we eventually go there, we compare the actual to the hyperreal, 
and the latter might feel more real, even if it is not. Baudrillard primarily refers to 
images, television and movies. This suggests that hyperrealism is the result of a 
quite traditional mediation.  
Baudrillard is far from being the only one or the first to describe how 
representations shadow the actual (Kearney, 1998; Lovén, 2001; Lovén, 2010); 
rather, “the history of the simulacrum is the history of the image and its reception” 
(Merrin, 2001, p.91). Janet Murray (1997) reminds us that storytellers have been 
giving similar dire warnings, for example in the fiction of Huxley and Bradbury. As 
outlined previously, Svante Lovén (2010) provides an extensive overview of 
fictional dystopias related to media technology. The common prohibition in many 
religions of images depicting God clearly demonstrates skepticism towards images, 
grounded in the fear that the imagery will be worshipped instead of the deity 
behind it. Aristotle’s stern judgment of spectacle and imagery still influences the 
elevation of text over images. Svante Lovén (2010), as well as Liljefors (2006), 
describe how painted imagery, especially trompe-l’œil has been attacked for its 
attempt at creating illusions. These attacks often refer to the myth about Zeuxis’s 
painted grapes, so lifelike that birds tried to eat them. As much as 500 years ago, 
Marsilio Ficino and Sir Philip Sidney argued, in 1482 and 1580 respectively, that 
poetry and painting demonstrated man’s power over nature, and our self-
divinization and hubris (Lovén, 2010). The invention of photography and cinema 
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brought even deeper concerns than those previously targeted at paintings and 
sculptures. Daniel Joseph Boorstin wrote in his 1962 book The image: a guide to 
pseudo-events in America that the Grand Canyon had been transformed to “a 
disappointing reproduction of the Kodachrome original” (p.14). Also during the 
1960s, Guy Debord wrote La Société du spectacle (1967) where he argued that social 
life gradually is replaced by the representation of social life, so that “everything that 
was directly lived has moved away into a representation” (p.1). Umberto Eco wrote 
about hyperreality in his 1973 essay Il costume di casa, later reprinted as Travels in 
hyperreality, discussing the desire for fake reproductions of American history. 
Neither simulacra nor hyperrealism deals with virtuality per se. Rather, both 
concepts deal with representation on a more general level (Friedberg, 2006; 
Gordon, 2002; Heuser, 2003). Virtuality can be either mimetic (a copy of an actual 
original) or a simulacra (a copy without an original). The conclusion is that 
Baudrillard is of some peripheral interest in a discussion about virtuality, but he 
does not bring any deeper insights related to virtuality specifically. 
Opposing or supplementing the actual 
It lies out of the scope of this poetic of virtuality to define, characterize or discuss 
the concept of reality at any length. However, an understanding of the concept has 
much importance as a counterpoint for virtuality, so it cannot be dismissed 
completely, even if, as Brind and others (Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007) write, it 
is a word “so volatile that it must be handled with the linguistic equivalent of 
radiation-protection gloves” (p.5). A pragmatic approach to reality is the 
straightforward suggestion formulated by Philip Dick, the pre-cyberpunk writer 
that occupied so much of his writing career and private life with questions 
concerning authenticity and reality. Dick writes that “reality is that which, when you 
stop believing in it, doesn’t go away” (Dick, 1978, p.2). Dick then chose a 
fundamentally phenomenological stance, differentiating between the inner mental 
world and the perception of the external, consensual world. Consider a virtual 
world such as Grand Theft Auto. The game is not actual, but it is real, in the sense 
that even if I stop believing that there is a game called Grand Theft Auto, that will 
not stop others from playing the game, or me from seeing ads for the game in the 
newspaper. In everyday language, it is easy to make the mistake of opposing reality 
and virtuality (Nusselder, 2009; Skagestad, 1998). However, virtuality cannot be 
opposed to reality; it has to be considered being a sub-category of reality. Instead it 
makes sense to oppose virtuality and actuality, as proposed by several academics 
(Brind, McKenzie & Sutton, 2007; Bryant & Pollock, 2010; Deleuze, 1968; Doyle, 
2009; Nusselder, 2009). 
We have a tendency to structure everything in dualistic pairs. This is certainly the 
case when it comes to issues around virtuality, as illustrated by the polarity 
reality/virtuality, and also by other polarities such as actuality/virtuality, 
material/immaterial, nature/technology, fiction/non-fiction, and body/mind. A 
postmodern stance tends to reject such polarities, and according to Veronica 
Hollinger, cyberpunk “is about the breakdown of these oppositions” (Hollinger, 
1991, p.205). Samuel Weber argues that the complex relationship between the 
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actual world and virtual worlds “can hardly be reduced to the relatively simple form 
of a mutually exclusive opposition” (Weber, 2010, p.65). There are instead different 
ways to relate the virtual to the actual, emphasizing that “the virtual is its own 
reality” (ibid., p.69), and that it supplants (Heim, 1993) and juxtaposes (Nusselder, 
2009) the actual. It can be thought of as a “a new layer of reality” (Heim, 1993, 
p.117). Sherry Turkle quotes one of her interviewees explaining that “RL [real life] 
is just one more window” (Turkle, 1995, p.13); the quote describes the situation of 
using a computer with many windows open. The different windows on a personal 
computer metaphorically illustrate the complexity of virtualities and realities. One 
window might be the view into Grand Theft Auto or World of Warcraft, worlds in the 
form of interactive, habitable fiction. Another window might display the word 
processor Microsoft Word, a digital tool with traces of virtuality in small icons that 
look slightly like buttons that can be pressed. And, finally, glancing to the side of 
the screen, there is the rest of reality. 
The virtual as a lesser copy or beyond the actual  
Imagine a day at the beach. Sand. Water. Sun. 
Imagine a day in Minecraft. Hardware. Screen. Pixels. 
Why is it that we shy away from the idea of replacing a beach with a virtual 
world? Why do we tell our kids to shut down and walk out? Why is the virtual 
worth less then the actual? Some academics take strong positions concerning these 
questions. Michael Benedikt (1991), Howard Rheingold (1991) and Sherry Turkle 
(1995) have been mostly optimistic in their writing. Turkle makes the non-
judgmental statement that “we are moving toward a culture of simulation in which 
people are increasingly comfortable with substituting representations of reality for 
the real” (Turkle, 1995, p.23). Mark Slouka is rhetorically critical in his book War of 
the Worlds (1995), while Jaron Lanier gives a sobering account in his You are not a 
gadget: a manifesto (2010). Both Slouka and Lanier warn us against letting the virtual 
take too much precedence over the actual. Our desire is split between nature and 
technology. Nature developed humans, but humans developed technology. So 
which is our most natural environment? The screen or the beach? 
No matter how alluring the virtual is, it nevertheless disappears when power 
drains. This illustrates a fundamental aspect of the virtual; it is sustained by 
technology (Lovén, 2010). The actual and natural have, compared to the virtual, 
completely different underlying set of causalities and underlying support structures 
(Irwin, 2002). So the virtual worlds might be worth less because they are our 
construct; they are fleeting, and they are possible to shut down. N. Katherine 
Hayles (1993a) soberly reminds us that “as we rush to explore the new vistas that 
cyberspace has made available for colonization, let us also remember the fragility of 
a material world that cannot be replaced” (p.49). Our value assessment of the 
virtual also depends on how we see the virtual in relation to the actual. Either we 
can regard the virtual as a pale imitation of the actual, a faulty duplication, or we 
can argue that the virtual does not try to fruitlessly mimic the actual. Rather the 
virtual carries a potential that is ready to be actualized, ready to be a supplement to 
the actual (Levy, 1998; Ryan, 1999). Our ability to see the virtual as a duplicate or 
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supplement depends on what we actually do with virtual technology. A virtual 
laboratory that does not manage to faithfully mimic the tactile handling of 
chemicals and equipment is a copy that lacks in comparison to the original, at least 
if the intention with the lab is to let students learn specifically how to handle 
chemicals and equipment. As a contrasting example, an educational game that 
simulate how virus pandemics could spread across the world and kill all of 
humanity (such as the game Plague Inc. by Ndemic Creations) could be seen as an 
extension of the actual, since it allows you to learn by doing things that would not 
be allowed in the actual. 
Cyberspace evangelists saw the virtual as a way to correct different flaws in the 
actual, a way to fulfill the broken promises of the real world. In the typically large 
and evocative words of Doel and Clarke, “priority is not given to the fallen first; it 
is withheld for the full second” (1999, p.268). They suggest there are three kinds of 
virtuality: 
•  Virtual reality 1: Simulation 
•  Virtual reality 2: Suppletion 
•  Virtual reality 3: S(ed)uction 
Doel and Clarke give the interesting example of landscape gardening. The English 
garden with its idealized nature is a simulation. The French garden is an abstract 
extension of the actual; it does not try to be a forest, instead it makes nature into its 
opposite. It converts organic chaos to geometrical perfection – a suppletion. 
The Zen garden might be close to their third kind of virtuality – s(ed)uction, a 
“final resolution of the fault-ridden world” (ibid., p.272). If s(ed)uction is a 
virtuality so sublime and alluring that we choose it instead of the actual world, then 
we might say that one example of this s(ed)uction is sandbox game worlds such as 
Grand Theft Auto. Thus, the third level of virtuality is not a lesser copy, nor an 
enhancing add-on, but a new world into which we are seduced. 
Michael Heim (1993) makes more direct connections between virtuality and 
sexuality, using not the term seduction, but the term erotic. He illustrates how 
strong our urge to enter the virtual can be, an urge similar to a sexual desire not in 
function but in strength. William Gibson was quite explicit in Neuromancer where he 
lets his protagonist Case compare the sexual orgasm together with Molly to his 
existence in cyberspace (Nusselder, 2009; Turkle, 1995). Heim also mentions Case’s 
erotically obsessive desire to return to the matrix. One intention Heim has with the 
term erotic is to emphasize that our desire for cyberspace is not only “utilitarian or 
aesthetic”, but goes further, becoming “a symbiotic relationship and ultimately a 
mental marriage to technology” (Heim, 1993, p.85). In other words, the virtual can 
be regarded a limited copy of the actual, a copy that in certain aspects extends the 
actual. This copy, even though limited, nevertheless seduces us effectively. 
A standard trope in cyberpunk is that of the hacker who strongly rejects the 
body. The body is an “outer shell” that is left “behind upon entry into the 
immaterial realm of cyberspace” (Heuser, 2003, p.33). Hayles points out how 
Necromancer’s protagonist Case “regards his body as so much ‘meat’ that exists 
primarily to sustain his consciousness until the next time he can enter cyberspace” 
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(Hayles, 1999, p36). In Ready Player One, (Cline, 2012) the protagonist chooses to 
indulge in the computer game world of the novels narrative, and rejects actuality by 
covering the windows of his apartment with black paint. This is indeed a harsh 
rejection of the actual. The word meatspace is typical cyberpunk terminology, 
meaning the actual world, as opposed to cyberspace. It is telling how the word 
meat is used instead of body or flesh. Meat brings an association to consumption, 
something that exists purely to be consumed. Meat does not have any value on its 
own. It is non-erotic and does not evoke desire, as does body or flesh. Cyberspace 
evangelists saw meatspace as a prison from which you needed to escape. It is also 
seen as the opposition between the heavy body of meat and the ethereal body of 
information (Dery, 1996; Lavery, 2001; Lovén, 2010; Nusselder, 2009). Barbara 
Flueckiger (2008) points out the “dissonance between body cult and 
disembodiment” (p.3); while the body is seen as disposable in typical cyber-
evangelism, there is a likewise strong body cult in marketing and entertainment, 
continuously repeating imagery of perfect bodies and turning the individual body 
into a project to manage. 
As Doyle (2009) has pointed out that the immaterial body of the avatar is the 
first step towards a post-physical, disembodied experience of cyberspace. But, the 
avatar is simply a visual representation of a body. We are far from being digital 
angles in an online heaven. Futurists dream of going much further, of discarding 
the physical body and uploading the mind, achieving technological transcendence 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1992; Hayles, 1993b; Hayles, 1999; Wertheim, 1998; Wertheim, 
1999). This idea of a post-physical existence belongs to posthumanism, and 
posthumanism asks theoretical questions about what we eventually will develop 
into as a species. This has been a commodity in science fiction for a few decades, 
but scientists such as Hans Moravec and Rudy Rucker have also seriously 
considered whether our minds can be stored and executed as software on 
computers (Wertheim, 1999). As early as 1950, the mathematician and philosopher 
Norbert Wiener played with the idea that a pattern of a human could be 
telegraphed (Hayles, 1999). This assumption requires us to see ourselves as patterns 
of information and not embodied creatures. It requires that we regard the body as a 
machine that we use, and not something we are. If our mind and consciousness is 
information, then we might be stored in another physical substrate than our 
organic brain. So far there is no evidence that it is even theoretically possible to 
scan the human brain in sufficient detail, nor that a simulation of such a scan would 
be self-conscious and have an identity comparable to that of what our biological 
brain exhibits. The idea of posthuman transcendence has been harshly criticized 
from many directions, referred to as simpleminded Gnosticism (Davis, 1998). For 
example, Margaret Wertheim cannot “imagine a worse fate than being downloaded 
into immortality in cyberspace” (Wertheim, 1999, p.265). Jaron Lanier harshly 
criticizes what he refers to as the new religion of post-physicality, a religion that 
wants us to believe that “information is real and alive” (Lanier, 2010, p.29). His 
argument is that information cannot be elevated to the same status as biological 
and physical entities, because information needs to be executed, and information is 
nothing without an interpreter. Hayles proposes a rather down to earth view of 
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posthumanism, emphasizing that our identity depends on embodiment; she rejects 
the utopian posthumanism that sees our bodies as exchangeable “fashion 
accessories” (Hayles, 1999, p.5). Britt Farstad (2010) suggests in a similar vein that 
posthumanism is based on a misunderstanding of the Cartesian mind/body 
dualism, the erroneous idea that mind and body can be seen as separate from each 
other. This dualism is also strongly contested by phenomenology, which emphasize 
our being in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
Freedom, empowerment and frontier spirit 
In cyberpunk fiction, the cyborgian enhancement of the body is usually associated 
with empowerment, and achieving control (Bukatman, 1997). The history of the 
personal computer and the Internet is associated with a striving for personal 
freedom and empowerment, as illustrated by the rebellious claim that “you have no 
sovereignty where we gather”. John Perry Barlow, an American poet and political 
activist, wrote this in 1996 (p.1), in A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
addressing it to the governments of the industrial world. He claimed that 
cyberspace could be seen as a governance-free space. The Internet was seen as a 
lawless country, a country to be explored and tamed, in a parallel strikingly similar 
to the mythology of the frontier spirit of the Wild West. Today we have a more 
mature stance towards the Internet – much of the frontier romanticism is gone, but 
the Internet can still be seen as a vehicle for freedom, exemplified by citizen 
journalism and at least some aspects of social media. It is as if the Internet is the 
new café where revolutions are spawned. John Coate (1992) refers to the Internet 
as a Third Place, adapting Ray Oldenburg’s idea where the First Place is the home, 
the Second Place is at work, and the Third Place is a commons, a neutral space 
where people can meet and conversation is the primary activity. Wertheimer (1999) 
has also drawn parallels from the Internet to both the (seemingly) open and 
democratic space of ancient Athens, the so called agora, as well as the European 
coffeehouses of the seventeenth century. However, it has been disputed whether 
the Internet is such a neutral space, and whether online communities are as free 
from hierarchies and judgments concerning gender, race and class, as initially 
anticipated (Borer, 2002; Kolko & Reid, 1998; Wertheimer, 1999). Power 
hierarchies do break down online, but new ones seem to re-emerge just as easily 
(Jones, 1998; Klastrup, 2003a). Members of online communities do experiment 
with identity – especially in role-playing games – but more often we bring our 
actual class, gender, name and personality into the online environment (Baym, 
1998; Cody et al, 1997; Danet, 1998; Joe, 1997; Jones, 1998), especially in social 
media environments such as Facebook and Twitter. 
The early development of the personal computer involved a distinct anti-
authoritarian and pro-decentralization stance, and some of the rhetoric was more 
or less directly targeted towards companies such as IBM and their mainframe 
computers. In Apple’s 1984 commercial, introducing the Macintosh, director Ridley 
Scott metaphorically depicted IBM as the Big Brother of Orwell’s novel 1984. 
About ten years earlier the organization People’s Computer Company had started a 
computer café in Redwood City (situated between San Francisco and what would 
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later be known as Silicon Valley) where terminals could be booked for programing 
or for text-based games, and on the front of their newsletter they stated that “until 
now computers have been used against people, now it’s time for a People’s 
Computer Company” (Markoff, 2005). The design and development of the 
personal computer had its roots in the revolutionary working prototype NLS 
developed by Douglas Engelbart at the Stanford Research Institute. The NLS was 
capable of combining different sorts of visual and text display, using mouse and 
keyboard as input devices, and of connecting with other computers (via leased 
telephone lines). The NLS was demonstrated on December 9th, 1968. During the 
demo “every significant aspect of today’s computing world was revealed in a 
magnificent hour and a half” (Markoff, 2005, p.148). The name of the department 
that Engelbart hade founded at Stanford – the Augmentation Research Center – 
reveal its connection to a strong movement towards using computer technology to 
augment the individual, a shift from technology and organization towards 
democratizing processes. This shift was related to the development in general of 
the counterculture of the late 1960’s. Douglas Engelbart was one of the advocators 
of this development. As summarized by Markoff, “computing went from being 
dismissed as a tool of bureaucratic control to being embraced as a symbol of 
individual expression and liberation” (ibid., p.xii). In both hacker culture and 
counterculture, there is a shared resistance against centralization and 
commercialization (Flichy, 2007). 
There are also suggestive associations between freedom, computers and drug 
use. Nusselder as well as Tatsumi point at the symbolic equivalence between drug 
use and computers (Nusselder, 2009; Tatsumi, 1986). Metaphorically, both drugs 
and computers have been associated with escapism, as a way to break out of reality 
and at least momentarily and illusionary achieve empowerment in order to fulfill 
different kinds of fantasies that give exaltation. Heuser points out that in Gibson’s 
description of cyberspace, he uses the term “consensual hallucination”. In 
Neuromancer, Gibson’s anti-hero Case is addicted both to chemical drugs and 
cyberspace, exemplified by the following passage. 
Because, in some weird and very approximate way, it was like a run in the matrix. 
Get just wasted enough, find yourself in some desperate but strangely arbitrary kind 
of trouble, and it was possible to see Ninsei as a field of data, the way the matrix had 
once reminded him of proteins linking to distinguish cell specialties. Then you could 
throw yourself into a highspeed drift and skid, totally engaged but set apart from it 
all, and all around you the dance of biz, information interacting, data made flesh in 
the mazes of the black market… 
There is a historical connection between drug liberalism and the personal computer 
via the people involved, as well as the intentions to augment the human mind. 
Myron Stolaroff is one example of a researcher that during the 1960s saw the same 
possibilities in LSD as others saw in the personal computer; the possibility to 
augment the human mind and its consciousness, both intellectually and creatively 
(Markoff, 2005). Timothy Leary, well-known drug evangelist, became enthusiastic 
over digital technology, proclaiming that the PC is the LSD of the 1980s. In 1995 
Brand wrote an essay tellingly titled We Owe It All to the Hippies, where he puts 
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forward the idea that “counterculture’s scorn for centralized authority provided the 
philosophical foundations of not only the leaderless Internet but also the entire 
personal-computer revolution” (p.1). Counterculture, as well as emerging computer 
technology, found fertile ground during the 1960s in the city of San Francisco, a 
city characterized by an environment of freethinkers, stretching back to the gold 
rush and the 1860s. 
The frontier mythology of the quite recent American settlements, and especially 
the conquering of the west coast, has been adopted as a metaphor for the building 
of cyberspace and the Internet (Gunnarsson, 2002; Lovén, 2010). William Gibson’s 
tendency to refer to hackers as cowboys is a way of relating to frontier romanticism 
(Borer, 2002; Godhe, 2010a; Lovén, 2010; Murray, 1997; Olsen, 1992). In the 
rhetorical essay Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age 
from 1994, the authors Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin 
Toffler vividly claim that “cyberspace is the latest American frontier” and that 
“there are as yet no rules – just as there were no rules on the American continent in 
1620” (p.5). Similar attitudes were frequently pronounced when the first multi-user 
virtual worlds started to appear, especially in the descriptions of Active Worlds 
(Schroeder, Huxor & Smith, 2001; Castronova, 2007). Ethnographers such as 
Andrew Hudson-Smith (2002) studied Active Worlds in order to “fully document the 
development of a virtual environment from beginning to end, as a plot of virgin 
virtual land” (p.1). These early virtual worlds seemed to satisfy a romantic longing 
for finding new land, building anew, and nostalgic dreaming of escaping authority 
and achieving freedom (Lovén, 2010; Olsen, 1992). It gave escapists and visionaries 
a new frontier to pursue while the space frontier gradually crumbled in the long 
slow death of the American space program. Bryant and Pollock (2010) point out 
how the dreams of both the space frontier and the digital frontier allude to a deep 
and spiritual yearning to escape the bonds of Earth and dirt. Nineteenth century 
frontier mythology instructed the mindsets of the early development of the Internet 
(Epperson, 1995; Schroeder, Huxor & Smith, 2001). Built into the concept of the 
frontier is the idea that this frontier needs to be explored and tamed (Heuser, 
2003). Some of the early computer artists worked under the assumption that the 
“computer became a micro-universe, an ‘unimaginable new world’ ready for tireless 
exploration” (Taylor, 2004, p.158). But can virtuality really be explored? Is it 
reasonable to conceive of our own artifacts as untamed virgin territory? Taylor 
(2004) describes how – in making computer art – the computer was 
reconceptualized in the 1980s from a frontier world to a tool for personal 
expression. Baudrillard (2002) argues that in cyberspace we only “interacts with 
known elements, pre-existent sites, established codes” (p.179), and Csicsery-Ronay 
(1992) agrees that cyberspace “cannot be conquered for humanity because it is an 
aspect of humanity” (p.224). There is nothing truly unknown in the virtual. 
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Structuring fiction, actuality and virtuality 
In this chapter I start with a brief overview of how other academics have structured 
the actual and the virtual, and then describe the model I have used for structuring 
actuality and virtuality, as well as fictional narratives. 
There are several models for conceptualizing the virtual, such as Popper’s Worlds 
1, 2 and 3 (Popper, 1979), Nusselder’s (2009) domains matrix, cyberspace and 
interface, and Stone’s (1991) four epochs. However, the models from Popper and 
Nusselder are general and abstract, and therefore not of much help for structuring 
a poetics of virtuality with focus on fictional representations of virtuality. Stone’s 
four epochs are primarily a device for structuring a historical perspective. 
In his essay Cyberspace: Some Proposals, Michael Benedikt (1991) attempts to use 
geometrical and mathematical arguments in order to suggest a framework for how 
to construct cyberspace. He grounds his arguments in “natural, physical space” and 
loosely organizes his reasoning under the “essentially topological rubrics” (p.132) 
Dimensionality, Continuity, Curvature, Density and Limits. Benedikt also 
formulates seven design principles. Some of these are relevant, for example the 
Principle of Indifference, stating that the perceived realness of the virtual world 
partly depends on how indifferent the world is to a particular user. The Principle of 
Transit suggests that it should take time and effort to move from one point to 
another. Both these principles are based on the belief that cyberspace should mimic 
the limitations of actual space. However, much of Benedikt’s reasoning is more 
relevant for information visualization than virtuality; he investigate different 
methods for mapping data to spatial and non-spatial dimensions, and what he 
writes about the virtual is nowadays outdated and irrelevant. Writing in 1991, he 
was still trapped in the Gibsonian idea of a three-dimensional Internet, and his 
proposals circled around that vision.15 
Michael Heim (1993) proposes seven essences of virtual reality that summarize 
different aspects of the virtual. 
•  Simulation – primarily the simulation in form of realistic computer graphics 
•  Interaction – the interaction is often based on real-life logic 
•  Artificiality – the virtual is artificial, but Heim warns us from using artificiality 
as a definition, since artificiality covers everything ever constructed by man. 
•  Immersion – primarily the hardware and software aspects of immersion 
•  Telepresence – the user’s virtual presence in an actual or virtual environment 
•  Full-body Immersion – immersion provided by head-mounted displays or a 
CAVE system 
•  Networked Communication – networked computers make it possible to 
meet in the virtual environments 
                                         
15 Moere, Neuckermans and Heylighen have documented an attempt to build a VRML based 
search engine interface based on Benedikt’s principles (1998). 
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Several of Heim’s essences are relevant for a poetics of virtuality. However, the 
proposed essences do not say much about the ontological structure of virtuality. 
What now follows is my own model for how virtuality is ontologically 
constructed, with a special focus on how it can be inserted into the framing 
narrative of fiction. This is the model upon which my own poetics of virtuality is 
built.16 The terms used throughout this poetics are highlighted in upper case in the 
following discussion. Typical for the studied narratives are that they hold both a 
framing narrative and an insert narrative. The framing narrative often is the actual 
world (“reality”), while the insert narrative is the events taking place inside one or 
more virtual worlds. In for example The Matrix, the framing narrative is the 
dystopic world where humans and machines battle for survival, while the insert 
narrative is the virtuality, the simulation, where most human minds are imprisoned 
and where the heroes of the story use super-natural abilities to fight artificial 
intelligence programs. The distinction between framing and insert narrative is not 
always clear-cut. In for example The Thirteenth Floor we only see the actual world 
during the last few minutes of the whole movie, while in eXistenZ and Avalon it is 
not clear if we ever see a glimpse of the actual world. 
 
 
Figure 2. The general topology of how virtuality relates to fiction and reality. 
                                         
16 Note that this description concerns movies where the virtual is a part of the plot, the diegetic 
world of the movie. The concept of virtual cinematography is not related to this, since virtual 
cinematography is a production method where much of the footage of the movie is shot within a 
virtual environmental. 
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Figure 2 on the previous page schematizes the general topology of actuality, fiction 
and virtuality. REALITY is the total sum of everything that is, including all mental 
constructs we create such as fantasies, illusions and so on. Reality encompasses 
both truth and lie, because even if a lie is untrue it still exists in the form of a lie. In 
the same way fiction is included in reality.17 
In this reality the world is split up in different ways. One is FICTION, for 
example stories, tales, and other fictional accounts in literature, movies and games. 
The term diegetic means the “fictional world of the story” (Bordwell, 1985, p.22), 
the world of the narrative (Dudley, 1984). For example, music can be diegetic 
(being played in the fictional world and heard by the fictive characters), or non-
diegetic (added as a layer outside the fictive world, only for the audience to hear). 
However, fiction and diegetic are not the same thing (Genette, 1980).18 The 
opposite of fiction is often referred to as reality, the real world and so on, but in my 
model I use the term REAL-LIFE as the opposite to FICTION. Real-life and 
fictional characters, events or places can co-exist inside the diegetic world of a 
narrative, as illustrated already in the title of for example The Hunchback of Notre-
Dame. The hunchback is fictional, while Notre-Dame is a real-life cathedral. The 
Saturn V rocket booster is an example of real-life technology, while the light saber 
is fictional technology. Note that the boundary between fiction and real-life is 
blurred. Real-life humans such as Abraham Lincoln can be used in fictional stories, 
for example portraying him as a vampire hunter. 
Another sub-set of reality is VIRTUALITY. In everyday speech virtuality is 
often opposed to physical reality or the real world, but I see virtuality as a subset of 
reality, and instead oppose virtuality with ACTUALITY. It is important to note 
that FICTION and VIRTUALITY are parallel sub-sets of REALITY, free to 
separate or combine in different ways.19 Also, REAL-LIFE and ACTUALITY 
normally collapse into each other, but it is still important to consider them as two 
separate concepts when discussing different combinations of fiction and virtuality. 
The separation of real-life and actuality, for example, explains how the fictional 
character Neo in The Matrix can escape from the virtual to the actual, without you 
having the chance of running into him in the street (since he is fictional and you are 
real-life). 
By forming a 2x2 matrix with the opposing pairs actual–virtual and fiction–real-
life, a model is constructed that can hold all the sub-sets of reality that will be 
discussed in this poetics. The combination REAL-LIFE / ACTUAL is the ordinary 
world around us. From this position you can go one step in either two directions. 
                                         
17 The reality that is discussed here can be an external, physical, independent reality, or an inner 
mental construct. The reality concept we employ does not matter for the model. 
18 The alignment of fiction and diegetic break up in for example a documentary; a documentary 
movie holds a diegetic world but the story is considered non-fictional. 
19 An architectural virtual reality model of a planned building is virtual, but not fictional, just as an 
architectural drawing is not fictional. A romantic comedy is a fictional story, but without the 
virtual (usually). However, a romantic comedy could be narrated in a virtual reality world or in a 
game world – this would be a virtuality with a fictional story inside.  
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You can enter fiction, where narratives move in a fictional version of the actual. 
This is FICTIONAL / ACTUAL, or just ordinary fiction – for example, Robinson 
Crusoe is actually shipwrecked in his diegetic world, but the story is made up, a 
fantasy. You can go the other directions and immerse yourself in a virtuality such as 
a computer game world or a virtual reality display. This is the REAL-LIFE / 
VIRTUAL, that is, virtual worlds that we actually can enter, experience and interact 
with. The fourth combination, two steps away from the REAL-LIFE / ACTUAL 
corner is what I will be focused on in the poetics of virtuality, the FICTIONAL / 
VIRTUAL. These are virtual worlds that we can not enter because they are part of 
a fictional account. The Matrix in the move The Matrix is such a virtual world. It is 
a virtuality wrapped in a fiction. 
This is a general model and it can be expanded and made more complex, as will 
be illustrated by a few examples. 
Examples of how virtuality and fiction are structured 
The model described in the previous section is generalized. For a specific narrative 
a specific model can be drawn. There are a variety of different configurations in the 
narratives I have studied and worked with. The following is an illustration of how 
the different variants can be modeled. The movies that I mention are introduced 
more extensively in the chapter The selected narratives, see page 87. 
Tron – the overt virtual world 
The relation between actual and virtual is straightforward in this case. What we see 
is a fictional feature film, and in this fictional (but actual) world, a (fictional) virtual 
world is created by computers. From the viewpoint of the audience the virtual is 
inside the fiction. Other examples similar to Tron are Johnny Mnemonic, The 
Lawnmower Man and Tron Legacy. 
 
 
Figure 3. The virtual /actual structure of the feature film Tron. 
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The Thirteenth Floor – the covert virtual world and the virtual within the 
virtual 
This is similar to the previous example – a virtuality inside a fiction – but it is 
complicated by two additional aspects. First, the virtual world is deceivingly similar 
to an actual world, initially fooling both the audience and the diegetic characters. 
The virtual appears to be cloaked as an actual world. Other examples of this are The 
Matrix and eXistenZ. Second, there are several levels of virtual worlds within each 
other. Inside the virtual world there is a computer simulating yet another virtual 
world. Such levels of virtuality can also be seen in for example Avalon and Inception. 
 
 
Figure 4. The virtual/actual structure of the feature film The Thirteenth Floor. 
Mirror’s Edge – real-life virtual world 
The primary focus of this poetics of virtuality is fictional virtualities. However, real-
life virtualities cannot be ignored. Real-life and fictional virtualities inspire each 
other to a large extent. A real-life virtual world such as Mirror’s Edge (or Minecraft, 
World of Warcraft, The Sims, Grand Theft Auto, and many more) is not a virtual inside 
a fiction; it is just virtual, available to us in real-life. We do not have to contend 
with watching fictional characters experience this virtuality, but instead we can 
experience it ourselves. The virtual world can mimic a real-life world – the city in 
Grand Theft Auto pretending to be New York – or it can indulge in and 
acknowledge its virtuality, foregrounding that it is virtual, as for example in 
Minecraft. This relation between virtuality in computer games and the actual can be 
compared to similar relationships in fictional narratives. The fictional virtuality in 
for example Tron is clearly virtual, whereas the virtual world in The Matrix hides that 
it is virtual. While the virtuality of, for example The Matrix is wrapped in a fiction, 
the Mirror’s Edge is rather a fiction wrapped in a virtuality, because the virtual world 
 
 
 61 
in Mirror’s Edge is clearly fictional. Other games, such as SimCity, simulate real-life, 
although they always have some degree of fiction. 
 
 
Figure 5. The virtual /actual structure of the computer game Mirror’s Edge. 
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METHODS FOR INVESTIGATING VIRTUALITY 
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This chapter explains the research methods and interpretational 
framework chosen for the study, and how they have been used. 
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Studying media using hermeneutics, semiotics and 
ethnography 
When formulating this poetics of virtuality I have used two approaches: analysis of 
professionally produced media artifacts, and analysis of my own work with 
producing media artifacts.20 As mentioned previously, a poetics connects the 
process of production and the form of the final artifact, and it bridges practice and 
theory. Therefore I have chosen to analyze media artifacts from two directions, as 
an author and as a reader. I have used hermeneutics and semiotics for this analysis 
and for the interpretation it involves. Note that a poetics does not aim to interpret 
the meaning of individual works (Bordwell, 2006), but rather I have used 
interpretation in order to analyze how virtuality is represented. 
Authoring – studying media productions 
My own media productions have mostly been small-scale visualization projects 
related to public understanding of science or related to teaching. For the study of 
my own productions, I have used autoethnography and self-ethnography, two approaches 
based on ethnography. These are primarily tools for conducting observations, but 
these tools can also partly inform the analysis and writing. The analysis of these 
observations has been done with a hermeneutic approach, with support from the 
theoretical framework of production culture studies. 
Reading – studying narratives 
The professional media artifacts I have studied are primarily feature films depicting 
fictional virtualities, but also include short films, TV series, computer games, art 
works, novels and short stories. These narrative texts need to be interpreted, and 
analyzed. For this work, I have chosen hermeneutics (text interpretation) and semiotics 
(sign analysis) as my analytical framework, supported by theories on virtuality and 
production culture studies. I have used a general semiotic approach to study the 
different aspects of the narrative texts, and fruthermore visual semiotics have come 
to play a dominant part since the representation of virtuality has proved to be 
highly visual. 
 
In her own poetics of virtuality, Lisbeth Klastrup (2003a) argues that the study of 
online virtual worlds requires a cross-disciplinary approach because the phenomena 
itself is so complex. Roland Barthes (1977) acknowledges that the different aspects 
of communication (producer, message and reception) “do not call for the same 
method of investigation“ (p.15). There can be an advantage in using triangulation, 
and thus having different methods support each other, providing a deeper 
understanding as well as a more holistic overview (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; 
Creswell, 2003; Denzin, 1978; Flick, 2009; Iversen, 2005; Jick, 1979; Seale, 1999). 
This is not to say that one methodology can explain the results of the other. The 
intention is to achieve a deeper understanding, and a more complex theoretical 
                                         
20 I use the term media artifacts in order to include both narratives (movies and literature) and 
other products such as the interactive visualizations I have been working on. 
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understanding, by letting different approaches inform each other on equal terms. 
When the results from different approaches converge they confirm each other, and 
when they diverge they highlight areas that need alternative and richer explanations 
(Jick, 1979). My two approaches – the autoethnographic study of production 
processes and the semiotic study of fictional narratives – cover different ends of a 
continuum, ranging from high-end Hollywood productions (the study of existing 
narratives) to semi-professional small-scale productions (the study of my own 
productions). Even though the scale and production value of these different 
productions diverge to a large extent, they still share similar aspects when it comes 
to production processes and the representation of virtuality. 
Analyzing media – production, text and reception 
Media artifacts can be studied from very different viewpoints. These viewpoints 
can be sorted roughly based on the chronological life-cycle of media artifacts. First, 
media artifacts are produced, and this can be studied. The field of production culture 
studies is mostly occupied with issues concerning the production itself, such as for 
instance gender issues in the production crews. Second, the finalized media artifact 
can be studied, in order to investigate meaning and meaning making. Different 
readings can be applied to the text, using the text to illustrate and shed light on 
external conditions in society, for example by doing a feminist or socio-economic 
reading of a text. Interviews and other documentations from the production can 
also be used to shed light on the media product itself. Finally, the reception of the 
media artifacts can be studied, investigating how the audience responds to and 
interprets a text, a genre or a media. 
My study is primarily an analysis of the different narrative texts, supported by 
observations of production cultures. It is not a reception study, nor is it a 
production culture study per se. Likewise, it is not a study of semiotics, neither 
general nor film semiotics. Rather, production culture studies and semiotics are 
used as a means to an end. My analysis of fictional representations of virtuality 
results in a poetics of virtuality, a poetics that sheds light on how we think about 
virtuality. 
The concept of theory is fundamental in research, and so also in this study. 
Theory is used in film theory, semiotics, hermeneutics, ethnography, and a poetics 
is a treatise on theory and practice. However, theory is a multifaceted concept. A 
narrow and strict definition of theory is well described by Sutton and Staw (1995) – 
theory answers the question “why”? It explains empirical observations with “causal 
arguments that are abstract” (p.4) and which can be generalized; that is, they can be 
applied to other settings then the one observed. Theory is a model to be tested 
(Brannick & Coghlan, 2014). Usually the theory is able to predict the outcome of a 
situation, and this often means that an experiment – the intentional arrangement of 
a situation to test the prediction – can be conducted. The experiment or the 
observation of other similar settings is guided by a hypothesis, and if the hypothesis 
is proved correct, then it becomes a theory verified by empirical observations. This 
view on theory is highly positivistic and dominates natural sciences. However, it is 
 
 
 67 
also quite well spread in psychology, pedagogy, sociology, as well as in other 
domains. 
A more general view on theory is that it is concept driven. Therefore, theory 
offers descriptions, but not predictions (Andrew, 1984). This is common in film 
theory and other media studies. Andrew refers to film theory as “a verbal 
representation of the film complex“, an accumulation of “ ideas and attitudes 
clustered around concepts” (p.3). Theory is then a symbolic system used to 
organize and interpret culture (Brannick & Coghlan, 2014). 
Theory as it is used in ethnography, is also concept driven and primarily 
concerned with descriptions and interpretations. When coding and analyzing 
ethnographic observations, theory sometimes emerges in the form of explanatory 
models. But falsifiable theories are generally not possible to formulate, mostly 
because of the impossibility of controlling all variables (Atkinson & Hammersley, 
1989). 
The theory that is offered in this poetics of virtuality should be thought of as an 
abstract description of the observed practices. 
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Hermeneutics – a theory of text interpretation 
The death of the author and her resurrection 
Hermeneutics is a method for and a theory of text interpretation. Hermeneutics 
“proceeds from history, desire, and value” (Andrew, 1984, p.176), thereby being 
opposed to structuralist methods of text analysis and what Andrew describes as 
mechanical attempts at interpretation. In Historical Poetics of Cinema, Bordwell (2006) 
launches a rather fierce attack on what he claims to be the doctrinal, political and 
rhetorical work in cultural studies where the interpretation of a movie or other 
narrative is used as an illustration of an assumed viewpoint. He asserts that a 
poetics should be based on open-ended questions, an approach that aligns well 
with a hermeneutic method. A major development of hermeneutics has been a 
move towards a radical standpoint – to more or less exclude the author from the 
analysis. When employing a hermeneutic approach, the text is assumed to stand 
apart from the author; the text has meaning in relation to other texts, not in 
relation to the author. When using hermeneutics, we see “interpretation as a 
dialogue between the text and the interpreter” (Prasad, 2002, p.16). 
This standpoint towards the author is referred to as the death of the author, this 
being the title of the French literary theorist, linguist, and semiotician Roland 
Barthes’ essay on the subject (Barthes, 1977). The exclusion of the author was a 
reaction against the earlier hermeneutic idea that when reading you should try to 
become the author, and try to achieve her viewpoint. The problem with trying to 
understand the author’s viewpoint is that it is difficult or even impossible to attain. 
Interpretation should not be an attempt to “mind-read” the author, because we can 
not (Prasad, 2002). We do not have access to the author, and we do not have access 
to the author’s context. The author had one horizon of understanding; as readers 
we have our own horizon. We end up constructing an author that did not exist 
(Lye, 2000). If I write a book, and you read it, I do not want you to put words into 
my mouth, saying that this is what I meant. I want you as a reader to find your own 
meaning, and to know that it is your own meaning and not mine. 
Interpretation is always open for negotiation and discussion; it should never be 
considered final (Ödman, 2007; Barthes, 1975). That was the fear that Barthes had, 
“to give an Author to a text is to impose upon that text a stop clause, to furnish it 
with a final signification, to close the writing” (Barthes, 1977, p.5). We must allow 
for some width of interpretation. But, we are not free to interpret a text in any way. 
The spread of possible meanings has limitations. The German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer wrote that “meanings represent a fluid multiplicity of 
possibilities… but within this multiplicity of what can be thought… not everything 
is possible” (Gadamer, 1989, p.281). Stuart Hall wrote about a “preferred reading” 
and how codes guide the reader towards a dominant meaning (Hall, 1980). To 
illustrate, we can consider the representation of virtuality that we will investigate in 
this poetics. In the movie The Matrix, it is quite obvious that the virtual world is 
supposed to be regarded as such; it is expressed literally in the dialogue. As a 
comparison, in the movie eXistenZ it is suggested that the final shot still takes place 
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inside a virtual world, but it is quite unproblematic to choose the opposite 
interpretation, that the convoluted narrative has finally arrived at the actual world. 
The distanced stance towards the author also means that explanations, for 
example from interviewing the author, are not valid as truth or final interpretations. 
Interviews are to be regarded as just more texts to be interpreted. When studying 
media, it is relevant to study trade magazines, interviews, and such, since they give 
insights into the production cultures of the media industry in general – but as 
Caldwell (2009a) has made clear, we should not regard these documents as 
revealing a final truth; they are just texts to interpret, alongside other texts created 
by these authors. 
Observing myself as a media producer – an author – seemingly contradicts the 
hermeneutic distancing from the author. To paraphrase Barthes; I am an author, 
and I am not dead! When studying my own work process I see both perspectives; I 
see the implosion of meaning when I put down words or choose signs for an 
image, and I see an explosion of meaning at the other end of the singularity. The 
author is not dead in the sense that we can completely ignore her. But the author – 
even myself – is still dead in the sense that the author’s own explanations are only 
new texts to interpret (Ödman, 2007). This includes my own observations of my 
work process. Conscious reflection, self-criticism and keeping different viewpoints 
separated but related is vital in sorting this out. 
The author as shaman 
Not only did Barthes consider the author as symbolically dead, he also considered 
the author an empty vessel. The idea is that what the author says not only comes 
from her, it also comes from her tradition, her culture. Barthes illustrates this by 
describing how the storyteller in primitive societies is regarded as a “mediator, 
shaman or speaker” (Barthes, 1977, p.1). The German philosopher Heidegger 
formulated the idea that “humans do not speak language, language speaks us” (Lye, 
2000, p.2). To use language is to wield the power of words, while also being under 
their control. All words and their meaning are given to us, and we have very limited 
possibility to invent new words or change their meaning. This is obvious in spoken 
language, where the repertoire of words is finite and the words have meanings and 
connotations that cannot be ignored. The situation is similar when working with 
visual and cinematic signs. If, for example, a movie maker chooses to shoot a scene 
with a handheld camera, this is a design decision that brings a whole set of 
meaning, connotations and conventions. Seeing the movie maker as a shaman 
suggests that the sign choices she makes is semi-conscious, semi-intuitive. The 
choice is based as much on a conscious, intentional decision as on earlier 
influences. 
Each individual has access to just a limited part of our shared culture. In 
hermeneutics this is referred to as the horizon – “the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (Gadamer, 1989, 
p.313). Anyone’s interpretation can only be based on the individual’s previous 
experience. Understanding what others say requires some overlap of horizons, that 
we at least partly have the same set of collateral experience. 
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Language is a system of conventions. When we as an audience see a shaky 
handheld shot in a movie, we interpret it based on all other handheld shots we have 
seen previously. These earlier acquaintances are what give the sign meaning. The 
sign itself, standing alone, would not mean anything. A standalone sign is empty, 
like the singularity of a black hole. When a word is put down on paper, all the 
intentions of the author are lost. After all, the word is just shapes of black on white. 
Meaning then explodes forth when readers interpret the word. The singularity is a 
fitting metaphor; when matter falls into a black hole, all structure and information 
is lost. French philosopher Paul Ricœur (1971) writes that “the book divides the act 
of writing and the act of reading into two sides, between which there is no 
communication” (p.107). Nothing passes through the singularity. The word a 
reader reads is disconnected from the word that the author wrote. Only the word 
itself passes through, and the belief that words possess their meaning is false 
(Ricœur, 1978). Barthes captures it beautifully when writing “literature is that 
neuter, that composite, that oblique into which every subject escapes, the trap 
where all identity is lost…” (1977, p.1). What gives the sign meaning on the 
interpretation side of the singularity is the intertextuality with all other texts that use 
the sign. A “text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the thousand sources of 
culture” (Barthes, 1977, p.1), and “it is because it has been used in various contexts 
that the word gradually accumulates a significance” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.346). 
The motifs from visually influential movies such as for example 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, Blade Runner, Tron and The Matrix are picked up by other filmmakers, so 
even if you have not seen those movies yourself, you nevertheless have been 
soaked in the visual culture they have created. Peirce refers to this as collateral 
experience or collateral acquaintance (Ransdell, 2003). 
Managing tradition and the hermeneutic circle 
In Truth and method, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) describes the “historically 
effected consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein), a concept that 
emphasizes that we should accept and put to use the experiences we have of being 
embedded in culture, the prejudices we have. In hermeneutics, these prejudices and 
pre-knowledge are referred to as tradition, and they are regarded not as errors to 
eradicate, but as necessary in order to understand anything at all (Ödman, 2007). 
What to do with tradition is one of the big debates in hermeneutics; the 
Habermas-Gadamer debate on tradition. Habermas was very skeptical about 
tradition; he claimed that the interpreter must become aware of her tradition, and 
free herself from the distortions they inflict on the interpretation (Negru, 2007; 
Piercey, 2004; Prasad, 2002). Gadamer, on the contrary, said that tradition is 
important, and he thought it was impossible to escape your tradition. As Merleau-
Ponty wrote in Phenomenology of Perception (1962), “we are condemned to meaning” 
(p.x), and we must take into account that we are “perched on a pyramid of past 
life” (ibid., p.350). You can never be free from tradition, but you are free to take it 
into consideration; this is the hermeneutic circle Gadamer mentioned many times. 
It is the “back-and-forth movement between the preconceptions one brings to 
inquiry and the theoretical insights one takes away from it” (Piercey, 2004) and 
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tradition is our starting-point in this circular movement (Andersson, 1986; Piercey, 
2004). The initial meaning we interpret from a text is constantly revised when we 
encounter more and more of the text (Gadamer, 1989). Ricœur suggests a kind of 
middle-path between Gadamer and Habermas. He claims that we must be self-
aware of our tradition, that we must accept it, but also distance ourselves from it, 
and be critical towards it. “Good readers” have the “ability to distance oneself from 
oneself” (Piercey, 2004, p.267). One important aspect to derive from this when 
doing media studies combined with practice-based research (as I do) is that it is 
necessary to carefully separate the roles of consumer and producer. These are 
inevitably intertwined, but what we can do is to consciously oscillate between these 
two viewpoints. 
Fundamentally, hermeneutics emphasizes openness towards the texts, 
proclaiming sensitive listening before intense analysis (Ödman, 2007) and rests on a 
“concern about the relativity of judgment” (Andrew, 1984, p.173). 
 
 
 
 
 
 72 
A semiotic approach to film studies 
Semiotics is the study of semiosis – the process of production and interpretation of 
signs – and of the structure of signs (Sebeok, 1999; Silverman, 1998). It was 
established in the beginning of the twentieth century, mainly by Charles Sanders 
Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure (Silverman, 1985). It is both a technique to 
analyze signs and texts, and a field of research. In a semiotic study we are not 
primarily interested in what the text actually means, but in how it is constructed. As 
philosopher, psychoanalyst, and sociologist Julia Kristeva (1998) describes it – “the 
point is not what the text means, but how it means” (p.112). The focus on 
construction and production connects semiotics with the intentions in formulating 
a poetics, and Bordwell (2006) emphasizes how semiotic studies can give “splendid 
contributions to poetics” (p.4). In semiotics, we study the cultural process of 
communication as a system of signification (Carravetta, 1998; Silverman, 1985) 
where relations between signs convey meaning, since a sign obtains its meaning 
from “its difference from other signs in the same language system” (Silverman, 
1998, p.2). Instead of using a simplified and linear sender/receiver model, a 
semiotic study investigates communication as a “structure produced and sustained 
through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments” of production and 
consumption, writing and reading (ibid., p.128). When analyzing and discussing my 
study, I will use a general semiotics. However, the visual representation of virtuality 
has proved to play a dominant part in my study of fictional narratives; therefore, 
there will be much emphasis on a visual and cinematic semiotics. 
Semiotics deals with representation. From a semiotic viewpoint, a sign represents 
something, stands for objects, feelings, events among other things (Sebeok, 1999), 
such as when a company logo is used instead of trying to show the whole company, 
or when someone draws an image of a dog instead of bringing the dog. From a 
semiotics point of view, it could be argued that virtuality is not represented; it is 
itself. When we engage a virtual environment, the virtual environment is not 
represented; it just is. A virtual world is designed; it is given a shape, and thus the 
German word Gestaltung could have been used, meaning forming, to give a shape. 
However, this poetics is not primarily a study of the shape of actual virtual 
environments. This is a study of how we represent virtuality, primarily in fictional 
narrative texts. In this context, when a storyteller wants to speak about the virtual, 
it is the idea of the virtual that is represented. The written descriptions of cyberspace 
in Neuromancer or the images showing the matrix in The Matrix are not virtualities – 
they are representations of virtuality, and as such can be analyzed with semiotics. 
According to Gunning (2007), the idea of cinema as a language originates from 
“the Soviet theorists in the twenties, who established that film could function not 
simply as a mode of mechanical reproduction but that it could create a poetics and 
a rhetoric that resembled a language”(p.37). The Soviet film theorists did not use 
semiotics to discuss film theory, but they could be said to have paved the way for 
the semiotic study of moving, narrative images. A pioneer in using semiotics to 
study representations in popular culture was Roland Barthes in the 1950s, when he 
started to analyze popular culture. 
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The semiotic sign 
We can define a sign as something which has meaning for someone, and which 
stands instead of, represents, something else. A sign is created when we invest 
meaning in something, when we decide that it stands instead of something else. Or, 
as Charles Sanders Peirce puts it, “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” 
(Peirce, 1931-58, vol. 2 p.172). The meaning of a sign is not contained within the 
sign. The sign does not determine, decide or force a specific meaning. The meaning 
arises in the interpretation, usually an interpretation that we have culturally agreed 
upon. It is not the Nazi swastika that has forced itself upon the Nazi ideology; it is 
the Nazis who invaded the swastika with their meaning. 
There are two common models for the structure of a sign: the two-part sign 
described by Ferdinand de Saussure and the three-part sign described by Charles 
Peirce (Sebeok, 1999). I will primarily use the terminology of Peirce’s three-part 
sign since it is theoretically more complete and thus more useful, but I will 
occasionally use Saussure’s two-part sign when the clarity of the discussion would 
benefit from a more simple terminology. 
The two-part sign consists of the signifier and the signified. It is often 
emphasized that the parts are inseparable (Silverman, 1998), as are the two sides of 
a coin. Barthes (1999b) even suggests that the sign is the relation between signifier 
and signifies. The signifier points to the signified, but the signified is not the thing 
that the sign represents; it is rather the concept of that object. Saussure described 
the signified as being purely psychological (Saussure, 1983). A word is a signifier, 
and the concept that the word evokes is the signified part of the sign (Barthes, 
1999b; Silverman, 1985; Silverman, 1998). One advantage with Saussure’s two-part 
sign model is the easy to grasp structure (where this points to that) and how the two 
words signifier and signified are quite self-explanatory. 
Peirce’s triadic sign is structured into the representamen, the object and the 
interpretant. The representamen is equivalent to the signifier. The object is the 
concept of the thing that is represented (equivalent to the signified), while the 
interpretant could be seen as the sign’s connection to all other signs, opening a 
door to language at large (Sebeok, 1999). The object is what the sign denotes, a 
quite (but not fully) fixed, literal meaning. The interpretant is the connotations, 
associative and transforming, and an area where ideologies surface (Hall, 1980). 
The difference between object and interpretant, denotation and connotation, is a 
matter of degree rather than a categorical separation. The denotation can be viewed 
as “the last of the connotations” (Barthes, 1975, p.9). The triadic sign has the 
advantage of emphasizing that a sign can have both explicit and implicit meanings, 
opening up for a more complete discussion concerning the structure and meaning 
of the sign. 
At a first glance it could be understood that the interpretant is the interpretation 
of the sign. However, it would be more correct to say that the interpretant is the 
result of the process of interpretation, the effect that the process of signification 
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inflicts on the mind.21 The interpretant is the ideas that the sign generates. These 
ideas can be regarded as new signs. Thus, any sign spawn additional signs, perhaps 
perpetually in what Umberto Eco has called an unlimited semiosis (Eco, 1976). 
Peirce wrote that “the meaning of a representation can be nothing but a 
representation” (Peirce, 1931-58, p.171). 
Semiotics describes language as a code, with combinational rules for how signs 
can be organized into different structures (Eco, 1976; Hall, 1980). New codes can, 
of course, appear. Eco describes this emergence of new codes as a dialectic process 
between sign production and sign consumption, an interaction between “rule-
governed creativity” and “rule-changing creativity” (Eco, 1976, p.161). He 
continues by suggesting that a new code emerges within a very limited group of 
people and then spreads through our culture (ibid., p.272). 
This new code is apparently spoken by only one speaker, and understood by a very 
restricted audience; it is a semiotic enclave which society cannot recognize as a social 
rule acceptable by everyone. Such a type of private code is usually called an ‘idiolect’. 
When a particular code spreads, it becomes a sociolect, a code used by a particular 
social group. The new code is a convention that is established through repetition 
within a group of people communicating (Carravetta, 1998). This pattern is easily 
recognizable in popular media. For example, a particular aesthetic invention is used 
in a movie that achieves success and the sign is then copied, spreading. A well-
spread sign can become a trope, a stylistic code, a successful “actualization of an 
aesthetic ideal” (Eco, 1982, p38).  
Symbol, icon and index 
There is yet another triad structure concerning the sign; the characteristics symbols, 
icons and indexes (Sebeok, 1999). 
•  A symbol is a sign in which the meaning is decided by a convention; it has 
been culturally agreed upon. Therefore the meaning of a symbolic sign must 
be learnt. 
•  An icon is a sign in which the meaning is decided by resemblance. The 
representamen shares some quality, some topological similarity, with the 
object. Images are to a large extent iconic, but other signs such as diagrams 
and sound effects should not be forgotten. 
•  An index is a sign in which the meaning is decided by some kind of physical 
and/or causal connection. Photographs are highly indexical since they have a 
direct connection to what they represent. 
Peirce has emphasized that these are not mutually exclusive; “it would be difficult if 
not impossible to instance an absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely 
                                         
21 Roland Barthes (1981) elaborately illustrates this when he at length describes the Winter 
Garden photograph of his now dead mother, and eventually concludes that he can never show 
the photograph he is seeing for us, because for anyone else it would not be the same sign. Thus 
the representamen which he perceives is the result of his personal interpretational process. 
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devoid of the indexical quality” (Peirce, 1931-58, p.306). A sign is all three types at 
the same time, but in different proportions. For example, a photograph is indexical 
because of the causality between the photograph and the photographed (Sebeok, 
1999). Through the indexical sign, the object “will touch me like the delayed rays of 
a star” (Barthes, 1981, p.81). A photograph is also iconic since it resembles what it 
represents. It possesses some of the attributes of the object it signifies (Eco, 1982). 
An iconic sign has some similarities with the thing it represents, but more or less 
limited; a dog in a film “can bark but it cannot bite” (Hall, 1980, p.131). A 
photograph also has a symbolical quality because we have agreed by convention 
that the photograph represents something, despite the fact that the photograph is a 
flat, thin piece of paper with colored patches on one side. At least part of the 
realism in photographs stems from symbolic conventions and not only the 
indexical and iconic nature of photography (Geimer, 2007). We have agreed to 
regard image artifacts such as motion blur and film grain as realistic aspects of a 
photograph, even if they do not resemble the scene that we see with our eyes. 
Super-sign structures 
Saussure writes that “normally we do not express ourselves by using single 
linguistic signs, but groups of signs, organized in complexes which themselves are 
signs” (Saussure, 1983, p.127). Barthes (1977) and Eco (1976) describe similar 
ideas, speaking about a “pyramid of functions” (p.103), super-signs that are built of 
sub-signs. Eco only provides fleeting descriptions of these super-signs, claiming 
that an image is a super-sign, and that super-signs are “signs whose content is not a 
content-unit but an entire proposition” and that they are “non-verbal sentences” 
(p.231).22 An image is a text, a conglomerate of signs. In this text there is a 
structure, with signs working together as words do in a sentence; these are super-
signs formed by sub-signs. For example, a lens flare can be thought of as a 
coherent sign, but it can also be split into its components: individual signs such as 
the color of the lens flare, its size, the number of iris reflections, and so on. The 
example of a lens flare is deludingly simple. A lens flare can easily be extracted 
from the rest of the image. We could even actually cut it out of the image if we had 
scissors and the image was a hard copy. But signs in images can just as well be on a 
more conceptual level, for example, related to the visual style of an image, and not 
any particular geometrical region of the image. 
My approach to working with super-sign structures can be exemplified by 
investigating Figure 6, on the next page, a computer graphics visualization I made 
for a X-15 book project together with Michelle Evans. It shows a winged 
spacecraft, a rocket plane, in space above the Earth. How do we know that? If 
[winged spacecraft in space above Earth] is seen as a super-sign, what are the sub-
                                         
22 In Articulations of the Cinematic Code (1985), Eco outline another model for hierarchical levels of 
signs, calling these levels semes (equivalent to super-signs), signs and figures. According to Eco 
figures have no independent meaning, which makes them equivalent to what he earlier (1976) 
referred to as the structural properties of the sign. 
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signs?23 The NASA name logotype on the tail is obviously a sign, connoting space 
travel. The blue horizon haze, the black sky and the blue-white surface of the Earth 
are three signs that denote a position in space far above Earth. These four signs 
combine to form the sign [in space above the Earth]. Note how these sub-signs 
correlate to specific areas of the image – they could literally be outlined with a 
pencil – while the super-sign to which they belong is not directly correlated to 
specific parts of the image. The wings, the cockpit and the height above ground are 
signs that together form the super-sign [aircraft]. Note how the first two again 
correlate with specific image areas, while the latter does not. The latter also 
connects to the [in space above the Earth] super-sign. Finally, the two super-signs 
[in space above the Earth] and [aircraft] form the top-level super-sign [winged 
spacecraft in space above Earth] (Figure 7). Note how this last combination 
changes the meaning so that the meaning becomes winged spacecraft rather than 
aircraft in space. This is, of course, my interpretation, which can be negotiated. Also, 
note that sub-signs are not just a matter of identifying image parts. Consider the 
details of the wings for example. I argue that the individual rivets and the shape of 
the wing are structural properties of the [wings] sign, and not sub-signs. Why? 
Because the sub-sign [wing] denotes aircraft both on its own and together with the 
other sub-signs, while each individual rivet does not denote aircraft; they could just 
as well have been rivets on a ship at sea. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Visualization of the spacecraft X-15, exemplifying a super-sign. Computer graphics by 
the author. 
                                         
23 An uttering, such as the X-15 visualization discussed here, can also be viewed as a text, not a 
super-sign. One of my points is to illustrate how a conglomerate of signs can be explored either 
as a text or a super-sign. I prefer to see it as a super-sign if the particular structure of signs is quite 
stable and repeated, thus forming a coherent entity.  
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Figure 7. The structure of the [winged spacecraft in space above Earth] super-sign. 
Visual semiotics and the semiotics of cinema 
General semiotics is essentially enough for analyzing fictional representations of 
virtuality. However, since I have primarily analyzed movies, a deeper understanding 
of the specific circumstances of cinema and visual storytelling informs my work. 
Visual semiotics and the semiotics of cinema involve a discussion about the nature 
of photography and cinema as a communication tool and a language, and what 
separates them from other modes of representation. As Jessica Evans and Stuart 
Hall (1999) emphasize, visual representations are distinctly different from other 
forms of texts such as written text, and, within the umbrella term visual, there is a 
wide diversity of images, photographs, cinema and such. 
Cinema as mediation or representation 
Understanding photography and cinema as texts has troubled semioticians and film 
theorists during the twentieth century. Other means of representation are so 
obviously a representation. A word cannot be mistaken for being what it refers to. 
But the high visual fidelity of photography and cinema gives them the false 
impression of being an unaltered mediation of direct reality, illustrated by the 
questions that arises when comparing a video image to a mirror. Is a mirror 
representation or presentation? And what is then a live feed from a video camera? 
Is the shot of a street a representation, or “are we looking at the street itself” 
(Andrew, 1984, p.52)? When we look through the viewfinder, it seems absurd to 
say that we do not see the street itself. But when the shot has been taken, and the 
street is seen again (this time in the acquired shot), is it then a representation? 
An iconic sign reproduces some of the conditions of perception (Eco, 1982), 
and photography and cinema appears to reproduce almost all conditions of 
perception. Cinema gives the impression of reality, partly due to its actual perception of 
reality; the motion on the screen of the cinema is actual motion, and the light is 
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actual light (Metz, 1974). It appears as if the photographic image is purely indexical 
and iconic, with no hint of it being a symbol. Photography “has often been 
described as a trace, impression, or index of the real” (Geimer, 2007, p.1). 
However, the photograph is also symbolic. Consider a photographic image with 
highly pronounced image artifacts such as excessive motion blur and film grain. 
Maybe the photograph is also framed so that we see only parts of the objects that 
were in front of the camera. Such an image could be so chaotic and jumbled that it 
could be impossible to actually see what it depicts. We might see a shape in the 
resemblance of a shoe… but it could also be a part of a guitar, or something else. 
Nevertheless, such an image could be an expressive representation of a chaotic and 
jumbled event, such as a rock concert or sports event. Thus, in order to understand 
photographic images, we do need to learn a code. Geimer (2007) claims that at least 
part of the realism we see in a photograph stems from symbolic conventions and 
not only the indexical and iconic nature of photography; we have learnt that a 
photograph is realistic. Even if the photograph is heavily color graded – as in blue 
tinted night images – we perceive it as realistic, even if the darkness of the night is 
not blue-tinted when we see it with our eyes! But how does the indexicality 
“functions within a fiction film, where we are dealing with a diegesis, a fictional 
world, rather than a reference to a reality” (Gunning, 2007, p.47)? What kinds of 
indexical links do we have between the image and the profilmic event, what was in 
front of the camera at the shoot? Let us say we have a shot of the actor Sean 
Connery playing the fictive character James Bond. Does the shot represent 
Connery or Bond? If the shot represents the actor Connery, then the sign should 
be indexical; Connery was actually standing in front of the camera. If the shot 
represents the character Bond, then the sign should be symbolic. Actually, in the 
latter case, the sign cannot be indexical at all, since the character Bond is fictive and 
does not exist. We could say that the shot represents both Connery and Bond 
depending on the context. 
Andrew writes about the realist and the formalist positions in film theory. The 
realist arguments “differentiate cinema from the other, purely conventional artistic 
systems like painting and literature”. The formalist argument “redeem cinema from 
the servile task of mere reproduction” (Andrew, 1984, p.20). With this, Andrew 
emphasizes that cinema can be seen as both representation and actuality. This can 
be illustrated by inserting a highly emotional stake into the argument. Consider a 
nude photograph of someone, or a video of someone having his throat cut. In the 
first case, you would say that you have seen the person naked. In the second case, 
you have seen someone die. Then consider the photograph and the video being 
replaced, line by line, frame by frame, by a cartoon drawing and an animation. 
Much of the emotional investment disappears. Nowadays it is possible to create a 
number of in-betweens, for example mapping photographic texture to a 3d model. 
However, this does not change the claim that the high degree of iconicity and 
indexicality in photography and cinema inserts a sense of reality into these 
representations. Does this mean that, as Lotman asks (1976), the cinema text “is 
simultaneously the object itself and a model of the object” (p.16)? Andrew (1984) 
further claims that this double nature of cinema is necessary to acknowledge in 
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order to understand cinema, that our understanding of “movies is incompletely 
described unless this tension between perception and signification, between the 
cinematography and the cinema is maintained” (p.22). Considering how cinema is 
used to telling stories, it is “obviously a message” (Metz, 1974, p.40), and thus 
cinema is “not life, it is created spectacle” (ibid., p.43). If then cinema can be seen 
as representation, it falls into the domain of semiotics; “cinema is a seductive, but 
ultimately conventional language” (ibid., p.21). The sense of realism should “no 
longer be thought of as fragments of reality” (ibid, p.58), but rather a 
reconstruction of actual experience. Then, cinema is not a copy of life; rather it is 
an edited re-creation. When we become aware that cinema is something we learn to 
read, it also becomes easier to distinguish the different tropes, the ready-made signs 
that are re-created in movie after movie (Lotman, 1976). When we discern the 
intricate weave of codes that builds a movie, we have to think of it as a text and not 
mediated reality; “never again can we accept this picture as the ‘seamless garment 
of reality’ when we have now been shown the seams, the threads, sometimes even 
the weave itself” (Metz, 1974, p.64). 
Thus, cinema both mediates and represents, and the construction of signs often 
starts with setting up the sound stage or location in front of the camera. The 
profilmic arrangement of objects in front of the camera become signs in the movie 
(Barthes, 1977). Production design works toward filling the frame with objects that 
become signs. The “profilmic event, function narrationally” (Bordwell, 1985, p.12) 
and construct the diegetic world of the movie. When we experience cinema, our 
interpretation sequence what we experience into distinct parts, the flow of images 
and sound is broken up into signs. However, before that, during production, the 
images and sounds was likewise brought together from separate parts, shots, audio 
clips, and so on. Even the apparently monolithic moving images in a separate shot 
are often split up into layers of imagery, this being one of the most important tools 
enabling the work with computer graphics and visual effects. This production work 
breaks the image apart spatially, but it also breaks apart the image temporally. An 
image seems to be a moment in time, frozen at the instance of exposure. However, 
the production of an image occurs before the exposure, and continues afterwards. 
The photograph, as well as cinema, is constructed before the shutter releases – 
when setting up the scene or at least the camera – and after, in post-production. 
Photographs are made, not taken. Granted, there is a certain degree of automation in 
taking a photograph, of unavoidability in the photographic process. Peter Geimer 
(2007) has discussed the balance between accidental versus intentional in 
photographic images. He claims that at the moment of exposure “something 
happens in the picture, or something slips into it” (p.19). He exemplifies this with a 
photograph where a fly accidentally was captured in the image (Antonio Beato’s 
photograph from 1870 of an archaeological site outside Cairo), and contrasts this 
with the intentionally inserted fly in Georges Seurat’s painting Un dimanche après-
midi à l’Île de la Grande Jatte. His argument is that small details such as an insect 
can by accident slip into a photograph since such a large portion of the production 
process is purely mechanical-optical. Such details do not appear accidentally in a 
painting; if they are there, they are created intentionally. Apparently accidental 
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details can be inserted intentionally in any kind of imagery, but the point is that it is 
more common that details slip into the image in photography compared to 
painting. This special characteristic of the photograph occurs at the moment the 
shutter releases – when the picture materializes (Geimer, 2007). Even if the 
photographer is free to create and manipulate the scene before the camera captures 
the image, and even if the photographer is completely free to manipulate the 
photograph afterwards, there is still some serendipity in that very moment when 
the shutter releases. When making a photograph, my freedom as image-maker is 
yielded during that short moment when light flows onto the recording device of 
film emulsion or the CCD. I regain my total freedom as soon as the image is 
captured, but for a short moment I surrender to nature. 
The image as monolith or conglomerate 
An image, especially a photographic image, seems to be a continuous, indiscrete 
mess of shapes, colors, textures and patterns. How can we discern distinct signs in 
this analog multitude, when it all appears to be locked into itself (Barthes, 1999a)? 
Bill Nichols (1985) is highly skeptical towards cutting up cinemas flow of images 
into signs (p.609): 
The standardized units of an arbitrary code are absent. Instead of arbitrary units 
(phonemes) with ‘nonsense’ gaps (noise) that can be coupled to produce second- 
order units (words) cinema has no alphabet of phonemes. It has no dictionary of 
monemes. Instead it has a continuum of images which it frames and punctuates with 
gaps (cuts, dissolves, fades, etc.). 
Nichols further claims that Umberto Eco and others “make the fatal error of 
inserting binary choices and oppositions where they don’t belong” (ibid., p.614). 
However, Eco (1985) is comfortable with breaking down the image into a complex 
text of signs. From a semiotic viewpoint, cinema is both discreet and indiscreet 
(Barthes, 1977; Lotman, 1976); the image can be reduced to discreet units, binary 
choices (Eco, 1985). Photography and cinema give the impression of continuity, 
hiding the discrete units they actually use (Metz, 1985). Eco (1976) acknowledges 
that an image seems to be more continuous, monolithic and difficult to split up: “in 
a painting the signal looks ‘continuous’ or ‘dense’, without distinguishable units” 
(p.181). Eco claims that when using spoken language the speaker can chose 
“among a repertoire of established types” (p. 152) that “can be codified and listed” 
(p. 214), while making a drawing requires “extra work… to invent a new type” (p. 
152). When working with images there is huge flexibility when designing new signs, 
to reshape existing, and to combine signs in different ways. However, signs in an 
image are indeed based on a code of “ready-made elements of signification” 
(Barthes, 1977, p.22). Despite the flexibility and freedom in creating images and 
cinema, there is still a structure to discern; the codification and listing of established 
signs that Eco connects with spoken language can be done for cinema as well. 
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Cinema as language 
Is cinema a language? In order to answer that question we need to know what a 
language is. Silverman (1985) writes that language is “a system of signs that express 
ideas, a network of elements that signify only in relation to each other” (p.6). 
Lotman (1976) describes it as an ordered communication sign system, a system of 
signs. Metz (1974) suggests that language either refers to a system with a formal 
structure or to “everything that expresses”, and that cinema is “a language without 
a system” (p.65). A language system needs to be learnt and thus one characteristic 
of languages is that we need to learn them to understand them. The high degree of 
iconicity and immediacy of film makes us believe we do not need to learn it. It took 
time to understand that what appears to be direct reality, is rather a structured 
representation, a language; the “transformation of cinematographic authenticity 
into a means for cognition was a long and difficult process” (Lotman, 1976, p.12). 
At least part of cinema’s code needs to be learnt, in order to understand it. 
Conventions such as film grain, fades and cross-cutting are partly symbolic signs 
that need to be learnt. 
One characteristic with language is that it can be used for direct communicative 
dialog. It appears that we cannot communicate using cinema in the same 
interactive, back-and-forth dialog as we do with spoken language. Movies give the 
impression of being stand-alone expressions (Metz, 1974; Metz, 1985). However, 
movie makers can engage in dialog, albeit much slower. Consider how Lars von 
Trier’s The Five Obstructions respond to Jørgen Leth’s The Perfect Human, or how 
separate feature films in extended franchises such as James Bond or Star Trek build 
on each other’s narrative. Also, consider how video-based memes swiftly spread on 
YouTube in response to and in dialogue with each other. Yet another important 
aspect of cinema as a language is that cinema is multimodal (Metz, 1985). It is a 
complex conglomerate of codes, visual and audial, spatial and nonspatial, “not so 
much as a system of signification as a place where various codes come together to 
create meaning.” (Andrew, 1984, p.68). Cinema is polyphonic; it absorbs and 
unifies different modalities (Lotman, 1976). 
The structure of a language allows the combinatory nature of signs. It has been 
debated whether cinema and images have a grammar. For example, Nichols (1985) 
has claimed that cinema is “subject to no determinate grammar or code. We cannot 
construct an ungrammatical sequence as we can write a nonsense sentence” (p.609). 
This has been disputed by Eco (1985), who claims that there are codes that govern 
which details do I choose to use when I create a picture of, for example, a zebra or 
a cat. Using zebra patterns on a stylistic drawing of a cat, or drawing the cat’s 
pointy ears under its belly, might confuse the viewer, and could then be regarded as 
a grammatically incorrect image. Cinema and other visual texts have different 
structures than written language, but nevertheless there is a visual grammar, a code 
for how visual signs representing objects and events can “combine in visual 
‘statements’ of greater or lesser complexity and extension” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 
1996, p.1). What is the atomic unit of cinema? What is cinema’s equivalent to 
written language (Andrew, 1984)? Lotman (1976) claims that the shot can be 
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considered a phoneme. Nichols (1985) states that “the shot is not a word; it is at 
minimum a sentence” (p.612). Umberto Eco (1985) likewise claims that the frame 
is an utterance; the parts of the image are equivalent to the words of spoken 
language. Barthes (1977) also compares “lines, surfaces, shades” (p.16) in an image 
to words. Metz (1974) approaches the question from a narrative viewpoint and 
suggests “the event is still and always the basic unit” (p.24), and that film images are 
“like statements” (p.26), “never a unit of language” (p.67). When performing the 
analysis I have done, I have worked under the assumption that images and movies 
have a language, that an image is comparable to a written sentence, and that parts 
of the image is the equivalent to words. 
The code that underlies sign production is based on conventions, and these 
conventions “rest on systems of choices and oppositions” (Eco, 1985, p.595); the 
author works with selection and combination (Ricœur, 1978; Silverman, 1985). 
There are two combinatory structures that describe how signs can be arranged into 
texts: the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. The paradigmatic structure concerns 
selection. Signs along a paradigmatic axis are of same kind but different from each 
other (Sebeok, 1999), they either overlap or stand in binary opposition (Silverman, 
1985), and they form a repertoire to select from, “a bounded set of alternatives 
which at some level serve equivalent functions” (Bordwell, 1985, p.151). A movie 
maker might, for example, choose from a range of colors; all colors are colors, but 
they differ from each other. An example of a binary paradigmatic pair would be a 
shot/reverse shot. A sign’s meaning is partly determined by how “it deviates from 
the other members of the abstract groups to which it belongs” (Silverman, 1985, 
p.103). Black would not mean the same thing without white, or any other color. 
And the selection of a particular sign at the same time signals the absence of the 
others; [black] means that [white] was not chosen (Bordwell, 1985). A paradigmatic 
analysis focuses on which signs were chosen from what repertoire. 
The syntagmatic structure concerns combination, the arrangement of order. 
These signs can be chained together in a sequence, a syntagm, and the syntagmatic 
structure sets up rules for how these individual signs can be joined together 
(Bordwell, 1985; Lotman, 1976; Sebeok, 1999; Silverman 1985). The obvious 
example is a sentence in written language, or a sequence of shots edited together 
into a scene in a movie. However, the sequence does not have to be linear, even 
though the combinatory system of written language seems to be more flexible and 
powerful than any other mode of communication (Eco, 1976; Lotman, 1976). 
Silverman (1985) emphasizes that the spatial, two-dimensional disposition of signs 
in an image is also syntagmatic, and architecture (actual or virtual) should then be 
able to exhibit syntagmatic structures in all three spatial dimensions. A syntagmatic 
analysis focuses on which signs are combined and how. 
Reading cinema as a text 
According to Eco (1976), almost any part of an image or any aspect of the image 
can be a sign, if the audience distinguishes it from the rest of the image and 
attributes meaning to it; “...every object may potentially become a sign within the 
environment of a given culture” (p.166). Does this include signs that are not 
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intentionally added to an image? Especially in photographic images, the author 
partly loses control over the sign production, and much of the content of the image 
appears more or less outside intentional control, such as film grain, lens flares, the 
quality of shadows and so on. Would such content of the image be considered 
being signs? Eco (1976) gives us the following argument (p.17): 
The first doctor who discovered a sort of constant relationship between an array of 
red spots on the patient's face and a given disease (measles) made an inference: but 
insofar as this relationship has been made conventional and has been registered as 
such in medical treatises a semiotoic convention has been established. There is a sign 
everytime a human group decides to use and to recognize something as the vehicle of 
something else. … In this sense events coming from a natural source must also be 
listed as sign. 
 According to this reasoning, signs that the author did not intentionally construct 
could be signs if the audience attributes meaning to them. Eco does not comment 
on the situation where the audience does not consciously notice the sign. Even 
though the viewer is not consciously aware of, for example, a lens flare, the lens 
flare and similar details in the image can nevertheless give the viewer an impression 
of, for example, strong light or photographic realism. I argue that such 
unconsciously noticed image details can be considered a sign, if the overall 
phenomenological impression – strong light in this example – is noted by the 
viewer. The impression of strong light comes from, for example, lens flares and 
beams of light. If the viewer perceives strong light, then she has on some level of 
consciousness perceived the signs that convey it. This is important for my work on 
representation of virtuality, because many signs of virtuality might express virtuality 
even though the audience does not consciously note them. The audience does not 
necessarily become aware of green colors or abstract geometrical shapes, but they 
interpret the environment as virtual anyway.  
Signs are more or less arbitrary (Sebeok, 1999; Silverman, 1985), ranging from 
arbitrary symbolic signs such as the word cat which just as well could have had the 
sequence of words d-o-g as its representamen, to iconic and indexical signs such as 
motion blur, which are motivated by technical production circumstances. Iconic 
signs can often be mistaken as fully motivated because of their similarity with the 
represented thing, as if there is only one way to draw a cat. However, iconic signs 
are also, to some extent, arbitrary, allowing for many different ways to draw a cat 
(Hall, 1980). When it comes to images, the different aspects and details of an image 
are a complex interplay between arbitrariness and motivation. For one viewer it 
might seem obvious that a sign such as [strong light] is highly motivated, after all, 
we see strong light because there is a strong light. Another viewer might instead see 
that the strong light is created by signs such as [blown out highlights], [lens flare] 
and [sunlit haze], and she might regard these signs as quite arbitrary; the impression 
of strong light could have been created by other signs, and thus they are to some 
extent arbitrary and from a repertoire of available signs. The distinction between 
arbitrary and motivated signs is important to include as a factor when reflecting on 
how signs are constructed, since it is a way to become aware of the presumptions 
that might exist. An example related to signification of virtuality is the use of green 
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color. Understanding that this particular color might be motivated by the green tint 
of old CRT screens informs the analysis.  
When does the form of the representation matter? When is green color just a 
color, and when is it a sign? Such questions will be raised repeatedly in this poetics. 
Saussure (1983) viewed language as a highly formal system, and he claimed that the 
form of the representamen does not matter; it does not influence the interpretation 
of the sign (p.118). 
…the actual mode of inscription is irrelevant, because it does not affect the system... 
Whether I write in black or white, in incised characters or in relief, with a pen or a 
chisel - none of that is of any importance for the meaning. 
It might be correct that in order to play the game of chess, the form of the pieces 
does not matter. But, what if we consider not only the game itself, but the meaning 
of the game as a game? If the pieces were made of wood, then the interpretation 
could be that playing of the game is a sophisticated activity with a long historical 
tradition. If the pieces were shaped as soldiers with weapons, it would highlight that 
chess is a representation of bloody battles. Eco (1976) acknowledges that signs can 
be “charged with cultural signification” by applying “extra-coding” in this manner 
(p.267). An even firmer standpoint is that “the material expression of the text is 
always significant; it is a separately variable semiotic feature” (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 1996, p.231). It can be argued that form or style, the material expression, 
is based on signs, signs that support other signs. Let us say that I get a note with a 
text on it. The text is “I miss you”. Assume that the text is written in the typeface 
Verdana: “I miss you”. Now, think of another note, with the same text in the 
typeface Mistral and a red color: ”I miss you”. The latter would probably seem 
more inviting; the text would have quite romantic connotations. The typeface and 
the color are signs in themselves, signs affecting the meaning of the textual signs. 
The text is not only a text composed of the three words (signs) “I”, “miss” and 
“you”, but also composed of the signs [romantic typeface] and the color [red]. 
Thus, a text can be analyzed in different ways; and, this ambivalence is an 
important aspect of my semiotic analysis of virtuality in fiction, forming my 
approach to think about and analyze the signs I studied. 
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My study of virtuality in fiction 
This poetics of virtuality is to a large portion based on an analysis of fictional 
representations of virtuality, using the semiotic framework outlined in the previous 
sections. In the following I will describe how this particular study was designed and 
conducted. 
Selecting the narratives and understanding science fiction 
The selection criterion that I used was that the narratives would have a plot that 
moves between a framing narrative portraying an actual world and an insert 
narrative portraying a virtual world. For a secondary selection, narratives involving 
virtual objects in an actual world were included as well. 
There are of course movies that fit the selection criteria but have nevertheless 
been excluded. The estimated impact of each movie has guided the selection. Has it 
been frequently discussed in academic texts, in trade magazines, and in the fan 
discussions online and elsewhere?24 The intention has been to include movies with 
rich and complex structures, thus opening up for an interesting study. A majority of 
the narratives come from western popular culture, with an addition of a few 
Japanese narratives. The reason is that the narratives that portray virtual worlds 
usually have that origin. Some attempts have been made to find texts from other 
parts of the world, but this endeavor has largely been without success.25  
Many of the selected narratives belong to the genre cyberpunk, a sub-genre to 
science fiction. I have also made attempts to include narratives that are more 
mainstream, or are at least not specifically cyberpunk narratives. Science fiction is a 
genre with a few misunderstandings attached to it.26 The layman definition of what 
a science fiction film is would probably include movies such as Star Wars, Avatar 
and 2012. However, Star Wars belongs to the sub-genre space opera, Avatar 
borders on being a fantasy, and 2012 is predominantly an action movie. Many of 
the studied narratives can be generalized as being spectacular. The experience of sense 
of wonder (Knight, 1956) is critical for many science fiction aficionados, comparable 
to the romantic notion of the sublime (Lovén, 2010), and the genre is often 
associated with both the spectacular and the speculative (Dahlkvist, 2010). Science 
fiction movies often involve extensive visual effects, and it is common to regard 
visual effects as opposed to and in conflict with good storytelling (Liljefors, 2006). 
                                         
24 The academic texts that have influenced my selection of narratives have been (Brind, 
McKenzie & Sutton, 2007; Bryant & Pollock, 2010; Collins, 2005; Heuser, 2003; Lovén, 2001; 
Lovén, 2010; Schroeder, Huxor & Smith, 2001). Trade magazines that have influenced my 
selection are primarily Cinefex and American Cinematographer. 
25 Svante Lovén (2010) notes a similar difficulty in locating non-western, even non-American, 
narratives portraying the virtual. Lovén brings up Stanislaw Lem’s The Futurological Congress (1971) 
but also note that even if the author is Polish the setting for his story is nevertheless American. 
Disch (1998), Määttä (2006), as well as Godhe and Ramsten (2010b) claim that in general most 
science fiction is produced in the United States. 
26 The definition of science fiction is highly debated, and some choose to not regard it as a genre 
at all but rather a narrative strategy, a marketing device, a meta genre or a mega text (Broderick, 
1995; Määttä, 2006; Määttä, 2010; Ramsten, 2010). 
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This critical stance towards spectacular visual effects seems to have connections to 
how cinema in its early history was showcased as a spectacle without narrative. One 
of the first examples of narrative cinema was actually a science fiction short film – 
Le voyage dans la lune by Georges Méliès, 1902 – as pointed out by Määttä (2006). 
Despite this, stories that rely on spectacle have traditionally been quite harshly 
criticized, and there is a strong tradition in positioning “realistic film” and “fantastic 
film” against each other, “as if they where the two great poles of cinema” (Metz, 
1974, p.207). Aristotle discussed the spectacle critically in his Poetics (part VI). 
The Spectacle has, indeed, an emotional attraction of its own, but, of all the parts, it 
is the least artistic, and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of 
Tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors. Besides, 
the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist 
than on that of the poet. 
Lars von Trier (1995) took a firm stance in the rhetorical Dogma95 manifest (p.1). 
Today a technological storm is raging of which the result is the elevation of 
cosmetics to God. By using new technology anyone at any time can wash the last 
grains of truth away in the deadly embrace of sensation. 
However, even spectacular narratives can be useful to study, and science fiction as 
a genre is not defined by spectacle, or by depictions of future technology and space 
travel, even though the archetypical science fiction stories often cover all three 
characteristics. A need to justify science fiction is central in the debate about the 
genre, since even though recently it has gained some mainstream popularity the 
genre is still looked down upon as being commercial and popular genre fiction 
(Määttä, 2006), and when well-known authors write science fiction both critics and 
publishers avoid acknowledging it as science fiction (Disch, 1998; Godhe & 
Ramsten, 2010b; Holmberg, 2010).27 The technology-oriented sub-genre Hard SF, 
in particular, is considered uninteresting (Pierce, 1993). Genre fiction in general is 
typically regarded as being of lower quality and value than literary fiction (Harold, 
2015). However, science fiction should be seen as an arena for exploration of ideas 
(Holmberg, 2010; Russ, 1975). Fundamental to narratives in science fiction is the 
question, “what if?” This “what if” scenario is created by inserting a novum, a 
strange newness, into the plot (Godhe & Ramsten, 2010b; Holmberg, 2010; Lovén, 
2010; Määttä, 2010). The novum – a term established by Darko Suvin (1979) – 
usually has a scientific or technological framework and justification (Godhe & 
Ramsten, 2010b; Määttä, 2006; Määttä, 2010). This would make Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) the archetypical science fiction story, 
since Shelley uses scientific reasoning to explain Frankenstein’s monster (instead of 
magic or divine interaction as in earlier depictions of artificial life). She also offers 
critique against the doctor’s hubris in playing with technological forces he cannot 
                                         
27 Ramsten (2010) gives a summary account of how the pulp era of science fiction (early low 
quality magazines such as Amazing Stories and Astounding Science Fiction) both helped define 
the genre and give it an unfavorable reputation. Määttä (2006) gives a highly detailed account of 
how science fiction and its reputation were established in Sweden. 
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control (Holmberg, 2010; Olsen, 1992). With the method of intentional 
estrangement, science fiction becomes a tool that helps us make sense of where we 
are heading, how we could manage major development in technology and 
knowledge, and what we are doing as a society (Benedikt, 1991; Lovén, 2010; 
McCaffery, 1991; Määttä, 2006; Määttä, 2010; Nilsson, 2010). Science fiction is then 
primarily used for critique and reflection, “providing possibilities for a diagnostic 
critique” (Kellner, Leibowitz & Ryan, 1984, p.2) and an arena for thought 
experiments that investigate moral implications in unknown situations (Farstad, 
2010; Holmberg, 2010). However, these explorations are often done with 
limitations; most science fiction is produced in western society, and generally there 
is also a clear lack of normative criticism or feminism (Kramarae, 1998). Patriarchal 
power hierarchies are seldom in focus, nor gender issues such as equality and sexual 
orientation. However, there are exceptions, such as Anne McCaffrey’s The Ship Who 
Sang, Joanna Russ’ The Female Man, and Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Left Hand of 
Darkness.28 Michael Godhe (2010a) brings into light a range of largely unknown 
feminist utopias from the seventeenth century and onwards, and in mainstream 
popular culture there are science fiction narratives with strong female leads such as 
Alien (1979) by Ridley Scott and The Terminator (1984) by James Cameron. Two 
movies that are central in my study and that do have strong female leads are 
eXistenZ (Cronenberg, 1999) and Avalon (Oshii, 2001). The TV series Sense8, created 
by Michael Straczynski, Andy Wachowski, and Lana Wachowski, have strong 
motifs related to different queer aspects, such as homosexuality and transgender. 
However, considering the creators of the studied narratives, the male dominance is 
striking. Out of the studied narratives, none were written or directed by a woman, 
except for You’ve Got Mail by Nora Ephron and the Matrix franchise by Lana 
Wachowski (together with Andy Wachowski). The first one is highly marginal in 
my study – it is only the title sequence that features virtuality – and the second one 
is of special interest concerning mainstream science fiction, normative criticism and 
feminism; Lana is a transgender person who made her transition during the 
production of the Matrix sequels. 
Science fiction is a multifaceted genre – if it is a genre at all – and it has a 
complicated relationship with the rest of popular culture and society at large. For 
example, science fiction movies might appear marginalized but nevertheless they 
generate huge box office successes (such as Alien and Avatar), as well as acclaimed 
reflections on society (exemplified by Blade Runner and 2001: A Space Odyssey). 
The selected narratives 
I have done full or partial readings of quite a number of narratives. A full reading 
has involved analyzing all observed signs of virtuality in the whole narrative. 
Occasionally, paratexts such as interviews and behind-the-scenes material have 
been included, and in such cases noted in the list of narratives below.29 It has also 
                                         
28 Murphy (2008) discusses Stephen Baxter’s Coalescent from 2004, a novel describing the 
formation of a matriarchal posthuman hive colony. I have analyzed several of Baxter's stories, 
however Coalescent is not included in my study since it does not deal with virtuality.  
29 See Genette (1997) for an introduction to the concept of paratext. 
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involved the drafting of a super-sign tree structure for all observed signs. A partial 
reading has not involved such an investigation of the super-sign structure, and I 
have then analyzed only a limited sequence of the movie, not the movie in its 
entirety. A full reading was often employed on movies where the portrayal of the 
virtual is central to the plot and/or style of the movie, while a partial reading 
sometimes concerns only one or a few scenes. In a full reading I have explored the 
world of the particular movie and how virtuality is situated and represented in that 
fictional world. In a partial reading I have contextualized the signs not so much in 
the movie where they are used, but more in relation to the intertextual fabric of 
signs used in other movies. 
The following movies are my primary selection and have been subjected to a full 
reading. They are sorted according to release year. 
•  Tron (Lisberger, 1982). This was one of the very first movies where the story 
takes place partly in the actual world and partly in a virtual world. A computer 
game developer is digitized into a computer where he fights virtual characters, 
liberates the world from an oppressive Master Control Program, and returns 
to the actual world in order to win back control over his company. The movie 
was influential and groundbreaking in many ways. Since the computer graphics 
of the era was very simple, the virtual environments realized by computer 
graphics were correspondingly stylistic and abstract. It was not possible to 
animate complex characters, so actors were shot live action and then the 
footage was heavily color graded and manipulated in order to mimic the look 
and feel of the virtual environments. The production was an unwieldy 
combination of digital and analogue techniques, situated as it was in the early 
development phase of computer graphics (Patterson 1982; Sorensen, 1982; 
Montfort et al., 2012).30 The commentary track of the 2002 DVD release was 
included in the analysis. 
•  Johnny Mnemonic (Longo, 1995). This is a screen adaption of a short story 
by William Gibson. The protagonist Johnny is a data courier who carries secret 
digital data in head-implants and the cure for a disease has been uploaded into 
his storage. His goal becomes to download the data and publish it free online 
before the hired killers of an evil pharmaceutical company catch him and take 
the data, including his head. The virtual environments he enters in order to 
achieve this goal are created by computer graphics which had been 
substantially developed during the thirteen years that separates it from Tron. 
The depiction of virtual reality is fairly realistic; characters don different sorts 
of virtual reality head-mounted displays (goggles) and data gloves in order to 
enter and interact with the virtual. 
•  The Matrix franchise (Wachowski, 1999-2003). The Matrix is a typical 
Hollywood high-concept movie with an excess of action, violence, and 
advanced visual effects. The two sequels (The Matrix Reloaded and The Matrix 
                                         
30 The color grading of the virtual characters was a highly labor intense and complex 
photochemical compositing process. 
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Revolutions) upped the ante with increasing levels of action, violence and visual 
effects, while suppressing the more philosophical issues brought up in the first 
installment. Also, nine animated Animatrix short films (Final Flight of the Osiris, 
The Second Renaissance parts 1 and 2, Kid’s Story, Program, World Record, Beyond, A 
Detective Story, and Matriculated) were produced, investigating different aspects 
of the Matrix universe, and employing quite different visual styles. The Matrix 
franchise tells the story of Neo, a computer hacker who thinks he lives in the 
real world, until a band of rebels helps him break out of the virtual illusion. He 
learns that intelligent machines have enslaved humanity and hold most of 
humanity in a virtual prison. A battle against the machines rage both in the 
actual world and the virtual world. The climax gives a truce between men and 
machines, brought about by the self-sacrifice of the Messiah-like Neo. The 
Matrix franchise had good success in sales, received fairly good critical 
response, and has been discussed frequently by academics. I would even argue 
that it has gotten too much academic interest, casting an unfortunate shadow 
over the other movies mentioned here, many of which offer interesting 
readings well in parity with The Matrix. Virtual environments are realized with 
live action, occasionally enhanced with visual effects. 
•  eXistenZ (Cronenberg, 1999). Compared to the dominance of The Matrix, 
Cronenberg’s movie takes the form of a small quiet art movie. It offers 
interesting critical comments on our dependency on technology, and it tells its 
story with a limited arsenal of visual and special effects. Designers of a 
futuristic, very realistic computer game flee from an assassination attempt, and 
get increasingly lost in meandering levels of virtuality. The final dialogue line – 
“…are we still in the game?” – is an efficient summary of the issues raised in 
the story. All parts of the narrative were shot as live action. 
•  The Thirteenth Floor (Rusnak, 1999). With simple means and few visual 
effects, this movie tells the story of three different levels of actuality and 
virtuality. It is a classical breaking-out-of-the-virtual story; characters who 
initially believe they live in a real world come to the conclusion that they are 
virtual characters living in a virtual simulation. The plot also involves a 
romance, murderous jealousy, and issues concerning authenticity when a real 
woman falls in love with a virtual man. The virtual worlds are not created with 
computer graphics but with tinted live action footage. 
•  Avalon (Oshii, 2001). This is a story dealing with different levels of computer 
game virtuality, and characters trying to find new levels and break out into a 
supposed actuality. One interpretation could be that while eXistenZ anxiously 
reminds us to keep track of the actual, Avalon suggests that it might not be so 
relevant. The virtual environments are created with heavily color graded live 
action footage. The movie was produced in Poland and Japan, and directed by 
Mamoru Oshii who often juxtaposes violent action with highly contemplative 
sequences. The commentary track of the 2003 DVD release was included in 
the analysis. 
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•  Life on Mars (Graham, Jordan, Pharoah, 2006). BBC produced this 
fourteen-episode drama TV series about the Manchester police officer Sam 
Tyler who gets mysteriously caught in a slightly exaggerated version of 1973. 
The unanswered question of whether he is “mad, in a coma, or back in time” 
reverberates through-out the two seasons, and Sam reluctantly realizes that he 
prefers the intriguing characters populating the illusion instead of the actual 
world, which he desperately tries to get back to. The series is highly character 
and dialogue driven and set in a bittersweet rethinking of a 1973 that never 
was. It is an interesting counterpart to movies such as The Matrix and Tron 
since it is almost devoid of action, visual effects and computer graphics. The 
commentary track of the 2006 DVD release was included in the analysis. 
•  Tron Legacy (Kosinski, 2010). A late sequel to Tron, this visual extravaganza 
tells the story about how Kevin Flynn from the first movie was again captured 
inside the virtual world of his own creation. The virtual character Clu runs 
amok trying to build “the perfect system” and eventually builds an army of 
virtual characters ready to invade the actual world. Kevin’s son Sam enters the 
game and saves the day. The first Tron movie was daring and overambitious, 
attempting to create imagery that had never been produced before, and barely 
succeeding in getting the vision to the screen. Tron Legacy, seemingly without 
effort, creates a beautiful and complex virtual world, wallowing in an excess of 
visual style, action and visual effects. In Tron Legacy, the boundary between 
indexical (live action) imagery and simulated (computer graphics) imagery 
breaks down. Tron established many of the tropes in a poetics of virtuality; 
Tron Legacy made them look gorgeous. 
The following movies have been partially analyzed, and they are sorted according to 
release year. 
•  The Wizard of Oz (Fleming, 1939) – early depiction of volumetric display 
•  Forbidden Planet (Wilcox, 1956) – early depiction of volumetric display 
•  2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968) – a canonical, epic story about 
mankind’s place in the universe, our origin and future. The novel by Arthur 
Clarke and the movie script was written in parallel, in a collaboration between 
Clarke and Kubrick. 
•  Star Wars episode IV (Lucas, 1977) including commentary track from the 2004 
DVD – one of the very first depictions of holograms, as well as the well-
known computer graphics display of the Death Star 
•  Star Wars episode V (Kershner, 1980) – minor elaboration on the holograms 
and computer graphics displays used in episode IV 
•  Escape from New York (Carpenter, 1981) – early depiction of wireframes and 
other computer graphics 
•  Blade Runner (Scott, 1982) – canonical cyberpunk story about renegade 
androids, framing philosophical musings about the nature of being human 
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•  Star Wars episode VI (Marquand, 1983) including commentary track from the 
2004 DVD – holograms and computer graphics displays 
•  The Lawnmower Man (Leonard, 1992) – early depiction of virtual reality, 
including a cybersex scene created with computer graphics 
•  Magnetic Rose (Morimoto, 1995) – anime short movie investigating the border 
between real and illusion 
•  Ghost in the Shell (Oshii, 1995) – an often referred to and debated anime 
cyberpunk feature film 
•  Virtuosity (Leonard, 1995) – featuring virtual environments and virtual 
characters 
•  Contact (Zemeckis, 1997) – an enigmatic sequence that might be real, or a 
dream, or an illusion 
•  Abre los ojos (Amenabar, 1997) – the Spanish original to Vanilla Sky 
•  Skyggen (Nielsen, 1998) – maybe the only cyberpunk feature film produced in 
Denmark 
•  You’ve Got Mail (Ephron, 1998) – short usage of computer graphics and 
virtuality in the title sequence  
•  Sofies verden (Gustavson, 1999) – philosophical discussions and diegetic 
fictions nestled inside each other  
•  Star Wars episode I (Lucas, 1999) – the modern prequel to the Star Wars saga 
upgraded the classic hologram 
•  The Cell (Singh, 2000) – primarily surrealistic virtual dreamscapes 
•  Space (Turner & Campbell, 2001) – a fictional virtual cube used as a class 
room in a science show 
•  Vanilla Sky (Crowe, 2001) – a man caught in a virtual world 
•  Resident Evil (Andersson, 2002) – brief usage of a hologram virtual character 
•  Star Wars episode II (Lucas, 2002) – further updates of the Star Wars 
hologram 
•  Minority Report (Spielberg, 2002) – canonical transparent screen and brief 
views of volumetric displays 
•  Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex (Kamiyama & Tachibana, 2002) – 
episode 9 from season 1 of this cyberpunk TV series 
•  Star Wars episode III (Lucas, 2005) including commentary track from the 2005 
DVD – the most complex version of the Star Wars hologram 
•  Storm (Mårlind & Stein, 2005) – Swedish, semi-religious cyberpunk story 
depicting a world of memories 
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•  Renaissance (Volckman, 2006) – French animated cyberpunk with highly 
distinct, high-contrast black-and-white visual style 
•  X-men: the Last Stand (Ratner, 2006) – futuristic depiction of virtual reality 
simulation 
•  Sunshine (Boyle, 2007) – plausible depiction of a virtual reality cube 
•  Resident Evil Extinction (Mulcahy, 2007) – hologram virtual character 
•  Atom (Usborne, 2007) – visualizations in a science show, inserted into live 
action shots 
•  Iron Man (Favreau, 2008) – holograms and heads-up displays 
•  Life on Mars (US) (Katleman, 2008) – the American remake of the Life on 
Mars TV series 
•  Avatar (Cameron, 2009) – complex holograms 
•  District 9 (Blomkamp, 2009) – complex holograms and heads-up displays 
•  Terminator Salvation (McG, 2009) including commentary track – virtual 
character 
•  Gamer (Neveldine & Taylor, 2009) – mix of mediation and virtuality 
•  Chatroom (Nakata, 2010) – text-based chatrooms metaphorically represented 
as spatial, virtual environments 
•  Resident Evil: Afterlife (Anderson, 2010) – brief usage of virtual environments 
•  Inception (Nolan, 2010) – artificial dream worlds nestled inside each other 
•  Total Recall (Wiseman, 2012) – palm-phone that projects a virtual display 
•  Man of Steel (Snyder, 2013) – hologram virtual character 
The movie Blade Runner (Scott, 1982) has a clearly canonical status, and it has been 
much debated among academics (Boşnak, 2001; Bruno, 1987; Bukatman, 1997; 
Godhe, 2010b; Hayles, 1993a; Heuser, 2003; Lacey, 2000; Lovén, 2010; Marder, 
1991; McCaffery, 1991; Neumann, 1999; Schroeder, Huxor & Smith, 2001). The 
plot concerns replicants, artificial humans, and it has been discussed with 
Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra as a springboard (Bruno, 1987). However, these 
replicants are actual and physical artificial beings, not virtual characters, and 
therefore Blade Runner is not central to this poetics of virtuality, even though it will 
be mentioned occasionally. 
Literary portrayals of virtuality from two writers have been included. These texts 
can be considered as partially analyzed. William Gibson’s work was included due to 
its canonical status in the cyberpunk genre (Benedikt, 1991; Crang, Crang & May, 
1999; Csicsery-Ronay, 1992; Disch, 1998; Godhe, 2010b; Gordon, 1992; Guynup, 
2002; Hayles, 1993a; Heuser, 2003; Hollinger, 1991; Kerman, 1992; Lacey, 2000; 
McCaffery, 1991; Rheingold, 1991; Lovén, 2010; Turkle, 1995). His complete work 
related to virtuality, six novels and one short story collection, has been analyzed. 
Several novels and short stories by Stephen Baxter have also been included due to 
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his occupation with Virtuals and the rich and consistent descriptions he offers 
(these are volumetric display of an artificial intelligences, a sub-category of what is 
commonly referred to as Intelligent Virtual Agents). Baxter is not widely discussed 
by academics, even though Pierce (1993) and Bould (2003) refer to him as a hard 
SF author. 
 
Texts by William Gibson. 
•  Neuromancer (1984) – Gibson’s first cyberspace novel, about a computer 
hacker who uses hacker attacks to free a mighty artificial intelligence 
•  Burning Chrome (1986) – collection of short stories, some of which take place 
in the same future as Neuromancer. The short stories Burning Chrome, Dogfight 
and Fragments of a Hologram Rose are discussed in this poetics. The title story was 
first published in 1982. 
•  Count Zero (1986) – Gibson’s second cyberspace novel describes how the 
artificial intelligence, Neuromancer, fragmentize into multiple sentient entities 
and populate cyberspace 
•  Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988) – Gibson’s third cyberspace novel, further 
exploring the characters and ideas from the previous novels 
•  Virtual Light (1993) – describes technology closer to real-world technology 
than the technology in his previous cyberspace novels. This novel concerns a 
hunt for a pair of augmented reality glasses 
•  Idoru (1996) – events circulating around the love story between a famous 
singer and the virtual character Rei Toei 
•  All Tomorrow’s Parties (1999) – a struggle between different agencies finally 
results in the virtual character from Idoru becoming physical by means of 
nano-replicator technology 
Texts by Stephen Baxter; the Xeelee universe holds an epic story about far-future 
galactic wars, frequently describing virtual characters similar to Rei Toei in 
Gibson’s Idoru. 
•  Ring (1994) – epic novel in the Xeelee universe 
•  Transcendent (2005) – novel about the near and far future of the Xeelee 
universe 
•  Phase Space (2002) – short story collection with Dante Dreams and Touching 
Centaury 
•  Traces (1998) – short story collection with Darkness 
•  Reality Dust (2000) – metaphysical novella set in the Xeelee universe 
•  Resplendent (2006) – short story collection set in the Xeelee universe, with The 
Siege of Earth 
•  Proxima (2013) – space colonization novel 
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In addition to these texts, I will also mention a few additional texts from science 
visualization, computer art, computer games, and advertising. 
Analyzing the narratives 
When I started this research, I had seen all movies previously, at least once, 
sometimes twice before. When I re-watched the movies I made notes describing 
the signs I observed, considering what aspects of the movie might give me the 
expression of virtuality. Is it something someone said or did? Is it because of the 
way things look, or the way things are seen by the camera? The distinction between 
how things look and how we see them is an important one, highlighting the levels 
of denotation and connotation that often take place; for example, the image of a 
knife on a kitchen table represents a knife on the kitchen table, but the signification 
does not stop there. The fact that the movie editor has cut to the image of a knife 
on the table also means something; the knife is going to be used and probably not 
for dicing vegetables. The diegetic fictional world is loaded with signs – while real-
life is comparably free of meaning (Sonesson, 2001). In real-life, rainy weather does 
not represent your sadness. 
How do we know if a sign actually signifies virtuality? Peirce wrote, “nothing is a 
sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (Peirce, 1931-58, vol. 2 p.172). The analysis 
has been done under the assumption that if I see a sign, it is a sign in the context of 
my analysis. This does not mean that the discussion is closed. No interpretation can 
be regarded as final. It is a pragmatic stance taken in order to make it possible to 
have a proper discussion. The signs that have been observed range from signs that 
might not be signs at all – such as a green tie – to signs whose signification of 
virtuality seems highly probable – as when Neo asks Morpheus; “are we inside a 
computer program?” (both examples from The Matrix). 
After watching the movies my notes were imported into the qualitative analysis 
tool Nvivo (Figure 8). This tool was used to code the notes; that is, the written 
notes describing the observed signs were analyzed and a code was assigned to each 
unique sign (a type). A code is essentially a category, a short descriptive name such 
as [glowing outline] or [optical distortion]. These codes are re-used (by assigning 
the code again) for every occurrence of this particular sign (a token). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Example of the Nvivo interface supporting the work to code and categorize signs. 
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When coding signs it becomes important to separate between what Peirce (1931-
58) refers to as the types and tokens of a sign. The type of a sign is the sign on an 
abstract, general level, the “class of all occurrences of the sign” (Sebeok, 1999, 
p.41). The token is the instance of the sign, the actual usage of it, “a particular 
occurrence of a sign” (ibid., p.41). In my coding of signs, every code describes a 
sign type, while the coded occurrences point out the tokens.  
Open coding was used, letting the codes emerge out of the observations. I did 
not start the coding with a pre-determined set of codes which I then made the 
observations fit. Instead, the necessary codes were created depending on the signs 
that were encountered in the list, making the codes fit the observations. The 
distinction between coding with or without a pre-determined set of codes has been 
debated in the Strauss-Glaser debate concerning emergence versus forcing of 
empirical data (Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Kelle, 2005). Here, there are 
similarities with the conflict in hermeneutics between Habermas and Gadamer. 
Both conflicts concern how much you should use and acknowledge your tradition 
(a collective term for pre-knowledge, prejudice and such which you bring to any 
interpretation). Tradition cannot be exorcised or turned of; it is always there. This 
study of virtuality was primarily explorative; the existing models and frameworks 
for conceptualizing virtuality have neither been unified nor elaborated into detailed 
hierarchies. They have not been adapted to analyze fictional representations of 
virtuality either. Therefore, open coding was used, with the intention of fitting 
theory to the data and avoiding the reverse. Creating pre-determined codes would 
have been guesswork based on prejudices, and thus an unnecessary amplification of 
the unavoidable tradition. Of course, this does not mean that the coding process 
was approached with a completely blank mind. As both Strauss and Gadamer have 
pointed out in the two above mentioned debates, it is impossible to not have a 
tradition. My own familiarity with movie making gives me ready-made codes such 
as [color grading] or [dialogue reference]. We can never escape the categorizing 
prison of language itself. 
After the signs had been coded, I explored the way they could be grouped with 
other signs that show similar aspects in some way. The point of making these 
higher level categories were to highlight themes, similarities, and differences in 
fictional representations of virtuality. I tried to formulate straightforward categories 
such as [color] or [dialogue reference], but the diverging nature of the signs 
sometimes called for more diffuse categories such as [conceptual properties of the 
world]. The categories are then arranged into further levels of top-categories, 
forming a hierarchy in order to create an easily reviewable structure that highlights 
themes, similarities and differences in fictional representations of virtuality. 
Creating relevant and revealing top-categories has been a difficult part of the 
analysis. In order to keep the analysis open and flexible I have allowed the structure 
to grow both top-down and bottom-up. Bottom-up means reviewing the existing 
bottom-level categories and considering relevant higher-level groupings. Top-down 
means theorizing potential high-level hierarchies – such as [visual style], 
[production design] and [plot] – and seeing if they can be used. On the middle-level 
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– where the different approaches so meet – there has been much negotiation 
between different structures.31 
Super-signs were coded as well as signs. This illustrates the difference between 
the super-sign hierarchy and the category hierarchy; super-signs are not a 
categorization. A category goes across the whole sample of movies, while a super-
sign can never traverse between the diegetic worlds of the movies. If we take the 
Matrix [curtains of green glowing code] as an example, the green color is 
categorized under the category [green color] alongside with all other usages of 
green color in other movies, while the [curtains of green glowing code] itself is a 
super-sign unique for the Matrix franchise, but categorized under the category 
[behind the scenes metaphor] and this category holds examples from other movies 
as well.32 
Interpreting super-sign structures 
During the coding process the super-signs and their structure were identified. 
Signs’ ability to form hierarchies results in the super-signs Eco (1976) describes. 
In order to identify possible super-signs, every individual coding was done with 
the questions: does this sign consist of sub-signs? Does this sign aggregate with other signs, 
creating a super-sign? For example, the Agents in The Matrix signify virtuality since 
they are supposed to be sentient programs inside the virtual world, and not really 
living humans at all. Thus, [Agent] is a sign. But what makes it a sign of virtuality? 
Are there details that discern the Agents from actual humans? Yes, for example 
their superhuman strength, their hive mind silent communication, and their similar, 
repetitive looks. Each and every one of these details is a sign in itself, combining 
into the sign [Agent]. This makes [Agent] a super-sign. 
What about breaking down a sign such as [superhuman strength] into sub-signs? 
This sign could be broken down to the specific details of how a fist hits a wall, how 
the wall fractures, the thud of the impact, and how dust rises into the air. The sign 
could be broken down into such sub-signs, but I do not regard them as relevant for 
how virtuality is represented in our popular culture. These details are, in the words 
of Eco, “structural properties of the signal” (Eco, 1976, p.92). They could just as 
well signify the strength of Superman, and not the virtual world strength of Neo. 
Whether the details of a sign can be regarded as sub-signs or merely structure 
depend on the contexts and the intended meaning.  
                                         
31 Also, I attempted to use the Semiotic Square – a method organizing oppositions in different 
configurations (Corso, 2014) – in my analysis. I came to the conclusion that the Square did not 
provide sufficient insights, partly because the different contrary oppositions did not form 
relevant implication pairs when contradictions were introduced. For example, in the [actual] / 
[virtual] opposition, the contradiction [not-virtual] collapsed with [actual]. Also, the concepts I 
have studied tend to form subsets and not opposing pairs. For example, virtuality is a subset of 
reality, and a fictional virtual world is a subset of the framing diegetic world. 
32 The Matrix [curtains of green glowing code] is a recurring visual motif in the Matrix franchise, 
where lines of enigmatic computer code either falls like rain across the screen, or outline objects 
in the virtual world. 
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So, we have a hierarchy as follows (note that there can be more than one level of 
super-signs nestled within each other). 
  
(super-­signs)  
  
super-­signs  
  
(sub-­)signs  
  
structural  properties  of  the  sign  
 
For each full reading of a movie, a model of the super-sign structure was 
constructed, using the software XMind. The structure is thus explorable as a tree 
hierarchy, and possible to overview at a glance. XMind is a mind mapping software, 
but the super-sign structures are not mind maps; they are semiotic structures 
showing relationships between signs, relationships that describe how signs signify 
together. 
I have chosen to make as direct connections as possible between my watching of 
the movies and the final poetics, to be able to backtrack my thoughts and also to 
make a huge body of observations easier to grasp and navigate through. This does 
not mean that I believe the interpretation can be formalized or mechanized. The 
reading of a movie is vague, personal and subjective. I choose to foreground the 
methods I use, encouraged in this by the discussion within ethnographic writing 
concerning foregrounding of the analytical and interpretational process (McCloskey 
& Megill, 1987; Merton, 1968). The super-sign structures are a product of my 
interpretation, a property of my reading and not a property of the analyzed 
narratives. My work does not discover these structures; they are not fossils dug out 
of the ground. Just as in any interpretation of a text, they are negotiable readings 
grounded in the reader’s own tradition. 
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Studying media productions with self- and auto-
ethnography 
Approaches to conducting ethnography 
We could argue that an individual is best situated to describe his or her own 
experience more accurately than anyone else. (Wall, 2006, p.3) 
The poetics of virtuality that I present is partly based on a study of my own work 
practice in a handful of media productions. The study of your own work practice is 
debated and to some degree controversial in scientific research. My comfort with it 
stems from my training as an architect, and my practice in creative and design 
oriented endeavors such as graphic design and media production. As an architect, I 
am trained in the iterative cycle of reasoning-designing-evaluating. Design 
processes are highly iterative, at least in theory (Lundequist, 1998; Rosell, 1990; 
Wåhlström, 1990). In practice, the iterations do not form neat, sequential loops, but 
rather a complex web of interacting back-and-forth movements of different time-
scales (Winograd, 1996; Lundequist, 1998; Norman, 2002; Rosell, 1990). An 
important aspect of these iterative loops is the back and forth movement between 
different modes – between the whole and the details, and between intuitive, 
spontaneous sketching and rational, dialog-based evaluation (Branzell, 1992; 
Hileman, 1998; Lundequist, 1998; Rosell, 1990). A design process is a continuous 
movement between letting thoughts drift, and nailing thoughts in the interrogative 
light of conscious reflection. Methods of self-reflection and self-criticism are well-
established work practices in many design areas. Can this work practice in which I 
am trained be turned into a scientific method? Can I explore the silent knowledge 
in my head by listening to what the mind whispers to my hand when I do my 
practice? It might be that self- and auto-ethnography is ideal for studying 
production culture and design processes, since these by default share the 
experimental, self-reflective and evaluative process of scientific research. 
Why self- and auto-ethnography? 
When deciding on a research method, it is not only a matter of fitting the best 
solution to the specific problem. It is also a matter of choosing a solution that 
accommodates and utilizes the actual and specific situation, context and 
circumstances. This results in an optimized research method, making the best of 
the available potentials for interesting observations (Brannick & Coghlan, 2014; 
Creswell, 2003; Riemer, 1977). As a researcher involved in actual media 
productions, I have access to my own work practice and production culture. This 
gives access to a reservoir of practice based empirical observations. Utilizing this 
connection between theory and practice works well when formulating a poetics, 
since a poetics traditionally stretches between theory and practice. 
This particular combination of self- and auto-ethnography, production culture 
studies and design studies that is put to use here is quite rare. Studying your own 
design process is common practice, implemented in quite different manners, for 
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example in artistic research, in action research and design-based research.33 John 
Thornton Caldwell and others have done ethnographic and even partly self-
ethnographic studies of production culture in the movie industry, studies that are 
highly insightful.34 Combining the different approaches, adding self- and auto-
ethnography to practice-based research, creates an opportunity to make well-
documented and orderly observations of real-life design processes. 
Ethnography, self-ethnography and auto-ethnography 
Ethnography is the study of social interactions, practices and events. The study is 
done as fieldwork; the ethnographer observes and participates in the everyday 
practices of the group of people that is studied. The observed social expressions – 
what people do and say – are described and to some extent interpreted and 
assigned a meaning (Atkins & Hammersley, 1989; Clifford, 1986a; Geertz, 1973; 
Hughes et al, 1994). Writing ethnography is a re-coding, a movement going from 
the decoding of that which is culturally coded, to a new encoding in the final 
theoretical writing by the ethnographer (Clifford & Marcus, 1986). Ethnography 
primarily provides descriptions and interpretations, rather than explanations or 
theories (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989). 
In most research it is generally taken for granted that the researcher is something 
to be exorcised out of the process, as if the researcher could infect and pollute the 
results. Ethnography embraces the presence of the researcher, as emphasized by 
Atkinson & Hammersley (ibid., p.19). 
Once we abandon the idea that the social character of research can be standardized 
out or avoided by becoming a ‘fly on the wall’ or a ‘full participant’, the role of the 
researcher as active participant in the research process becomes clear. He or she is 
the research instrument par excellence. 
However, we need thorough methods to use that instrument in the best manner, 
and we need to be skeptical towards the observations and interpretations that this 
instrument produces. 
The methods of ethnography require us to turn ourselves as research 
instruments towards other groups of people, in some way external, foreign, alien. 
The ethnographer needs to break into this group of people, and to break into their 
practices. In self-ethnography, we turn ourselves towards a group of people where we 
already belong. Here, we need to break out of the group and to break out of our 
practices. In auto-ethnography, the observer turns herself towards the own self, and 
observes herself in a particular role, in my own case the role as computer graphic 
                                         
33 Action research and design-based research is often used in research on pedagogy or on usability 
and graphical interfaces, fields of study that I have previous experience with. 
34 As early as 1950 the anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker wrote the ethnography Hollywood: 
the dream factory, and in 1941 Leo Rosten published the sociological study Hollywood: the movie colony, 
the movie makers. More contemporary studies have been performed by Horace Newcomb, Robert 
Alley, Todd Gitlin, Elizabeth Traube, Barry Dornfeld, Arlene Davila, Laura Grindstaff, Vicki 
Mayer, and Georgina Born. 
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artist. In auto-ethnography the researchers need to break apart herself. When you 
are a stranger to a group, you need to do much work to observe and interpret 
practices and their meaning, because you have never encountered them before. 
When you are a part of the group, you also need to do work, but now it is a matter 
of discovering things that are so taken for granted that they might be easy to miss, 
or of opposing structures, explanations and interpretations that you have been 
indoctrinated to accept and take for granted.  
In a self-ethnography, a group of others is studied while in auto-ethnography the 
researcher studies herself. The key difference is that in the latter the observer has 
direct access to the experiences, feelings and reasoning that floats through her 
mind. It is as if we could mind-read the informant, instead of just watching her 
from outside. There are dangers in regarding auto-ethnography as mind-reading. It 
is mind-reading in one sense – we actually do observe our own feelings and 
thoughts – but we have to acknowledge that this access is actually mediated. Even 
though we observe our own mind there is still a layer of mediation, of 
representation, of interpretation. 
Achieving credibility – the critical debate on self- and auto-ethnography 
Self- and auto-ethnography have been debated and criticized. Objections that have 
been raised are that the methods are too narcissistic, that they rely too much on 
one source, and that the closeness between the observer and the observed clouds 
judgment and analytical abilities (Brannick & Coghlan, 2014). Already in the late 
1970s ideas on the acceptance of personal writing emerged and opened up for 
“experimental writing projects that blended the genres of ethnography, biography 
and autobiography” (Reed-Danahay, 2001, p.411). Much of the debate on personal 
writing played out in the journal Current Anthropology (Honigmann, 1976; 
Mandelbaum, 1973; Nash & Wintrob, 1972; Sangren, 1988; Strathern, 1987). The 
term auto-ethnography originated from Hayano (1979). In ethnographic studies of 
professional practices it is quite common to study your own work (Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 1989). In ethnography, there has been a general shift from 
colonialism, the conventional image of a white man studying estranged tribes, to 
insider accounts, where the study of your “own cultures offer new angles of vision 
and depths of understanding” (Clifford, 1986a, p.9). According to Reed-Danahay 
(2001) self- and auto-ethnography is the outcome of a general shift towards a focus 
on the personal narrative, influenced by different merging trends; trends towards 
social practice in social theory (Cohen, 1994; Giddens, 1991), towards social and 
cultural poetics (Fernandez & Herzfeld, 1998; Lavie, Narayan & Rosaldo, 1993), 
and towards a more reflexive ethnographic writing (Cole, 1992). Today, self- and 
auto-ethnography are established methods within an international community of 
researchers and universities (Bochner & Ellis, 2000; Ellis, 2004). There are a 
number of conferences and journals accepting publications based on self- and auto-
ethnographic research, for example the conference Cumulus 38° South and the 
journal Forum: Qualitative Social Research. 
The utilization and reliance on narrative – telling stories – is one of the criticized 
aspects of self- and auto-ethnography (Johannisson, 2002; Reed-Danahay, 2001). 
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Narrated accounts of real life events are often marginalized and devalued as being 
anecdotal. A core strategy in order to achieve credibility is to establish traceability; 
every claim and every account need to be connected back to the initial observation. 
Thorough and systematic field notes are vital in order to achieve traceability, so 
that every interpretation can be traced back to an observed behavior (Atkinson & 
Hammersley 1989; Holt, 2003; Wall 2006). This strategy relates closely to the 
concept of thick description (Geertz, 1973), an ethnographical method where not 
only the observed behavior but also the context is carefully explained. The 
intention is to make it easier for the reader to make her own interpretations of the 
behavior. However, the ethnographic researcher is always an interpretational link 
between the field setting and the reader (Brannick, 2014). The role of the 
ethnographer is to interpret, orchestrate voices, and do this within an analytical 
framework. 
Another necessary methodological strategy in self- and auto-ethnography is self-
reflectivity and self-criticism. Research in general demands a self-critical stance 
towards the results and claims we as researchers make, and even more so in self- 
and auto-ethnography. The hermeneutic approach to interpretation is very useful in 
this. Hermeneutics as a method is a “deeply self-reflexive and self-critical process” 
(Prasad, 2002, p.24). Teresa Brannick and David Coghlan (2014) suggest that 
through reflexive awareness we can articulate tacit knowledge and rephrase it as 
theoretical descriptions. They emphasize that there are two kinds of reflection that 
must be carried out: the epistemic reflection that challenges the researchers 
assumptions and tradition, and the methodological that monitors how the research 
is conducted and how it impacts the field setting and the informants. 
The ethnographer must also avoid becoming rhetorical or political; ethnographic 
writing should not be an ideological projection (Clifford, 1986b). 
The study of me – narcissism, self-disclosure, vulnerability and 
censorship 
One danger in self- and auto-ethnographic texts is the risk of becoming too self-
indulgent and egotistical, so that the actual issues of the research are veiled and 
instead dominated by observations and discussions associated with the researchers 
own person (Atkinson, 1997; Bruner, 1993; Charmaz & Mitchell, 1997; Coffey, 
1999; Holt, 2003; Sparkes, 2000). Self- and auto-ethnography is not about the 
individual; it is a study of culture and humans through the individual, towards “the 
understanding of a social phenomenon” (Johannisson, 2002, p.8). This requires a 
very delicate balance in the work of the researcher, and careful attention to the 
different voices in ethnographic writing. If auto-ethnographic writing becomes too 
narrow, too specific, or too related to you yourself, the work no longer holds much 
interest to anyone beside yourself. If your writing becomes too broad, too general, 
and makes too many assumptions about your own role as a representative for 
everyone else, your observations and writings lose credibility.  
Self-disclosure in ethnographic studies has been discussed quite thoroughly 
(Atkinson, 1992; Denzin, 1989; Friedman, 1990; Tedlock, 1991; Van Maanen, 
1988). Many advocate that ethnographers should become deeply and emotionally 
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immersed in their field work. Geertz (1998) criticizes the cultural studies done by 
Clifford and his followers for being non-immersive, hit-and-run ethnography. It is 
argued that vulnerability gives authority (Ryang, 2000; Behar, 1996). Vulnerability 
could be seen as a verification of honesty, closeness and commitment. Making 
myself vulnerable, for example exposing the ugliness of my own doubts on my 
capability as designer, my lack of coherent reasoning, and so on – gives me the 
authority to say I have been there, this was how I perceived it. However, Behar 
(1996) cautions that self-exposure “has to take us somewhere we couldn’t 
otherwise go to. It has to be essential to the argument, not a decorative nourish, 
not exposure for its own sake” (p.14). Since there is a danger in revealing your own 
flaws, you have to be careful how you present yourself (Ellis, 2007). Can there be 
issues of vulnerability when I study my own work in media productions? In my role 
as a computer graphic artist, there are questions that I should not ask, but in my 
role as researcher questions are a way to oppose and deconstruct the seemingly 
obvious. For example, as a movie maker I cannot ask why suspension of disbelief is 
so important. But as a researcher I can ask this apparently “silly” question. 
Exposing my deepest flaws might damage my own career, either as an academic, 
as a computer graphic artist, or both. It is therefore inevitable that I will adapt a 
layer of censorship. In my study, the sensitive issues concern my role as a 
professional media producer. The very usage of that phrase highlights that it is 
important for me to regard myself as a professional media producer. Since I am the 
authorial voice here, it becomes very easy for me to describe my work process and 
myself in favorable terms. I might intentionally or unintentionally “forget” less 
favorable design decisions. I might rationalize originally unmotivated decisions and 
dress them up in fancy language borrowed from rational and theoretical ideas about 
how media productions ought to work. I must make a conscious effort to be harsh 
on myself in a careful and systematic manner. Also, this poetics of virtuality is not 
hugely dependent on the degree to which I am a professional media producer. It 
might be that some of the design decisions are not as thought-through as I claim, 
but that is not highly relevant for a discussion about representation of virtuality. 
The study of others – achieving rapport and caring for informants 
The autoethnographers relations to others have different levels of closeness and 
commitment, and the study of these others presents different sets of problems 
depending on these levels of intimacy. Ellis (2007) asks “how can we act in a 
humane, nonexploitative way, while being mindful of our role as researchers?” 
(p.5). 
A good example is the fieldwork observations I did in the Environmental 
Science Investigation project where a group of people collaborated on a daily basis 
for about one and a half years. Initially, I thought of myself as someone observing 
others; it was easy for me to think of the other participants as informants, and 
when talking or socializing with them I often thought of this as building rapport. 
Then, after about six months, I passed a line. I had started becoming friends with 
some of the participants, and I made a thought-through decision to not think in 
terms of rapport and informants. I had gone native. I came to this decision not as a 
 
 
 103 
researcher but as a friend and fellow human. When you spend much time with the 
people you observe it is natural to get to know these people quite well and develop 
friendship, something that Ellis (2007) has been discussing thoroughly. I came to 
the understanding that my fieldwork “radically deconstructs the boundary between 
the researcher as a representative for the scientific community and as a responsible 
subject in the social context concerned” (Johannisson, 2002, p.6). It is interesting to 
note the importance of the word informant. Newton (1993) mentions the shock one 
of her friends had when being referred to as an informant, and Carolyn Ellis asks 
(2007, p.7): 
Who wants to spend time with someone who is out to use you for their own 
purposes? And how pleasant can it be to spend time with people who feel you are 
intruding into their lives? 
What Ellis is pointing out is the problem with the un-equal power-balance that is 
created when someone is studying someone else. The observations we researchers 
collect give us an advantage since we apparently know more about the other than 
vice versa, and we can potentially use this knowledge by telling it to others. 
Therefore, contemporary ethnography is often focused on polyvocality, different 
attempts at letting the voices of informants be heard, even though the 
ethnographer always needs to be the editor and interpreter of these different 
accounts (Clifford, 1986a; Clifford, 1986b; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989). The 
study of others also has a more emotional component; we are in a position were we 
use the other for our own purposes of earning professional prestige (Brannick 
2014; Lincoln, 1995). An idealistic way to compensate for this utilization of others 
is to use a care-giving approach (Bochner & Ellis, 2006), where the strategy is “to 
research from an ethic of care” (Ellis, 2007, p.25). This could minimize the power 
imbalance by emphasizing research and writing that are of use and interest not only 
for the research community, but also for the involved informants as well (Newton, 
1993), perhaps even empowering the informants (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989). 
How can you give care when studying media productions? One thing I have done 
is to always work as professionally as I can, treating each production as a 
production and not as a field for careless experimentation. I have also often been as 
clear as possible with my research questions, openly discussing them in detail with 
whoever has been interested. 
There comes the final moment when the written academic text is published, and 
the answer is given to the disturbing question What happens when they read what I 
write? Not willing to hurt people creates a difficult balance between honesty and 
damage control. Any ethnographic study might involve negative criticism towards 
and judgment of the people involved. In conventional ethnography, this is at least 
partly resolved when the researcher leaves the field setting. The career related risks 
of self-ethnography are more difficult to flee from since the researcher acts in her 
natural setting. It is obvious that this might lead to self-censorship and very 
difficult situations in the writing and publication of research results (Alvesson, 
1999). In response to such concerns, Carolyn Ellis (2007) points out a few useful 
strategies. One approach is to write a first draft of the text without any censoring, 
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in order to build a text that is as “nuanced and truthful” (ibid., p.24) as possible. 
Then, for the final version, the researcher should do her own private negotiation 
between this first draft and what is ethically and socially acceptable. Depending on 
the specific issues, different levels of censorship can be deployed; the researcher 
can “omit things, use pseudonyms or composite characters, alter the plot or scene, 
position your story within the stories of others, or occasionally decide to write 
fiction” (ibid., p.24). My own addition to these recommendations is that the text 
needs modality markers that comment on done omissions or alterations, otherwise 
the resulting text might lose much of its potential usefulness as an academic text. 
Influence from the research agenda 
Generally in ethnography, the presence of the ethnographer and the informants’ 
awareness of the research agenda in itself can have subtle influences on what is 
observed, and what is said and done (Atkinson & Hammersley 1989), with the 
assumed danger of creating “a self-fulfilling prophesy” (Johannisson, 2002, p.13) 
instead of actual research results. If I study my own decision process, and if I, for 
example, anticipate that my designs will be influenced in a certain way, how do I 
know where this idea originally came from? Did I perform the design decision 
because I as a researcher hypothesized that I would do it? Or did I hypothesize it 
because I already knew I would do it? The following unedited field notes illustrate 
how the research agenda was in play during design work.35 
The Americans are supposed to have done much of module 4; I hope not so much 
that a grey-room microscope is ruled out. I would like to have it, and I need it for my 
research. 
When talking about salmon images (problems with copyright) I offered to do Maya 
images (seeing an opportunity to test visual fidelity levels) and he was mildly positive, 
but reasonably suggested to do good content first, then see if we need to draw our 
own salmon pictures. 
These field notes illustrate that my research question had had impact on the 
productions I have been involved with; I have occasionally made design decisions 
as well as suggestions for further design work with the primary intent of providing 
additional empirical observations. The risk seems obvious; I might attempt to 
design stuff that is not needed, the research question could corrupt the design 
process. However, there are always many different agendas behind production 
decisions. Media productions are a competitive environment where personal 
preferences, personal promotions, and insubstantial ideas about the potential 
audience clash with practical circumstances such as lack of resources, technical 
problems and approaching deadlines. As an example, my suggestion mentioned 
above to 3d model salmons never reached acclamation. This illustrates that in most 
production environments, the influences from any research question are simply 
                                         
35 From the Environmental Science Investigation project (February 10th, 2008, Hotel California 
and February 11th, 2008, Stanford University campus). 
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outrivaled by other concerns, and therefore it is acceptable to let research questions 
be a part of the process. 
On a few occasions I deliberately decided to try the usage of a particular sign I 
was interested in and that I hoped would work as a sign of virtuality. The key word 
is “try”. There is nothing in my field notes that suggests that I insistently forced the 
usage of a particular sign, to prove a thesis or to argue that it should work. The 
process has instead been highly investigative, so that I have tried to use a sign and 
then realized that it did not work. One example is the [flickering] that I 
experimented with in the Via Tecta production, but which I finally abandoned in 
favor of other more successful signs such as [semi-transparency] and [blur]. This 
means that my self- and auto-ethnographical study has been in some sense 
intervention based, in the sense of injecting change and observing what happens. 
This injection of change is an important part of action research and design-based 
research, and it is also how design processes normally work, with the iterative 
circles where ideas are tested, evaluated and rejected. Therefore, even if my 
research question influenced the situation, the productions can still be regarded as 
naturalistic field settings. 
So, the solution to the issue of influence from the research agenda is that the 
problem is not a problem; it is part of the empirical data itself. Yes, as a designer I 
do come to the sketchpad with my head full of ideas; what I actually study are all 
this knowledge, prejudice and these anticipations. So, the observation is not a self-
invented, self-sustaining illusion or fraud; it is a self-invented, self-sustaining 
observation. 
Creating distance 
In self-ethnography, can we be close but avoid closure (Alvesson, 1999; Brannick 
& Coghlan, 2014)? Going native is in direct conflict with conventional 
ethnographic approaches, as explained by Atkinson & Hammersley (1989, p.90). 
The comfortable sense of being ‘at home’ is a danger signal. From the perspective of 
the ‘marginal’’ reflexive ethnographer, there can thus be no question of total 
commitment, ‘surrender’, or ‘incoming’. There must always remain some part held 
back, some social and intellectual ‘distance’. For it is in the space created by this 
distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done. Without that distance, 
without such analytic space, the ethnography can be little more than the 
autobiographical account of a personal conversion. 
The fear is that by going native, the researcher loses her ability to see clearly; she 
achieves the same viewpoint as the natives themselves, and loses her bird’s-eye-
view (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989; Clifford & Marcus, 1986). Does the ability to 
observe and analyze break down when the distance disappears? What do we mean 
by being close? Being close is to have extensive tradition (pre-knowledge) as well as 
emotional attachment. This is both a curse and a blessing. The abundance of 
tradition gives us a wealth of interpretational clues. Considering my own study, 
someone less immersed in the production culture surrounding movie making 
would most likely have a limited ability to interpret experiences in that field, while 
my interpretational repertoire is wider and deeper (albeit also twisted and tinted by 
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tradition). The emotional attachment means that we have a complex connection to 
what we study. This not only influences how we see things but what we see; we see 
different things. Neither the outside view nor the inside view is more superior than 
the other. They are different; they complement each other. 
It is possible to create an observational distance in auto-ethnography, since we 
have a capability to assume different roles. Ethnography holds a contradiction 
between two authorities: the personal subjective “within or down in the middle of 
things” and the scientific observer “on the edge of a space, looking in and/or 
down” (Pratt 1986, p.32). Alvesson’s (1999) metaphor of breaking out illustrates 
how we can create the distance needed to observe and analyze that which is very 
close. This is a process of defamiliarization (Marcus & Fischer, 1986) and creating 
breakdowns of that which is taken for granted (Alvesson, 1999) – challenging our 
own ideas of the setting we study. This concept of breaking down viewpoints is 
well supported by the hermeneutic method. Gadamer (1989) advocated that we 
must genuinely question, a questioning characterized by a willingness to repeatedly 
oppose your own viewpoints and to accept new insights, regardless of how they 
challenge our own deep tradition. Our standard mode of perception is seeing 
without really seeing, just knowing we have seen. Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes that 
“nothing is more difficult than to know precisely what we see” (p.51), and then he 
illustrates that it is nevertheless possible to a degree, describing the situation of 
watching mountains on the horizon. When we observe the horizon we can see 
both distance and blueness. We experience distance, but we can also consciously 
understand that this comes from the blueness we also see on distant mountains. 
Reflection and conscious interrogation of our own experiences can create at least 
some distance, so that we may actually understand what we actually see. 
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My observations of production culture and virtuality 
In the following pages I will discuss how the self- and auto-ethnographic method 
was applied in my study of media productions, and make some comments on how 
the methods worked in this context. 
Taking field notes and analyzing observations 
The moments of observation that occur in the field setting are quickly dissolved, 
and all that remains besides fleeting memories are the field notes, audio recordings, 
and artifacts such as sketches, to name a few. Field notes become vital for later 
analysis and interpretation. Writing is a central activity in ethnography, present at all 
levels from sketchy field notes to the final ethnographic account, and this emphasis 
on writing highlights that all ethnographic accounts are to some extent a construct 
(Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989; Clifford, 1986a). Concerning field notes, Atkinson 
and Hammersley (1989) suggest that “one should aim to make notes as soon as 
possible after the observed action” (p.176). Finding a rhythm between observation 
and note taking is important. In my own fieldwork, I made extensive and daily 
notes. One problem was that sometimes I was very pressed for time while working, 
so the notes were short. In order to find time for extensive field notes I started 
recording them into an audio recorder, a method I came to use extensively. 
These field notes were analyzed similar to how the film study notes were 
analyzed: with coding in the qualitative analysis tool Nvivo. The coding of the field 
notes was not fully open; the coding of the film studies was done before the field 
notes, and categories related to semiotic codes (such as [color], [glow], [pixels] and 
so on) were inherited from the film study coding to the field notes coding. But 
many additional codes were created specifically for the field notes, primarily ones 
related to production circumstances (such as [lack of time] and [design 
discussions]). The analysis was done by categorizing the coded notes, looking for 
similarities and dissimilarities, and employing the reflective and self-critical mindset 
discussed earlier. 
My context as a researcher and media producer 
As a researcher I am part of the Digital Representation group in Göteborg, 
Sweden. Sven Andersson, my main supervisor, formed the group and our research 
approach, using semiotics and hermeneutics to study digital media. About half the 
group is located at the Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts at the 
University of Gothenburg, doing artistic research. The other half, where I am 
located, is at the Department of Applied Information Technology at Chalmers 
University of Technology. 
The researchers in the Digital Representation group are practitioners working 
with media productions in different forms. Personally, I have been involved in 
various media productions for some years. It started in 1986 when I joined the 
editorial of the Swedish non-profit astronomy magazine Astronomi & rymdfart. 
Here I filled various positions such as editor-in-chief, writer and illustrator. My first 
media related employment came in 1995 at the Chalmers University of Technology, 
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designing and building web sites. From 1997 I spent three years as a web developer 
at the company Akzo Nobel, and then came to Chalmers Medialab in 2000, with 
the clear intention to do more advanced media productions than web sites. Since 
then, I have been involved in small and large productions, ranging from one week 
to one year in full time equivalent. I have contributed in various roles, for example 
as project leader, production manager, designer, movie maker, computer graphic 
artist, and writer. The academic environment where I do my research has had 
several media related university courses, and I have been deeply involved as a 
teacher and course manager for many of these. The course Digital Movie Making is 
highly related to my research area. I have been course manager for this course for 
fourteen years and supervised over a hundred student movie productions. I have 
also been working with research and teaching concerning usability and graphical 
user interfaces. This brought me to the division of interaction design in 2011. Here, 
my fellow researchers, as well as the teaching I do at our Masters program, 
Interaction Design and Technology, have given me ample experience in areas that I 
will bring up in this poetics, such as game design and augmented reality. When I 
worked at the Chalmers Medialab we had a virtual reality CAVE system. That gave 
me valuable insights in real-life virtual reality. 
I have a Masters in Architecture, and besides movie production, I have worked 
with other design areas, such as graphical design. Creative professionals often move 
between, for example, industrial design, architecture and (movie) production design 
(Neumann, 1999; Rosell, 1990; Wåhlström, 1990). Architecture and production 
design in movies are considered especially close, design-wise (Neumann, 1999). 
Both architecture and movies are spatial and temporal arts, in that they both stage 
different kinds of movements through space and through time. 
Although I would not consider myself a professional movie maker, I have 
insight in movie production that informs my readings and interpretations. Any 
poetics must consider considerations such as technical limitations (some things are 
more costly in time and money to do), technical possibilities (some things are 
asking to be done since they are technologically possible), collaborative issues (the 
nature of the team work and the artistic leadership might result in success or failure 
to achieve organic unity), among other things. 
Achieving access to observe media productions 
John Caldwell and other researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles 
have documented the difficulties of studying media productions, especially high-
profile ones (Caldwell, 2009a; Caldwell, 2009b; Malcolm, 2009; Ortner, 2009. 
Caldwell speaks about aspirational cultures – production cultures where a large 
potential work force is trying to get into the industry and wants to say they are a 
film maker, pretending to be a part of Hollywood (Caldwell, 2009b). These are 
cultures that traditionally have been highly hierarchical and where it previously took 
years to achieve any level of creative leadership. Caldwell highlights that these 
production cultures are changing when digital technology, hardware as well as 
software, makes it possible for anyone to make a movie. He emphasizes that 
amateurs and semi-professionals now have the potential to produce high quality 
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media, and he describes it as a porosity between consumers and producers 
(illustrated in Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Porosity between Hollywood and independent movie making – Hollywood professionals 
and semi-professionals including the author formed the crew of the short film Postcards from 
the future. 
 
For me, it was quite trouble-free in most cases to achieve access to do auto- and 
self-ethnographic observations in the different semi-professional productions I 
have studied. But my studies demanded more than just having me sit in and 
listening; they required me to actually work hands-on with the production, and to 
interact in a conventional manner with the other participants. This was not always 
such an easily achieved objective, and identifying the gatekeepers that provide 
access (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1989) proved challenging in some cases. In one 
of the productions – Environmental Science Investigation – I started out with a 
quite marginal role and I gradually gained creative leadership. Initially, my 
involvement in the project was not clearly defined and the result was that I was 
occasionally excluded from design work. I became increasingly firm in my requests 
for an actual decision on who would work on design and production. Eventually I 
got my formal approval to work on the design of the virtual laboratory. Thus, in 
this kind of semi-professional production, creative leadership can very well be 
achieved by simply deciding to “grab the keyboard and the mouse and write the 
texts and do the graphics”, as I described the process in my field notes.36 As 
another example, getting access to the Postcards from the future movie production was 
                                         
36 Field note entry from April 11th, 2008 
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a gradual process. I got contact with the director, Alan Chan, via e-mail, and when 
he got to see some of my previous illustration work, I was asked whether I wanted 
to contribute to his projects. While accepting the offer I also suggested that I could 
make an ethnographic study of the collaboration, and was given a formal consent. 
Showing my work also gave me access to working on the Via Tecta project. My 
collaborator, Jonathan Westin, stated that the reason why he invited me to the 
collaboration was that he had seen my work on Environmental Science 
Investigation. 
But even when I had achieved formal approval for taking creative leadership, 
there were problems with losing access. In the Environmental Science Investigation 
production, there were occasions where one of the participants sidestepped my 
communication with the Flash programmers who coded the Virtual Gas Lab. This 
was probably due to ambivalence concerning my role as creative leader and also 
due to misconceptions concerning proper production procedures. These 
experiences correspond well with how Brannick and Coghlan (2014) outline how 
you as an insider can quite easily get general, primary access to a setting, but the 
same role can stop you from getting secondary access to certain areas. My role as a 
team member gave me general access, but since other members occasionally did 
not see me as creative leader, I was sometimes excluded from creative decisions. 
Another observation is that my role as an observer is quickly forgotten in most of 
the media productions I have participated in, a common situation according to 
Atkinson and Hammersley (1989); informants will “be more concerned with what 
kind of person the researcher is than with the research itself” (p.83). This prompted 
me to remind the participants of my role as observer. This was primarily for ethical 
research reasons, and it did not lead to any notable comments. The clearest 
indicator of this was that the participants almost never mentioned it; there were 
exceptions, though. Jonathan Westin in the Via Tecta production, himself doing 
slightly similar research on his own work process, was highly aware of my research 
agenda and we discussed it frequently. 
Wall (2006) as well as Moustakas (1990) speak of immersion and incubation; the 
time consuming long-term contact with the field and the authority this provides. 
The field study needs to be sustained until “themes and meanings emerge” (Wall, 
2006, p.5). Wall divides immersion and incubation into separate phases. First there 
is fieldwork, when we engage in “sustained focus… total concentration… and a 
deep exploration” (ibid., p.4). Then there is reflection after fieldwork, “a period of 
retreat” (ibid., p.4) where theory emerges un-forced out of the data. My experience 
is that the study of media productions takes place in a working environment where 
these demands are met quite well. The media productions I have been involved 
with have typically been long projects where a slow-burning creative process is 
occasionally interrupted by short periods of intense activity. 
Summarizing my experiences in getting access in semi-professional media 
productions for self- and auto-ethnographic studies, I can emphasize that it is often 
a matter of showing what you can do and that you are willing to do it. One 
drawback with semi-professional productions is that this does not give direct access 
to the more high-concept media industry; it does not give you Hollywood. 
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However, semi-professional productions such as Postcards from the Future can give 
access to the production culture of professional movie makers. 
Observing externalized and internalized design processes 
How can autoethnography be used to study design processes and thus the 
semiotics of the designed and constructed images and narratives? The 
autoethnographic part of my research has been a study of design processes and 
their results, the sign production. An inherent difficulty in studying design 
processes is that they are to a large part an internalized process, and thus difficult to 
access and document. The externalized part of the design process – sketches, 
meeting discussions and so on – is possible to record, and document, but it 
represents only a fraction of the process. 
Why is it difficult to document and study design processes, especially in movie 
productions? It is common that design decisions are made as a purely cognitive 
internal process, and then sketched down. Sketching is highly important for the 
iterative loop that characterizes design work (Branzell, 1992; Jonsson, 2002; 
Mitchell, 1996; Rosell, 1990; Wåhlström, 1990). However, traditional sketching – 
drawing visual drafts with pen and paper – can be difficult to use in movie making. 
Many directors use production design sketches, concept illustrations and 
storyboards extensively (Keegan, 2009), but many aspects of movie making are 
difficult to sketch effectively. For example, the work of the cinematographer is 
highly dependent on experience, guesswork and decisions during principal 
photography (Fauer, 2006). It is usually difficult and inefficient to sketch these 
decisions on paper, because cinematography is a matter of light and shadow, details 
and texture. This is not as easy to sketch as, for example, the shapes and colors that 
architects and industrial designers concentrate on. 
Thus, the internalized design process is difficult to observe or document with 
external means. Autoethnography seems to be ideal for observing the internalized 
part of the design process. Events in the design process can be externalized, 
primarily via logbook entries. But a problem is that much of the design process is 
internalized so deep that not even the designer herself is guaranteed to understand 
all the mechanisms and processes leading up to a specific design solution. 
Designers often experience how an idea emerges seemingly out of the blue after a 
long period of meandering thoughts (Branzell, 1992; Lundequist, 1998; Rosell, 
1990). Observing and understanding your own internal idea generation is a skill that 
is important for designers since it is highly related to your capacity to apply self-
criticism, so a professional designer utilizing an autoethnographic approach is able 
to see down through some of the layers of consciousness, but never the whole way 
down. Knowledge of the complete design process is out of reach, and any description 
of a design process will always be partial. 
As already mentioned, the externalized design process is possible to document, 
using recordings, sketches and so on (Freitas, 2002). The documentation that is 
most easily done and retrieved is design sketches and e-mail conversations. I 
archived all these kind of artifacts, and they have been useful, both as data in 
themselves and as a device to remind of the different details of each design 
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decision. I have been experimenting with other sorts of recordings and 
documentations. In the previously mentioned Environmental Science Investigation 
project we had a number of desktop videoconferences using the Marratech 
software that enabled me to record audio, video and shared whiteboard 
communication. The extent of the design related discussions were highly limited 
though, resulting in a limited usefulness of these recordings. In the Via Tecta 
project my collaborator Jonathan Westin generously allowed complete audio 
recordings of all our production meetings, resulting in a quite rich documentation 
of parts of the externalized design work. I have also experimented with recordings 
of my own design and production work. When doing these recordings, I made a 
screencast recording of the design work I did on my computer screen as well as an 
audio recording of my verbal explanations and reflections on what I was doing. 
These have proved to be of very limited value. Often, a sketches is an after-the-fact 
jotting down of already emerged ideas, a kind of visual note making. Also, creative 
design decisions are often a matter of selecting signs, not constructing them. 
Consider signs such as [flickering] or [desaturation]. These are almost impossible to 
draw in a conventional pen-and-paper sketch. They are rather like words; I must 
select them before I can sketch them down, and when I have selected them, that 
design decision has already passed. Therefore these kinds of design decisions are 
better documented using ethnographic note taking, than trying to record the design 
work in progress. 
So, I have tried several different methods for documenting design processes and 
have learnt some lessons. In the following the methods are ordered in accordance 
to their importance in relation to my research question (highest importance at top, 
then falling): 
•  Field notes (written and verbal) 
•  Archived e-mails 
•  Archived design sketches and the final product 
•  Audio recordings of meetings 
•  Documents such as scripts, meeting minutes, synopses and similar 
•  Audio recording of myself doing live commenting during production work 
•  Screen image recording during production work 
•  Recordings of video conference meetings (audio, video, text chat and digital 
whiteboard) 
It is hardly surprising that the classical ethnographic field notes have been the 
most useful. Neither is the importance of e-mails surprising considering e-mail 
have been the primary form of communication in the geographically distributed 
teams I have been working with.  
The observed media productions 
Typical for the productions I have studied is that I have been primarily a computer 
graphic artist, but often take on other roles such as project leader, production 
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manager, scriptwriter, and director. My work has involved both creative design 
decisions and hands-on media production. This mix of roles is rather characteristic 
of smaller, semi-professional production teams. Often the productions have 
bridged the boundary between academia and the media industry, with participants 
from both sides. In some productions, there has been an external client with an 
interest in the end product. 
Usually I used the production tools Adobe Photoshop (graphics and photo 
editing), Maya (3d modeling and animation), Adobe After Effects (compositing and 
2d animation), and Adobe Premiere (video editing). They are all professional media 
production tools used by the industry, with the exception of Premiere that is on a 
semi-professional level. There has also been work done with Adobe Flash 
(interactive web graphics and programming), usually done by other participants. 
Several of the productions have had distributed teams, often situated on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In some cases, I have never met face-to-face with the other 
participants. I met Rick Dunbar – my closest collaborator in Astronaut – once in 
Washington and I have never met Alan Chan – the director of Postcards from the 
Future. Other productions involved frequent face-to-face meetings, for example the 
Via Tecta project with Jonathan Westin and the Environmental Science 
Investigation project. Distance communication was highly dominated by e-mail; the 
telephone was almost never used. In two projects – Postcards from the Future and 
Environmental Science Investigation – we used desktop videoconferences on 
numerous occasions. 
These are the media productions I have included in my study of virtuality. They 
are ordered according to the time of production start. 
•  Astronaut (ongoing since 2003). This is a large private endeavor to produce 
a feature film using production techniques similar to Sky Captain and the World 
of Tomorrow and Sin City – shooting actors against a green screen and adding all 
environments as computer graphics in post-production. I wrote the script in 
2003, and shot the live action footage with seven actors together with Rick 
Dunbar (two actors in Washington, USA, and the others in Göteborg, 
Sweden). For a few years I had non-profit help from a small production crew 
of semi-professional movie makers, but since the production was caught in 
limbo due to lack of time these participants dropped out one by one. The 
production has no funding and it is still uncertain if the movie will ever be 
completed. Nevertheless it has given much insight into semi-professional 
movie making and one scene depicts a virtual character – Ejahja – which 
makes it interesting for this study. This was my first self-ethnographic study 
and it also generated research results concerning distributed collaboration in 
the movie industry (Eriksson, 2003; Eriksson & Spante, 2004a; Eriksson & 
Spante, 2004b; Eriksson, Sundström & Thelander, 2004).  
•  X-15 (2006-2012). The science writer Michelle Evans wrote this historical 
book on the X-15 flight research rocket plane, and I provided computer 
graphics illustrations of the X-15 in different flight situations. Both Michelle 
and I agreed that the illustrations should be as photorealistic as possible, and I 
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experimented with using signs that could convey the virtual 3d model behind 
the visualizations. 
•  Environmental Science Investigation (2007-2008). This project was a 
collaboration between Chalmers University of Technology, the University of 
Gothenburg and Stanford University, financed by the Wallenberg Global 
Learning Network (WGLN). A total of twelve people worked on the project 
and five people were involved in design and/or production work. I worked 
40% of a full-time position for two years, and was highly involved in design 
and production. We produced a web site intended to be used as teaching 
material in high-schools, and this involved a virtual laboratory (the Gas Lab) 
and a short computer graphics movie describing how gas atoms in a soda 
bottle form bubbles. Maya was used to build the graphics for the virtual lab, 
and the final interactions were done in Flash. The web site and especially the 
Gas Lab were extensively tested and evaluated in four different high schools in 
Sweden. The research results from these evaluations mostly concerned 
pedagogical issues (Eriksson & Sunnerstam, 2008; Eriksson, Sunnerstam & 
Karlsson, 2010; Spante et al, 2009; Spante et al, 2010). 
•  Via Tecta (2008-2009). Even though being a small production together with 
only one other participant – Jonathan Westin at Department of Conservation, 
University of Gothenburg – this project was highly focused on the issues of 
representation of virtuality, mostly because both Jonathan and I are computer 
graphic artists and we shared similar research interests. The production was a 
part of the interdisciplinary research project Via Tiburtina – Space, Movement 
and Artefacts in the Urban Landscape at Istituto Svedese in Rome. We created 
a computer graphics visualization / reconstruction of the ancient roman 
temple Via Tecta, investigating different strategies to emphasis the different 
levels of un-certainty in the reconstruction. All graphics were created in Strata 
Studio and Photoshop, and we used Flash to create animations and the final 
interactive visualization. The visualization was showcased for an audience of 
dignitaries at a press event for the inauguration of a new library at the Swedish 
Institute in Rome, March 24th, 2009. Since then, the display has been 
demonstrated at various institutes internationally and research results have 
been published in (Westin & Eriksson, 2010). 
There are also a few media productions that I will refer to even if they are not 
related to virtuality. These are projects I have worked with that shed light on media 
production culture. 
•  Postcards from the future (2005-2006). On a non-profit basis I participated 
in this independent short film production crewed by various industry 
professionals in Los Angeles and elsewhere. The computer graphic artist Alan 
Chan directed it and Eric Adkins was the director of photography. I worked 
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for about four months on animatics, and built parts of a 3d-model for a Moon 
base.37 
•  Rymdlust (2005-2006). This was a major project where we produced 25 
minutes of computer graphics for an interactive science show movie depicting 
a voyage through our galaxy. Myself, Josef Wideström and Magnus Axelsson 
at Chalmers University of Technology collaborated with Saab Ericsson Space 
and Universeum (the science center where the final product was exhibited for 
about a year). 
•  Solen, månen och den röda planeten (Utbildningsradion, 2007-2008). I 
worked with producer Helen Rundgren at the public service company 
Utbildningsradion, supplying a few minutes of computer graphics shots 
visualizing different astronomy scenery. The shots were used in a science show 
series for young children (distributed on DVD to elementary schools in 
Sweden). 
Interviews with media producers 
As a complement to the movie analysis and the study of my own work process, I 
have also done a number of interviews with people involved in movie and TV 
productions. As suggested by Atkinson & Hammersley (1989), ethnographic 
observations and interviews can illuminate each other. Thomas (1993) suggests that 
interviews with high-profile professionals can be easier to set up when the 
interviewee happens to be close at hand, something that aligned with my own 
experience; often, I planned interviews in conjunction with industry conferences. 
These interviews did not focus specifically on representation of virtuality; rather, 
they covered general aspects of digital movie making. They also investigated issues 
concerning distributed collaboration in movie production and authenticity in 
science shows (research questions that I have worked with before this study on a 
poetics of virtuality).  
The interviews always started with establishing mutual rapport, trying to 
understand what kind of person the other one is, and implicitly negotiating the 
nature and form of the interview (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1989). One 
important aspect of this rapport making is that the interviewee needs to understand 
my agenda and how familiar I am with the movie business. Therefore, I usually try 
to make it clear that I am not looking for a job or pitching a movie, and that I am 
quite familiar with movie making in general, and visual effects and computer 
graphics in particular. During the actual interview, usually lasting 30-45 minutes, I 
start with general and open questions, and narrow down to more specific and 
confrontational questions towards the end, shaping the interview in the form of a 
conversation with a structure. The consistent impression during the interviews was 
                                         
37 It was one of the world’s first independent short films produced in 4K resolution, and it 
achieved several awards; “Best Special Effects For Short Film” at Shriekfest Los Angeles Film 
Festival (2007), “HDFEST Deffie Award for Best Special or Visual FX in an HD Short Film” 
and “HDFEST Deffie Award for Best Short HD Film” at HDFEST 2007, “Gold Award – 
feature/short” and “Platinum Best of Show – Use of Special Effects” at Aurora 1997. 
 
 
 116 
that the interviewees willingly and generously shares their experience and thoughts 
with me. John Thornton Caldwell evocatively describes issues of getting reliable 
research data from interviews with high-profile movie makers (2009b). 
These guys know the drill, they have done hundreds and hundreds of interviews, and 
they are experts, there is no way to re-purpose that interview. They give you the line, 
they always give consistent lines, and they are on point all the time. They make the 
Pentagon look like amateurs. 
Production companies and movie makers share extensive information with the 
press and the public, but everything is scripted; everything is regarded as a 
marketing opportunity. This ability to repurpose interviews according to their own 
interests is also noted by Thomas (1993) in regard to high-level decision makers in 
big companies in general. Thomas suggests that it is important to be aware of 
which one of the interviewees’ different roles and personas you are interested in, 
that you need to recalibrate the interview and demonstrate that you are not a 
journalist, and that you need to show that you are quite knowledgeable in the issues 
that you ask questions about. I addressed all these issues, especially during the 
initial rapport building, throughout the interview. Sometimes, some additional 
probing, in areas concerning my rather specific research questions seemed to have 
the interviewee in a more thoughtful and elaborating frame of mind, even 
hesitating. I see that kind of hesitation as a good sign, suggesting that I am not 
given a standard response. 
These are the people I have interviewed: 
•  Phil Dolling, BBC (2007). Dolling was executive producer on the science show 
Space (Turner & Campbell), and he also represented the production and 
broadcast company BBC in general. 
•  Mike Milne, Framestore (2007). Milne worked as director of computer 
animation for Walking with dinosaurs by Tim Haines, the 1999 BBC TV series 
that became the gate breaker for a rush of science show documentaries with 
advanced visual effects and semi-fictional narratives, at BBC and elsewhere. 
•  Dan Maas, Maas Digital (2008). Freelancing computer graphic artist doing 
high-end visual effects and computer graphics for contractors such as Disney, 
NASA, and the BBC. 
•  Helen Rundgren, Utbildningsradion (2008). Rundgren is a producer of science 
show TV series for children. I had worked with Rundgren on a science show 
for children, and this interview was an opportunity to summarize our 
experiences of working together. 
•  Bob Saul, NASA (2008). Saul works as computer graphic artist at NASA, 
doing visualizations of spacecrafts, space missions and such. He also worked 
uncredited with visual effects for the feature film Deep Impact by Mimi Leder.  
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Reflections on production culture and my own work process 
Any fictional representation of virtuality in a movie is the product of a complex 
process of design and production. Understanding some of the particularities of this 
process is important in order to understand these fictional representations. The 
following notes are based on my own work process in the productions I have been 
involved with, and interviews with professional movie makers made by both others 
and myself. 
Fundamental insights into design work inform the following discussion. Design 
is an elusive concept and there are numerous definitions that more or less overlap, 
but a common denominator among many definitions is the intentional adaptation 
of resources to reach a predetermined goal (Buchanan, 1989; Mitchell, 1996; Rosell, 
1990; Winograd, 1996). A design process starts with an idea or a demand, and ends 
with a finalized artifact. A designer needs to envision the future, and give it form 
(Lundequist, 1998). Design work explores a mental space of possibilities, and finally 
selects a final solution by making numerous decisions. Some design work ends with 
plans for construction, as in architecture and industrial design, while in, for 
example, game design and movie making, there are design issues to be solved all 
the way into production; in movie making, design merges with craftsmanship 
(Bjurbom, 2005; Caldwell, 2008; Fauer, 2006). 
Working as a computer graphic artist 
Above-the-line movie makers such as the director, production designer and 
cinematographer have the most impact on how virtuality is represented in a movie. 
However, post-production crewmembers finalize the visions of the three above-
the-line professionals, and computer graphic (CG) artists play a vital role in 
producing many of the movies that I have analyzed (for a brief introduction to the 
different computer graphics work in a movie production, see appendix 01). 
A computer graphic artist creates computer graphics. Very often, the work is a 
flexible and complex combination of photography, digital painting and 3d 
modeling. The skills that are needed have a firm foundation in fine art such as 
painting and photography. The emphasis on artist is important; even though 
technical skills and problem solving are important, computer graphic artists 
consider themselves primarily to be artists. The work they do is artistic, albeit not 
always art. Rather, a computer graphic artist usually works with products that can 
be categorized as illustrations, visualizations, or entertainment such as games or 
movies. As a computer graphic artist, you often have a quite personal relation to 
the work you do. Movie makers, in general, and computer graphic artists, 
specifically, have a creative drive that is not connected to the audience, but to 
themselves. They rationalize their design decisions according to the idea of an 
audience, but it is not the audience that provides the drive. The creative drive, and 
one possible reason why some media workers work long hours under high 
pressure, is that they want to do the best work they can. They constantly compete 
with themselves and others. This makes it personal, and emotional. The creative 
drive is both intrinsic and extrinsic. Instead of having the mindset that I do what the 
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audience like so that they like my stuff, it is more a matter of the mindset that I have to 
show the audience how wonderful my inner vision for this is. 
Two additional, quite personal creative drives are worth mentioning. The first is 
best described as a curiosity, a longing to see how the imagery actually turns out. 
When working as a computer graphic artist you often have a strong vision of how 
the final result will be, and there is much challenge and excitement in discovering 
how it will actually turn out. It almost feels like the faint memory of a dream, but 
with the twist that this image becomes more and more clear when time passes, 
rather than gradually fading into oblivion. This can be theorized as a tension 
between an internalized and an externalized vision. The more I work on an image, 
the more it becomes an external object that I can step back from and watch, almost 
as if someone else has done it. The second drive is what I call the smell of the kill. 
This is a drive that is more primordial, a hunter-gatherer instinct, an urge to 
finalize, to reach a goal. I would compare this feeling to the challenge of collecting 
yet another stamp in your stamp collection, of making a good deal in a purchase, or 
running the final hundred meter dash in a long distance race.  
Pragmatic creativity 
My study of my own media productions suggests that very little time and effort is 
spent on creative decisions. Instead, the design decisions are often pragmatic. The 
following logbook excerpts from one of my productions give an illustration of the 
situation.38 
Managed to find an hour to model on the microscope; didn’t get very far; much to 
model. Many meetings, no time to work. 
Desperately seeking the two or three hours I need to complete the GUI. 
Not only is time in short supply, but a common observation is that the time and 
focus spent on creative and design oriented issues is a fraction of the total project 
work. In the Environmental Science Investigation project, much of the time was 
spent on talking about other issues such as production procedures or project 
management. Most design decisions were done without any deeper discussions. In 
both the Rymdlust and the Solen, månen och den röda planeten productions, most of the 
time was spent on just finalizing the computer graphics, not considering the look of 
them. One exception was the Via Tecta project together with Jonathan Westin. 
During this project, we talked for hours and wrote numerous e-mails about 
different aspects of the design of the visualization. Both Jonathan and I are 
computer graphic artists and, as such, we clearly took both pride and interest in 
working hard on the creative issues. 
As a computer graphic artist you go into a production with a high level of 
creative ambition, but then the work often becomes a constant struggle to keep on 
striving for the ideal imagery despite the difficulties. There are indications that 
these pressing working conditions are the norm in high profile, professional visual 
                                         
38 From the Environmental Science Investigation project (December 7th, 2007 and January 30th, 
2008). 
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effects work as well. During 2012, there was a recurrent debate within the 
American visual effects industry about the poor working conditions, with short-
term employments, low salaries, unfavorable insurance policies, and general time 
pressure to produce more in less time. In my interview with Bob Saul, a computer 
graphic artist at NASA, he describes his own experience of working on a high 
profile Hollywood based feature film production.39 
I have done a little bit of animation for Deep Impact, and that was the hardest most 
frustrating thing I have ever worked on, because initially they came in and said we 
want you to do this little scene, it’s going to be used here, and I was intrigued and 
excited. From the start to the time when I finished, I worked 20 hours a day, and 
some days 2-3 days in a row, because it kept going back and forth in so many 
iterations. Change after change after change. On the last version I worked Thursday, 
Friday, Sunday, no sleep, no food. 
Under circumstances like these, design decisions can become pragmatic and 
intuitive instead of rational and thought-through. Any analysis of sign-making in 
movie production needs to take this pragmatism in to account. We must restrain 
ourselves from inferring meaning where it might not exist. 
Serendipity in movie production 
Serendipity is when a solution to a problem appears by chance. Serendipity plays an 
important role in design processes. Movie makers frequently mention it in 
interviews and behind-the-scenes material (Clarke, 1972; Fauer, 2006; Giger, 1979; 
Murch, 2001), and I have often described it myself in my autoethnographic 
observations. Designers often confess to the suggestion that limitations bring about 
creative solutions (Neumann, 1999). Ridley Scott illustrates this in an interview 
when he claims that the influential production design of Blade Runner (a retrofitted 
futuristic city drenched in rain, darkness and smoke) came from budget limitations 
that forced the crew to reuse old sets and to hide the less then perfect set dressing 
from too close scrutiny. He ends with the comment that “by a necessity we actually 
started designing it that way” (Lauzirika, 2007, at 02:22). 
The process of accepting limitations and surprises, and turning them into a 
means of coming up with creative ideas and design solutions pervades these kinds 
of accounts. The need to work with and around restrictions is closely related to the 
resources and budget of each production. In a production with extensive resources, 
it is usually possible to confront limitations directly. If the weather is wrong one 
day, then there are resources to just wait until the weather changes, or to adjust the 
weather, either with extensive special effects (such as rain and wind machines) or 
with post-production visual effects. Large-scale productions with huge resources 
abound with accounts of how the movie makers exert an arrogant control over 
every nuance of the final shot. 
The importance for a poetics of virtuality is that the construction of any sign in a 
complex movie production is a messy process governed both by intentional 
planning from the storytellers as well as external limitations turned into creative 
                                         
39 Interview April 22nd, 2008. 
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solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to read these narratives not as perfect 
executions of the author’s intent, but as a highly complex negotiation between the 
storyteller’s intent, the production circumstances, and the reader’s interpretations. 
Shaman or auteur – freedoms and limitations in design processes 
This poetics of virtuality concerns how virtuality is portrayed in fictional, narrative 
texts. Contrary to virtualities that have actually been built in real-life, fictional 
virtualities are essentially unconstrained by technical limitations. The storyteller is 
seemingly free to depict any kind of imaginable technology. These fictional 
virtualities are, however, constrained by other limitations related to production 
methods and production cultures. When working with fiction, the storyteller is 
influenced by the context of production culture. 
As in other design work, movie makers reference each other extensively. Even 
though the movie industry tries to convey a sense of secrecy towards the audience 
and journalists, the exchange of ideas inside the industry is quite free. According to 
Caldwell, there is a continuous flow of ideas in Hollywood, a continuous pitch of 
ideas; “It is like free water” (Caldwell, 2009b). Design in movie making is a 
balancing act between staying within the boundaries of the familiar in order to not 
estrange the audience, while being innovative in order to achieve attention and 
acclaim. This is especially important in storytelling and movie making, where there 
is a constant demand for new stories and new worlds (Bjurbom, 2005; Buchanan, 
1989; Neumann, 1999). However, these new ideas must be grounded in the known, 
as “the unfamiliar is always extrapolated from the known” (Gombrich, 2002, p.72). 
Creative leadership in movie productions is often described as highly 
hierarchical, related to the idea of the director as an auteur. The creative and 
aesthetic decisions are lead by the movie director, with the help of primarily the 
cinematographer and the production designer (Fauer, 2006; LoBrutto, 1992; 
Tarkovsky, 1986). An important aspect of the director’s and the production 
designer’s work is to guide the other professionals into a team working towards a 
common design goal and a shared aesthetics. The production designer and 
cinematographer collaborate quite intimately on the look of the movie, since the 
cinematographer is essentially responsible for making the props, sets, wardrobes 
and locations of the movie visible; the cinematographer controls the light that 
brings the world of the movie into being (Fauer, 2006; LoBrutto, 1992). In addition 
to the above mentioned professionals, a movie production can involve hundreds of 
workers, often divided into above-the-line (people responsible for high-level 
creative decisions) and below-the-line (people who primarily execute the creative 
decisions, applying different crafts) (Caldwell, 2008; Caldwell, 2009). 
Roland Barthes (1977) metaphorically compares the author to a shaman, 
meaning that authors reuse utterances of previous authors. This aligns well with 
movie professionals’ own comments about their work. Production designer Ted 
Haworth says, “if I have any style, it’s not mine, it’s borrowed” (LoBrutto, 1992, 
p.31), and cinematographer Hiro Narita says “when you have an idea, it is usually 
an idea you have seen it, you have heard or you have experienced it” (Fauer, 2006, 
at 30:00). The myth of the auteur, the individual, dictatorial genius, strongly 
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contradicts Barthes’ idea of the author as shaman.40 The collaborative approach of 
different directors actually covers a broad range, from directors who are very 
decisive about what they want and often do much on their own, to directors who 
listen extensively to their creative team, or not even know what they want (Keegan, 
2009; Landon, 1992; LoBrutto, 1992; Neumann, 1999; Tarkovsky, 1986). 
Essentially all movie making is a collaborative art (Caldwell, 2008; Handyside, 2004; 
Lacey, 2000; Neumann, 1999; Sundstedt, 1999), where cohesive unity is important. 
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986) acknowledges that cinema is a composite art, but he then 
singles out the director and writes that in the center of the creative work done by 
artists and craftspeople “stands only one person: the director, and he alone, as the 
last filter in the creative process of film-making” (p.18). But Tarkovsky also 
emphasis the importance of the artists and craftsmen to work as a single unit; 
“because until we are linked up, as it were, by our very veins and nerves, until our 
blood starts to circulate around the same system, it is simply not possible to make a 
real film” (p.136). In America, the auteur myth appears in the early 1970s when a 
number of directors managed to establish themselves as “distinctive artistic 
personas” (Thompson, 1999, p.2), more or less importing the idea from Europe 
where it was already popularized (Handyside, 2004). The French auteur concept 
originated in a 1954 essay Une certaine tendance du cinéma français (A certain tendency 
in French cinema) by François Truffaut, and was theorized in 1968 by Andrew 
Sarris in his book The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929–1968. The 
auteur concept implies that a movie should be a personal statement and that a good 
film cannot be made by committee (Bordwell, 1985). The assumption that 
American cinema is a commercial, mindless industry while European cinema is a 
playground for geniuses was a very successful marketing strategy for the European 
industry, and it still works (Bordwell, 1985; Caldwell, 2008; Handyside, 2004; 
Thompson, 1999). Setting such marketing stunts aside, movie making is a balance 
act, a balance between ideas on creative leadership, between the auteur director and 
the committee making decisions. The following quote from Giger’s (1979) diary 
notes about his work on Alien succinctly illustrates the dictatorial relentlessness that 
appears to lie behind the auteur myth. 
Scott thinks it’s absolutely great. O’Bannon, who has just flown over from the USA, 
doesn’t think it’s technical enough. A battle of pros and cons begins. I keep quiet; I 
know that Scott will win the argument. 
This should be compared with Scott’s own comment in an interview concerning 
the work on Blade Runner (Lauzirika, 2007, at 10:09). 
I don’t like discussions, I know exactly what I want, I’m gonna walk in and say it; 
that’s a director’s job, directors are not meant to stand there and consult with half a 
dozen people in the room, the term director means direct me, do the job. 
                                         
40 Flueckiger (2008) suggests that there is a parallel “personality cult” (p.45) in academic discourse 
concerning the visual effects industry and computer graphics, emphasizing visual effect artists 
such as Dennis Muren. 
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Whether the director acts as a dictatorial auteur or not varies between productions 
and depends on individual preferences. TV series production, in particular, is highly 
based on design-by-committee (Caldwell, 2008). 
“Hollywood” – breaking down the monolith 
Many of the movies I have analyzed are well-known parts of popular culture, and it 
would be easy to characterize them as “Hollywood” movies. What do we mean 
when we speak about Hollywood? It is important to realize that the concept of 
Hollywood is more or less illusionary. Hollywood conveys the image of itself as 
one entity, but Hollywood is not a stand-alone ziggurat or monolith; rather, the 
production culture in Los Angeles is highly interconnected with other production 
hubs such as Canada, London, Paris, Sydney and New Zealand (Caldwell, 2008; 
Caldwell, 2009). Industry people move between these locations; they meet each 
other. They are connected with lower profile media industries such as the ones in 
Stockholm, Copenhagen, and further on. At least one of my field studies gave 
direct access to the production culture in Los Angeles – the short film project 
Postcards from the future. This is important because it bridges the two parts of my 
study: the study of my own work and the study of narratives produced by 
professional storytellers. Even though these are very different in many aspects, they 
still share fundamental aspects when it comes to design processes, and sign 
production. 
Have I accessed the production culture of Hollywood, sitting in my studio in 
Göteborg, Sweden? After all, Ortner (2009), another academic studying production 
culture, has clearly stated the importance of being on location. However, 
Hollywood is not an isolated community; it is diluted with other production 
cultures, dispersed geographically as well as across different levels of 
professionalism. Visual effects artists with work experience from high-end 
productions occasionally collaborate with semi-professionals such as myself. The 
differences in scale and commercialism are huge, all the way from privately funded, 
zero-budget short films, through the independent feature films that are exhibited at 
art-house cinemas, up to industrialized, high concept movie franchises. Within this 
spectrum there is room for both highly experimental, individual work of art as well 
as highly formalized box-office successes, and a wide range of hybrids between 
these extremes (Buckland, 2006; Caldwell, 2008; Thompson, 1999). My poetics of 
virtuality stretches across this range. So even if my level of access has been 
peripheral, I believe I can make a relevant and interesting research contribution. 
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Surprising complexity – a thousand signs 
The following poetics is the result of my study of fictional representations of 
virtuality. Parts of, as well as additions to, this poetics have been published 
elsewhere, see appendix 03. 
We will start this exploration of fictional virtualities with a general observation. 
A quite surprising result from this study was the quantity and complexity of the 
observed signs. There are almost a thousand signs that I have identified in the more 
than 50 narratives I have analyzed. Out of these signs about 350 have been 
classified as super-signs. The movie with the highest number of observed signs of 
virtuality is Tron with about 250 sign types used almost a thousand times, some 
used once, others over and over again during the movie; each usage is a token.41 The 
Matrix franchise – three feature films and ten short films – count in at a total of 
over 300 sign types used 1 400 times.42 The movies with the least number of signs, 
such as Escape from New York, exhibited about ten sign types. 
Another way to quantitatively describe the usage of signs in each movie is the 
ratio between number of signs (number of types) and how often they have been 
used (number of tokens). That is, which movie has repeated a limited number of 
signs over and over again? This would be the TV series Life on Mars with its ratio of 
almost 1:5, followed by Tron and eXistenZ (ratios close to 1:4). These narratives are 
quite different in their fictional representations of virtuality.43 The signs used in Life 
on Mars are highly related to dialogue, character behavior and events, and they often 
form a complex and efficient weave of intratextual references and signs where a 
simple representamen has several interpretants. The depiction of virtuality in Tron is 
highly visual, but it is also highly dialogue and event driven. In comparison, 
eXistenZ takes a minimalistic approach, using a comparatively limited number of 
signs (about 30) repetitively. 
Even though I start with these quantitative measurements, this poetics of 
virtuality is not a quantitative study. The point is not how many signs there are, but 
that they are many.44 It shows that the representation of one condition, virtuality, 
employs a numerous and complex set of signs. It might be that any representamen 
can be made to signify virtuality; however, such a claim is difficult to support 
empirically. Even if a thousand observed signs is a large number, it is still a fraction 
of all potential signs that can be used in a movie. If we investigate the paradigmatic 
                                         
41 For movie franchises such as The Matrix and Star Wars I count each individual movie, but when 
it comes to TV series such as Life on Mars I count the series as one singular media artifact. 
42 There are also computer games and comic books situated in The Matrix saga, but these have 
not been included. 
43 Life on Mars does not represent technical virtuality per se. The plot remains mysterious 
concerning the nature of the protagonists where-abouts, but the most common suggestions 
(quite clearly spelled out in, for example, diegetic dialogue and director’s commentary) are that he 
is in coma. 
44 Also, the quantification of how many times a sign has been used is highly approximate. 
Statistical results are not possible to draw, but major quantitative differences that are too large to 
be explained away as an interpretational error can be relevant to discuss. 
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structure of a sign, exploring the range of possible variations of a sign, then we can 
get a hint at how well these variations are covered. The representamen [color] is 
easy to investigate with a paradigmatic analysis. A color-based representamen is 
limited to a constrained set of available hues, for example red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue, black, grey and white.45 When looking at how the movie makers have 
utilized this repertoire, it is clear that the colors blue and green have been used 
most frequently (in about 70 different sign types in 26 of the movies, and 50 sign 
types in 13 movies, respectively), but movie makers have also used yellow, red, 
orange, pink, purple, violet, grey, black and white. That is, the movie makers have 
more or less drawn from the whole paradigmatic repertoire. Thus, any color can 
signify virtuality. 
Using a syntagmatic analysis to investigate how signs of virtuality are combined 
with each other and other signs, we see an obvious reason for why so many signs 
can be used to represent virtuality. Virtuality is something other than the actual; 
therefore, the signs must differentiate the virtual from the actual. Therefore, a 
natural color grading is not very suitable, since it is not in contrast with the actual. 
But any other tint – green, blue, red, orange – works fine since it contrasts with the 
natural. 
There is actually an interesting exception, or rather an example where the 
relationships between natural and unnatural color grading has been cleverly 
switched around. This occurs in Avalon, where the plot moves between a computer 
game environment and what is supposed to be the actual. Both environments are 
heavily color graded with deep desaturation, strong yellowish tint and blooming 
highlights. Since the computer game environment has a more extreme visual style 
and color grading, and the mise-en-scène of that environment also exhibits other 
signs of virtuality, it seems obvious that the game world is the insert virtual world 
of the narrative. If so, then the other world, into which heroine Ash wakes up 
when leaving the game world, is her actual world, even though the latter also has a 
quite distinct color grading and seems strangely vacant. But, late in the movie,46 
Ash comes to a new level of the computer game, and surprisingly enters a world 
that seems to be our own actuality, with natural color grading, busy city streets and 
familiar soft-drink ads. So, this illustrates how, surrounded by the proper context, 
even a mise-scene and visual style that usually signifies actuality can be switched 
around into signifying virtuality. 
But if anything can signify virtuality, why does not the text of the movie break 
down completely? How can we make sense of a text if any representamen can 
connect with any interpretant, if any sign can mean anything? The explanation is 
that even if any representamen has the potential to mean anything, the signs mean 
                                         
45 The number of actual hues is of course virtually unlimited, but the number of hue categories is 
limited. The green in one movie is not exactly the same as in another movie, for example one 
being bright and the other being murky, but the precise hue of the representamen is not relevant. 
Compare with how the color [red] often signifies danger. It is not the precise hue of red that 
makes it a sign, as long as it is quite distinct, but instead it is the context that make red signify 
danger. 
46 At 01:22:20. 
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something specific in each text, and it is the context of the text that determines the 
interpretant. As in the example of Avalon – the natural color grading represented 
virtuality since it was in contrast to the previous un-natural color grading, and also 
because events in the plot (additional signs) suggest that the storyline takes place 
inside a computer game. 
A vagueness we have to accept is when to consider the usage of a sign as being 
new or not, and how to discern between a unique type and repeated tokens. 
Consider, for example, the green color employed in The Matrix and several other 
movies. When we see the operator’s screen-based views into the virtual world, we 
see scrolling computer code in a green color. This is one sign, a type. We see this 
on several occasions in the movie, and each occasion is a new token (instance) of 
the sign, but it is the same sign type. Then, all scenes taking place inside the virtual 
world have a characteristic green-tinted color grading. This is another sign type, 
once again occurring in numerous tokens. At the end of the movie,47 the 
protagonist Neo takes conscious control over the virtual world and in his point-of-
view shot the virtual world is revealed as curtains of green glowing computer code. 
Are these curtains of computer code a third sign type, or can it be regarded as yet 
another token of the first screen-based computer code? We could regard green as a 
representamen, and then regard both [green tint] and [green code] as complete 
signs, the latter also being a sub-sign in the Matrix super-sign [curtains of green 
glowing code]. Thus, every substantially different way in which [green] is used 
should be regarded as a separate sign type. When [green] is used in a highly similar 
manner as seen before, then that occurrence is a new token and not a new sign 
type. 
The most frequent signs  
Which signs has been used most frequently in the studied movies? The list below 
includes the ten most frequent, from the more than 50 different narratives. Most of 
these signs are not only used frequently in specific movies, but they are also used in 
about half of the analyzed narratives; more or less every second fictional 
representation of virtuality uses each of these signs. 
 
representamen sign types 
[monochrome color scale] 65 
[semi-transparency] 75 
[floating] 110 
[blue color] 75 
[wireframe] 55 
[glow] 115 
[dialogue reference; computer software] 100 
[stylization] 100 
                                         
47 At 02:00:30. 
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[dialogue reference; simulation] 75 
[appearing from nowhere] 70 
   
All these signs are conceptually straightforward and simple, and none of them form 
a super-sign. Also, most of these have visual representamina. This illustrates the 
dominance of visual signs when representing virtuality, but it does not mean that 
signs related to narrative structure, plot or dialogue have not been observed. On 
the contrary, non-visual signs play an important role, as we will see in many of the 
examples that will be discussed further on. 
Simple representamina such as [glow] and [semi-transparency] can be used in 
many different ways, and thus lend themselves to frequent usage in many different 
sign types. Observations from my own productions show that some signs are 
favored simply because they are easy to construct; for example, both [glow] and 
[semi-transparency] can be added to an object in a matter of seconds in post-
production using software such as Maya and After Effects. Compare this to signs 
such as [super-human agility] or [solids becoming liquid] which might take days or 
weeks to accomplish in a movie. It is also quite obvious that highly specific super-
signs such as the [curtains of green glowing code] in The Matrix or the [light cycles] 
of Tron are much more confined to one movie. Such signs can be highly influential, 
spawning similar signs in other movies, but the specific sign type can hardly be 
used in another narrative. 
A tapestry of intratextual signs – the case of Life on Mars 
Some of the analyzed narratives have highly complex structures of super-signs: 
these narratives exhibit super-signs that have three or four levels of nestled super-
signs, super-signs sharing signs in complex manners, and super-signs that are 
consistently and effectively used. These super-sign structures are so detailed and 
complex that they are difficult to take in when represented as a static figure.48 
When it comes to complexity both the Matrix franchise and the TV series Life on 
Mars stand out, and I will exemplify this with a few cases from the latter. The 
storytelling in Life on Mars signifies virtuality in an often self-reflective way, and the 
production crew has managed to create an intriguing fantasy world with a 
minimum of spectacle and visual effects. The signs of virtuality in Life on Mars are 
almost completely reliant on non-visual signs related to characters, dialogue and 
events. The story of Life on Mars has a profound feeling of nostalgia and sadness. 
The modern day police officer Sam Tyler is hit by a car, and he wakes up in 1973, 
attired in periodic clothing and with a fresh employment at the local police force. 
Piece by piece he tries to puzzle together how he got there, where he is, if he is 
trapped in a coma dream or not, and how to get home. The storytellers never make 
it completely clear. What is clear is that the Manchester of -73 is an exaggerated 
caricature version of Manchester. Estranged from his more or less lunatic 
                                         
48 With the mind map tool Mind42 I have created online representations of some of the most 
complex super-sign structures. These structures can be investigated interactively, see appendix 02 
for URL addresses. 
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colleagues, Sam desperately tries to wake up from the enigmatic illusion. But his 
growing love interest for fellow officer Annie Cartwright and his growing taste for 
an illusion that is more alive and real than the actual, finally have him make the 
choice to stay in the illusion. 
Media technology plays a central role in the narrative, and can be regarded as one 
of the top super-signs. The emphasis on [media technology] reminds us that just as 
the TV screen is an image, Sam’s world is just an illusion. This super-sign breaks 
down into several lower level super-signs, for example the [talking through the TV 
screen], [Test Card Girl character], and the [Open University Professor character]. 
The Open University Professor is an example of a super-sign that works on 
different levels. The character connotes old-style television programs, and is 
therefore one of many signs signifying that Sam is caught in a [different era]. Other 
signs that create the impression of a different era are the periodic clothing, 
architecture, a pronounced lack of modern day technology, and irrational police 
procedures. All these super-signs coalesce into one of the top super-signs: the old-
fashioned and apparently primitive time of 1973, deliberately contrasted with 
modern day style, technology and rational police procedures. Media technology has 
other connotations as well in Life on Mars. The Open University Professor always 
talks to Sam via the TV screen, and Sam always wakes up afterwards as if it was all 
a dream. Here, communication technology denotes mediation and it connotes a 
lack of actuality, signifying that everything might be just illusions in Sam’s mind. 
Additionally, the Open University Professor occasionally talks about Sam as if he is 
Sam’s doctor, and he can never hear what Sam says back to him. This emphasizes 
that Sam might be in a coma, as well as his profound loneliness in this strange 
world of 1973. So, the [Open University Professor character] is a sub-sign in five 
different super-signs – [different era], [talking via TV screen], [dreaming], [coma], 
and [not belonging]. This illustrates how many of the signs and super-signs in a 
narrative are interconnected in complex, syntagmatic patterns. Other branches of 
the complex pattern of related signs include the two super-signs [different era] and 
[not belonging]. Sam Tyler’s loneliness in the foreign world and his conflicts with 
his police colleagues are persistent themes in the TV series. His loneliness is often 
accentuated in front of the TV screen; he eats his TV dinners in front of the screen, 
he sleeps in his clothes in an armchair in front of the screen, and he occasionally 
makes desperate attempts to have the mysterious characters of the TV screen (such 
as the Open University Professor) actually acknowledge him. It is an equally 
recurrent theme that Sam is caught in a world that is in stark contrast to his actual 
world. He is amazed and aggravated over caricatured police brutality, police 
sloppiness, sexual harassment, and so on. There are many examples of short 
dialogue that effectively holds several meanings. Often, one of the meanings is 
related to the in-diegetic situation, while it simultaneously can be interpreted as a 
self-reflective, non-diegetic comment. Late in the series, his boss Gene Hunt 
overhears when Sam records audio commentary about the outrageous police work 
at the station.49 Hunt’s line – ”What are you; the narrator?” – both means that he 
                                         
49 Season 2, episode 8, at 10:48. 
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has overheard Sam, and at the same time references the fictive status of both Sam’s 
illusionary world, and the BBC produced TV show itself. Another example is this 
dialogue exchange.50 
Gene Hunt: “How do you think I spend my time here Tyler?” 
Sam Tyler: “Building a Death Star?” 
Gene Hunt: “By listening to the sound of the cogs in the machine going round and 
round all day, while your cog is out of synch with the rest of us since you rode in on 
your big Hyde horse” 
The phrase “spend my time here” points out that the world they are in is not the 
real world, but a world within the world; the “here” is the place, the contained 
illusion, where Sam is caught. The phrase also reflects on whether the characters in 
this world are autonomous or not. Does Hunt actually do anything when Sam does 
not interact with him? Or does he, as with the proverbial tree falling in the forest, 
cease to exist when Sam is not present? Sam’s reference to the Death Star is both a 
reference to another fiction (the Star Wars saga) as well as to his out-of-time 
situation,51 while Hunt’s final line both suggests that the world they inhabit is an 
artifact, an illusion upheld by stage machinery, and once again emphasizes Sam’s 
estrangement.  In this manner, different kinds of signs support each other; a 
handful of simple representamen can be loaded with several interpretants, and a 
short dialogue exchange open up several connotations. 
This is typical for how the dialogue in Life on Mars is highly self-reflective, 
especially the many dialogues between Sam and Annie where they swap arguments 
about whether the world and its inhabitants – including Annie herself – are 
illusions in Sam’s mind or not. One such example comes from the first episode.52 
Annie Cartwright: “Where’re you going?” 
Sam Tyler: “I can’t deal with this place. Look; somewhere out there, Maya needs me. 
My mind could only invent so much detail; you know, so I’m gonna walk until I can’t 
think up anymore faces or streets. 
Annie Cartwright: “What will you find; a mist; a big cliff, white door?” 
The idea of breaking down the illusion and of reaching the end of the world is used 
elsewhere, most notably in The Thirteenth Floor where characters literally drive until 
the road ends. As we will discuss later, #containment is a topology of virtuality, and 
the end of the world suggested in the dialogue above is a distinct way to signify this 
containment. 
Life on Mars uses some super-signs that are somewhat spectacular, such as the 
characters that speak to Sam in his dreams, and the sudden black-outs enclosing 
him in darkness. But most of the signs and super-signs used in Life on Mars are 
                                         
50 Season 2, episode 3, at 08:15. 
51 Star Wars had not premiered in 1973. 
52 At 41:20. 
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incorporated as natural parts of the diegetic world, such as the dialogue examples 
above. The production design is another example, where the super-sign 
[Manchester 1973] becomes heavily loaded with the interpretant that it might all be 
an illusion. One of the clearest signs of the era is Sam’s leather jacket which he is 
mysteriously outfitted with when waking up after his car accident, and which he 
almost never takes off. It is as if it is his second skin, an embodiment of his status 
in the illusionary world. 
Building a world that represents itself 
The designed world of a narrative becomes a super-sign in itself, as when Los 
Angeles connotes the American dream, New York connotes film noir 
undergrounds, Paris connotes romance, and London connotes the world of 
espionage. In similar fashion, the virtual world represents its own virtuality through 
production design, visual style, mise-en-scène and cinematography. There are 
general similarities between designing buildings and such for real-life usage, and for 
movies. But the difference in purpose creates an important difference in result. In 
architecture, the utilization of the building itself is the end product. In movie 
making, a building is just a means to an end, the end being the story (Neumann, 
1999). The cityscape of Blade Runner has no other purpose then to say this is the 
future and it’s hell. In the diegetic world of the narrative, a whole palace might be 
there to make a king appear a king. In storytelling, a whole world, including its 
inhabitants (characters) and history (plot) is designed (LoBrutto, 1992). A common 
ambition is to make this world more complex and deep than what is shown on 
screen, both when it comes to characters and their back stories, and to 
environments with a level of detail and complexity that overwhelms the viewer in 
order to be perceived as realistic (Bjurbom, 2005; Card, 1988; Keegan, 2009; 
LoBrutto, 1992). 
In the studied narratives, the signs of virtuality seldom come one by one. 
Usually, in movie after movie, a syntagmatic analysis reveals that the signs support 
each other, and that there is tight integration – what Buckland (2006) refers to as 
organic unity – between style, narrative, production design and production value.53 
The total sum of signs combines, and it is possible to consider a top-level super-
sign in each narrative text, a top super-sign representing the fictive virtual world 
itself. This super-sign represents the idea of the virtual world in its entirety, a world 
that represents itself. The [1973 world] of Life on Mars has been discussed 
previously, and another example, likewise based on a historical period, comes from 
The Thirteenth Floor, where the mise-en-scène and cinematography work tightly 
together in characterizing one of the virtual worlds (the 1990s world) as vacant, 
moody, depressive, stylish, and modern; one of many examples are the green and 
blue computer diode lights which in other shots are repeated by the green and blue 
lighting scheme. The 1990s is cold and modern, while the other virtual world, (the 
1920s world) is warm and vintage, but also has a sense of closure and loneliness. At 
                                         
53 Aristotle speaks much about unity in his Poetics, and refers to it as organic, comparing a 
narrative to a living creature. 
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the end of the movie, the supposedly real world (the 2024’s world) successfully 
balances between being even more futuristic but at the same time warmer and 
friendlier, once again seamlessly combining cinematography and production design. 
This contrast between worlds – their mise-en-scène and their visual style – is 
frequently used as a means to distinguish between different virtual worlds and/or 
the actual world, as highlighted by Judith Kerman (1992) in her critical analysis of 
Tron. A third example of consistent world design comes from Avalon. As described 
by Crogan (2010), the different worlds have their fundament in contemporary and 
historic Poland (most of the movie was shot in Poland). The supposedly actual 
world is portrayed as a “drab, featureless and vaguely authoritarian … Warsaw Pact 
urban dystopia” (p.102) with “‘soup kitchen’ bistros, dilapidated public transport 
and high density cramped apartments” (p.103). The supposedly virtual war game 
world Avalon is represented as “a mix of World War II Eastern European 
battlefields and Cold War urban spaces of resistance to Communist rule” (ibid., 
p.103), and the final virtual game level is contrasted with the two others by being 
“depicted naturalistically as a living color, buzzing, contemporary post-89 city” 
(p.103). 
The time epochs portrayed in the virtual worlds discussed above can be 
compared to the romantic convenience of placing real-life computer game worlds 
in medieval and other historical environments. Medieval environments in games 
such as World of Warcraft depend on the popularity of the fantasy genre in games. 
World War II and other historical settings reflect a thematic interest for re-enacting 
more or less historically correct world events and societal changes. Considering 
fictional virtualities, barely any are set in a medieval time (the Matrix franchise short 
movie Program being an exception), but many are set in twentieth century worlds: 
the 1920s of The Thirteenth Floor, the 1940s/1970s of Avalon, the 1972 of Life on 
Mars, and the 1990s of The Matrix. The choice of these historical, nostalgic 
environments seems surprising when it comes to portraying futuristic technology 
such as virtual worlds. However, if we consider narrative requirements these design 
choices make more sense. When the virtual is conceptualized as being opposed to, 
or at least thoroughly separated from, the actual, then the virtual world needs to 
contrast with the framing actual world of the narrative. One way to create this 
contrast is to set the virtual world in another time epoch. Some of the studied 
narratives describe the virtual as highly futuristic – for example Tron Legacy and 
Neuromancer – but in these narratives, the protagonists are aware that they have 
entered a virtual world. However, in narratives where the protagonists, and partly 
the audience as well, need to be fooled into believing that the overt virtual world is 
the actual world, then historical time epochs are used, as is the case in the movies 
The Thirteenth Floor and The Matrix mentioned above. 
The subtle world building that the above examples illustrate is not always as 
visually spectacular or memorable as the dense characterizing super-signs such as 
the Matrix [curtains of green glowing code] or Tron’s light cycles, but nevertheless 
plays an important role in signifying virtuality.  
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Sound signifying virtuality 
Even if visual and dialogue based signs of virtuality dominate in numbers and 
complexity, sound nevertheless plays a small but vital part in representating 
virtuality.54 A syntagmatic analysis shows that the sound-based signs usually 
connect to the other super-signs and to the general topologies that are discussed at 
the end of this poetics. 
The most prominent kind of sound-based signs, and one that connects to the 
topology of the #engineered space, see page 224, is the kind that emphasizes 
artificiality. A common way to connote artificiality is by using non-acoustic sounds 
(or manipulated acoustic sounds), for instance from a synthesizer or by using 
effects such as a reverb or a flanger. These sounds often seems to denote 
”electricity”, as opposed to naturally occurring sounds. These unnatural, electrical 
sounds are the sound-based equivalent to the glowing lights (both city lights and 
electricity connote urbanity and artificiality), and have been used in, for example, 
Avalon, The Lawnmower Man, The Thirteenth Floor, Tron, Tron Legacy, Minority Report, 
Virtuosity, and frequently in the whole Matrix franchise. These sounds come in 
different versions, but they all have a timbre of a decidedly electronic nature. 
The sounds that signify virtuality usually show a syntagmatic combination with 
visual signs. Quite often, the sound accompanies a volumetric display. In the 
science show Atom, for example, the narrator Jim Al-Khalili interacts with a graph 
displayed as a fake hologram or floating screen in front of him.55 Several visual 
signs – [floating], a thin lined [grid], [white glow], and [pixels] [flickering in and out 
of existence] – suggest that the graph is a virtual object, along with a flickering and 
artificial sound that is softly heard while we see the display. Sound signifying 
virtuality is often related to appearance and disappearance, as when volumetric 
displays of meeting participants fade away with a flickering of scan lines and a slight 
electronic buzz in Resident Evil Extinction.56 Sound also marks the dramatic event of 
entering or leaving the virtual world. This is used prominently in Avalon and the 
Matrix franchise, often as a windy [swoosh]. A more dramatic example is the 
screaming that accompany a jacking-in sequence in The Matrix, when Neo re-enters 
the virtual world the first time after his escape from it.57 
Most of the sounds signifying virtuality emphasize the artificiality of the virtual. 
A specific version of the electronic sound is what I call [the glitch], the abrupt 
sound of something disconnecting or connecting, or malfunctioning. The glitch 
connotes the technology that sustains the virtual. The glitch sound often acts as a 
sub-sign, combining with visual sub-signs into a super-sign. The most obvious 
example is the electronic glitches or flashes in Tron, in the form of moving flashes 
of light gliding along glowing lines or on top of a wireframe. These are often 
                                         
54 Dialogue should be regarded as a third communication channel alongside visual and sound, 
even though it is carried by audio. 
55 At 13:10 in episode 4. 
56 First seen at 17:34, and similar scenes of a videoconference meeting with volumetric display 
avatars are repeated at 46:46 and 01:23:10. 
57 At 37:45. 
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accompanied by a glitch sound. Other kinds of artificial sounds are the different 
sorts of alert sounds, often some sort of [beep] or [ping] emphasizing interaction 
via touch, as when a character manipulates data in a volumetric display. This is used 
in, for example, Tron, Avatar and Johnny Mnemonic. The visual equivalent is when 
part of the interface or display lights up when interacted with, and the light-up 
effect and the alert sound usually work together. 
It is very seldom that sound-based signs are used in the literature, but one 
exception is the Virtuals that Stephen Baxter includes in several of his short stories 
and novels. In his descriptions of these Virtuals (volumetric displays of artificial 
intelligences), he mentions soft chimes and tiny pings, often associated with 
Baxter’s idea of protocol violation rules for these Virtuals, as in the following 
excerpt from Siege of Earth. 
They played elaborate games of hide and seek, which could involve hiding inside the 
fabric of a wall, which evidently didn’t hurt that much; the air was full of warning 
pings, and the laughter of the boys. 
Besides Baxter’s violation protocol pings, there are very few literary sound-based 
signs used to signify virtuality, but the following descriptions from William Gibson 
are an example. Gibson envisions an artificial voice composed of arbitrary sounds 
from a large sound archive (from All Tomorrow’s Parties). 
It was one of those voices that they fake up from found audio: speech cobbled from 
wind down skyscraper canyons, the creaking of Great Lakes ice, tree frogs clanging 
in the Southern night. 
This example works by highlighting the artificial nature of the character’s voice. 
What unite all these sounds signifying virtuality are their associations to artificiality 
and electricity, and to computer technology. 
Yet another aspect of sounds that emphasizes artificiality, and thus can signify 
virtuality, is the synthetic voice. This often signifies that the character is a virtual 
character and it can for example be heard in Johnny Mnemonic, Resident Evil, Tron, 
Tron Legacy, and episode 9 of the TV series Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex. 
Usually these voices are manipulated with effects such as echo, reverb and flanger 
(very short delay combined with phase variation). They can also have the 
archetypical detached computer voice. The trope of the emotionless and detached 
voice of an artificial intelligence is highly influenced by the computer HAL 9000 in 
Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey. HAL’s voice, performed by Douglas Rain, 
superficially involves a detached performance, but several other aspects of the 
voice are outlined in James Naremore’s On Kubrick (2007). HAL has been referred 
to as sounding gay, but he is rather androgynous, maybe revealing traces back to 
the originally scripted idea that HAL should be female (Clarke, 1972). Michel Chion 
(1994) calls HAL’s voice an acousmêtre, a disembodied voice that seems to have 
panoptical knowledge of everything. HAL’s voice is recorded with a microphone 
very close to the actor’s mouth and with no reverberation. This contrasts his voice 
with the human astronauts that have voices that belong in the physical space 
portrayed on screen. The effect is the suggestion of an ubiquitous artificial 
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intelligence, permeating both the material ship interior as well as the immaterial, 
electronic spaces of the spacecraft. HAL’s voice subtly signifies that he is a creature 
of both the physical and the virtual. A decade later, in Alien (Scott, 1979), the aptly 
named artificial intelligence and ship computer Mother cemented the science 
fiction trope of the female artificial intelligence. 
In my own productions, I have only once worked with sounds; in the Via Tecta 
project, Jonathan Westin and I discussed the possibility of using audio. When the 
virtual heads-up display slides down across the visualization it does so with a 
mechanical, clunky sound, and we did discuss other sounds that could be used to 
signify the virtuality of the wireframes that appear in the display. We had the 
ambition to try something new and fresh, and we experimented with the 
screeching, tearing sound of wrinkling a half filled balloon. The idea was interesting 
but regretfully we never had time to actually test the sound and the visuals together. 
Thus, the audio signs that are used to signify virtuality are few, and they are also 
rather simplistic, and attached to the visual signs. A [beep] here, a [buzz] there, and 
the obvious choice of manipulating the voice of the virtual character. In general, 
sound plays a vital role, but in a quite limited manner. One exception is The Matrix 
and its sequels where the soundscape is especially dense and complex, using a 
variety of sounds to signify virtuality. In an interview with sound designer Dane 
Davis, he explains how the directors, the Wachowski brothers, required the 
soundscape of the movie to be “motivated by electricity” (Carlsson, 1999, p.1). The 
movie makers also establish a specific sound, unique for the Matrix franchise. It 
occurs almost immediately, during the title sequence: a complex blend of chiming, 
sliding, metallic, creaking sounds. It is repeated frequently throughout the movie, 
seemingly related to different events in the virtual world; it is heard when a 
telephone, or when the sub-way train approaches during the climactic fight 
between Neo and Agent Smith. The sound does not have any diegetic explanation 
and it is not directly associated to artificiality, electricity, or any particular topology 
of virtuality. The only occurrence of the sound being diegetic appears in the short 
story Final Flight of the Osiris when the sound accompanies a samurai sword slicing 
through the air of a virtual sparring program world. The moving blade distorts the 
air around it, causing a kind of ripple effect, suggesting that both the sound and the 
ripple are caused by the synthetic disturbances occurring in the virtual air around 
the virtual sword blade. Both the ripple and the sound are arbitrary signs, signifying 
virtuality because it is strange and different. Things like that are not seen or heard 
in the actual world. Therefore, they are beyond the actual. They are virtual. 
Production culture and representation of virtuality 
One mistake in media analysis is to regard media production as a perfect process, as 
if everything is a direct expression of the storyteller’s intentions and professionality. 
This is not the case, and the productions I have participated in and my interviews 
with other media producers bring forward some of the production culture 
circumstances that can be especially related to fictional representations of virtuality. 
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The computer graphics and live action divide 
When movie makers produce shots that are supposed to show a virtual 
environment, they have two production approaches to choose between.58 One 
approach is to use computer graphics in order to build the environment as a 3d 
model (an actual virtuality) and then render it. In this case, the artist use technology 
and artistic skill to add details to the originally empty 3d model, thereby increasing 
realism. In this approach, the work with increasing realism does not go all the way 
to full photorealism. Instead, the work stops somewhere between the abstract and 
the realistic, in order to convey virtuality. What conveys virtuality then is the lack of 
realism that comes from the production method itself. The other production 
approach is to not use computer graphics, and instead shoot live action. During the 
90s, virtual worlds in movies started to be realized by shooting actual actors and 
physical sets. They were then made to appear virtual by a range of different signs: 
unnatural color grading, image artifacts, and signs related to the narrative and the 
dialogue. Instead of adding realism, realism was taken away from footage that 
originally appeared real. The Matrix, Avalon, The Thirteenth Floor and eXistenZ are all 
examples of this. 
During the 80s and 90s, the makers of movies such as Tron, The Lawnmower Man 
and Johnny Mnemonic primarily used computer graphics, the first approach outlined 
above, to portray the fictive virtuality. These computer graphics were similar to the 
technology that was used to create the actual virtual reality environments of those 
days. Limitations in technology then became the source of signs of virtuality. When 
Tron was produced, the computer graphics of the day was highly limited. Rendering 
algorithms only allowed simple shadows, it was difficult to apply complex surface 
textures, and 3d models had simple shapes. The limitations to 3d modeling were 
such that simple, geometric shapes and flat textures prevailed. Signs such as 
[abstract] and [geometrical] were motivated by such production procedures and 
such technical limitations. As Bill Kroyer, storyboard artist at Tron, explains in an 
interview (Pellerin, 2002, at 03:28): 
It was this constant give and take of visual requirements with their technical 
possibilities that created Tron. 
Today we have the technical capability and artistic skills to create fully 
photorealistic virtual environments, and thus it is more common to use the second 
production approach outlined above. The paradigmatic repertoire of signs is 
broader thus, and signs of virtuality can be more arbitrary. This might have freed 
movie makers creatively to more or less abandon computer graphics to create 
fictional virtualities, in favor of live action. When real-life computer graphics could 
create photorealism it became uninteresting to accentuate the computer graphic 
style when signifying virtuality, and live action was used instead. Also, it might be 
that shooting live action is to a large extent a creative decision grounded in 
production circumstances. After all, it is easier – and more cost effective – to shoot 
                                         
58 Making the movie as an 2d animated movie – a cartoon – is actually a third production 
approach that has been used, for example in Ghost in the Shell and Magnetic Rose. 
 
 
 138 
an actor and then color grade her than it is to build and then animate the same 
characters using computer graphics. The effect is that the virtual worlds we see 
portrayed in contemporary movies appear much more realistic, and not as abstract 
as their predecessors. Flueckiger (2008) suggests that during the 1980s and early 
1990s, fully photorealistic virtual characters where so “inconceivable” that they 
were considered “unattainable” (p.13). It might be that it was not until the late 
1990s that photorealistic virtual characters could have been plausibly incorporated 
into fictional narratives, and thus the production method of shooting and then 
color grading live actors was opened up. 
Since the two Tron movies bridge the time between the early productions using 
computer graphics, and the later productions using live action, it is interesting to 
discuss how the sequel Tron Legacy was produced. The production crew of Tron 
Legacy shot actors on sets. It featured much more visually complex and realistic 
environments, trying to find a balance between on the one hand an abstract 
virtuality and on the other hand a rich, dense and spectacular virtuality that almost 
seems physical. Since the mise-en-scène and visual style of the virtual world of Tron 
Legacy is highly realistic and almost fully physical (with virtual smoke from virtual 
tires, virtual skid marks on the virtual ground, virtual clouds in the sky, and so on), 
the movie makers had to rely on subtle color grading, production design, super-
natural actions and dialogue to signify virtuality. The production design of the 
movie indulges in a visual feast of virtuality; the obligatory metaphor of the glowing 
lines is taken up from the original Tron. Everything is aglow, representing electricity 
and hence virtuality. However, at the same time, the production design defies and 
shies away from the virtual. The visual style is highly photorealistic – as opposed to 
the stylized and often cartoonish Tron – and the director Joseph Kosinski mentions 
in interviews that he deliberately wanted to have a very physical version of virtuality 
(Nathan, 2011; Pollack, 2011). In flashback shots, we see the avatars of the humans 
Kevin Flynn and Alan Bradley, wearing stylish black leather jackets, with only one 
reference to the production design of the original Tron-suites – a white glowing 
stripe running along the front of the jacket.59 It is as if the director Kosinski and 
production designer Darren Gilford cannot make up their minds; is it cool to be 
virtual, or is it nerdy? Tron Legacy is based on the legacy of the original Tron movie, 
and Kosinski seems to believe that the abstract and cartoony style of the first 
movie is a bit too much for modern audiences, accustomed to the apparently real 
virtual prisons of The Matrix, The Thirteenth Floor and Inception. 
Literature obviously does not have the production limitations that movie 
productions have, but William Gibson nevertheless let his cyberspace be highly 
influenced by the real-world limitations of computer graphics. Examples of abstract 
virtual objects include “the little yellow pyramid” and “bright geometries 
representing the corporate data” in Burning Chrome, and the “stepped scarlet 
pyramid of the Eastern Seaboard Fission Authority burning beyond the green 
cubes of the Mitsubishi Bank of America” in Neuromancer. Sabine Heuser (2003) has 
also discussed the latter passage, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay (1992) has made similar 
                                         
59 At 52:35. 
 
 
 139 
observations, commenting that Gibson’s cyberspace seems to be built by “rapidly 
moving geometrical figures of light in a metaphorical transformation of solids” 
(p.236). William Gibson conveys a landscape built of artificial, immaterial 
abstraction. 
When the virtual becomes a spectacle 
The representations of virtuality that I have studied are often deeply integrated with 
the narrative. They are not wallpaper added just to help the audience distinguish 
virtual from the actual, on the contrary they are a central backbone of the story. 
This often makes it impossible to separate the designs of the fictive virtuality from 
the requirement of telling a dramatic and compelling story. Many signs of virtuality 
are also used to dramatize events, forming the spectacle of the narrative. Thus signs 
of virtuality not only have the function of representing virtuality, but sometimes the 
double function of bringing spectacle to the narrative. Sometimes this might be 
their only function. Spectacle has been theorized, most notably by Guy Debord in 
his La Société du spectacle (1967). His main argument is that mass media have replaced 
lived experiences and human interaction with mere representation, and being has 
been replaced by appearing. Spectacle has a political dimension, but can be discussed 
disconnected from the ideology of Debord. Some movie makers object to 
cinematic spectacle on both aesthetic and implicitly political grounds, maybe most 
noteworthy Lars von Trier when he justified the Dogme 95 manifest with the 
lament that “anyone at any time can wash the last grains of truth away in the deadly 
embrace of sensation. The illusions are everything the movie can hide behind” (von 
Trier, 1995, p.1).60 Political implications aside, there are aesthetical and narrative 
hazards with spectacle. Just as with the aesthetics of sexy, the aesthetics of spectacle 
often rely on extravagant exposure. Exposure of skin can be sexy, and to create 
spectacle other things need to be exposed, for example, advanced technology, huge 
spacecraft, and large-scale destruction in slow-motion detail. As pointed out by 
Baudrillard (1990), there is a pornographic dimension to the totalizing hyper-reality 
that he speaks about. But, too much exposed skin becomes un-sexy, and too large a 
spacecraft, or too huge an explosions become un-cool. Both sexy and spectacle must 
push the boundary, but not penetrate it. 
When Neo and Smith perform their epic battle over the virtual metropolis in The 
Matrix Revolutions, when Tron Legacy’s Sam Flynn materializes his light bike in a 
cascade of light, or when Sam Tyler in Life on Mars sleeps in his leather jacket… is it 
virtual, or is it just spectacle? It is reasonable to assume that sometimes a specific 
expression is merely a spectacle, and sometimes carries the meaning of virtuality 
and being a spectacle. Consider the scene in The Matrix Reloaded, where the virtual 
character Merovingian forces a virtual woman to orgasm using computer code 
hidden in a (virtual) dessert cake. The primary meaning of the scene is to depict 
Merovingian as unsympathetic and to create a spectacular situation. Indirectly, the 
                                         
60 A few years later von Trier directs the spectacular art-house-porn-horror Antichrist and then the 
dystopian science fiction Melancholia, both embracing visual effects without the slightest hint of 
embarrassment. This suggests that von Trier does not reject the possibilities that the spectacular 
manipulation of the image have opened up, rather he reflects on it. 
 
 
 140 
scene also portrays aspects of the virtuality, since it is an example of a character 
using code in order to take control over someone else. As I will discuss frequently 
in this poetics of virtuality, many signs of virtuality have a tight unification between 
what they denote, what they connote, and thus, these signs often have an aesthetic 
of spectacle. It might even be obvious that representations of the virtual are 
perceived as spectacle. Technology can be regarded as a spectacle, as illustrated by 
action heroes such as James Bond and Iron Man, who rely on spectacular high-tech 
devices. Virtuality is characterized by technology, and often extraordinary such. 
Therefore, an effective way to signify virtuality is to contrast it with the ordinary, 
with the nature, and instead make it stand out. This can be the flickering of a 
hologram, opposing it to the calm and steady nature of a physical object. It can be 
the supernatural speed and strength of Neo, opposing his capabilities to our weak 
actual bodies. So there are numerous signs of the supernatural that connote 
virtuality, and since they stand out from the ordinary, such signs also create visual 
interest and spectacle. 
Signs of virtuality and their relation to the plot 
Signs can be characterized by how they relate to the narrative and its plot. If we 
consider the purpose that signs of virtuality have in a plot, they can be roughly 
categorized as per the bullet points below. This emphasizes that signs of virtuality 
have a purpose in relation to the plot. Some signs of virtuality are plot related and 
have to carry a large burden of meaning. Other signs of virtuality do not have to 
convey so much of the plot, and then the storyteller are more free to construct 
these signs. The former, plot related signs, might be constructed primarily to 
convey the story and only secondarily in order to say something about virtuality per 
se. The latter, not plot related signs, can have the reversed priorities, opening up for 
several relevant reflections on virtuality. 
•  Signs carrying narrative clarity are important as prime carriers of the plot. 
These are signs that show the audience as clearly as needed where the narrative 
takes place at any given time, in a virtual or an actual world. A good example is 
the usage of different time epochs in The Thirteenth Floor. The two virtual 
worlds are portrayed as the 1920s and 1990s. These time epochs efficiently 
differentiate between the different worlds, but their production design and 
cinematography do not have much explicit to say about virtuality. 
•  Dense characterizing signs are primarily used to establish and maintain the 
movie’s specific style, often becoming a trademark for the movie. The 
streaming curtains of computer code quickly became a stylistic code which 
characterizes The Matrix, and the light-bikes rushing through the virtual space 
of Tron launched themselves into twentieth century iconography. These signs 
are often striking and visually spectacular; they are examples of the stylistic 
codes described by Eco (1982; 1985). Stylistic codes are often, according to 
Eco, the mark of an auteur, or the result of a typical aesthetic ideal. They are 
predominantly complex super-signs, and even if their primary purpose is to be 
memorable and spectacular, they can nevertheless have much relevance for 
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our way of interpreting the virtual. It should be noted that even though these 
stylistic codes for signifying virtuality become highly associated with the 
narrative – as in the case of the [curtains of green glowing code] of The Matrix 
– they are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg, and should not get all the 
attention in our analysis. 
•  Supporting signs do not draw much attention; often they are not even 
brought to the audiences’ attention at all. They can be repeated dialogue 
references such as “download” (The Thirteenth Floor), “simulation” (The Matrix, 
The Thirteenth Floor) or “system” (Avalon). They can be visual details such as 
scan-lines (Avalon, The Matrix, Tron Legacy), desaturation of the image (Avalon, 
The Thirteenth Floor, The Matrix, Tron Legacy), or pixelation (Avalon, The Matrix, 
Tron Legacy). Even though these signs are often subtle and non-intrusive, they 
nevertheless permeate the diegetic world with a tapestry of reminders of the 
virtuality of the depicted environment. 
A narrative can be split up into appearances (mimesis) and events (diegesis) (Bordwell, 
1985; Genette, 1980).61 Appearances are how the world seems, how it looks and 
sounds. Events are what happen in the world, the characters that inhabit the world, 
and what they are doing and saying. There are many signs of virtuality that fall 
along a continuum between these two opposites; they are related to both events 
and appearances. Immateriality for example can be signified by [semi-transparency] 
– which is an appearance – but it can also be signified by objects that [fragmentize] 
– which is an event. The division into mimesis and diegesis will be used as a 
starting point in the following two chapters. However, we should remember that, 
as the example of immateriality illustrates, many signs and super-signs have a 
syntagmatic construction where mimesis and diegesis support each other. 
                                         
61 Flueckiger (2008) makes a similar division into appearance and behavior in her analysis of 
digital bodies. 
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Mimesis – show, don’t tell 
As explained at the end of the previous chapter we will now look at how virtuality 
is represented via appearances (mimesis) and events (diegesis) in a fictional narrative. 
We will start with mimesis. Mimesis “conceive(s) of narration as the presentation of 
a spectacle: a showing” (Bordwell, 1985, p.4). This showing, this representation, 
originates in Aristotle’s ideas about narratives, especially in relation to theater, and 
Plato’s more general ideas about perfect imitation, extending the concept to include 
not only drama but also iconic representations such as statues or pictures (Genette, 
1980). Mimesis is not replication or copying; rather it is “the active process of 
imitating or representing something” (Ricœur, 1984, p.33). 
Mise-en-scène, cinematography, and production design 
In movie making, the concepts of mise-en-scène, cinematography, visual style and 
color grading blend together. 
The mise-en-scène, literally meaning to put in the scene (Sikov, 2010), usually refers 
to everything that appears in the picture (Bordwell & Thompson, 2003) and how 
“the overall patterns of actor movement and stage space” are organized (Bordwell, 
1985, p.14). The prefix mise emphasizes the involvement of a “creator’s 
intervention” and the “overriding intelligence” (ibid., p.15) of a storyteller.  
Cinematography is how the camera shows the world (Bordwell & Thompson, 
2003). In classical Hollywood cinema, cinematography is subordinate to the story, 
but there are also movies where the cinematography is allowed to dominate and “to 
be consumed as an experience in itself” (Bolter, 2000, p.70). The importance of 
these components varies, and in spectacular narratives – such as science fiction – 
the mise-en-scène, and the production design, often become centerpieces of the 
movie, even becoming a kind of character (Arnman, 2005; Buckland, 2006; Lacey, 
2000; LoBrutto, 1992; Neumann, 1999). The monster in Alien or the metropolis in 
Blade Runner become almost erotic in a way that is comparable to pornographic 
movies. The drive of the story is to confront the monster or inhabit the city, but at 
the same time this only works if we, the audience, are handed out carefully 
measured glimpses of monster teeth and futuristic skyscrapers. If we see too much, 
it becomes silly and boring (Arnman, 2005). 
Visual style could simply be described as how the images look, and cinematography 
and color grading are the methods for achieving this look; they are – together with 
production design – a part of the visual style. Generally, cinematography deals with 
actions taken before acquisitions of the images, before shooting, such as selecting 
camera, camera settings, film stock, lighting, filters and so on, while color grading 
refers to actions taken in post-production, for example, the digital manipulation of 
hue, saturation, brightness and so on. Bordwell (2007) suggests that the visual style 
of a movie can be a manifestation of the movie maker’s personality, an expression 
of an emotional state, or a property of the movie’s design. In art history, the 
concept of style is used to group together works that relate to each other, often 
because they have been designed and produced at a specific time, place or by a 
specific artist or group of artists (Fernie, 1995; Gombrich, 1998; Shapiro, 1998). 
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Style is a distinctive, and therefore recognizable, expression, manner or production 
method. Therefore, visual style is a matter of paradigmatic choice between different 
options within a defined design space, and these available options can often be 
influenced by technological change (Gombrich, 1998), such as a new kind of paint 
or a new kind of rendering algorithm (to contrast a centuries old technological 
change with innovations occurring nowadays in computer graphics). Sometimes, a 
particular style can be connected with specific visual features, but often the 
characterization of a particular visual style can be hard to define. For example, 
anime – Japanese animation – often features characters with large eyes, but also 
involves more subtle features, such as limitation of movements. If a particular artist 
makes choices that move the artwork outside of a particular style, it stretches the 
boundaries of what that style can be, or the artwork can no longer be categorized 
under that style. Style can thus be both descriptive and normative (Gombrich, 
1998), and style can also be conceived of as a value term (Shapiro, 1998), making a 
distinction between a right and a wrong style. I use visual style as a descriptive 
term, and I see it as a more generic term than cinematography, color grading, 
production design and mise-en-scène. For example, Tron and its sequel Tron Legacy 
have distinctly different styles, Tron Legacy being more detailed, more photorealistic, 
more physical, and more modern, and all these differences show in the 
cinematography, color grading, production design and mise-en-scène. 
It is easily taken for granted that photography and cinema show the world just as 
it is, but the situation is not that simple. Imagine taking a photograph of the view 
through your window. The image would look quite similar to what your eyes see 
directly, but not exactly. Different image artifacts show marks from the production 
process. Maybe the strong sunlight creates a lens flare, or the photographic 
emulsion we used has an obvious film grain. These differences can be regarded as 
signs. The lens flare and the film grain tell us that the image is not what our eyes 
see; it is what a camera has acquired. The visual style of a movie, its 
cinematography, will always be something else than what our eyes would have seen, 
and this visual style is invested with meaning. Is the visual style a way to see the 
world, or is it how the world really is? Imagine stepping into the diegetic world of 
The Matrix, or any of the other studied narratives with a pronounced color grading. 
Would your hands be green tinted when you look at them? Tint is a part of the 
color grading, and it plays a vital part in characterizing the diegetic world. In a 
movie such as Traffic by Steven Soderbergh – where the scenes taking place in 
Mexico have a yellow tint and the scenes taking place in the US have a blue tint – 
the intention is not really to suggest that Mexico actually is more yellow than the 
US. However, in The Matrix, is it the world that is green, or is it conveyed as that? 
Usually the audience does not engage in this kind of hairsplitting, as long as the 
movie has organic unity between its different parts. We have learnt to accept the 
quite blurred line between the world and the storytelling. What is relevant is that 
green – along with other hues – represents virtuality. 
As an example of how cinematography, production design and mise-en-scène 
combine, consider how the following excerpt (Figure 10) from Tron Legacy was 
created. 
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Figure 10. Excerpt from Tron Legacy, exemplifying how different design decisions are created by 
different professionals during a long process of production design. 
 
The image exemplifies how one single shot can have a production history and a 
design process that involves many artists over a long period of time. Most likely the 
work with the scene started with a sketch for the conceptual design – investigating 
lighting, color, mode and such. Most of the scene was shot live action with the 
actors in suits with practical light effects. In post-production, the computer 
generated hologram head was added, and the whole image was color graded. Before 
and during the shoot the cinematographer is responsible for deciding on camera, 
camera settings and the lighting on set. At the same time, the wardrobe designer 
has been working under the production designer, deciding on the design of the 
suits and their glowing patterns. This means that the cinematographer and the 
production designer are leading creative professionals that have responsibility for 
what is shot and then handed over to post-production. They both report to the 
director, the top creative leader of the movie production. When the shot enters 
post-production, computer artists will build, animate and render visual effects such 
as the hologram head, a compositor will add it to the shot, and a color grader will 
make final adjustments to color, light and such in the final shot. They all have 
influence on how the final image will appear, and thus have input on how this 
particular example of virtuality will be conveyed. The director remains the creative 
leader throughout the post-production as well. 
The complexity described above is typical, especially for movies such as Tron 
Legacy and The Matrix. Many signs related to cinematography, visual style and 
production design have simple representamen with complex interpretants, such as 
[glowing lights], [primary colors], and [semi-transparency]. Others have more subtle 
and complex representamen, for example how the movement of the camera 
occasionally seems to signify virtuality. In the 3d animated short Final Flight of the 
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Osiris, the camera work is notably different in the virtual world sequences and the 
actual world sequences. In the latter, the camera moves in a conventional 
nonintrusive manner, typical of live action photography (even if the camera is 3d 
animated). The camera is locked down, makes subtle dolly moves, or mimics 
Steadicam shots following running characters. In the virtual world the camera work 
is different. One of the virtual worlds we see is the training program where the 
male and female protagonists are engaged in an erotically charged sword training 
sequence. During this sequence, the camera moves freely and draws attention to 
how it follows the characters movements. When the clothes fall from the male and 
female bodies, the camera studiously circles around and perfectly captures the grace 
and beauty of their virtual avatars. When the woman later races through a city the 
camera speeds along by her side; the complex movements of the woman and the 
camera take on the form of a choreographed, acrobatic dance.62 Complex camera 
movements are, of course, not unique for movies depicting virtuality; 
contemporary action movies often have complex camera movements, and even as 
early as in Citizen Kane from 1941, complex free-moving camera work has been 
used.63 Such camera movements do not signify virtuality in Citizen Kane. Neither 
does the free-moving camera in Final Flight of the Osiris explicitly tell the audience 
that the world is virtual; instead, it is a supportive sign, characterizing the virtual 
world. The choreographed camera motions connote both how the point of view 
moves in computer games (Kampmann, 2003) and the floating, liquid freedom of a 
world where physical restrictions such as gravity are optional. 
Semiotic inertia - the green flickering screen 
The very first computer graphics I made was in the last term of secondary upper 
school, in 1987. My classmate Dennis Saluäär and I coded software that, amongst 
other functions, displayed an accurate star field chart. We ran the software on 
Compis computers using the Comal programming language. The screens were low-
resolution and mono-chrome (Figure 11). They displayed monochrome green 
graphics on a dark background. And, they flickered. 
 
                                         
62 See for example the shots at 01:51 and 06:00. 
63 At 14:17. 
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Figure 11. The D&T Astromedia star field chart, created by the author and Dennis Saluäär 
in1987.64 
 
About twenty years later, in 2006, I did computer graphics star fields for the science 
show Rymdlust using the state-of-the-art 3d software Maya (Figure 12). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Star field from the science show Rymdlust, created by the author in 2006. 
 
                                         
64 This is a simulated screen shot, based on actual screen printout modified to correspond to my 
memory of how the screen appeared. 
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Just as when comparing the movies Tron (1982) and Tron Legacy (2010), it is striking 
how far computer graphics have evolved in a few decades. In the light of this 
evolution, it is interesting that one common strategy to signify virtuality is to use 
signs related to vintage computer graphics and display technology. The 1987 screen 
shot above includes many of the most important signs related to old computer 
graphics and displays: [flickering], [low resolution]/[pixelation], [mono-chrome], 
[green color], and [glowing lines]. It is as if there is a semiotic inertia causing old 
image artifacts to turn into signs of virtuality that survive, and thrive, long past their 
due date. This tendency to use the appearances of old signs, a tendency which I 
choose to call semiotic inertia, is a common phenomenon in sign-production.65 It is 
similar to the often-stated example of how the first cars retained the attributes of 
horse carriages long after the horse was cut out of the equation (see Figure 13 for 
another example). Umberto Eco (1976) emphasizes that new signs are always based 
on the previous, suggesting “no new cultures can ever come into being except 
against the background of an old one” (p. 256). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Another example of semiotic inertia; even though modern trains do not look like this, 
road signs depict an old train.  
 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000) use the term remediation to describe 
how a new media reforms and refashions an older media, and how this leads to the 
“representation of one medium in another” (p.45). They argue that modern media 
has both immediacy and hypermediacy in a contradicting and ambivalent way. 
Immediacy is the urge to erase all traces of mediation, as in an engaging action 
movie with photorealistic visual effects and continuity editing, or a virtual reality 
environment. Hypermediacy is the urge to play with the media, and indulge in 
mediation, as in a found footage horror movie or a Dogma drama, both of which 
represent a documentary style that acknowledges the camera as an object, and thus 
acknowledges the mediation. The ambivalence between immediacy and 
hypermediacy can be seen in the fictional representations of virtuality, for example 
in The Matrix where the virtual world seems to be a total simulation, fully realistic 
                                         
65 The phrase semiotic inertia has been used by Corrington (1992; 2000) but in a different context, 
more related to how mythical images express themselves. 
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and immersive for Neo and the other inhabitants. This gives the virtual world a 
high level of immediacy. In contrast, the movie makers deconstruct the perfection 
of the illusion by tinting the virtual world in the green hue of an old cathode ray 
tube computer screen, emphasizing the mediation of the world, making it 
hypermediated. Likewise, in Tron Legacy, the virtual world is given a tactile, physical 
impression by the movie makers, but then they deconstruct it by inserting elements 
of primitive computer graphics, such as grid lines and pixels. However, I will not 
make any extensive use of the term remediation. These virtual worlds are not 
primarily old media refashioned in new media; they are, rather, virtual worlds that 
in different ways signify, or remind us of, their virtuality and artificiality. They are 
perfection that borrows imperfection from earlier technologies. 
Semiotic inertia connotes a certain nostalgia that appears when new technology 
is integrated into the fabric of society (Olivier, 2011). Etymologically, nostalgia 
traces back to the Greek words for returning home and pain or sorrow. Nostalgia 
gives the impression of something being lost, and when we mythologize new 
technology with the impression of old technology we sooths us into believing that 
we have returned to what has been lost. Nostalgia gives new technology a certain 
status, infuses it with a historical context, and prepares us for the shock of the new. 
Ultimately, this technological nostalgia is reminiscent of the mythological Garden 
of Eden, a paradise lost through our choice of wisdom and thus technology. The 
Fall of Man can be read as a metaphor for the idea that we lose an earlier, more 
innocent state when we develop society and technology. Going forward means 
leaving something behind. Even though the following discussion will focus on 
signs referencing old display technology, there is another kind of nostalgia in how 
movie makers often choose to portray fictional virtual worlds in the style of 
historical epochs, discussed on pages x and x. 
When signs of virtuality reference old technology, it is often a matter of picking 
up on image artifacts that have been more or less eradicated today and then 
emphasize them to a point where the technology seems close to breaking down. 
Movies such as Tron, The Matrix and Avalon exhibit the paradigmatic repertoire of 
[flickering], [scan-lines], [pixelation], [green color], [glitches], [distortions], [static 
noise], the simulated [TV screen shut-down], and so on. These are all signs that are 
reminiscent of old and faulty display technology. These references to old 
technology can be direct, one example being the inclusion of computer or TV 
screens in the mise-en-scène. This is used frequently, and it is similar to how 
computer technology, in general, is connoted via physical devices such as tape 
stations, computer screens or keyboards (Bolter, 1984). The digital and the virtual 
are elusive and often not very visual, so physical manifestations of technology are 
often used instead. Both The Matrix and Avalon exhibit an almost fetishist 
fascination with old technology. In The Matrix, computers in the virtual world are 
clunky and old. In Avalon, the apparently actual world also shares the retro-
futuristic visual style of The Matrix. In Avalon, the protagonist Ash’s computer in 
her apartment often seems to be on the verge of just simply breaking down. 
References to old technology can also be more indirect, taking the sub-signs of 
particularly the TV screen out of their original context, in order to have them as 
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components in new super-signs. The hologram in Star Wars66 is a good example; 
the scan-lines and flickering of the TV screen have been applied to a futuristic, 
fictive volumetric display recording. A quote from the 2004 DVD commentary 
track highlights that this is an interesting case of how production technology 
influences the construction of the super-sign. Dennis Muren states that they ran 
live action footage of the actor “…through sort of a TV screen like that to give it a 
real TV electronic look”.67 Thus, the reminiscent TV screen attributes were created 
by actually using a TV screen, even though no TV screens are found in the mise-
en-scène. In Figure 14 below, the structure of the Star Wars hologram super-sign 
shows how image artifacts of the TV screen are combined with other sub-signs, 
remediating the TV screen.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. The structure of the Star Wars hologram super-sign. 
Flaunting artificiality via mediation 
The virtual is an artifact, something constructed. Its construction is based on code, 
written by man. This artificiality of the virtual is often emphasized using signs that 
connote mediation, as if the artificiality of mediation is copied, and remediated, to 
the virtual. Virtuality can be seen as both representation and existence; a model 
slice of the actual world is simulated, and the simulation is then mediated through 
an interface. By emphasizing the mediated nature of the virtuality, artificiality is 
likewise emphasized. 
A range of signs can be sorted under the strategy of flaunting artificiality via 
mediation, often related to the foregrounding of old media technology artifacts 
                                         
66 First used at 20:17 in episode IV, then expounded and repeated many times during the whole 
franchise of movies and the TV series. 
67 At 20:15. Dennis Muren was assigned the role as second cameraman of the miniature and 
optical effects unit. In practice he was responsible for many of the visual effects techniques 
applied in the movie. 
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such as scan-lines, flicker, green colors, low resolution and wireframes. These old 
display artifacts are quite often deeply related to mediation rather than virtuality. Why 
do the movie makers make such frequent visual references to mediation 
technology? It is as if the storytellers conceptually mix up mediation and virtuality, 
or deliberately let mediation technology permeate the virtual. The mix-up seems to 
have been there in early fictional accounts of virtual reality technology; Ray 
Bradbury imagined the telvisor, described by Reid (2000), as “a combination 
virtual-reality room and television” (p.55). The virtual reality room in Bradbury’s 
short story, The Veldt, speaks of glass walls creating the illusion. William Gibson has 
explained how he conceptualized cyberspace as an extrapolation of existing 
television technology (Gross, 1989). 
So that rather than having to look at a television set and put on the earphones, you 
simply plug yourself into something that makes you feel that you’re in the 
environment that the media producer has generated. 
The aesthetics of the TV screen are used, remediated using the terminology of Bolter 
and Grusin (2000), to signify virtuality in different ways. The TV is not only a 
template for reimaging virtual reality, it is also a machine surrounded by symbolism. 
In Life on Mars, Sam Tyler lives alone in his apartment, and his TV set plays an 
important part in the strange illusion he is stranded in. Mysterious people seem to 
communicate with him via the TV screen, and the threatening Test Card Girl 
occasionally leaves the mediated TV world and harasses him. TV screen references 
abound in the Matrix franchise as well, and the most prominent might be Neo’s 
audience with the Architect (the machine intelligence that created the virtual 
world).68 The Architect meets Neo in a space completely walled by arrays of TV 
screens. The camera viewpoint passes through one of the screens several times, 
only to arrive in the same space again. When breaking the membrane of the screen, 
the scan lines seem to envelop us. An electronic buzz whispers softly. The 
Architect illustrates his dialogue by showing scenes of Neo on the screens, as if the 
TV sets represent the Architect’s artificial mind and his panoptic surveillance of 
everything that happens inside the matrix. The TV screens are a metaphor, not for 
mediation, but for the artificial in general, and for different hierarchies of actuality 
and virtuality. The sequence has been discussed by Catherine Constable (2006) and 
she interprets the enclosing sphere of TV screens, and the circular passage through 
screen after screen, as an “inescapable mirror space” (p.240). No matter how many 
screens Neo passes through, he is still trapped. The difference in Constable’s and 
my own interpretations – Constable emphasizing entrapment and myself 
emphasizing artificiality – illustrates how a quite simple super-sign can have 
multiple connotations. 
Flaunting artificiality via electricity 
In Tron, the virtual world seems infested with electricity. Wherever we look, there 
are glowing electronic pulses gliding along grid lines. The grid pulses from Tron are 
                                         
68 At 01:45:14. 
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similar to the Matrix [curtains of green glowing code] with its lines of falling, 
glowing, pulsing signs, and other electronic, racing light pulses can be seen in a 
range of movies – Johnny Mnemonic, The Thirteenth Floor, and the Danish cyberpunk 
movie Skyggen. The commentary track provided on the 2002 DVD release of Tron 
gives some glimpses into the creative and technical process behind these running 
pulses.69 
…and then it has that pulse to it, which is after I saw the first composite of this 
scene, I felt that we were lacking a kind of energy, and we needed to bring some life 
to it, some magical, and so I put this pulse to the light to give it more life. 
The above quote is director Steven Lisberger’s explanation, seconded by the claims 
from producer Donald Kushner:70 
We did little things to keep it alive as it is a lot of dialogue that was going along 
here… …so I come up with this zingers that go wailing by in the background, 
electric comets that blast by just to add the potential for sound, that they are moving 
more, just to create something interesting in the background, which we tried a lot. 
…to keep it from monotonous and boring we just came up with little things in the 
background. 
In an interview, Lisberger suggests another background for the light pulses 
(Burnett, 2002, at 55:54): 
What we did was that from that point on any footage that had this problem, that’s 
where you have these little zingers going through the background like little pulses of 
light… …because it was an electronic world and sometimes things glitch. 
These explanations could be after the fact rationalizations, but they at least suggest 
that the [running pulses] super-sign, albeit simple, might come from a complex mix 
of creative intentions and technical circumstances. And, even if it is a quite simple 
sign, the interpretants nevertheless form a complex chain of associations, where 
electricity connotes both artificiality in general and computer technology 
specifically, which connects further to virtuality. The complexity of this seemingly 
simple super-sign, and the likewise complex interpretants, is illustrated in the Figure 
15 structure (next page). Note that the line between what can be considered a sub-
sign is diffuse. [Glow] is a sub-sign of virtuality since it connotes immateriality, 
artificiality and electricity, but [round] and [small] do not have a connection to 
virtuality; thus, they are considered structural properties of the sign, rather than 
sub-signs. 
 
                                         
69 At 01:04:35. 
70 At 01:09:35. 
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Figure 15. The structure of the running pulses super-sign. 
The green and the other colors 
…colorization is a bit weird. 71 
In The Thirteenth Floor, there is the unique example, quoted above, of a direct 
dialogue reference to the color tint of a virtual world. It is a rare occasion where the 
characters in the narrative actually acknowledge that the strange colors are a 
diegetic part of the fiction. In The Matrix, the virtual world is slightly green tinted. 
In Avalon, the game world has a strong yellow-brown tint. These are examples of 
how cinematography conveys virtuality. 
Green is one of the primary colors, and as with all the other distinctive colors it 
comes with its set of connotation and symbolism. Green connotes not just 
computers, the digital and the virtual. Green also represents nature, and being 
environmentally friendly; it can even represent weird and alien – as in little green 
men from Mars. The connection between the color green and computers is 
possibly motivated by the reference to early phosphor cathode ray tube (CRT) 
computer screens (a claim suggested by Shedroff and Noessel (2012) as well). A 
more contemporary connotation is the void of the green screen. A green screen is a 
background used to key out the background in visual effect shots; a person 
photographed in front of a monochrome green screen can later be placed in front 
of any image background. The green screen connotes the virtual set that so often is 
used to create the backgrounds that replaces the green screen, as well as the total 
fluidity of the digital image. 
Below is a quantitative summary of the observed color based signs.72 
                                         
71 In The Thirteenth Floor, at 07:31. 
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Monochrome hue signifying virtuality 
blue 85 signs in 30 narratives 
red 65 signs in 21 narratives 
green 61 signs in 17 narratives 
yellow 23 signs in 13 narratives 
grey 17 signs in 7 narratives 
Color tint signifying virtuality 
green 39 signs in 10 narratives 
blue 24 signs in 14 narratives 
red/yellow 18 signs in 12 narratives 
 
What counts as green, or blue, or any other hue? Green is of course green, but 
when does it signify virtuality, and when is it just a design choice that does not 
signify virtuality? For the specific hue to have meaning, it usually needs to be quite 
dominant, in terms of saturation strength and screen coverage. It is also reasonable 
to assume the hue has a meaning based on the syntagmatic combination with other 
signifiers, such as the [blue] [wireframes] used for the 3d visualization of the plane 
crash into a Manhattan skyscraper in Escape from new York.73 There are two 
fundamentally different ways in which a color is applied – either as a monochrome, 
solid color on an object in the mise-en-scène, or as a general tint to the image. In 
the first case, a color in the mise-en-scène, there are often other signifiers coming 
in to play as well, often signifying virtuality through a stylized, abstract design. One 
example is the introduction sequence in Ghost in the Shell. A collage of images shows 
the construction of the cyborg/android heroine Major Motoko Kusanagi – 
apparently the imagery shifts between her physical body and her virtual body. The 
excerpt on the next page (Figure 16) shows a still image from the introduction 
sequence, illustrating an abstract visual style, combining the solid [monochrome 
green] with [floating] in an [empty environment], [stylized shapes], [simple raycast 
shadows], [pixel cloud] and [superimposed graphics]. 
 
                                                                                                                               
72 These colors correspond closely with the three most common colors – blue, red and green – 
used to depict fictional graphical interfaces, according to Shedroff and Noessel (2012). 
73 At 11:39. 
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Figure 16. Excerpt from the anime feature film Ghost in the Shell. The digital/virtual part of 
Major Kusanagi’s cyborg body is represented in a stylized manner, showcasing a typical usage of 
solid monochrome green. 
 
An example of [green tint] comes from The Matrix where all the sequences taking 
place in the virtual world are characterized by this sign. This is one of the ways in 
which the virtual and the actual worlds of The Matrix are contrasted with each 
other. It is used consistently through-out the whole franchise. The strength of the 
tint varies from subtle to pronounced. The example below (Figure 17) is taken 
from an Animatrix short film; Final Flight of the Osiris. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Excerpt from the Animatrix anime short film Final Flight of the Osiris. The 
virtuality of the world is signified by a strong green tint, characteristic for the whole Matrix 
franchise. 
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Compared to the frequent use in the movies, color is used quite seldom in literary 
descriptions of virtuality. Stephen Baxter has not referred to color at all, and 
summarizing the usage of color in William Gibson’s descriptions of virtual 
environments, we see that color does not seem to be that important. 
Color signifying virtuality in six of William Gibson’s novels and one 
anthology of short stories 
[green] used 11 times in 6 sources 
[blue] used 11 times in 3 sources 
[grey] used 6 times in 5 sources 
[red] used 3 times in 2 sources 
[yellow] used 3 times in 1 source 
Green and blue dominate, just as for the visual depictions in the movies. Gibson 
uses phrases such as “green walls”, “emerald arches”, “walls of emerald green”, and 
“infinite blue space”, “chill blue neon”, “a blue flicker” in Neuromancer, his first 
novel. Most of the mentions of blue and green occur in this work. In his later 
works, reference to color is scant, being used only once or twice in each novel. 
That the green hue is grounded in vintage computer displays is an assumption. It 
gets some support from statements by movie makers. In an online chat session 
(Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999), the directors of The Matrix offered the 
explanation that “it was a whole motif inspired by the phosphorous green of old 
PCs”. In an interview (Hanson, 2005) production designer Owen Paterson claims 
that (p.106): 
We decided the real world… would be cold, mechanic. So we would have a blue‐gray 
color sense to the real world. Within the Matrix, it was natural to have a green hue, 
because we just thought of the basic computer monitor color, that of the green type 
on the black screen of early DOS operating computers. … It was easy to get lost, so 
coming up with those visual keys was really needed. 
In addition to green, the usage of blue to signify virtuality also takes possible 
inspiration from old display technology. The well-known hologram from the Star 
Wars franchise, first introduced in 1977 in episode IV, has a distinct [blue tint]. 
This color tint, originally caused by the TV screen used to create the visual effect of 
the Star Wars hologram, has developed into a common super-sign representing the 
idea of fictional hologram technologies, picked up by recent movies such as District 
9, and Avatar.  
Thus, the frequent use of green and blue can be explained by references to old 
display technology; the blue TV screen and the green PC monitor. But why can 
other hues be used to signify virtuality as well? Other hues work by connecting to 
the interpretant of abstraction, as exemplified by the excerpt on the next page 
(Figure 18) from Resident Evil: Afterlife. Here, the [red] and [blue] do not connote 
either TV screens or old CRT screens. Instead, it is the syntagmatic combination of 
minimalistic abstractness and primary colors that connotes artificiality and 
virtuality. 
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Figure 18. Excerpt from the feature film Resident Evil: Afterlife. Two monochrome primary 
colors, together with empty background, wireframe, and superimposed graphics and data, signify 
the virtuality of this 3d model depicting an underground facility. 
 
Thus, any color can signify virtuality, as long as it is used in an unnatural, abstract 
way. 
The Cartesian construction kit 
Maya is a well-known 3d modeling software that I have been working with for 
many years. When a new Maya file is created you always see the same: a grey non-
space with a single, floating grid. Thin black lines forms a plane. The grid is the 
basic underlining canvas of the small artificial space just created. On the hard drive, 
the space is folded into itself, collapsed into a database of x, y and z coordinates, 
coordinates that through their relationship with each other open up an information 
space. The connections from this real-life virtuality to canonical cyberpunk 
narratives such as Neuromancer and Tron goes deep; in both fictional and real-life 
virtualities we see the void of cyberspace, the intersecting lines of the Grid. 
However, William Gibson and Steven Lisberger both got their initial inspiration 
not from 3d modeling but from watching kids playing arcade games, and Gibson 
has claimed that he was highly ignorant about computers. He offers the following 
comment about his first computer (acquired after he wrote Neuromancer): “I’d been 
expecting an exotic crystalline thing, a cyberspace deck or something, and what I 
got was a little piece of a Victorian engine that made noises like a scratchy old 
record player” (McCaffery, 1991, p.270). That Gibson could nevertheless catch on 
to the fundamentals of 3d model production by watching arcade games suggests a 
closeness between the production and the product. Gibson understood the 
fundamentals of the construction process manifested, as they were, in the arcade 
games he saw. Form follows tools. 
The most fundamental property of the 3d model is the point, a position in 
Cartesian xyz space. Between two points a line forms. The line connecting dots in 
the virtual goes back to Sketchpad, one of the first and most influential drawing 
programs, written by Ivan Sutherland in 1963. The user of Sketchpad positioned 
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points and then the software connected them. Considering lines more generally, we 
recognize that drawing a line is a fundamental aspect of our pictorial culture. The 
line is used in millions of comic books. The line characterizes established line art 
forms, such as pencil drawings and etchings. The line is fundamental in 
architectural and construction drawings. The line emerges spontaneously when a 
young child uses pen and paper. The line was there in the early cave paintings, at 
least 30 000 years ago. 
Parallel and intersecting lines create the grid, the basic framework of the computer 
screen, the TV screen and the 3d model. In The Grid Book, Hannah Higgins (2009) 
describes a grid as “spaced parallel bars broken by another system of spaced 
parallel bars at such regular intervals as to form a visual lattice and set of standard 
modules” (p.275). Parallel, intersecting lines create the polygon, the grid, and the 
wireframe in the 3d model; it creates the pixelation of the digital image and the 
similar pixelation of the old analogue TV image. These lines are typically straight 
and the intersections at 90 degrees. 
Several of the signs that relate to semiotic inertia – lines, grids, wireframes, 
polygons, pixelation, scanlines – are deeply connected according to a syntagmatic 
code, so that they can be combined in different ways. There is no grid without its 
components, no brick wall without bricks, no street grid without the urban block, 
and no image grid without the pixel (Higgins, 2009). The first bricks were invented 
about 11 000 years ago in city-states in Mesopotamia. This collection of signs with 
ancient roots – lines, grids, wireframes, polygons, pixelation, scanlines – is what I 
call the Cartesian conglomerate. The Cartesian conglomerate symbolizes construction and 
it does so by stylization and abstraction. This construction is not the physical, material 
construction of the actual world – based on applying violence to raw material – but 
the immaterial construction of the virtual world – based on abstract relationships 
within a Cartesian coordinate system. The drawing, which is the prelude to 
construction, is abstract because it is a simplified model of the world. Virtual 
worlds and objects have the abstraction of points, lines and surfaces as their 
fundamental building blocks. The line, the grid and the polygon with their straight 
lines and intersections are the opposite of organic shapes. Rosalind Krauss (1985) 
writes in her essay Grids that the grid is “geometrized” and “antinatural … antireal. 
It is what art looks like when it turns its back on nature” (p.9). Hannah Higgins 
(2009) corrects the view that grids are purely artificial with the example of bubbles 
in a pond forming a quite regular grid. The beehive is, of course, another example. 
But, despite these examples of natural grids, the general connotation of the grid is 
artificiality. 
The glowing line 
In 1968, Charles Csuri created the computer animated video art piece, 
Hummingbird. A collection of scratchy black thin lines formed the image of a 
hummingbird, an image that fragmented and transformed. The line is used over and 
over again in his art. Even in artwork published by Csuri just a few years ago we see 
ribbons of color floating in a tangle, we see repetitive curves, and parallel lines. It 
was obvious for Csuri, and other early computer artists such as Pierre Hebert, 
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Herbert Franke and William Fetter, to employ the line; the computer displays could 
not display much more than lines. However, the line was important before 
computer art. It was a vital part of abstract art in general, and a very specific 
example is the oscilloscope artists of the 1950s such as Ben Laposky and Peter 
Keetman (Carlsson, 2003), doing work that was a precursor to computer art. A 
characteristic of both the oscilloscope screen and early CRT computer screens was 
that the lines glowed. The glowing line on a dark background became a dominant 
motif, and a sign of virtuality, in Tron and then in a long line of succeeding movies. 
Everything in the virtual world of Tron – from interiors, vehicles, the landscape, 
and the inhabitants themselves – seems to be outlined and decorated with lines 
glowing in different primary colors. The sequel almost thirty years later followed up 
with a substantially different production design – but the glowing lines remained. 
They became the motif holding the two movies together visually. The very first 
shot of the Tron Legacy title sequence seems to self-consciously reflect on this; 
across a faintly glowing grid, a single line of light falls down, followed by another, 
and another, and so on, until the shape of high-rise buildings is outlined. 
Production Designer Darren Gilford, interviewed in the behind-the-scenes 
documentary on the 2012 DVD release, alleged that (Horton, 2012, at 00:07) 
when you look at the first film, you think of the lines of light, that kind of defines the 
characters and the architecture and the vehicles. … The lines of light that flow 
seamlessly through-out the architecture and the vehicles and costumes are probably 
the most important theme of the film. 
If the ascetic aesthetics of this first shot in this title sequence shows restraints 
similar to the first Tron movie, the shackles are swiftly overcome. In many scenes in 
Tron Legacy, the movie makers indulge in cascades of glowing lines (as in Figure 19). 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Excerpt from Tron Legacy showing the emergence of a light bike, in a cascade of 
glowing lines and curves. 
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The glowing lines characterizing the 1982 release of Tron did have its forerunners in 
influential feature films. 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), Alien (Scott, 1979), Escape from 
New York (1981), and Blade Runner (1982) all featured in-diegetic computer displays 
depicting different forms of 3d models on the screen.74 And the glowing lines of 
Tron have its successors even though no other film has indulged so deeply in the 
glowing line aesthetics. Johnny Mnemonic featured glowing lines, as did The Matrix in 
its own way: the lines of glowing code. 
The line signifying virtuality comes in two variants: the glowing line referencing 
old computer displays and the thin black line, possibly inspired by traditional pencil 
line drawings. In contrast to the glowing and often ribbon shaped lines in Tron, 
there is the thin line that is often black, like a line on a pencil drawing. The most 
prominent example is the Zion Control Room in The Matrix Reloaded,75 a virtual 
environment used as a control room for the landing dock of the underground city 
of Zion (see Figure 20). Flight controllers enter the environment and use it as an 
interface. It is a blank void room similar to the one in The Matrix, and the 
controllers are surrounded by sketchy interactive graphics; floating and immaterial 
controls have replaced the clunky mechanical levers of a physical control panel. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Excerpt from The Matrix Reloaded showing thin black lines sketching the 
immaterial control panels of the Zion Control Room. 
 
Yet again we see how a simple representamen has a complex web of interpretants; 
the glowing line and the thin black line connote artificiality since glow is artificial, 
reminiscent of neon lighting. The glowing line and the black line also connote 
artificiality because the line connotes non-organic shapes, construction drawings, as 
well as the construction principles for real-life virtual 3d models. 
                                         
74 In Blade Runner at 10:24 and in Alien at 12:29 two very similar air traffic/approach pattern 
displays are shown on control panels. Simple 3d models are shown in Escape from New York at 
02:45 in the title sequence and in scenes at 11:39 and 24:35 visualizing airplanes approaching 
Manhattan. In 2001 a 3d model of the faulty communication antenna is shown repeatedly, 
starting at 01:07:09. Approach patterns shown as lines on computer displays are used in 2001 as 
well, at 22:15 and 48:05. 
75 At 12:00. 
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The grid 
The grid, a digital frontier.76 
In the title sequence of Tron Legacy, actor Jeff Bridges rumbles in a deep voice 
about the grid and the frontier myth of the virtual. This is the only time there is a 
dialogue reference to a grid, and in the original Tron the grid is mentioned only 
twice in dialogue.77 Despite the scarcity of these direct mentions, the idea of the 
game grid pervades the narrative of both movies. The visual motif of the grid – 
often in monochrome neon glow – is repeated over and over in the mise-en-scène, 
and the game grid arena plays a vital role in both plots. Considering how the grid is 
referenced, it seems to take on two meanings. There is the game grind, the floor of 
the gladiator arena. This is where you play until you die (or get “derezed”, 
dissolved, as the characters call it). Then there is the general grid underlying the 
whole world, the bedrock of the virtual world. This grid seems to be the basis for 
construction and the basis for digital life. In real-life, the grid plays a vital part in 
the history of construction, as described by Higgins (2009). Not only buildings, but 
also urban landscapes are built according to grid structures. The word grid is also 
associated with the power grid, national networks of electrical power cables. The 
grid symbolizes modern life; it is “a visualization of modernity’s faith in rational 
thought” (ibid., p.6). This might have inspired movie makers to regard the fictional 
virtual grid as a source of power and life. In Ghost in the Shell, the creation title 
sequence, when cyborg Major Motoko Kusanagi is constructed, shows her virtual 
ghost body resting on a green grid, as if it gives her life, and underpins her existence 
(see Figure 21). 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Excerpt from Ghost in the Shell, showing the grid supporting the cyborg’s virtual 
ghost body. 
                                         
76 The title sequence of Tron Legacy, at 00:25. 
77 Early in the introduction (at 03:04) a virtual character is sent down to “the game grid”, which 
soon is revealed to be a kind of virtual futuristic gladiator arena. Later on (at 40:53) one of the 
protagonists is sent to a similar play-to-the-death arena, the “light cycle grid”. 
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The grid also has an indirect association to control and surveillance; living off-the-
grid is American slang for a self-sufficient and autonomous life style, and it is fitting 
that in Tron Legacy, Sam and Quorra escape from the game grid and run of into the 
virtual wilderness to Kevin’s off-the-grind abode and sanctuary. 
Tron and Tron Legacy’s game grid where light bicycles race against each other 
seems highly reminiscent of the holographic airplane battle in William Gibson’s 
short story, Dogfight: “He buzzed the grid, millimeters from the glass”. Compare 
this literary description to the excerpts from Tron Legacy below. The grid in Tron 
Legacy glows; it is a reference to electrical power, to the artificial light, and to the 
phosphor glow of vintage computer screens (see Figures 22 and 23). 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Excerpt from Tron Legacy; aerial view of the game grid arena floor. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Excerpt from Tron Legacy; Kevin Flynn uses the power of the ground grid to mirror 
himself into the artificial intelligence Clu. 
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The pattern of the grid pervades our technology and our culture, from city 
planning to children’s math books. It symbolizes artificiality, rationality, and 
technology. It is also one of the strongest signs of virtuality. Nusselder (2009) 
claims that cyberspace is the continuation of the Cartesian grid and the 
mathematical space it creates, and Higgins (2009) points out that the map, with its 
gridded model of the actual, is an ancient method of organizing a space, a map 
space that imitates the actual. The map, being a model of the material landscape, is 
a forerunner to the virtuality we now have. Having a map means having control, 
and the grid connotes achieving control, making something possible to manipulate. 
Predating real-life digital image manipulation, this control is symbolized when the 
bounty hunter of Blade Runner, Deckard, digitizes a photograph into the Esper 
Machine. The scanned image appears on screen, with a blue grid on top of it.78 The 
grid signals that the image now has become virtual, and since it is virtual it can be 
controlled. Deckard navigates through the image via voice commands, and the 
machine is able to fragmentize the content of the image, making it fluid, so we can 
peak behind corners and through mirrors. The interpretant of the Esper Machine 
grid is power and control.  
In The Matrix, the term “matrix” in itself is a direct reference to a grid, the grid 
of a rectangular array of numbers or symbols. William Gibson used the term matrix 
extensively in his Sprawl trilogy (Neuromancer, Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive) as 
a term synonymous with the word he coined himself: cyberspace. Gibson actually 
uses the two words in approximately equal numbers. According to Heuser’s (2003) 
reading of William Gibson, the “matrix is almost synonymous with cyberspace, but 
the term also carries a more general meaning” (p.105). Gibson also repeatedly 
refers directly to the grid of cyberspace, often described as “grids of neon” (Mona 
Lisa Overdrive) or the metaphorical “bright lattices of logic” (Neuromancer). 
According to Heuser’s interpretation, these phrases evoke references to glowing 
pixels on a screen as well as the invisible logic of the computer. The grid stretching 
into infinity also emphasizes the geometrical infinity of the virtual world (Bingham, 
1999; Heuser, 2009; Higgins, 2009; Kneale, 1999). The neon glow of the grid 
combines the “articulating Cartesian grid” and “light, the informing essence of 
sight” (Hillis, 1999, p.40). The glowing grid simultaneously creates the world and 
makes us see it. 
The wireframe and the polygon 
On December 18th, 2011, I sent an e-mail to science writer Michelle Evans with a 
link to the image on the next page (Figure 24), the latest iteration of a computer 
graphics visualization of the research rocket plane X-15. Evans was writing a 
technology history book about the vehicle and we worked on some of the 
illustrations for the book. I wrote in the e-mail that the image showed 
                                         
78 At 41:00. 
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a suggestion for adding a wireframe, to clearly reveal that the image is fake. This is an 
idea that I have toyed with for a while. We don’t need to use it but I wanted to 
suggest it. 
The following day Evans responded. 
As for the wire frame, I don’t think we need to worry about things like that. The 
more realistic the better and anything that takes away from that would probably not 
be welcomed by the publisher. 
 
 
Figure 24. Computer graphics illustration from the collaboration with Michelle Evans. The 
visualization of the rocket plane X-15 has a wireframe image added to it. My intention was to 
signify the lack of authenticity and the virtual 3d model from which the image originated. 
 
The response from Michelle did not come as a surprise. The hesitation to side-step 
realism and the risk of breaking suspension of disbelief were concerns I had 
encountered before. The X-15 project was the fifth visualization project where I 
tried to use wireframes with this meaning. Jonathan Westin and I did use 
wireframes in our final version of the Via Tecta visualization, but not without 
difficulties. Adding wireframes made the image more complex and hard to 
interpret, and it was also not obvious how the audience would understand the 
wireframe. We wanted to signify uncertainty by alluding to virtuality, rather than 
signifying virtuality directly. Uncertainty means lack of information and a lack of 
precision. But there was a risk that adding wireframes could give the opposite 
impression. Wireframes superimposed on the objects of the reconstruction made 
the image more visually complex, thus increasing the amount of information, at 
least on an aesthetic level. We also feared that wireframes would suggest 
construction drawings and via that association signify precision, and not the 
intended signification of uncertainty. 
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Wireframes abound in movies portraying virtuality; Tron, Tron Legacy, The Thirteenth 
Floor, The Matrix Reloaded, as well as the holograms of for example District 9 and Iron 
Man are a few examples (all in all I have observed about 70 sign types in almost 30 
sources). Wireframes and the previously discussed grid are similar, but the grid is 
more general, more fundamental. The wireframe is a specific kind of grid, the grid 
that outlines the shape of a particular object. The line between wireframe and 
polygons is also blurry. Technically, wireframe lines outline a polygon’s flat surface, 
so they are actually two components of the same structure. But, both of these two 
components can be visually emphasized. The excerpts from The Matrix Reloaded and 
Sunshine below exemplify this (Figures 25 and 26). 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Excerpt from The Matrix Reloaded, showing how the green code lines becomes lines 
of wireframes outlining shapes in the virtual world. The polygons between the lines are not 
emphasized at all. 
 
 
 
Figure  26. Excerpt from Sunshine; showing how a wireframe outlines the 3d model of a 
spacecraft. The polygons between the wireframe lines have a dark blue color, contrasting them with 
the bright blue of the wireframe.  
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Barbara Flueckiger (2008) describes how wireframe figures were a trendy metaphor 
for technology in general during the 1980s, and illustrates this with the animation 
by Rebecca Allen for the music video Musique Non Stop (1986) by Kraftwerk. 
Nowadays, wireframe is typically used in advertisements for computer graphics 
tools and services, as shown in the two examples (Figures 27 and 28). The logic of 
the two images are similar; the textured and rendered areas appear almost 
photoreal, and to reveal the successful illusion there are areas where signs of virtuality 
are used to let us see what is behind the scene, so to speak. The intent is similar to 
trompe-l’œil art, the triumphal look-how-I-fool-you. The pants of the woman 
(Figure 27) are revealed as [grey-shaded without texture] in the mirror, and a [thin-
lined] [wireframe] can be seen both on her leg and the small of her back. The gun-
man hands (Figure 28) are outlined with [green] [wireframes], signifying the 
underlying 3d model. It is typical that a few common signs work together in this 
syntagmatic way. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Advertisement (detail) for the company Eyetronics, taken from the trade magazine 
Cinefex. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Advertisement (detail) for the company Autodesk, from the trade magazine American 
Cinematographer. 
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The voxel and the pixel 
“What’s a sea of simulation?” The question is rhetorically phrased by Nikos 
Kalaitzidis in an interview (Duncan, 2010, p.56) about his work as vfx sequence 
supervisor on Tron Legacy.79 The Sea of Simulation was a mysterious part of the 
virtual landscape in the original Tron movie, an undulating surface of wireframes 
and polygons, and Kalaitzidis describes the process of look development for the 
sequel’s version of the sea. He answers his own question, claiming it to be “a sea 
made out of millions of cubes” (ibid., p.56), and visual effect supervisor Eric Barba 
offers that they considered it to be “made up of these cubes that represent the 
simulation” (ibid., p.56). The sea is depicted as a dark surface with a grid pattern 
and below the surface the grid extends in all directions as arrays of glowing cubes. 
These cubes look like voxels. A voxel (volumetric pixel or volumetric picture 
element) is a volumetric, cubic construction element used in 3d modeling. It is the 
three-dimensional equivalent to the pixel. When working with voxels, a volume is 
sliced up into cubes, as if stacking lots of Lego bricks together. It is often used to 
render semi-transparent volumes such as clouds and gases. It is quite render 
intensive and is therefore not widely used. The scarcity of voxel usage in real-life 
computer graphics is mirrored by the scarcity of fictional references to voxels. Tron 
Legacy is the only movie that makes extensive and explicit use of voxel aesthetics. 
A well-known real-life example of voxel aesthetics comes from the sandbox 
game Minecraft. The Tron Legacy voxels have a material, photoreal quality to them; 
they are slightly rounded, and their self-glow and interaction with other light 
sources are visually complex and alive. The Minecraft building blocks (they are not 
technically voxels) are intentionally the opposite: hard-edged, and with repetitive 
and stylized textures, no specularity and simple shadow rendering (Figure 29).  
 
 
 
Figure 29. Screen shot from the sandbox game Minecraft, showcasing its voxel aesthetics. 
                                         
79 Vfx stands for visual effects. 
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Other computer games such as Fez, Ilomilo and Planets3 also have a distinct use of 
voxel-like cubic blocks. 
William Gibson never mentions voxels, he only makes occasional references to 
two-dimensional pixel graphics, such as a brief mention of a “wonkily bitmapped 
fish” in Idoru. In contrast to Gibson, voxels are frequently used by Stephen Baxter, 
describing the virtual projections that saturate many of his stories, as in the 
following examples from Reality Dust and Dante’s Dreams. 
Sarfi reached out and swept her arm down at the desk – no, Hama saw, startled; her 
arm passed through the desk, briefly breaking up into a cloud of pixels, boxes of 
glowing colour. 
Pixels, cubes of light, swirled in the air. They gathered briefly in a nest of concentric 
spheres, and then coalesced into a woman: thin, tall, white, thirty-ish, oddly serene 
for someone with a sparrow’s build. 
Baxter often refers to cubes and pixels interchangeably, just giving a general idea of 
computer graphics elements fluttering through the air.  
Contrary to voxels, pixels are much more common in the movies. Pixels can be 
employed in different ways. They can be free floating, as if being parts of a 
fragmented virtual object, being part polygon, part pixel.80 They can be the arrays 
of pixels on a low-resolution texture on a part of an object.81 They can be a 
pixelation pattern wrought across parts of the image, as in the flickering pixelation 
of the attack helicopter in the Avalon war game.82 Pixelation has a strong conceptual 
connection both to computer graphics and television technology, which in the case 
of Avalon is directly acknowledged by Isao Sato in a behind-the-scenes interview 
where he claims they “simulated a damaged video” (Miramax Films, 2003, at 36:28). 
Pixels are not unique for the digital age of the computer. Creating images from 
small picture elements is an ancient technology, starting with mosaics in stone, 
glass, ceramics and textiles (Wagner, 2003). Textiles with patterns have a deep 
connection to the origin of the computer, since one of the predecessors to the first 
computers was the Jacquard loom. In twentieth century art history the different 
aspects of picture elements were utilized by, for example, pointillism 
(approximately 1880s) and cubism (roughly 1910s). During the 1960s and 1970s, 
one branch of computer art and computer graphics occupied itself with ASCII 
graphics. The pixel is one of the most dominant ornaments of our age. 
Scan lines and flickering outside of the TV screen 
The connotations connected to the TV screen have been discussed previously, and 
one specific feature – scan lines – can be discussed from the viewpoint of the 
Cartesian construction kit as well. A syntagmatic analysis of how different signs are 
used together suggests that two characteristics of the TV screen – scan lines and 
flickering – can be taken out of context and used more or less stand alone. The 
                                         
80 For example the traces left by an exploding virtual tank in Tron, at 44:34. 
81 For example the face of a tortured virtual character in Tron, at 07:07. 
82 At 05:35. 
 
 
 168 
other Cartesian signs – lines, grids, wireframes, polygons and voxels – are related to 
the construction process of virtuality. When we see these signs, we seem to be 
peeking behind the wall paper, seeing the virtuality of the 3d model as it is before it 
has its photoreal render added. Flickering and scan lines are not related to the 
construction of 3d models; instead these signs are motivated by physical display 
technology and its early limitations. When we create 3d computer graphics, the 
lines, grids, wireframes, and polygons are always there, just behind the surface of 
the texture. In contrast, it is a long time since we saw TV screens actually flicker, 
and scan lines are more or less a conceptual idea and not something we actually see 
on the TV screen.83 Despite this the sign of scan lines is very predominant. It has 
been used to suggest virtuality in 40 sign types in about 15 of the analyzed movies. 
A syntagmatic analysis shows that it is very common for the three CRT screen 
signs [scan lines], [scrolling bars] and [flickering] to be used together, and this use is 
often quite subtle. Note, in the excerpt below, how the example from Tron Legacy is 
so subtle that the scan lines need enlargement to be clearly seen. This is highly 
typical for Tron Legacy; signs of virtuality are contrasted with contradictory signs of 
realism and physicality, such as the rain puddled street surface around the central 
action (see Figure 30). 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Excerpt from Tron Legacy, showing a typical combination of scan lines, scrolling 
bars and flickering. The hexagonal pattern is also interesting since it is a kind of grid and was 
used in a prominent way in Avalon as well. 
 
Flickering has quite complex interpretants emerging out of a simple representamen. 
From the stroboscopic and visually violent effect in Paul Sharits’ video art and the 
feature film Enter the Void by Gaspar Noé, to the subtle flickering of the glowing 
suits in Tron and Tron Legacy, flickering always conveys a sense of intensity and 
energy, and adds visual interest. Karl Denham – vfx sequence supervisor at Tron 
                                         
83 CRT screens had mask patterns in different configurations – hexagonal grids, square grids, and 
so on – but the horizontal scan lines could usually not be seen because that was the back-and-
forth horizontal movements of the in itself invisible electrode beam behind the glowing screen. 
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Legacy – explains that the original flickering comes from exposure mistakes in the 
complex optical compositing done in the first movie and that it had the advantage 
of suggesting electrical energy (Duncan, 2010, p.41). 
That look had been unintentional, but they used it in their favor, and even added a 
sound effect to go with the flickering. It’s subtle, but it’s there. So we did the same 
thing. The flickering also made it look as if there was a pulsing energy moving 
through the suits. 
Flickering also has associations with some sort of breakdowns. A quick burst of 
flickering is often used to show how a screen starts up or shuts down as well as for 
the appearance or disappearance of virtual objects. So, once again, we see a 
connection between signification of mediation (the screen) and virtuality (the 
virtual object). This is illustrated in a scene in Sunshine where the protagonist stands 
inside a virtual reality room and explores different simulation scenarios for their 
future voyage (see Figure 31). The projection walls flicker chaotically in large square 
patches. This is yet another example of how signs work together, coalescing into a 
super-sign. The patches can be read as a sort of pixelation, or a grid revealing the 
projection technology behind the walls. The flickering evokes both the sense of a 
simulation that has broken down, and the mediation of the flickering TV screen. 
This illustrates why Cartesian construction signs are successful in signifying 
virtuality; they have simple representamina that are easy to create and easy to 
combine, their denotations points to real-life construction principles behind 
computer graphics and media technology, and the connotations of the interpretants 
are complex and rich, evoking deep connections to the virtual via immateriality and 
artificiality. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Excerpt from Sunshine, showing the breakdown of a simulation. 
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Diegesis – tell, don’t show 
While mimesis is imitating and showing, diegesis is a recounting telling, the way the 
narrative is told (Bordwell, 1985; Genette, 1980). Virtuality in fiction is an integral 
and central aspect of the story, and therefore it is also often highly integrated with 
elements of the story, such as events, dialogue, and characters. The plot is at the 
heart of movie making, and connects it deeply with other forms of storytelling such 
as theatre and literature. Even cinematographers, the artists responsible for making 
the world of the narrative visible by light, acknowledge that “it starts with the story, 
it’s always, always about the story”, as stated by Charles Minsky (Fauer, 2006, at 
23:55). Nevertheless, much happens with the words of the script during a movie 
production. A movie production involves many different artists and craftspeople 
that influence the final movie; thus, the scriptwriter of a movie is not the almighty 
autonomous creator that we see in a novel writer (Bjurbom, 2005). 
A narrative is a sequence of statements that tell of the events of the plot 
(Genette, 1980). The plot can only be analyzed indirectly, through the narrative. 
Narration is the act of telling, and can be viewed as managing the audience’s 
knowledge about events and characters in the diegetic world; narration controls the 
flow and disclosure of what happens (Buckland, 2006; Genette, 1980). What the 
audience gets to know is highly dependent on the narrative viewpoint, the narrative 
mode; who is it that tells the narrative and what relation does this storyteller have 
towards the diegetic characters (Genette, 1980; Ricœur, 1984)? Is the storyteller one 
of the characters? Is she among them, or is there an external omniscient storyteller 
(Barthes, 1977)? In cinema, the camera viewpoint is the incarnation of an invisible 
observer, sometimes the emotionally engaged filmmaker and sometimes a more 
detached narrator (Bordwell, 1985). The storyteller puts the plot together by 
connecting events into a chain of logical cause and effect (Thompson, 1999). Or as 
Tarkovsky (1986) describes it, the story is sculpted in time, the director removing 
what is not needed so that we see the story more clearly. This viewpoint makes no 
distinction between storytelling about actual events (when a coherent story need to 
be found in a river of flowing events) and fictive events (when a coherent story 
needs not be built from fragments of real-life events and fantasy). Both become a 
matter of finding the relevant chain of causalities. 
At the heart of the plot are the characters, what they strive for, and the 
justification for this striving. The goals and needs of the character are then 
hindered by something, and the conflict, the holy grail of storytelling, arises 
(Bjurbom, 2005; Card, 1988; Carlshamre, 2005; Thompson, 1999). 
Verbal and textual references 
Narrative signs of virtuality can be direct or in-direct. The storytellers behind for 
example Tron, The Matrix and Life on Mars have their characters discuss, debate, 
refer to and in other ways directly mention the virtuality of the worlds they inhabit. 
Out of the close to a thousand signs that I have observed, about forty-five were 
textual. By textual I mean that they were spoken in dialogue by characters or 
written in text. Written text was not used as frequently as spoken dialogue, and it 
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was almost always diegetic; that is, the text was in the fictive world of the movie. For 
example, in The Matrix there is a book cover with the title Simulucra and Simulations.84 
In the game sequences in Avalon, there is repeated use of game related texts – such 
as “Mission Complete”85 – in floating letters superimposed on the realistic 
environment.86 I have observed only three cases of non-diegetic textual signs: a title 
card in Avalon introduces the game world with phrases such as “illusions of their 
own”, “illegal virtual-reality war game”, and “can leave a player brain-dead”;87 in 
Tron, a title card explicitly point out what kind of world we see (“Meanwhile in the 
real world…” at 03:40); and in Johnny Mnemonic, a title card explains what we see 
(“INTERNET 2021” at 01:16). The infrequent use of title cards is easily explained 
by the strong convention in movie making to let the story tell itself. An important 
part of the heralded suspension of disbelief is that the audience is not told the 
story; instead, the audience experiences the story. This is summarized in the almost 
mantra-like claim that movie makers should show, don’t tell. 
The most frequent kind of verbal sign has been some kind of [explicit verbal 
reference to computer software]. To exemplify, we can list verbal signs from Avalon 
(“program”, “load”, “data”, “bug”, “system”, “virus”, “digital” and others), The 
Matrix Reloaded (“upgrades”, “code”, “encryption”, “system”, “program”, “copy”, 
“source”), Tron (“program”, “file”, “memory”, “bugs”, “system”, “code”) and The 
Thirteenth Floor (“download”, “link”, “program”, “connection”). [Explicit verbal 
reference to simulation] has also been used, for example, in all parts of the Matrix 
trilogy: 
It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you.88 
See those birds; at same point a program was written to govern them.89 
[Explicit verbal argument concerning reality or the lack thereof] has been 
exemplified in my discussion about the Life on Mars show, but it also forms an 
integral part of the story in eXistenZ, exemplified by: 
I’m feeling a little bit dis-connected from my real life.90 
Don’t panic it’s just a game!91 
                                         
84 At 08:11. This is a reference to the book by Jean Baudrillard, and there is a more subtle 
reference to Baudrillard when Morpehus refers to “the desert of the real” at 39:40, one of 
Baudrillard’s metaphorical concepts. These references have been theorized in (Constable, 2006; 
Irwin, 2002; Lavery, 2001; Rovira, 2005). An interesting interview with Baudrillard concerning 
The Matrix has been published (Bryx & Genosko, 2004). 
85 First used at 07:30. 
86 The environment is live action footage color graded to look like a photorealistic computer 
game. 
87 At 01:10. 
88 The Matrix at 27:00, Morpheus explaining the ontological status of the world. 
89 The Matrix Reloaded at 44:50, the artificial intelligence The Oracle describes how all aspects of 
the illusionary Matrix is under intentional control. 
90 At 01:23. 
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[Explicit verbal reference to computer games] has also been used, which is not 
surprising considering that several of the studied narratives have plots concerning 
computer games.92 
Apparently, movie makers utilize dialogue to a high degree, when representing 
virtuality. Dialogue plays a vital part in a poetics of virtuality, and the signs usually 
refer to familiar aspects of computer hardware, computer software, and computer 
simulations. The rule-of-thumb to show, don’t tell is an oversimplification since these 
examples suggest that movie makers to a large extent show, and tell. 
Interrupted narrative and surrealism 
Gentry unzipped his beaded jacket, exposing his bone-white, hairless chest. “Do 
something about the sun”, he said. Twilight. Like that. Not even a click. Slick heard 
himself groan. (Mona Lisa Overdrive) 
In what I call interrupted narrative, the plot of the story is interrupted by a shift to 
another world, virtual or actual. This is used in two different ways: the parallel 
linear narrative and the disrupted, fragmented narrative. A parallel narrative usually 
has a plot where characters jack-in to or jack-out of – enter or leave – the virtual 
world, and it is characterized by the contrasting production design of the different 
worlds. The jack-in sequences often foreground the technology that is being used, 
and occasionally reference death (as in Life on Mars, Avalon and The Cell) or at least 
becoming impassive by lying down (the Matrix franchise) or going to sleep (The 
Thirteenth Floor). 
The disrupted narrative shows swift transfers between the worlds (as when Sam 
Flynn suddenly finds himself in the Tron Legacy world or when Sam Tyler wakes up 
in the 1972 of Life on Mars), but it can also be used in a more complex manner, 
suggesting the fragmented nature of being in the virtual world. This is most 
pronounced in the short film Magnetic Rose where environments, characters and 
events change repeatedly between cuts, resulting in a dreamy, hallucinatory 
impression of surrealism. 
Literary descriptions lend themselves to swift transcendence from the actual to 
the virtual and back. Ray Bradbury was early in describing this with his line “he 
stepped into Africa” in his 1950 short story The Veldt, and, much later, sequences 
of disruptive narrative abound in the writing of William Gibson. Gibson uses the 
“surreal logic found in dreams” (Heuser, 2003, p.128), the literary equivalent to 
jump cut editing, to characterize the encounter with cyberspace (Heuser, 2003; 
Kneale, 1999). He employs it in terse off-the-cuff fashion, as in Fragments of a 
Hologram Rose “the transition from delta to delta-ASP was a dark implosion into 
other flesh”) and in Neuromancer (“Case hit the simstim switch […] and flipped into 
the agony of broken bone”).  Gibson also uses disrupted narrative in longer, 
narratively crucial passages such as when the artificial intelligence Wintermute 
                                                                                                                               
91 At 15:47. 
92 According to an interview (Pellerin, 2002), Tron script-writer and director Steven Lisberger 
were inspired by contemporary computer games such as Pong. 
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meets Case in Neuromancer. Case is instantaneously transported from the abstract 
virtuality of cyberspace to the fully realistic simulations of first a shop and then a 
beach. The completely different styles of the different worlds are highly reminiscent 
of the contrasting production designs in the movies such as The Thirteenth Floor and 
Avalon, even though Gibson uses prose to describe them. The protagonist Case 
does not know how he got there or how he can escape, and when he is eventually 
released he realizes that even though the stay in the virtual imprisonment went on 
for hours or even days, he was gone for just a few seconds in the actual world. This 
is similar to scenes in Contact (the protagonist Ellie is gone for hours meeting alien 
intelligences on a simulation of a beach, while no time has passed on Earth) and in 
episode 9 of the TV series Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex (during an online 
chat session a participant is taken away by the Major to a blank void room virtual 
worldlet and then the Major herself is taken away to a library room without an exit). 
These examples show how the interruption of space, the jump from one space to 
another, also leads to a compression of time, both in the form of compressing the 
time it takes to transfer between worlds, making it instantaneous, and in the form 
of allowing the time to run at different speeds in different locations. Usually time is 
portrayed as running faster in the illusion, maybe connoting the speed of 
computing, or tapping into the wishful urge of having more time, more life. 
In many cases, the parallel flow of narratives is simple and straightforward. The 
archetypical example is, once again, the Matrix franchise. When a character jacks-in 
to the matrix, her physical body becomes inert, and the character is almost fully 
transcended into the virtual world. Characters remaining in the actual world can 
talk to the character inside the virtuality, and can even see what happens via the 
Operator’s screens. From a cyberpunk point-of-view this symbolizes the liberation 
into cyberspace thanks to the separation of body and mind (Heuser, 2003). But, 
from a narrative point the situation is actually quite mundane, being similar to, for 
example, two people being in different buildings, talking over the cellphone, one 
character watching the other via surveillance cameras. Alan Paul (2010) has 
described how the movie Inception provides a more complex structure of entangled 
narrative threads. Superficially the situation is similar; characters enter artificially 
induced dream states and their bodies become inert (sleeping) while other 
characters remain awake, watching over them (albeit not in direct communication 
with the dreamers). But inside the dreams of Inception the dream alter ego can enter 
a second level of dreams, and another, and so on. In the long third act of the movie 
there is a complex hierarchy of dream worlds within dream worlds, almost a 
Russian doll of worlds. The worlds are dependent on each other; a slight jolt in a 
top world gives a chain reaction of literally world-shaking events further down. 
Time is going slower, so a second in the actual world (the top of the hierarchy) 
translates to months two or three levels down. This shows how the fundamentally 
simple concept of nestled worlds, a space within a space, a room inside another 
room, can be expounded upon by creating surreal chains of cause and effect, 
emphasizing the un-natural, and thus virtual, nature of the nestled worlds. 
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The jump versus the transit 
The original idea of cyberspace as a three-dimensional space to navigate human 
knowledge, proposed in fiction by William Gibson and taken up as a real-life vision 
by Michael Benedikt, David Gelernter and others, has not been fulfilled. We do not 
fly among virtual skyscrapers of data to find information or to book a train ticket. 
Gibson’s vision, a narrative device never meant to be a roadmap for building real-
life interaction design, might have been taken too literally by cyberspace visionaries. 
In 1991, Benedikt seemed to be standing with one leg in the naïve cyberspace idea 
and the other leg in the future World Wide Web when he writes (p.172). 
It also seems plausible that frequent trips between the same locations could be 
truncated. Commuting can be tiresome, and the geography of cyberspace, once 
learned, may not be that enthralling to the jaded user… 
One aspect of cyberspace navigation that did become significant is the idea of 
quickly switching between different foci of presence. Gibson vividly describes and 
builds a suspenseful plot around how Neuromancer protagonist Case can 
instantaneously flip between presences. Case flips between cyberspace, his own 
view of the actual world, and a mediation of his collaborator Molly’s sensorium. 
The effortless switch between presences can easily be recognized in what we do 
today; we flip between Facebook text communication, Skype video conferencing 
and e-mail writing (Turkle, 1995). Michael Heim (1993) wrote, two years after 
Benedikt, that (p.96) 
the jump, not the step, is the characteristic movement in hypertext. As the 
environment for sensory hypertext, cyberspace feels like transportation through a 
frictionless, timeless medium. There is no jump because everything exists, implicitly 
if not actually, all at once. 
If we consider the real-life Internet, the two different navigation methods discussed 
first by Benedikt and then by Heim – the jump and the transit – have actually been 
realized. The instantaneous click-and-jump of the World Wide Web is used for 
achieving goals such as finding information and running errands. The transit 
through environments only occurs as a spectacle, for fun, in online games such as 
World of Warcraft, or in virtual worlds such as Second Life where the user actually can 
either teleport instantaneously or navigate by flying. 
Specific references to Oz and Wonderland 
Kansas is going bye-bye.93 
Cyberspace can be seen as a continuation of our ancient yearning to replace the 
actual with a range of different imaginations. It draws from myth and fairytales, just 
as surrealism art does (Smejkal, 1974). One way to suggest that the narrative moves 
between, and jumps between, different worlds is to reference well-known fiction. 
                                         
93 Cypher’s sardonic remark just before Neo is extracted from the virtual world prison at 29:26 in 
The Matrix. 
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References to The Wizard of Oz and Alice in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865) dominate in 
fictional representations of virtuality, as observed by others as well (Irwin, 2002). 
When looking at the narratives analyzed in this poetics of virtuality, there are a total 
of 14 references to The Wizard of Oz in five of the analyzed movies, and 14 
references to Alice in Wonderland in six movies. Usually the references are explicit 
dialogue references to “see the Wizard”, “the yellow brickroad” and falling down 
“rabbit-holes”. There are also subtler references such as the character names in 
Resident Evil (the protagonist Alice and the artificial intelligences Red Queen and 
White Queen). Neither William Gibson nor Stephen Baxter make any such 
reference in any of their novels or short stories. 
Why these? Of all the fiction in our culture, why The Wizard of Oz and Alice in 
Wonderland? Obviously, both stories have plots with two parallel worlds, as pointed 
out in an interview (Burnett, 2002) with Donald Kushner, producer for Tron, and 
the stories also involve transcending from a prosaic place to a fantastic place 
(Olsen, 1992), following Campbell’s monomyth structure, a narrative pattern 
described by Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1949; Palumbo, 2014). Both are very well 
known and appreciated children stories in the US, and after all it is American 
popular culture that has spawned the majority of contemporary fiction about virtual 
worlds. The screen adaptation of The Wizard of Oz actually displays what might be 
the first movie-based depictions of holograms (released in 1939, almost 40 years 
before the Star Wars hologram hit the silver screen and cemented the idea of how a 
hologram should look). One explanation is the special treatment of space and time 
that Alice in Wonderland offers, according to McLuhan (1964). He writes that Carroll 
creates a “fantasia of discontinuous space-and-time” and a “playful foretaste of 
Einsteinian time-and-space” (p.162). This disrupted space-time corresponds well to 
how space-time often is portrayed in virtual worlds. 
Alice in Wonderland is even referenced by Ivan Sutherland, the inventor of the 
first head-mounted display virtual reality system, when he wrote his seminal essay 
The Ultimate Display (Sutherland, 1965). The essay is a kind of manifesto 
encouraging researchers to utilize the ultimate possibilities of input and output 
devices, and he ends the essay with the phrase (p.3): 
With appropriate programming such a display could literally be the Wonderland into 
which Alice walked. 
Jacking-in – the techno-transcendence into the virtual 
In the interrupted narratives of virtual worlds, fictive characters repeatedly pass 
from one world into the other. This is the case in the Matrix franchise, Avalon, 
eXistenZ, Inception, Johnny Mnemonic, The Lawnmower Man, Life on Mars, The Thirteenth 
Floor, The Cell, Tron, Tron Legacy, Vanilla Sky, and in most of William Gibson’s 
novels. In other fictional narratives of virtuality, the plot lingers in the actual world, 
and the virtual projects into the actual. This is the case in Avatar, District 9, Resident 
Evil, the Star Wars franchise, some of Gibson’s novels (Virtual Light and Idoru), and 
in some of Stephen Baxter’s writing. When do you enter another world, and when 
are you just glimpsing virtual objects? How much of the actual world must be 
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replaced, how much of the senses, how much of your sensations, how much of 
your presence need to be changed, before you consider yourself being somewhere 
else? Can you be in two places at the same time? Everyday experiences, such as 
reading a book or watching a movie, illustrate that it is actually quite natural and 
easy to shift between different foci. When attending a videoconference you are not 
really immersed in a virtual world, but you nevertheless have a presence in another 
space, and there is a sensation of partially being in the video conferencing space. In 
fictional representations of virtuality, the situation is usually much more clear-cut 
than these real-life examples. Either the characters are in the actual world or in the 
virtual, and the transfer between the worlds then becomes a fundamental plot 
point, a matter of changing location; the event of entering is a sign carrying 
narrative clarity. 
Entering the virtual is a modern-day rite of passage (Tomas, 1991), and the 
theme of transcendence is one of the characteristics of western narratives, 
according to the monomyth template (Palumbo, 2014). Palumbo describe how the 
transcendence to the virtual world in Tron and The Matrix follows the patterns of 
the monomyth where the hero takes on a quest and must pass a line between the 
ordinary world (the actual) and the extraordinary world (the virtual), and similar 
patterns prevail in several of the other narratives studied in this poetics. 
The transfer between the actual and the virtual is foregrounded in a number of 
quite different, distinct ways. It can be through the display of futuristic virtual 
reality technology, or through subtle signs such as a flicker in someone’s eye. 94 It 
can be vaguely hinted at as Gibson often does in his more poetic passages, 
fleetingly referred to as jacking in. The word jack has a range of meanings, one of 
them being an electrical connector of some sorts, as in an audio jack or telephone 
jack. Jack also means a gash, a wound, or an opening into the body. Openings into 
the body, penetration of the flesh, are accentuated in eXistenZ as well as in the 
Matrix franchise. Circuitry invading and integrating with the body and mind is a 
recurrent theme in cyberpunk fiction (Gordon, 2002; Hollinger, 1991; Sterling, 
1991), and the idea of feeding the brain with sensory stimuli via a neural jack 
appeared in fiction at least as early as 1930, in the pulp story City of the Living Dead 
by Laurence Manning and Fletcher Pratt (Lovén, 2001). In The Matrix, the mind is 
connected to – jacked into – the virtuality simulation by a highly prominent neural 
probe; a metal stick is inserted into a head plug in the back of the head.95  
William Gibson writes with a thorough focus on jacking in. He shifts from hard-
boiled, off-the-cuff, and breezy mentions of the process of jacking in… 
                                         
94 One example is the Flynn’s Ride, the visually spectacular and lengthy travel into the virtual 
world in Tron, criticized by Kerman (1992) as merely being “the interface between a melodrama 
and a cartoon” (p.196). 
95 There are real-life Brain-Computer Interfaces in progress, both invasive and non-invasive. The 
most well known application is the cochlear implant which replaces parts of the inner ear, and 
there is also extensive research into restoring vision for the blind. One major difficulty is that 
current interfaces only connect with a large number of neurons, not individual neurons, making 
the connections rough and limited (Friehs et al, 2004). 
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He settled the black terry sweatband across his forehead, careful not to disturb the 
flat Sendai dermatrodes. (Neuromancer) 
Something covers Laney's eyes. Red wink of a diode. Cables. (All Tomorrow's Parties) 
Plug for each one. Jack and jack... (Idoru) 
…to detailed, technical and exhaustive accounts. 
He fitted the Batang behind his ear after coating the inductor surface with paste, 
jacked its fiberoptic ribbon into the programmer, and plugged the programmer into 
the wall current. Then he slid the wafer into the programmer. It was a cheap set, 
Indonesian, and the base of his skull buzzed uncomfortably as the program ran. But 
when it was done, a sky-blue Spad darted restlessly through the air a few inches from 
his face. It almost glowed, it was so real. (Dogfight) 
She leaned forward and picked up the trode-set, shook it to free its leads from the 
tangle. 
No there, there. 
She spread the elastic headband and settled the trodes across her temples - one of the 
world’s characteristic human gestures, but one she seldom performed. She tapped the 
Ono-Sendai's battery-test stud. Green for go. She touched the power-stud and the 
bedroom vanished behind a colorless wall of sensory static. Her head filled with a 
torrent of white sound. (Mona Lisa Overdrive) 
Often jacking-in is done in a hurry – the protagonist’s swift preparation for yet 
another heroic feat inside the virtual world. As pointed out by Heuser (2003), the 
almost effortless transit from actual to virtual stands in sharp contrast to the 
archetypical spacecraft voyage depicted in science fiction, the first being swift, and 
the latter being long in duration, often of epic dimensions. Sometimes jacking-in 
has the feeling of a more tender, even intimate action between the two persons 
involved; it seems as if you then need help establishing the connection. There is 
often one person penetrating the other, as in this polite exchange where a woman 
has her mind jack inserted by a man.96 
“Would you mind?” 
“Not at all.” 
The insertion of the brain jack is often accompanied by an expression of first pain 
or surprise, then an almost erotic pleasure. The emphasis on strong emotion, as 
well as the occasional subtle erotic undertones, is a quite obvious way for movie 
makers to dramatize the transcendence from the actual to the virtual. The transfer 
can also be violent. Transcending is dramatic in Life on Mars. Protagonist Sam Tyler 
is hit by a car and wakes up in the illusionary 1973. In Avalon, the chair in which 
you have to be seated is strikingly similar to a death chair, as if it is a gate through 
death and the virtual world of Avalon is a modern-day equivalent to Valhalla or 
Elysium. The drama of entering is equaled by the effort it takes to leave. In The 
Thirteenth Floor, the characters need to go to sleep in the virtual world in order to 
                                         
96 At 05:35 in the Animatrix short film Matriculated. 
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wake up in the actual world again, otherwise the abrupt ejection from the virtual 
will result in severe nausea and discomfort. In contrast to this gentle exodus, the 
dreamers of artificial dreams in Inception can only be awakened by a strong invasive 
experience such as being plunged in water, and in The Matrix leaving the virtual 
becomes a complicating plot point, an obstacle; you have to find a landline 
telephone to exit. 
Entering the virtual world is always a matter of going somewhere, often with a 
bang or at least a whimper. It is a continuation of a long line of dramatic 
transcendence in popular fiction, the twister in The Wizard of Oz, and the fall down 
the rabbit hole in Alice in Wonderland being just two examples. Entering the virtual 
also symbolically relates to the ancient dream of transcending to a heavenly 
existence. However, the Heavenly city as metaphor for the virtual that Benedikt 
(1991) discusses has no clear equivalence in fictional virtualities. The glowing 
virtual city in Tron Legacy is spectacular, and seems to be formed by light, but it is 
also shrouded in a perpetual night; there is no sun in the virtual world. The 
Machine City in The Matrix Revolutions is also radiant and might be interpreted as a 
Heavenly City; however, the fiery color scheme, the dire situation (Trinity has just 
died from a vehicle crash and Neo is about to meet the menacing machine artificial 
intelligence and eventually sacrifice his life) and the scurrying machine critters tend 
to make it a nightmarish, hellish Heavenly City. There are frequent religious 
references in fictional representations of virtuality but the virtual worlds themselves 
are usually quite ordinary, quite decadent and conceptualized as downwards, 
underneath the actual. The process of jacking-in, the act of transcendence, is often 
more spectacular than the destination. 
The brain jack and its slightly erotic implications are cunningly investigated in 
eXistenZ. The female protagonist, Allegra, asks Ted “where’s your bioport?” and is 
surprised when she realizes he has never been “fitted” with a brain jack in the small 
of his back.97 The character Ted has a fear of having a bioport inserted, of having 
his body penetrated. Thus, Ted experience much angst when Gas, a car mechanic, 
is hired to fit him out with a bioport in a greasy workshop. When Allegra later 
helps him to port into the virtual world, she lubricates the organic looking jack hole 
in the small of his back, and penetrates him with the umbilical cord-like cable of 
the game pod. The sexual implications are taken up again in a scene of reversed sex 
gender roles.98 Allegra investigates Ted’s swollen bioport and comments that “…it 
is not infected, it is just excited, it wants action”, while moistening her finger in her 
mouth and then slipping the finger into him. He repels and slaps her away, crying 
out “I really don’t think I want action, me I mean, the bearer of the excited 
bioport”. The question of identity, free-will and sexuality is a theme investigated 
repeatedly in eXistenZ. Olsen (1992) as well as Springer (1996) note that there are 
subtly sexual implications of jacking-in, especially considering how William Gibson 
brings together two metaphors: cowboys and wombs. Hacker cowboys jack in to 
penetrate the matrix, a word that derives from the Latin for womb. Later in the 
                                         
97 At 16:35. 
98 At 34:37. 
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movie eXistenZ, the invasive, penetrating and organic bioport is contrasted with 
non-invasive, metallic neural probes.99 This so called SQUID-interface 
(superconducting quantum interference device) is a fictional version of existing 
real-life technology that can measure magnetic fields with high sensitivity. In real-
life, this promise interesting opportunities for actually developing non-invasive 
brain-computer interfaces. However, the real-world technology that is used to feed 
sensory impressions directly into the brain is so far very rudimentary, only capable 
of triggering a mental image with a resolution corresponding to a few hundred 
pixels (using invasive probes). 
In real-life, VR goggles (head-mounted displays) have been the established 
means of immersing the user in virtual reality since they were invented in 1968.100 
Codognet (2003) has pointed out that the VR goggles quickly became an important 
symbol for virtual reality in general, maybe in part due to the fact that it shows how 
the user is immersed within herself, thus illustrating how she is enclosed in an 
apparently private universe. Movies that showcase fictional virtual technologies that 
are similar to real-world equivalences, for example Avalon, Skyggen and Johnny 
Mnemonic, use different extrapolations of the head-mounted display. The resulting 
images of people with their eyes covered by hardware are striking; covering the 
mirrors of the soul make the user seem detached, and robotic, as if we who watch 
from the outside can glimpse the immersion in another world which the wearer of 
the helmet experiences. One of the most prominent features of cyberpunk – 
mirrored sunglasses – creates a similar effect. 
                                         
99 At 01:13:00. 
100 There are also systems such as the CAVE where immersive graphics are projected on 
surrounding walls. 
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The anatomy of super-signs 
The super-signs that are discussed in this poetics are often intricately constructed. 
A strong super-sign forms a coherent, logical and memorable organic unity, and in 
the following chapter I will de-construct a few illustrative examples. I will also 
describe the design process and rationale behind a couple of the super-signs I have 
built in my own productions. The intent is to show examples of how narrative and 
appearances, diegesis and mimesis, often work together to signify virtuality. 
Ejahja – building a female Virtual 
In my independent feature film production Astronaut, one of the characters is 
Ejahja. She is the on-board artificial intelligence who manages the spacecraft 
depicted in the movie. Ejahja is an example of what Stephen Baxter in his fiction 
refer to as a Virtual, a volumetric display embodiment of an artificial sentience. She 
has an inter-textual ancestry going back to artificial intelligences in movies such as 
2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968) and Alien (Scott, 1979). She was portrayed by 
an actress and the live action imagery was manipulated to look as if she is a virtual 
character (see Figure 32).101 
 
 
 
Figure 32. The virtual character Ejahja in the movie Astronaut. Tempcomp by the author. 
                                         
101 The movie is still in production. I made a temporary composite (tempcomp) for the scene in 
2003 and have still not finalized the sequence of shots. 
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The character Ejahja is a super-sign, signifying the idea of a [volumetric display of 
an artificial intelligences]. As we will see, similar super-signs have been constructed 
in many other movies, as well as in several of Baxter’s stories. I will dissect Ejahja’s 
construction, and point to a few similarities of what other storytellers have done.102 
Ejahja’s construction is quite simple and the sub-signs making her can be described 
in full: 
•  [young female artificial intelligence] – as will be discussed later this is highly 
typical in the science fiction genre 
•  [virtual character, direct reference] – the name Ejahja is an intentional 
reference to the term AI, for artificial intelligence. 
•  [on-screen presence] – she is seen on a large computer wallscreen 
•  [black empty background] – she is situated in an empty void 
•  [grey color] / [monochrome] – her featureless, grey clothing 
•  [surrealistic color grading] – I manipulated the grey scales and colors to 
achieve an effect similar to solarization103 
•  [blooming blacks] – a color grading effect where dark areas of the image 
increase in size 
•  [transformation] – the color grading changes slightly 
•  [frozen motion] – she briefly pauses, as if waiting for instructions 
•  [neutral expression]/[zombie-like] – her emotions and behavior are 
downplayed in a subtle way by the actress 
•  [referring to data] – ”Yes, it is ready for display” 
•  [virtual character, direct reference] – ”It is not certain that I have a life.” 
•  [virtual character, direct reference] – “Are you aware of yourself?”, “I don’t 
know.” 
•  [virtual character, direct reference] – ”You won’t go HAL on me will you?”104 
These sub-signs are organized as shown on the next page, Figure 33. 
 
                                         
102 This is based on my reading of the half-completed shot, eight years after I last worked with 
them. The erosion of my own memory of the work gives me more the status of a reader than of 
an author. This is interesting from an auto-ethnographic viewpoint, as well as in relation to the 
hermeneutic discussion about the death of the author. As an author of these shots, I have “died” 
and returned as a reader. But, the parallel reading of the archived e-mail conversations 
symbolically resurrects the author in me. 
103 Solarization is an effect where grey scales and colors are displaced to make a surrealistic effect. 
104 HAL is the artificial intelligence in 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
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Figure 33. The structure of the Ejahja super-sign. 
 
One prominent sub-sign is that Ejahja is a young female. Similar characters have 
been used in several movies (for example the Test Card girl in Life on Mars, Seraph 
in The Matrix Revolutions, the Ghost in Avalon, and Skynet in Terminator Salvation). I 
will look more closely at the Red Queen in Resident Evil and the White Queen in 
one of the sequels, Resident Evil Extinction. Both of these characters are Virtuals, 
volumetric display projections of artificial intelligences, taking the form of a young 
girl with artificial appearance and behavior.  
What strategies have I, and other movie makers, used to represent these 
characters as virtual? Ejahja is seen on the screen, in her own enclosed black void of 
hers. The Red Queen is a volumetric display and the display technology is 
emphasized by light beams projecting her, and by typical image artifact signs such 
as [flickering] and [scan-lines]. The (likewise female) Skynet character in Terminator 
Salvation is also seen on computer screens. Seeing a character displayed on a screen 
is a strong, hard to miss, sign, but the meaning is not obvious. After all, the imagery 
could be interpreted as mediated, as in a videoconference. One way to create 
supporting signs of virtuality, is to manipulate the visual style, especially the color 
grading of the character. That is a method I used and the signs I created for Ejahja 
are listed above. Color grading effects are also used for the Red Queen: [red-tint], 
reflections reminiscent of [liquids], [desaturation], [semi-transparence], and [brightly 
lit]. Note that the White Queen (in the sequel) uses only one of these signs, 
[brightly lit], maybe because the movie makers anticipate that the first movie firmly 
established this artificial intelligence character. From a production viewpoint, shots 
of these Virtuals can be created in two ways: either you shoot live action footage 
and manipulate it (making it look virtual), or you create computer graphics that 
appear virtual because the 3d model used in the production process is a real-life 
virtual object. From a production viewpoint it is advantageous with the first option 
of manipulating live action footage into representing virtuality. The reason for this 
is quite straightforward – it is much easier (quicker and cheaper) to shoot a real 
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actor instead of modeling and animating a computer graphics character – and this 
was very much the rationale when I created Ejahja. 
Yet another similarity between Ejahja and the two Queens of the Resident Evil 
franchise was how verbal signs were put to use. For Ejahja, the dialogue with the 
human protagonist Scott about her ontological status as self-conscious entity 
highlights her as an artificial intelligence, and was one of the meanings I wanted to 
convey in the scene. Essentially, the two characters, the man and the machine, say 
good-bye to each other before they are both destroyed. The two queens of the 
Resident Evil saga also talk with human characters in a manner relating to their 
status as artificial intelligences. The White Queen reveals her status with the line 
“My sensors have detected…”105, which is quite similar to Ejahja’s line “Yes, it is 
ready for display”. They both refer to hardware peripherals that in-directly 
designate them as not human.106 A similar verbal reference has been used in 
another of my productions. The science show Rymdlust had a narrator, with lines 
written by me, that was supposed to be the ship’s on-board computer. She presents 
herself with “I am Technica, this spacecraft’s main computer”.107 Note that 
Technica is female, just as Ejahja and the Resident Evil Queens. Interestingly, the 
ship-bound, disembodied artificial intelligence voice that is such a common trope 
in science fiction movies is usually female. The father of all these fictive spaceship 
artificial intelligences might have been the male HAL 9000 in 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
but HAL was distinctly androgynous and the aptly named Mother in Alien (Scott, 
1979) has become the ancestor to a long row of female on-board AI’s. Huyssen 
(1981) points out that fictional robots in general are female. Then there is the 
virtually embodied artificial intelligence (that is, the Virtual, projected as volumetric 
display), which often appears as a young girl. Without being consciously aware of 
these predecessors, I created two characters – Ejahja and Technica – that 
corresponded to this pattern. The logic of the young female Virtual is open for 
different interpretations; one might be that the syntagmatic juxtaposition between 
young innocent girls and futuristic technology creates a surrealism that emphasizes 
the artificiality of the character.108 Other possible motivations for the female gender 
of these Virtuals are the old heritage of female secretaries and the human 
computers of early Twentieth century; originally, computer was the term for a 
human – often a group of women – doing mathematical calculations. As pointed 
out by Cheris Kramarae (1998), “women are employed to do what the men don’t 
want to do and the machines can’t do yet“ (p.15). Huyssen (1981) suggests that the 
                                         
105 At 01:14:20. 
106 The phrase ”It is ready for display” could be uttered in a natural way by a human, but my co-
director Rick Dunbar had actress Grace Folsom look up and freeze in an anticipating manner, 
subtly indicating that the display feature was an embodied part of her being. This is a clear 
example of how a combination of subtle signs, in themselves unrelated to virtuality, can support 
each other and create a super-sign that connotes virtuality. 
107 Originally in Swedish; ”Jag är Technica, den här rymdfarkostens huvuddator”. 
108 This is similar to how the juxtaposition of an innocent girl and a demon creates an intriguing 
representation of evil, as exemplified in The Exorcist by William Friedkin and countless other 
horror movies. 
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robot, the artificial life, is so often female because it symbolizes man’s final 
conquering of nature, it is “the male phantasm of a creation without mother;” 
allowing man to be “at long last alone and at one with himself” (p.227). Concerning 
Ejahja, I rather considered her as a companion to the lonely, male astronaut 
protagonist of the story, the other side of a symbiotic, platonic relationship. 
My exact reasoning for having Ejahja being female remains vague. E-mail 
conversation from the production suggests that the choice of gender for Ejahja was 
somewhat arbitrary. I wrote this with co-director Rick Dunbar on January 21st, 
2003. 
Thommy: “I suggest female” 
Rick: “I agree! No idea why I changed this...” 
It could be that I was influenced by intertextual references, possibly Resident Evil (it 
was released the same year I wrote the script for Astronaut). I did write into the 
movie script that Ejahja was female, but there was no mention of her young age. 
Ejahja’s young age – the actress being in her early teens at the shoot – was 
somewhat arbitrary and an example of serendipity. Ejahja appearing as a young 
teen had partly come from production circumstances. This e-mail exchange is from 
July 1st, 2003. 
Thommy: “BTW, again, I just realized that we will need a female voice for Ejahja, 
the artificial intelligence onboard the ship. It would be nice to have an american 
accent on that voicer, not swedish, and I started to think about young girl I 
mentioned that auditioned together with Ted. Would she be interested in doing the 
voice over? Or maybe even have screen time, we could use footage of her on a 
computer screen, and filter it, so it looks as if Ejahja is a virtual ship member, not 
only a voice.” 
Rick: “The question for you is, what age would you like the voice to sound?  An 
actress would much prefer to have her face on screen, but a VO is better than no 
role at all. There is one particular actress I would like to have a shot at it because she 
is a friend of a friend.  However, I don’t want that to influence your decision.  Just 
tell me what age you are looking for and we’ll take it from there. 
Thommy: “I think Grace is the one for the Ejahja character. She was good during 
audition, and she got a personal look which I think correspond great for Ejahja. A 
good second choice would be Rachael, I really think she did an equally good 
performance, even though she doesn’t look like Ejahja to me (but if Grace can't do 
Ejahja I can consider Rachael instead).” 
What this exchange shows is that we were in a small-scale production situation 
where we had to make use of the actors we had easy access to, and that both the 
age of Ejahja and the idea to color grade (“filter”) the imagery co-evolved with the 
casting procedures. The example of the Ejahja super-sign is an example of how 
creative decisions can be influenced by different vague influences: a mix of 
intertextual influences, plot-derived necessities, and practical production 
circumstances.  
 
 
 185 
The grey surface and the Virtual Gas Lab 
A surface attribute that is often used as a representamen when signifying a virtual 
object is a featureless, solid grey surface. The [grey surface] is a supporting sign, 
subtly suggesting virtuality, instead of intrudingly claiming virtuality. After all, a grey 
surface can also be just a grey surface. The sign [grey surface] might be thought of 
as a very simple sign – the representamen being just a grey surface. But, both the 
representamen and the interpretant of this sign bloom into complexity, and the sign 
can also be seen as a super-sign assembled by sub-signs, such as the [lack of color], 
[lack of texture], and [the lack of specular]. The lack of specular means that the 
surface is completely matte. All three sub-signs share the notion of [lacking] 
something, and this engages three different interpretants. The stylized simplicity of 
these matte grey surfaces connotes computer rendering, emphasizing that the 
imagery has been rendered and not photographed. This means that it is artificial; it 
has been engineered. And finally, the featureless grey evokes immateriality, 
emphasizing that the objects or environments are not fully there; they are not fully 
physical. 
 
 
 
Figure 34. The structure of the grey-surface super-sign, showing how reduction and abstraction 
combine with contrasting sub-signs of realism. 
 
Sometimes the [grey surface] is a construct incorporating realistic, high-quality 
shadow rendering and a high-level of geometrical detail. One example comes from 
the Eyetronics advertisement on page 165. The jeans bottom in the mirror shows 
fine details with wrinkles in the fabric and sews, and the shadows are smooth and 
realistic. The surface texture, however, is grey and featureless. This syntagmatic 
combination of image quality attributes combine into a striking and visually strong 
super-sign (see Figure 34), and the conflicting juxtaposition of both high visual 
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fidelity and low visual fidelity makes the image tell two things at the same time; that 
it is real, and that it is not real. It is as if the virtual tries to rival the actual; I am 
virtual, but that does not matter. This combination of low and high visual fidelity might 
be yet another example of how a representation of virtuality have its roots in 
production practices. The procedure of rendering a detailed 3d model with high-
quality shadows but without a texture, with only the default grey surface shader, is a 
common way to both showcase the accuracy of high quality rendering algorithms, 
and to showcase the perfect and detailed geometry of a 3d model (as was the 
intention with the Eyetronics advertisement). Also, in 3d software used by 
computer graphic artists, such as Maya, the default surface material for newly 
created geometries (objects) is a matt medium grey, non-textured shader.  
I used the [grey surface with realistic shadows] super-sign in a couple of my own 
productions. I used it in Astronaut, deciding that the actress should wear as grey and 
featureless textiles as possible, and in the Environmental Science Investigation’s 
Virtual Gas Lab, where the grey look of the lab bench became one of its most 
prominent characteristics. In this design decision, I was influenced both by fictional 
representations of virtuality and aesthetic preferences. As a designer I favor the 
minimalism of the grey surface, and as a computer graphic artist I recognize how 
the grey surface connotes 3d modeling. The juxtaposition of both abstract and 
realistic is intriguing. And, I knew that the grey surface of the Gas Lab and the 
empty void behind it were quite similar to what I had seen in movies such as The 
Matrix. So, here lies a double rationale for the [grey surface with realistic shadows] 
super-sign: that it is pleasingly aesthetic in its minimalism and simultaneously the 
very same minimalism represents virtuality. 
The following suite of images (Figures 35-38) illustrates the progress of design 
work I did on the Environmental Science Investigation production. Two cities, the 
actual Athens and the virtual city of Mirror’s Edge, inspired the design and visual 
style of the Gas Lab. I was especially inspired by the grey-white facades, primarily 
colored details and the soft real-life light, and I let details metaphorically fused 
actuality and virtuality. I used the materiality and realism that is suggested by soft 
shadows, and by high level of detail in a 3d model’s geometry. Then, as a contrast, I 
emphasized, and signified, virtuality by using a featureless grey surface. Color 
accents highlighted interactive parts of the graphical interface, and aesthetically 
broke the blandness of the grey surface. 
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Figure 35. Real-life city that inspired the Gas Lab; the city of Athens. Photo by the author. 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Virtual city that inspired the Gas Lab; promotional image for the computer game 
Mirror’s Edge. 
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Figure 37. Design sketch for virtuality; a low-level prototype of the Virtual Microscope (a never 
realized virtual lab in conjunction to the Virtual Gas Lab) using a grey surface with soft 
shadows, and accents of primary colors. Sketch by the author. 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Final virtuality; the Virtual Gas Lab from the Environmental Science Investigation 
project. 
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The immateriality of a flickering candlelight 
They manifested, like a flame.109 
In the visualization project, Via Tecta, Jonathan Westin and I made an interactive 
presentation showing a reconstruction of an ancient, Roman temple, the sanctuary 
of Hercules Victor. We developed what we called an open visualization, as in open for 
interpretation. The purpose of the project was to investigate different methods of 
conveying the inherent uncertainty in reconstructions such as these. Historical 
remains – from dinosaur fossils to temple stones – are always partial. Sometimes, 
there are only a handful of bones, or a few stonewalls in the grass. The 
interpretations of such remains are vague and full of uncertainties and alternative 
explanations. This comes in conflict with visual reconstructions; in order to make 
the visualization both interesting and possible to understand, much information 
needs to be added to the image, information that is based on interpretations. The 
problem is to show enough to let people understand what they see, but not so 
much that we suggest things we do not know. This is a difficult balance to find. 
Even if the visualization is introduced with an explicit explanation that the 
reconstructions are incomplete and uncertain, this knowledge is soon subsumed by 
the experiential power of the visualization (Favro, 2006). In the project that Westin 
and I worked on, we tried to find ways in which the representation can speak 
directly to the audience about its lack of certainty and its provisionality. Such 
methods have been investigated by a number of scholars (Haselberger, 2006; 
Klynne, 1998). Even though our visualization concerned an archeological 
reconstruction, the issue of representing uncertainty is relevant in other domains 
where 3d visualization is used as well (Johnson, 2004), for example in geographic 
information systems (Ehlschlaeger, Shortridge & Goodchild, 1997) and medical 
imaging (Lundström et al, 2007). 
Our main approach was to reference virtuality of different sorts. The rationale 
was that virtuality also has a sort of uncertainty and immateriality to it. We used 
several signs and super-signs to signify levels of virtuality/uncertainty. We 
attempted to use flickering and changes over time as indicator of uncertainty, paths 
that have been explored by others as well (Ehlschlaeger, Shortridge & Goodchild, 
1997; Lundström et al, 2007). The rationale behind using flickering to indicate 
uncertainty was the connection to immateriality and virtuality; we took inspiration 
from flickering TV screens and flickering virtual objects we had seen in fictional 
representations of virtuality. We worked with the assumption that more flickering 
meant a higher degree of uncertainty. We experimented with the speed of 
flickering, the strength of it, and whether it was random or regular. However, it was 
difficult to strike a balance between drawing attention and giving the feeling of not-
being-there. We had to balance foregrounding on the one hand (in order for the 
viewer to become aware of our signs) and repression on the other hand (less certain 
aspects of the reconstruction would be metaphorically pushed away, as if they were 
                                         
109 Character Kevin Flynn describing the spontaneous emergence of artificial intelligence in the 
virtual world of Tron Legacy, at 53:15. 
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not really there). Since we wanted objects to appear uncertain, one seemingly logical 
way was to make them less “there”, less material. But, the flickering turned out to 
be too imposing, drawing too much attention to the effect. As a final attempt to 
make comprehensible use of flickering and striking a balance between attention and 
fading away, we tried to emulate the look-and-feel of a flickering candle. Our 
intention was to communicate virtuality/uncertainty through the connotations of a 
starving flame. The concept of a dying flame was also our attempt to viscerally 
suggest how the scale of colors we used should be interpreted. We had problems 
with showing how the color scale was mapped (for example, is red or blue the most 
uncertain color?), and by using the dying candle metaphor we hoped to establish 
that red was the most uncertain, because the flame was red when it almost died 
away. We hoped that the irregular flickering would emphasize the feeling of a flame 
dying away, establishing that the more it flickered the less certain the object was. 
Eventually we abandoned both colors and flickering, mostly because it still drew 
too much attention. Instead, we used blur and transparency together, a 
combination of signifiers that Penny Rheingans and Shrikant Joshi (1999) also 
arrived at in their work on visualization of positional uncertainty in molecules. 
Transparency was also used by Djurcilov et al (2001) to indicate uncertainty in 
medical imaging. The reason we chose blur was that conceptually it lessened the 
amount of information, which gave the appropriate connotations of a lack of 
certainty, and of information. Transparency was chosen because it connected with 
ghosts and fog, and of not really being there materially. Balancing the effect of the 
signs remained an issue even with blur and transparency, but it worked quite well; it 
was a true reduction of the information content of the image, and it gave the 
impression of fading away, while at the same time being quite obvious and visible. 
What is interesting with the failed super-sign of the flickering candlelight is its 
illustration of how a design idea that seems promising in the initial design phase 
meets practical issues in application, leading to a quite different solution, and a 
different set of signs. 
The world that is sick 
“How was your life like before?” 
“Before?” 
“Before it was changed by Alegra Geller.” 
“I operated a gas station” 
“You still operate a gas station.” 
“Only on the most pathetic level of reality.”110  
This dialogue from eXistenZ emphasizes how similar life in the actual world and the 
virtual world can be, while having a distinct difference in value. It also illustrates the 
common idea that the virtual has less value and how it is sometimes portrayed as sick 
and depraved in the analyzed narratives. This is related to the topology 
#engineered space, the world that is initially empty, waiting to be filled, but there is 
                                         
110 From eXistenZ at 20:10, dialogue between characters Ted Pikul and the aptly named gas station 
operator Gas. 
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also a specific kind of sickly emptiness, as if the world has been populated, but then 
was abandoned. This stylistic and supporting super-sign is frequently used in the 
Matrix franchise. Not only are the back streets empty, and not only is the nighttime 
lighting spooky, there is also a distinct impression of being a run-down world. It is 
dirty. There is wind blown garbage on the pavement. The building facades are worn 
and broken (see Figure 39). The green tint of The Matrix references not only old 
CRT computer displays, but also a sickness and unhealthiness as well. 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Excerpt from The Matrix Reloaded; a typical view of the vacant back street 
aesthetics and sickly green tint used in the Matrix franchise. 
 
Similar depictions of run-down city environments can be seen in, for example, 
Inception, Chatroom, Storm, and Avalon. Should this be understood as a degrading 
frown towards the artificiality of the virtual? Or is the intent to signify a world run 
out of control, an artificiality that humans have lost control over, just as we have 
lost control over so much real-life technology? In Storm, there is a plot-based 
motivation to the deprived environment; the illusionary visit to his childhood that 
the character DD is forced to encounter is a reflection of the disturbing memories 
that haunt him. The childhood town he wanders through is completely empty, and 
wind strewn autumn leaves cover the foggy streets. The director Måns Mårlind 
claims, on the DVD commentary track, that the leaves were a coincidence that they 
took advantage of. Concerning the shabby look of a building, he offers that “the 
idea was that the closer he gets to places where he has done bad things, the places 
gets more infected and rotten”.111 Similar logic prevails in Inception where crumbling 
skyscrapers represent the troubled subconscious of one of the movies fictive 
characters. Thus, these signs of a depraved illusion not only support the plot, but 
they are also signs which carry some sense of narrative clarity. 
These dystopic cityscapes seem to fit well with how Heuser (2003) characterizes 
the aesthetic of the cyberpunk genre in general, mentioning “the omnipresence of 
                                         
111 At 48:38. Translated from the Swedish statement: ”Iden här var att ju mer han närmar sig 
ställen där han gjort dumma saker så blir dom ställena mer infekterade och ruttna.” 
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black leather clothes and mirrorshades, the obligatory neon lighting and dreary rain, 
and the ubiquitous chrome and concrete” (p.41). However, it is more than just a 
matter of stylistic codes and a visual style; as mentioned above, the mood of the 
environments could also be attributed to what the plot needs. Is it then reasonable 
to speak of sickness and depravation as a sign of virtuality? Is it reasonable to 
assume that we think of the virtual as sick and broken? What can be said with 
certainty is that in a plot that interweaves two narratives, moving back and forth 
between the virtual and the actual, there is a necessity to distinguish between these 
different worlds. This distinguishing contrast between worlds is portrayed in a way 
that is logical too, and forms an organic unity with the visual style, themes, and plot 
of the movie. In Tron, the virtual world glows with energy, as if fueled by the heroic 
fight for freedom. In The Matrix, the virtual world is run down because it is a 
prison. In Storm, the illusionary world is rotten at its core because the human sub-
conscious hides dark secrets. This illustrate unity between story and style, and 
between diegesis and mimesis. 
Virtual death – how to die without the flesh 
How do virtual characters die? Is it death when you do not have a material body? 
As illustrated by the following examples, dying is both a dramatic plot event and an 
opportunity for storytellers to signify virtuality. 
The death of a progeny in Tron112 
During torture – represented by screams of agony, blue electrical bolts, and bursts 
of pixelation – the virtual character Clu is killed in the virtual world. At his death, 
his body is gradually replaced by a green-glowing wireframe. The lines and dots of 
the wireframe are then gradually erased. Similar step-by-step disappearances – and 
corresponding appearances – are used frequently throughout the Tron movie, and it 
is referred to in dialogue as being “de-rezzed”. The creation of something out of 
nothing is referred to as “rez up”. Disappearing and appearing connects to the 
topology of #immateriality. In subsequent Tron deaths, the aspects of dying in the 
virtual world are expounded upon even further. A fallen gladiator disappears with a 
bright flash and then a series of red glowing discs float upwards, as if his digital 
soul is leaving his body.113 When the virtual character Ram dies, his body 
fragmentizes into a myriad of glowing dots and disperses into the glowing circuitry 
lines of the floor.114 It is as if his body is returned to the digital dust from which he 
was made. Thus, the first death referred to how virtual objects, digital code, can be 
written and erased, appearing and disappearing seemingly without effort. The two 
later deaths are instead clearly inspired by traditional religious ideas about the soul 
going to Heaven and the body returning to dust. 
                                         
112 At 07:40. Clu is the digital, semi-autonomous alter ego of the human hero Kevin Flynn.  
113 At 35:25. 
114 At 53:50. 
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The death of a gladiator in Tron Legacy 115 
In Tron Legacy, the characters from Tron have been upgraded into higher levels of 
realism and they look completely physical.116 In most cases, it is only the futuristic 
design of their suits and the prominent lines of glowing light that signify them as 
virtual characters.117 When characters in Tron Legacy are killed they instantly 
fragmentize, cascading into a shower of disintegrating cubes. When the inside of 
the virtual body is opened up, it lights up as if an inner glow was released when the 
outer shell was compromised. The effect is very simple in its components (its sub-
signs), but the resulting look is highly complex and beautiful. The sight of an 
apparently living human fragmentizing has unsettlingly, un-natural connotations; 
the super-sign signifies virtuality by a syntagmatic juxtaposition of what appears to 
be a human body with a strange and surreal fragmentizing. 
The death of a soldier in Avalon118 
When game character soldiers (NPC’s, Non-Player Characters) are shot to death in 
Avalon, they instantly freeze, and then their image is slashed into pieces by straight 
cuts. These pieces swiftly turn, revealing them as flat 2d pieces of imagery, and then 
fragmentize into a cloud of debris. The emphasis on two-dimensionality is repeated 
in the more complex death patterns of the more advanced virtual characters. When 
the Ghost is shot by Ash, the camera viewpoint circles the frozen image of the 
Ghost, revealing that her previously 3d body has been split up into ribbons of 2d 
planes.119 These image ribbons start to rotate, leaving cylindrical dark trails, which 
then turn into thin blue glowing circles, which expand and fade out. A few brilliant 
pinpoint lights are seen along the blue lines. When human avatars are killed in the 
virtual world, the death-sequence starts with a subtle blur of the face, and a strange 
sound.120 The body splits up in 2d planes that swipe around in 3d space, leaving a 
cylindrical, trailing 3d shape. These shapes expand and are infested with brightly 
glowing bars of green light. Finally, the cylinders fade and shrink, as if eaten up by 
the glowing bars of light. These deaths in Avalon are built from the same 
paradigmatic repertoire as the deaths in Tron and Tron Legacy; the movie makers use 
different forms of fragmentizing and contrast the apparently human body with sub-
signs such as voxels and 2d-planes, related to the construction of virtual 3d-models. 
 
In fiction, death is seldom realistic. Western operas and Asian drama have a 
tradition of very slow, outdrawn and poetic deaths. Much has to be sung or said 
before the last breath. In feature films, dying seems to have evolved from a short 
scream followed by a graceful collapse in vintage Western films, via the famous last 
                                         
115 First revealed at 29:15. 
116 Production-wise, the Tron Legacy characters were live actors shot with practical lights in their 
costumes. The glow of the lights was enhanced and changed slightly in color grading. 
117 Here, I am only referring to their appearances. There is much in their behavior and dialogue 
that signifies their virtuality. 
118 First seen at 04:25, then used frequently in the same sequence. 
119 At 01:15:00. 
120 Stunner at 01:13:10 and Murphy at 01:36:15. 
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words before a silent relaxation in dramas and soap operas, to violent cascades of 
blood and gore in contemporary action and horror movies. Cyber-punk movies 
have evolved these tropes into the quick, but complex, deaths described in the 
examples above. These deaths are mostly portrayed visually, but the visual often 
shows narrative sequences of events, such as step-by-step fragmentation. 
A paradigmatic study of these sub-signs of virtual death throes clearly shows that 
they have things in common, and that there is a specific repertoire to draw from. 
[Fragmentization] is a recurring sub-sign. It is not only dying characters that 
fragmentize. It is also a very common sign applied to vehicles, buildings and other 
parts of the environment. This kind of fragmentation has been observed in Kid’s 
Story, Program, Beyond, Johnny Mnemonic, The Matrix Revolutions, The Matrix Reloaded, 
Tron, Tron Legacy, Ghost in the Shell, The Lawnmover Man, Skyggen, and Virtuosity. 
Looking at written descriptions of virtuality, fragmentation is a motif in the writings 
of Stephen Baxter as well, here in Reality Dust: 
Sarfi reached out and swept her arm down at the desk - no, Hama saw, startled; her 
arm passed through the desk, briefly breaking up into a cloud of pixels, boxes of 
glowing colour. 
Already in Charles Csuri’s computer animated short film Hummingbird from 1968, 
fragmentation was an important part of the aesthetics (Glowski, 2006). 
Fragmentation is sometimes combined with apparently material objects turning 
liquid, both in movies such as Tron Legacy and – as pointed out by Sabine Heuser 
(2003) – in William Gibson’s fiction. This is used occasionally in the Matrix 
franchise and in Johnny Mnemonic, but Tron Legacy makes it a fetish by excessive, 
stylistic devotion to the cool, beautiful imagery of how the crashing Light Cycles 
fragmentize in liquid cascades on the Game Grid gladiator arena. 
Why would fragmentation be related to virtuality? I believe it connects with the 
interpretant of two high level super-signs, that of [immateriality] and [the 
clockwork mechanism]. It is as if the characters and objects have an inherent 
tendency to fragmentize, because they are so close to not being there. Therefore 
fragmentation represents immateriality. An adjacent super-sign is the reveal of [the-
code-behind], as in the super-sign of Neo’s unique vision; the hero Neo in the 
Matrix franchise can see the green glowing computer code that is the background 
fabric of the illusionary virtual world. It’s like peeking behind the curtain, or behind 
wallpaper. This is reminiscent of the famous Flammarion engraving121 depicting a 
man breaking through the edge of the world and seeing the mechanism behind 
(Figure 40). 
 
                                         
121 It was published by Camille Flammarion in the 1888 book L’atmosphère: météorologie populaire, the 
artist is unknown. 
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Figure 40. The Flammarion engraving, a precursor to Neo’s vision in The Matrix – seeing the 
mechanics behind the scene. 
 
The association to clockwork mechanism – or behind-the-stage mechanism – is 
highly related to the way the fragmentations reveal the inner structures of the 
virtual object. The digital deaths that we have discussed are designed to reveal the 
inner mechanisms of the virtual characters. Either they reveal an inner wireframe 
skeleton, or a cascade of voxels, or the characters are turned into 2d imagery – 
acknowledging that flat 2d-textures are one of the most important components of 
producing computer graphics. Voxels are a modeling and rendering technique used 
in some computer graphics. The cubes that the fictive Tron characters fragmentize 
into seem to be motivated by this real-life production technique. Writer Stephen 
Baxter has also used [voxels], putting them into words in the short story Darkness.  
Hilegas looked down, startled, at the hole in his chest. Pixels fluttered about him, 
blocks of colour in the air. 
The quote from Baxter exemplifies how the revelation of inner mechanisms is used 
not only in deaths, but also in wounds of virtual bodies. A memorable example is 
Tron villain Sark’s huge gash in his skull, disgorging a cascade of white-yellow light 
out of his skull.122 A close-up shows sparks coming out of the wound, and in the 
                                         
122 At 01:21:00. 
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gap in his head there are glowing electrical circuits, and machinery in different 
colors, as if his head is filled with electronics. This is a rather blunt denotation of 
artificiality. 
There is another kind of death symbolism in the virtual world, the super-sign 
[dying and going to heaven]. There are more or less subtle references to the 
transcendence to another world: characters jump off roof tops and wake up 
somewhere else (Life on Mars, Abre los ojos/Vanilla Sky, and Kid’s Story), characters 
refer to death as the only way out (“In order to get back home, we needed to kill 
ourselves” in Inception123), and characters jack-in to the virtual reality simulation by 
donning a death mask (The Cell) or lying down in something that resembles an 
electric chair (Avalon). The numerous references in the Matrix franchise to Neo as a 
contemporary cyberpunk Messiah – saving mankind with his calm, detached and 
contradictory combination of wisdom and confused searching for who he is, 
sporting almost god-like powers – have been described and debated thoroughly 
(Constable, 2006; Irwin, 2002; Kaveney, 2005). The most prominent example 
occurs at the moment of his death; sacrificing himself for the sins man has 
committed on intelligent machine, Neo is engulfed by light and throws out his 
arms, forming the symbolic image of the crucified Jesus. Here, there are strong 
parallels with the climax of Tron Legacy, where the protagonist Kevin Flynn also 
sacrifices himself, redeeming his sins (decades of neglecting his virtual offspring 
Clu) and saving mankind (from Clu’s invasion into the actual world), while being 
engulfed in light and holding a pose with outstretched arms. Flynn even sports a 
beard and wears a white toga, making him messianic. There is another parallel 
between the death of Neo and the death of Flynn; both die by merging with their 
evil creation, a creation that can be seen as the copy-gone-bad of themselves. Neo 
merges with Agent Smith, and Kevin Flynn merges with Clu. In both cases, the 
protagonist (Neo and Flynn) is a human visiting the virtual, and the antagonist 
(Agent Smith and Clu) is an artificial intelligence in the form of a virtual character. 
Their mutual destruction is reminiscent of how matter and anti-matter meet, 
causing a brilliant explosion. Is the subtext that the evil in man and the good in 
man adds up to nothing? Or is it a posthuman comment on the man-machine 
relationship, that merging might save/destroy humanity? 
                                         
123 At 01:13:20 
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Breaking the screen – how the virtual bleeds into 
the actual 
Cyberspace has leaked into the real world. …what was inside the box in all eras up to 
ours …is outside (Vinge, 2006). 
In the previous chapters, we have primarily discussed the archetypical virtuality in 
fiction, exemplified by The Matrix; the immersive, imprisoning virtuality that a 
protagonist breaks out of. But, virtual objects can also emerge into the physical, 
material, actual world. In fiction, these virtual objects are usually referred to as 
holograms. In real-life, some steps of development have been taken to realize these 
fictional technologies. Conceptually, the primary computer screen has already been 
broken into many secondary screens. The usage of these secondary screens 
contribute to a reconceptualization of the virtual from being locked into a box with 
a window, to being a layer on top of the actual. A discussion about holograms and 
virtual objects will navigate between fictional and real-life technologies. In real-life, 
the area is in fast development and this development is heralded as being 
revolutionary in how we interact with computers (Lamantia, 2009; Rakkolainen, 
2008). In an interview, William Gibson acknowledges this shift, saying that 
“cyberspace is everywhere now” and it has “colonized the world. It starts to sound 
kind of ridiculous to speak of cyberspace as being somewhere else” (Wallace-Wells, 
2011, p.199). 
Anne Friedberg (2006) has theorized the window/screen of the computer, 
describing how the parallel usage of these two concepts, the window and the 
screen, highlights how the window is a transparent portal or frame we can look 
into, while the screen is an opaque page or surface we cannot penetrate. Friedberg 
suggests that the window metaphor was derived by the Renaissance architect Leon 
Battista Alberti, who in his 1435 treatise De Pictura instructed painters to think of 
the frame of the canvas as an open window. The window metaphor has during the 
twentieth century connected diverse medias such as photography, cinema, 
television and the computer, and it has now diversified into multiple screens, 
creating a new kind of fragmented space, a post-Cartesian, post-cinema, post-
television, and post-perspectival space. Furthermore, the virtual seems to be ready 
to leave the screen entirely. 
Holograms and volumetric displays 
The term hologram is problematic. It has an accurate and technical meaning referring 
to a holographic display. It also has a popular meaning that is very broad and which 
does not correlate with the technical meaning. It is a bit surprising that the term is 
still so much in use, and has not become outdated like other over-hyped and 
inflated technical terms such as multimedia and cyberspace. 
The technical meaning is that a hologram is an image that via holographic 
technology has an apparent depth. The physical media of the image is actually flat. 
Even if a good quality hologram gives a convincing appearance of being viewed 
from a range of angles, it cannot be viewed from a full range of 360 degrees. This 
 
 
 198 
kind of hologram exists in real-life (holographic technology is also used in other 
applications such as data storage and security identification). 
However, the popular meaning of hologram also includes images projected in 
the air. The technical term for images that are projected in the air is volumetric 
display.124 A volumetric display is an image that actually has extensions in all three 
spatial dimensions. In contrast to the hologram described above, a volumetric 
display can be seen from all directions. It might not be fully correct to refer to a 
volumetric display as an image at all, but rather as a sort of immaterial, projected 
model or statue. From that viewpoint, it is a virtual object. In fiction, the 
archetypical hologram (technically a volumetric display) is the image of Princess 
Leia, floating semi-transparently in the air in the first Star Wars movie (1977), noted 
as well by Shedroff and Noessel (2012). This kind of volumetric display is very 
difficult to realize with real-life technology. There is research and development on 
volumetric displays, but real-world examples are far from the holograms of science 
fiction. Just to mention a couple of emerging technologies, there is the Perspecta 
system developed by Actuality Systems (Genuth, 2006) and there is the laser plasma 
system developed by The National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and 
Technology in Japan, Keio University and Aerial Burton Inc. (AIST, 2006; 
Whitwam, 2014). The Perspecta is not actually a true volumetric display; rather, it 
works by projecting a 2d image on a swiftly rotating projection screen inside a glass 
sphere and the projection is confined to the inside of the sphere. The Japanese 
system is a true volumetric display using laser beams to create glowing dots of 
plasma, ionized air, arranged in a three-dimensional volume. Even though the dots 
only form crude shapes, it is easy to envision how technological improvement 
could yield smaller dots and thus higher resolution, modulation of spot brightness 
and thus a grayscale, and finally color. Of course, it remains to see if such 
development will ever be feasible. 
One way to achieve the illusion of an image projected in the air is Pepper’s ghost 
effect. Pepper’s ghost is not a hologram, nor is it a three-dimensional image 
projected in the air. It is an illusionary technique where the sight path to an object 
or a screen is reflected into another environment by a semi-transparent mirror; the 
effect is that the object seems to hover in front of the audience, semi-transparent 
and floating in the air. The Pepper’s ghost image is actually projected in the mirror, 
and it cannot be seen from the side. The technique is very similar to a heads-up 
display. The effect is often used to display ghost-like appearances in theaters, 
concerts, theme parks and so on, and in popular media it is often called a 
hologram. This is technically incorrect, but the appearance of a Pepper’s ghost 
effect is similar to the archetypical Star Wars hologram. One of the most dominant 
visual aspects of Pepper’s ghost effect is the semi-transparency of the image. It 
seems to be a strong stylistic code that holograms should be semi-transparent. The 
only observed deviations in the studied movies are Forbidden Planet and Resident Evil 
Extinction, which feature opaque volumetric displays. In the commentary on the 
2004 DVD edition of Star Wars, Dennis Muren comments that the animated chess 
                                         
124 The term mid-air display is also used. 
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game pieces were “transparent because they too were supposed to be 
holograms”.125 More or less all other volumetric displays depicted in movies are 
semi-transparent – from the early examples in The Wizard of Oz and Star Wars to 
contemporary versions in the Matrix franchise, Avatar, Iron Man, Resident Evil, and 
District 9. This might be heritage from the Pepper’s ghost illusion, since it is one of 
the most well-known examples of real-life display of images-in-the-air that we can 
create so far (Shedroff & Noessel, 2012). 
Looking at literary depictions of volumetric displays, we see an example of how 
William Gibson shifts between explicit, technology-heavy descriptions and short, 
suggestive, almost poetic, depictions. The following quotes illustrate how Gibson 
describes a volumetric display in Mona Lisa Overdrive. 
“Here, I’ll show you.” When he returned to the white breakfast table, he carried a 
shallow square black tray with a number of tiny controls arranged along one side. He 
placed it on the table and touched one of the minute switches. A cubical holo-display 
blinked on above the projector: the neon gridlines of cyberspace, ranged with the 
bright shapes, both simple and complex… 
In the later All Tomorrow’s Parties, a novel that Gibson himself claims to have the 
merging of the virtual and the actual as its central theme (Johnston, 1999), Gibson 
indulges in a much more poetic and suggestive depiction. 
Something flickered. Neon butterfly. Torn wings. 
And then this girl was there, kneeling, right up close, and he felt his heart roll over, 
catch itself. 
The how of her not being there, then being there. 
A specific kind of volumetric display is the Virtual, a projection of an artificial 
intelligence, a partial embodiment of the virtual sentience. Different aspects of 
Virtuals and artificial sentience are discussed repeatedly in this poetics of virtuality, 
see pages x, x. Virtuals are portrayed in several different narratives – for example in 
Man of Steel and the Resident Evil franchise – but the most extensive and interesting 
construction of this super-sign that I have observed is the Virtuals that populate 
many of Stephen Baxter’s narratives. The structure of the Stephen Baxter Virtuals 
super-sign is shown in Figure 41 on the next page, and the complexity of both the 
sub-sign representamen and the interpretants is quite high. 
 
                                         
125 At 57:20. 
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Figure 41. The complex structure of the Stephen Baxter Virtual. 
The first fictional volumetric displays 
Fictional volumetric displays seem to acknowledge the technical difficulties related 
to real-life volumetric displays, in a kind of backward semiotic inertia; depictions of 
fictional volumetric displays employ a variety of image artifacts highly related to the 
artifacts discussed in the chapter on semiotic inertia and old style computer 
displays. These artifacts are invented artifacts, as if the movie makers suggest that if 
or when we will achieve actual volumetric displays, they will have these artifacts. 
These signs seem motivated by technical restrictions, but are quite arbitrary 
choices. A paradigmatic analysis shows that the representamina that are selected 
when constructing a [volumetric display] super-sign are quite standardized, and that 
the syntagmatic construction follow quite distinct codes. In movie after movie, 
holograms are monochrome, blue tinted, glowing, semi-transparent, flickering, and 
they show scan lines or pixelation, a strong uniformity that has been noted as well 
by Shedroff and Noessel (2012). Obviously, these signs are not arbitrary; even 
though they represent an envisioned technology, they have their origins, their 
motivation, in the image artifacts of existing technology, especially the TV screen. 
This is an example of the remediation, the refashioning of an old media into a new 
media, that Bolter and Grusin (2000) describe. Volumetric displays are often used 
as advanced TV screens, either to look at a scene distant in time and/or space, or 
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to communicate with someone as in a videoconference. So it is not a matter of a 
substantially new media borrowing nostalgic traces from an old media (as in The 
Matrix where the green tint is borrowed from old CRT screens), it is rather an old 
media refurbished into something new.126 And, as has already been stated, the look 
and style of the iconic Star Wars hologram borrows directly from the TV screen; a 
TV screen was actually used to create the visual effect. Roots in television are still 
there in almost every fictional hologram, but the super-sign has been expanded 
with additional sub-signs. 
The Star Wars hologram has been influential in creating the popular culture ideas 
about volumetric display. But the Star Wars hologram did have its predecessors. 
The 1939 The Wizard of Oz feature film with the projection of the wizard could be 
thought of as the first cinematic depiction of a volumetric display (see Figure 42). 
The floating head of the wizard is semi-transparent and green colored, and 
surrounded by a display of smoke and fire. The smoke and fire adds to the drama, 
and connects to real-life stage magicians. Underneath the head there is a collection 
of strange machinery, and quite late in the movie the dog Toto unveils the trick; 
behind a curtain the ordinary man that is the actual wizard can be seen 
manipulating machinery and voicing the wizard’s booming voice via a microphone. 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Excerpt from The Wizard of Oz, showing what might be the first fictive volumetric 
display from 1939. 
                                         
126 This reasoning assumes that the step from CRT screens to fully immersive and realistic virtual 
environments is bigger than the corresponding step from the TV screen to a volumetric display. 
This is a general assumption in a very complicated area that is beyond the scope of what is 
investigated in this poetics of virtuality. But, if we limit ourselves to how the different 
technologies are used in the plot of the studied narratives, volumetric displays are essentially 
portrayed as advanced TV screens. 
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Between The Wizard of Oz and the 1977 hologram of Princess Leia there was also 
the mind projection device of the feature film Forbidden Planet, from 1956. The 
antagonist Edward Morbius attaches a device on his head – slightly reminiscent of 
the mind-reading SQUID tiaras that much later will populate Gibson’s fiction and 
real-life research laboratories – and soon an image of his daughter Altaira forms 
inside a machine.127 The image is referred to as a  “statue” and a “three-dimensional 
image”, which is interesting because it is actually more technically correct than the 
term hologram generally used today. The image of Altaira is picture perfect. While 
Princess Leia 22 years later will be flickering and twisting with the image artifacts 
remediated from television, Altaira looks like an exquisite miniature model. She is 
not even semi-transparent. 
It is revealing how the very earliest attempts at depicting hologram grapples with 
how to conceptualize what it is, and how later holograms are depicted as dependent 
on more or less faulty projection technology. The Wizard of Oz seems inspired by 
the real-world Pepper’s ghost illusion that was well known at the time, so here it is 
the Pepper’s ghost that is remediated. The movie makers of Forbidden Planet make 
the correct assertion that a volumetric display is to be considered the equivalent of 
a projected statue, rather than a flat image. The visual effects crew of Star Wars 
instead selected the television screen as the real-world technology to remediate in 
order to envision the futuristic technology of their movie. 
Augmented reality – projecting virtual objects 
Augmented reality means overlapping and supplementing our ordinary experience 
of the world with additional contextual information, often done as a visual 
projection overlapping what the user sees of her surroundings (Holmquist, 2000; 
Milgram et al, 1994). Andy Clark (2003) contrasts augmented reality with virtual 
reality, explaining that “the aim here is not to create a richly detailed version of the 
daily world inside the machine, but to use the machine to add new layers of 
meaning and functionality to the daily world itself” (p.53). However, the concepts 
virtual reality and augmented reality overlap extensively, and Milgram et al (1994) 
describe a continuum between fully actual environments and fully virtual 
environments, where the in-between can be referred to as mixed reality. Head-
mounted displays, heads-up displays, immersive or non-immersive displays and 
other technologies can be combined in many different configurations, resulting in a 
number of differently mixed realities. A technology that is similar to augmented 
reality is the heads-up display. Heads-up displays present information in a user’s 
direct line of sight, typically for fighter pilots or drivers of vehicles (Lamantia, 
2009). Usually, the graphics are not intended to look three-dimensional or 
photorealistic, and heads-up displays do not match positions and orientations of 
the background in the way that augmented reality does. Nevertheless, augmented 
reality and heads-up display overlap each other in fiction as well as in real-world 
examples, since they both add graphics and virtual objects in a way that makes 
them appear to overlay the actual environment. It can be disputed whether graphics 
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displayed with heads-up displays or augmented reality can be regarded as virtual 
objects. Simpler graphics in the shape of, for example, projected text or numbers 
stretch the concept of virtuality too far; they are not almost as if something else. 
However, graphics that gives the impression of being actual objects, could be 
regarded as at least to some extent virtual, since they are almost as if they had a 
material existence. For example, the projection of what appears to be a hovering 
model of something (a house, a car, a human, and such) would then be a virtual 
object. 
Real-life augmented reality can be projected in two different ways: via the 
combination of a camera and a video display, or via a see-through screen. Real-life 
consumer applications are so far essentially limited to the first technology, 
augmented reality seen through smartphone cameras or some other combination of 
video camera and display (Boda et al, 2009). The general concept is that a camera 
records a view in real-time, inserts the additional graphics – for example a simple 
3d render of a building – and then displays the mix of actual and virtual imagery for 
the user to see (Holmquist, 2000; Milgram et al, 1994; Robinett, 1992). Position and 
motion trackers make it possible to position the projected object at a specific 
spatial position. Even with this simple technology, it is already possible to project a 
virtual object in a room, and have the user walk around it. However, tracking 
position is still quite inaccurate, the real-time rendering of the virtual object is still 
far from photorealistic, and – most importantly – the object disappears as soon as 
the smartphone or similar device is lowered. The other technical solution uses a 
see-through screen, making it possible to build augmented reality goggles; these are 
similar to the head mounted display used for virtual reality, but with the exception 
that augmented reality shows virtuality superimposed on the actual environment. 
The user’s view of the actual environment is seen directly, not mediated through a 
camera system (Milgram et al, 1994). There are already companies offering such 
goggles.128  
Augmented reality and heads-up displays in fiction 
Augmented reality has been anticipated in science fiction for a few decades. William 
Gibson has dealt with the concept extensively in Virtual Light, and his other stories 
also include notions about additional visual input, such as time displays fed directly 
into the optic nerve. A combination of augmented reality and heads-up displays is 
used quite often in the action and science fiction genres, and two examples 
standout: Iron Man and District 9. In Iron Man, the protagonist Tony Stark constructs 
and wears an advanced exoskeleton suit, enhancing his physical strength, and giving 
him powerful weapons. In District 9, the anti-hero Wikus Van De Merwe finds an 
advanced and powerful exoskeleton suit constructed by extraterrestrials. Both 
exoskeletons feature a heads-up display that the audience sees either in the point-
of-view of the character, or seemingly floating in front of the protagonist’s face. 
The production design of the two displays is quite similar: [floating], 
                                         
128 One such company is Vuzix, and Google with its very large resources have already entered and 
temporarily left the game with their Google Glass. Microsoft demonstrated their HoloLens in 
early 2015, and Magic Leap is a promising start-up company. 
 
 
 204 
[monochrome], [transforming], [semi-transparent], [glowing] graphics with 
[geometrical shapes] and patterns, [data displays] and [thin lines]. It is interesting 
that even if these fictional heads-up displays can be regarded only as rudimentary 
virtual objects, they nevertheless share many typical signs of virtuality with full-
fledged virtual environments. 
 
 
 
Figure 43. Excerpt from District 9; the heads-up display of the exoskeleton suit, wrapping the 
characters head in an immersive sphere of information. 
 
Two details distinguish the heads-up display in District 9 (see Figure 43). The 
display is not a flat surface in front of the character, but gives the impression of a 
layered, deep, and immersive sphere of information. It wraps around the head, and 
occasionally it displays positional information, such as the triangular/circular 
markings in the excerpt above. These are gunshots hitting the suit from different 
directions. This makes it into a blend of augmented reality, heads-up display and 
volumetric display.  
There is also a hint of how this projection is created; when Wikus mounts the 
inside of the suit, his painful grimace and a drilling sound suggest that neural 
probes are drilled straight into his brain. This suggests that the images are not 
projected in the air, but directly into the brain. The technical solution that is hinted 
at in District 9 could be a technically feasible way of creating real-life volumetric 
displays. In some fictional descriptions, such as in Stephen Baxter’s novels and 
short stories, the volumetric displays seem impossible to achieve with real-life 
technology. They appear anywhere as if they do not need projection devices at all 
and they look completely real. This means that they are even opaque, just like the 
projection of Forbidden Planet. How could a volumetric display be projected without 
a projector? And how could an image painted in thin air occlude objects, even 
strong light sources, behind it? Baxter does not give a clue; he only describes how 
the Virtuals can walk through solid objects and how they break “up into a cloud of 
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pixels, boxes of glowing colour”, as in the short story Reality Dust. Other science 
fiction writers with similar visions give more clues. In The Dreaming Void (2007), 
Peter Hamilton writes that a character’s “exovision displays had paused at the point 
where he’d fallen asleep, colorful profiles of exotic density modulators floated like 
mechanical ghosts around him”, and Alastair Reynolds in Redemption Ark (2002) 
provides the explanation that a battle display highly similar to the ones depicted in 
Star Wars and Avatar is “not a hologram, a joint hallucination”. From the Swedish 
popular science writer Peter Nilsson comes similar suggestions. He concludes his 
fact book Stjärnvägar: en bok om kosmos (2013) with a fictional, depiction of the far 
future, describing how “shining signs suddenly flashed into thin air… the machines 
did not write in the air, but inside my own brain”.129 This is a way to solve the 
technically challenging task of projecting volumetric displays in the air – to not 
actually project the display in the air, but make it appear as if it is. That would mean 
that for every person seeing the display, it is actually an individual display – from 
the appropriate vantage point. This could be achieved with augmented reality, 
assuming that the volumetric display is displayed in the augmented reality glasses 
that each viewer of the volumetric display have to be equipped with (projecting the 
imagery directly into the brain is so far quite beyond our technical capabilities). 
The anticipation for augmented reality is the blend of real and virtual, a 
“deliberate blurring of the boundaries between physical and informational space” 
(Clark, 2003, p.53). Clark further anticipates that the “next-generation human 
minds will not invest very heavily in the virtual/physical divide” (p.54) and 
Klastrup suggests that the blend with the actual will be so thorough that the 
concept of virtuality might “lose its descriptive value” (Klastrup, 2003a, p.343). 
Kathy Cleland (2009) describes how the online and offline become “increasingly 
blurred and enmeshed” (p.1), and Lars Erik Holmquist (2000) claims that 
computation will “seep into the very fabric of our existence” (p.21). The comments 
made by informants in the attitude survey Digital Life in 2025 (Anderson, Rainie & 
Duggan, 2014) echo the anticipations of Clark and Cleland; they speak about 
multiple layers of the actual, and how the Internet will be like electricity, “woven 
right into everything” (p.38) and “blend into the background of all we do” (p.26). 
The idea of a total blend between actual and virtual, and the stance that it does not 
matter if it is actual or virtual, has been investigated in fiction. Stanley Kubrick 
touched upon the concept twice. The Victorian hotel room beyond the Stargate in 
2001: A Space Odyssey is one example, and the other instance is the distant future in 
A.I. Artificial Intelligence (Spielberg, 2001) where autonomous god-like artificial 
beings engulf the android David in some kind of simulacrum, re-creating a final 
happy day for him. It is never clear in any of these sequences what is real and not, 
“because it posits a situation beyond human understanding” (Naremore, 2007, 
p.262), and the blend is so total that the question is rendered meaningless. 
                                         
129 My translation. The original wording is: “lysande tecken plötsligt flammade upp i tomma 
luften… …maskinerna inte skrev i luften utan inne i min egen hjärna”. 
 
 
 206 
The transparent screen 
A specific kind of volumetric display seen in the studied narratives is the 
transparent screen; this is a semi-transparent screen that seems to float more or less 
unsupported in the air.130 Depending on how advanced the portrayed technology is 
supposed to be, the screen either seems to be material – as in a sheet of glass – or 
immaterial – as in some kind of volumetric display. The curved screens in Minority 
Report is the canonical example, but there are examples to be found in District 9, 
Renaissance, Gamer, Terminator Salvation, Total Recall, Avatar, Iron Man, and Sunshine.131 
The material transparent screen can be regarded as similar to a heads-up display, 
projecting virtual objects for the user to see. Immaterial transparent screens can be 
seen as a volumetric display, showing virtual objects projected in mid-air. Usually 
these transparent screens allow interaction via touch, making them a virtual object 
that also serves as a graphical interface. 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Excerpt from District 9; a volumetric display in the form of a flat transparent screen. 
 
District 9 uses an interesting mix of hologram and transparent screen, seen in the 
excerpt above, Figure 44. This is found onboard an alien spacecraft and it is far 
beyond our present-day technology, showcasing an obviously immaterial 
transparent screen. In this scene a sheet of glowing light slides out of a physical slit 
in the wall.132 The display [floats] in the air and [gradually appear]; it is highly 
                                         
130 The floating screen is primarily discussed as a fictional technology here, but there are real-life 
displays that partly correspond to the fictional vision. There are semi-transparent physical 
screens, often referred to as see-through screens, and the FogScreen uses back-projection on a 
thin wall of fog, creating a floating image (Rakkolainen, 2008). 
131 The following discussion on transparent screen and volumetric displays has been published 
elsewhere, see appendix 03. 
132 Starting at 01:19:51. 
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[pixilated] at first, then stabilizing. Segments of the heads-up display slide through 
air, without connecting to each other, emphasizing their immateriality. 
[Monochrome], [blue] and [abstract] [geometrical] shapes, often-repeated signs of 
virtuality, are used in the mise-en-scène. 
The image below (Figure 45) from Sunshine shows another example with a 
transparent screen that seems more material. A group of characters observes and 
interacts with an expository computer graphics visualization showing a model of an 
external scenario (happening outside their spacecraft). From a visual storytelling 
perspective, the set-up has clear advantages. It lets the characters interact with 
elements of the story – such as incoming data or, as in the Sunshine example, 
simulations that forecast coming events – while the audience can see their acting, 
most importantly their faces (Shedroff & Noessel, 2012). For a movie maker, it is a 
win-win solution: the mis-en-scene provides narrative exposition, human emotions 
and technology that looks good and conveys the futuristic setting – all in one 
package. The interaction design and display technology is for the benefit of the 
audience; from the audience point-of-view, the information content is maximized. 
We see the actors and what they look at. However, considering the interface as a 
real-life display, the transparency would in most circumstances be highly 
impractical, primarily because of the visual confusion of seeing a graphical user 
interface in front of a background environment.  
 
 
 
Figure 45. Excerpt from Sunshine showing a typical scenario with characters observing, 
interacting and reacting to a semi-transparent display.  
 
The Zion dock control room in The Matrix Reloaded features another set of 
transparent screens used as a graphical interface, combined with a blank void room 
environment. Here, the movie makers have taken the [blank void room] super-sign 
– an empty and contained virtual worldlet concept – and made it into a control 
room (see Figures 46 and 47). A small group of users jack-in to the virtual room, 
and there they are surrounded by a circular display of information and virtual 
control interfaces, layered in depth in a manner similar to the heads-up display seen 
in the District 9 exoskeleton. The graphics are [minimalistic], [abstract], 
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[geometrical], [monochrome] and characterized by [thin black lines]. This 
production design combines visual novelty with the often-repeated signs of 
virtuality. At the same time the usability of the Zion dock control room interface 
seems reasonably effective from the fictive characters viewpoint. The contrast in 
the interface is good and there is no confusing background behind the transparent 
screens. The transparency is cleverly used to display information in layers. A quite 
similar blank void room with virtual transparent display screens can also be seen in 
Renaissance133 (premiered 2006, three years after The Matrix Reloaded). Transparent 
screens can also be seen surrounding an avatar in the 1998 Danish cyberpunk 
movie Skyggen.134 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 46 and 47. Excerpts from The Matrix Reloaded; the Zion dock control room, a 
virtual blank void room showcasing what might be good usability in a transparent screen setting. 
 
Science fiction scenarios can influence real-world graphical interface development, 
especially if the envisioned interfaces seem to be a good idea (Butz, Endres & 
                                         
133 At 01:15:37. 
134 At 03:00. 
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Schmitz, 2008; Shedroff & Noessel, 2012; Özcan & Ünlüer, 2012). Transparent 
screens often look cool, fun and innovative. It is seductive. The question whether it 
would be a good idea in a real-life scenario remains open. Are transparent screens 
similar to the vision of three-dimensional browsing in cyberspace, a spectacular 
idea that provide only limited real-life usability? The obvious risk is that if the 
screen displays dense information then the combination of the display and the 
often complex background environment seen through the screen could lead to 
visual confusion, as well as bad contrast between, for example, text and 
background. 
The many fictional scenarios with transparent screens can be regarded as an 
interaction design playground, a design laboratory investigating different user 
scenarios, designs and technologies. Human-computer interaction scenarios shown 
in many science fiction movies can then be thought of as a sort of fictional, high-
level prototyping (Butz, Endres & Schmitz, 2008; Shedroff & Noessel, 2012). 
Occasionally, the designs are created in close collaboration with interaction design 
experts and researchers, as in the case of Minority Report. 
Backtracking the transparent screen  
Transparent screens are in some ways the cyberspace of our time, an idea for 
interaction design popularized in fiction, but with dubious real-life usability. Future 
development of interaction design and technologies will show how the transparent 
screen will come to use (or not), but we can still discuss the historical origin of the 
idea. When tracing the history of the fictional transparent screen, Minority Report 
stands out. This feature film premiered in 2002 and has inspired numerous 
successors; similar displays have been seen in many movies after Minority Report 
premiered. One precursor predating Minority Report is Star Wars, from 1977, that 
shows an early example of a transparent screen. In one brief shot (see Figures 48 
and 49) in a military command room, there is a large transparent screen with simple 
graphics; [green] [glowing lines] and [grids] yet again suggesting virtuality.135 The 
effect is produced by very simple means on the set; it seems to be a large sheet of 
glass or Plexiglas with the graphics of the screen being realized as physical cutouts 
attached to it. It is difficult to know what the intention is, or if there even is a clear 
intention. Should the display be interpreted as a static physical structure? Or should 
it be interpreted as an interactive, floating, transparent screen? The context – a 
high-tech civilization that in other situations can clearly display volumetric displays 
for recording and communication purposes (as shown by the Princess Leia 
hologram) – suggests that it is the latter, supported by a few details of the mise-en-
scène. The visual style of the displayed graphics show the typical signs of virtuality; 
[green] [glowing] [lines] and [grids], similar to the style of the Death Star wireframe 
virtual model that is seen in a following scene. We can also see a brief glimpse136 of 
characters apparently interacting with the screen using pens with glowing tips, a 
user scenario that mimics existing real-life interaction technology where light pens 
                                         
135 At 01:40:55. 
136 At 01:49:57. 
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are used as input devices on computer screens. It seems as if Star Wars has been 
influential in popularizing not only holograms, but transparent screens as well. 
The movie makers of Star Wars might have been inspired by another source. In 
September 18th 1976, eight months before the Star Wars premiere, the episode 
Journey to Where (Clegg, 1976) of the TV series Space: 1999 aired on UK television. In 
a brief shot (see Figures 50 and 51)137 from a futuristic control room (supposedly 
on the far-away future Earth), we see brief views of characters sitting in front of a 
transparent screen; simple graphics are displayed on what appears to be transparent 
panes of glass, with no frame, rising out of the table. In front of the characters, 
there is strange looking semi-transparent objects, held in a way that suggests that 
they are interfaces for interacting with the screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 48 and 49. Transparent screens from Star Wars, released May 1977. 
 
                                         
137 At 15:33. 
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Figures 50 and 51. Transparent screens from the Space: 1999 episode Journey to Where, 
aired September 1976. 
 
However, Shedroff and Noessel (2012) and Friedberg (2006) have pointed out that 
even earlier, in the 1936 feature film Things to Come (Menzies), a transparent display 
can be seen. 
It is not clear if the transparent screens popularized by Minority Report can 
actually be traced back to Journey to Where or Things to Come, via Star Wars. It is not 
clear whether the transparent screen was a carefully thought through design choice, 
or a more intuitive, spur-of-the-moment decision in the perpetual hunt for the new, 
the different, and the spectacular. But, it is clear that Minority Report was not first. 
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The first occurrence of an idea and the popularization of the same idea usually do 
not happen at the same time. The same pattern seems to repeat over and over 
again: precursors, break trough, and followers.  
Environmental Science Investigation – interfaces within 
interfaces 
What all the fictional examples of volumetric displays, augmented reality, heads-up 
displays, and transparent screens show is that there are many different 
configurations and overlapping combinations between virtual worlds, virtual 
objects and the actual. The number of possible configurations is daunting and well 
outside the scope of this poetics to taxonomize, and it will take much time for 
researchers to explore and evaluate them all. Also, the different screens of 
computers, cinema and television converge, while a variety of screens are available 
in different sizes, formats and using different display technology, from the 
smartphone to the animated billboard (Friedberg, 2006). Which of the envisioned 
technologies that will find real-life use will be a long negotiation between the 
possible, the whished-for and the needed. 
A virtual object can be an interface to a digital tool, as in the example of a virtual 
keyboard projected as a volumetric display or via augmented reality. The keyboard 
is an interface to a word processor, for example. However, the virtual can also be 
regarded an interface to itself; the world is the interface. When I experienced real-life 
immersive virtuality in the CAVE virtual reality system we managed at the 
Chalmers University of Technology, my interaction with the system was an 
interaction with the computer. When I walked forward, or bent down on my knees, 
the tracking system informed the computer of my movements, and adjusted my 
viewpoint of the virtual world accordingly. 
It has been proposed that interactive virtual objects can change the current icon-
oriented interaction paradigm, making interaction with computers more direct. 
Bardzell, Bolter and Löwgren (2010) have commented that touch displays have the 
ability to erode the conventionalized division between content and interface, so 
that you do not manipulate content via the mouse or via icons. Instead of pressing 
the keys for D, O and G on a keyboard you can draw a dog shape with your 
fingers. Even though this concerns touch displays, a similar argument can be made 
for interaction with virtual objects, assuming that they can be manipulated directly 
via, for example, gesture and touch (as in many real-life virtual reality 
environments); Lanier claims that virtual environments open up for what he calls a 
post-symbolic communication (Lanier & Biocca, 1992) where the virtual world can be 
changed by directly interacting with it. The virtual could enable a more direct 
communication without the middle-hand of signs (Benedikt, 1991; Lennon, 2000). 
According to Brenda Laurel (1993), the advent of virtual reality “contradicts the 
notion that one needs a special-purpose language to interact with computers” and 
thus “the pane is blown out of the interface window” (p.204). These claims can be 
disputed; after all, putting aside the mouse does not necessarily change the division 
between an icon and the underlying data or function it represents. It might be true 
for specific cases, such as when the pinch-to-zoom function of a map leaves the 
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plus and minus signs behind and instead makes use of gestures. Moreover, neither 
gesture based interaction nor interaction with virtual objects automatically excludes 
all usage of indirect interaction via icons or menus; a slider that adjusts audio 
volume is still an icon with an underlying function, regardless of whether we 
control it with mouse or fingers, or whether it is displayed on a conventional screen 
or floating in the air as a volumetric display. In this example, audio volume is not 
directly manipulated, it is manipulated via a graphical icon that represents changes 
in audio volume. 
 
 
 
Figure 52. Sketch of virtual lab interface for the Environmental Science Investigation project, with 
features that are either part of the virtual environment of the lab, or part of an additional interface 
layer. The gas bottle valves to the left are interfaces within the virtual environment, while the 
rectangular thermometer display to the right is an interface on top of the virtual. Sketch by the 
author. 
 
The virtual laboratory I built for the Environmental Science Investigation project 
illustrates how the virtual can be an interface in itself and to itself (Figure 52). The 
Virtual Gas Lab was a virtual lab experiment mimicking an actual chemistry 
experiment. The intention was to have high school students learn about gas 
solubility in water, via guided experiments. The virtual lab showed a semi-realistic 
lab bench with equipment such as an experiment canister, containers with 
chemicals and gas bottles. The students interacted with the lab in a semi-realistic, 
partly non-symbolic way by clicking on objects in the lab environment. These 
interface controls were conceptually a part of the virtual lab itself, so the interface 
was an example of the virtual environment being an interface to itself. As a layer on 
top, or in front, of the virtual lab, we created additional superimposed graphics 
showing data about what happened in the experiment canister (amount of gas in 
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the water, temperature and pressure). The superimposed graphics should be 
regarded as an additional layer of interaction, and not a part of the virtual 
environment, because of the way they appear to float in front of the lab bench. At 
the same time, these floating graphics were represented as three-dimensional, semi-
realistic objects, and they had lines – symbolic electrical cables – connecting them 
to the virtual lab bench. 
In the Virtual Gas Lab, the difference between the virtual world and the virtual 
interface was rather subtle. Some of the controls seemed to float slightly in front of 
the lab bench, and one small detail of the design is how the shadows from the 
controls fall onto the background. This question was brought up on February 14th, 
2008, by the two Flash programmers involved. They asked whether the shadows 
would fall across the lab bench – distorting along the three-dimensional shapes of 
the lab bench – or fall on the image of the lab bench – falling flat and un-distorted. We 
quickly decided on not using shadows at all, primarily because the production 
needed to be done as quickly as possible and this would complicate the process. 
But, the question was nevertheless an excellent way of highlighting the small but 
existing difference between an in-world interface and an on-top interface. Other 
details signaling the difference were the shape and design of the meters. The meter 
showing the amount of gas in water was the most abstract since that kind of 
measurement is not really done in an actual, hands-on lab. The abstract visual style 
of the gas meter suggests that it is a part of the interface layer on top of the more 
realistically depicted lab bench virtuality. The meter was designed as a flat rectangle 
with a [solid monochrome color] fill, a [black outline] and no other details. The 
pressure meter on the other hand was conceived more realistically as a physical 
shape, a circular object with self-shadow and specular highlights. This made it 
appear more physical and material, suggesting that it was to a greater extent an in-
world interface, a part of the lab bench environment. There was also a discussion 
about how the lab should give feedback to the user when the user did something 
that was not allowed. One option was that the engaged part of the lab bench would 
change, so that it would flicker slightly. If so, that interaction feedback would be a 
part of the lab bench virtual environment. But since we chose to keep the lab 
bench quite realistic (and actual objects do not flicker), we decided to put this user 
feedback not in the world but in the interaction layer on top of the world, as 
rectangles with pop-up texts and a minimalistic, abstract visual style. 
Virtuality can be both conceptualized as existence and as representation, and the 
design choices discussed above exemplify how quite minute changes in design, how 
the selection of different signs and sub-signs, can explore and straddle the 
spectrum between existence and representation. 
In fictional representations of virtuality, different forms of direct interaction, 
post-symbolic interactions, are common, and usually followed by transformation. 
The causality of touch/transformation is linked in a syntagmatic chain. 
Characteristic examples are the transparent screens in District 9 and the volumetric 
displays in Tron Legacy. These interfaces respond by different transformations: 
blinking lights, sweeping lines, and transforming shapes. When virtual objects react 
to touch and transform in this way, they engage two topologies of virtuality that 
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will be discussed later; the user has #control over the object, and the object is 
#immaterial and can therefore change shape in any way. 
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Topologies of virtuality 
I will now generalize a set of topologies that emerges from the rich tapestry of signs 
of virtuality I have analyzed. This will not be an attempt to categorize signs into 
distinct and separate categories, nor will I propose a nomenclature. Instead, I will 
describe different conceptual principles for world construction that are apparent in 
the analysis of how we depict virtuality in fiction. The term world-views lies close at 
hand, but I will not use the term world-views because virtual worlds can not only 
be viewed in different ways, but they also are different; they have different 
foundations, different conceptual assumptions. It is also important to be able to 
incorporate not only virtual worlds but also virtual worldlets and objects. Therefore 
I will use the term topology. Topologies are the different configurations that an entity 
has and that remain even after extensive deformation. It can refer to the 
fundamental shape of an object, and also the structural arrangement of parts, as in 
a network topology. Topology is primarily a mathematical concept, originating in 
Leibniz’ ideas about mathematical structures and relational systems. Leibniz ideas 
create, according to Michael Heim (1993), the foundation for the contemporary 
concept that virtual space can have different spatial dimensions, dimensions other 
than the three dimensions of Cartesian physical space. Virtual space can have 
dimensions built on relationships between data, as a supplement to the dimensions 
that mimic the three spatial dimensions of the actual world. 
The way I use topology refers to both its application in cosmology and 3d 
modeling. In cosmology, topology is a description of the general shape and 
properties of space itself. For example, is our universe closed or open? In 3d 
modeling, topology is a description of the fundamental shape of an object. For 
example, is it a sphere or a cylinder? This topology is so fundamental that it cannot 
be taken away, not even by extensive transformations and deformations. In 3d 
modeling, a sphere can be twisted into what appears to be a cylinder, but it will 
nevertheless continue to have some properties of being a sphere. A common 
example of topology is the Möbius strip compared to a conventional circular band. 
Even though they look quite similar these two geometries have fundamentally 
different topologies; the Möbius strip is one-sided while the conventional circular 
band is two-sided. 
 
 
 
Figure 53. An example of topology – the one-sided Möbius strip. 
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So, topology is the fundamental principle for how we think about a virtual world. 
This does not mean that the topologies are mutually exclusive; a virtual world can 
be based on different topologies. Compare how the Möbius strip can be said to 
have one-sidedness as one fundamental topology, and circularity as another. 
My use of topology extends the concept beyond geometry. Some of my 
topologies of virtuality include descriptions of geometry, such as the inside-outside 
and down-up of the topology of #containment. Others, such as the topology of 
#control, is based on non-geometric but relational arrangements, as in how the 
creator of the virtual world can have total control. This is topological in the sense 
that it is an aspect that remains even after extensive deformation. Since the virtual 
world is based on code and data, access to this code and data will always grant 
extensive control, regardless of the content or the size of the virtual world. 
My topologies of virtuality could be compared with the different aspects of 
virtuality brought up earlier, such as the characteristics of technical virtuality 
described on page 37 to 55, as well as the essences described by Michael Heim and 
the topological rubrics brought up by Michael Benedikt (both on page 56). 
However, these describe the virtual from a rather philosophical and abstract 
approach, while the following topologies of virtuality are interpretations based on 
my empirical observations.  
Topology #surrealism 
“A long long way away” 
“In Mexico?” 
“Even further than that”138  
Virtuality is often signified by creating dichotomies between the actual and the 
virtual; the virtual is portrayed as an alternative world. Related is the idea of the 
virtual as a surreal world; pieces of the actual are in there, but juxtaposed, and 
mixed up. This relates to surrealist art of the twentieth century, as well as to earlier 
examples of combining unrelated elements in non-rational combinations, such as 
the art of Hieronymus Bosch. Surrealism was a movement of thought which 
expressed its ideas in different art forms. Even though it was short-lived, it has 
influenced later art forms and styles since its start in 1924. Typical for surrealism is 
the dream-like, non-rational juxtaposition of different realistic elements, often 
resulting in bizarre contradictions and contrasts. The basis for the art was often 
free, associative fantasies, trying to mediate or evoke inner mental images. There 
were actually quite few surrealists that used night dreams as direct inspiration for 
their art, Giorgio de Chirico being an exception in that he used his own night 
dreams in his work. The intent – at least according to André Breton’s First Manifesto 
– was to merge reality and dream into a new reality, a surreality (Smejkal, 1974). 
This connects surrealism to virtuality on a conceptual level since virtuality can be 
seen as a kind of fantasy. There are also similarities between surrealism and 
                                         
138 Life on Mars, episode 4 at 29:05. 
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cyberpunk; both were short-lived but influential, and both were more about a 
conceptual attitude towards the world rather than a genre or style. Both have their 
roots in written literature; the first surrealists were poets (ibid.). 
There are several interesting examples from both literature and movies of how 
the surreal juxtaposition of contradictory elements is used to signify virtuality.139 
For example, William Gibson describes strange virtual landscapes where a god-like 
artificial intelligence “leaned in across Barcelona like a cold dark rain” (Count Zero), 
and how the sky in cyberspace is covered with the “spiral arms of military systems” 
(Neuromancer). A syntagmatic analysis show why these utterances are surrealistic; 
representing an artificial intelligence as a rain cloud and military computer systems 
as celestial objects is so uncommon and counter intuitive that it can be regarded as 
a juxtaposition of contrasting elements. This surrealism then represents virtuality, 
since it is something other than what we would expect in the actual world. In his 
later novels, Gibson’s style of writing becomes less poetic and instead increasingly 
more explicit and direct; moreover, in some of his later narratives his descriptions 
of virtuality remain surreal (from All Tomorrow’s Parties). 
The other presented in far more abstract form: an only vaguely human figure, the 
space where its head should have been was coronaed in a cyclical and on-going 
explosion of blood and matter, as though a sniper’s victim, in the instant of impact, 
had been recorded and looped. The halo of blood and brains flickered, never quite 
attaining a steady state. Beneath it, an open mouth, white teeth exposed in a 
permanent, silent scream. 
This is a quite graphic and disgusting scene and such depictions occur in virtualities 
depicted in movies as well. In The Cell, a man has his entrails pulled slowly out 
through his navel, and in another scene a horse is cut up in multiple sliced 
segments by a number of glass panes. This reveals the inner surfaces of the horse 
body, while the segmented horse continues to breathe and move as if nothing had 
happened. 140 While Gibson’s descriptions of rain and spiral arms are metaphorical, 
these graphic depictions are more direct, and therefore signify virtuality not only by 
the contrasting surrealism, but also because such scenery is impossible in actuality. 
A well-known surreal episode in science fiction canon comes from the end of 
Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey – the Stargate Sequence. Astronaut David Bowman 
is drawn into a passage through space where he first encounters alien planetary 
landscapes and finally ends up in an enclosed hotel room were he is transformed 
into the Starchild, a posthuman demi-god. The hotel room is a surreal mix of 
Victorian style with modernistic additions such as a white glowing, gridded floor. 
The whole sequence is intriguing and open for interpretation, so it is difficult to 
judge whether any of the environments are supposed to be virtual (the movie 
premiered in 1968, so the conception of virtuality was not culturally established by 
that time). The hotel room is most likely intended to be a facsimile of some sort. 
                                         
139 Beside my own examples, Sabine Heuser has also brought attention to how, in Pat Cadigan’s 
Mindplayers from 1987, “transitions between scenes follow the surreal logic found in dreams” 
(Heuser, 2003, p.128). 
140 At 11:00. 
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The novel describes it as a physical object hidden in the core of a red star, but the 
movie is much more mysterious.141 Besides the mise-en-scène with the strange 
hotel room floor, the scene shows a montage of events creating a surreal disruptive 
narrative. Since astronaut Bowman has traveled across space to end up in an 
environment where he eventually is transformed by alien intelligences into a 
posthuman, it is not likely that the hotel room is a hotel room. Hence, it is an 
artifice. Whether this artifice is physical or virtual, we do not know. But since the 
hotel room seems to be there in order to cushion Bowman in an apparently familiar 
environment, and veil the complex machinery that transforms him, it could very 
well be some kind of mental construct – a virtuality – created by the aliens. If so, 
this is an early example of surreal virtuality in a feature film. A conceptually similar 
sequence is given at the end of the movie Love (Eubank, 2011). A last surviving 
astronaut wanders around inside an enigmatic alien spacecraft appearing as a worn 
down Russian art deco concrete building. The montage of images and events forms 
a disruptive narrative, and one possible interpretation for the whole sequence is 
that the astronaut is dead and his consciousness has been downloaded into some 
kind of simulated, virtual environment. The sequence is highly ambiguous, offering 
many competing interpretations. There is, however, one explicit reference to a 
simulation with a voice stating: “Sorry for this projection… The place that you see 
here is a scrap of a sorts, a collection of memories…”.142 The sequence ends with a 
scene in what appears to be a hotel room, followed by the astronaut’s immersion in 
a clearly virtual environment, reminiscent of a planetarium, projecting a space 
simulation around him, and then engulfing him with light. 
Surrealism is an effective sign of virtuality since the juxtaposition of objects, 
environments and events can be made quite explicit. The surreal combinations can 
be strange and surprising, but in many cases also directly contradictory. Objects in 
the environment can actively contradict each other. Events can also contradict each 
other, and such disruptive narrative is discussed in the chapter Interrupted narrative 
and surrealism, see page 172. There is also surrealism in the form of geometrical, 
spatial discontinuity, such as when a big space seems to fit inside a smaller 
enclosure. This is not only contradiction, but also impossibility. In the Animatrix 
short film Beyond, the main character opens a door inside a small house and reveals 
a huge black abyss that could not possibly fit inside the house.143 The central plot 
device of the story is the breakdown of causality and natural laws; the cause for the 
breakdown is supposed to be a series of simulation errors. The characters of the 
story refer to the site of the breakdown as a haunted house. This is an explicit 
connection to ghosts and the supernatural. The animated short Magnetic Rose tells a 
story about a derelict and in some way haunted space ship, shifting between ghostly 
appearances, memory replays and virtuality in a confusing, disruptive narrative. 
Space-suited explorers that investigate the cramped interiors of the spaceship 
                                         
141 The two versions, the novel and the movie, were co-written by Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley 
Kubrick, more or less at the same time (Clarke, 1972). 
142 At 01:14:00. 
143 At 09:46. 
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encounter huge beautiful concert halls inhabited by the enigmatic ghost/avatar of a 
long dead opera singer. 
When relations between different spaces are constructed in an impossible 
manner, the result can become a level of surrealism that shows that the world is not 
only strange, but immaterial and insubstantial as well. Such spaces are not fully part 
of the same world; rather, it seems as if the unity of space is broken, and some 
space fragments become supplants to the general space. In The Matrix Reloaded, the 
characters can leave the large Matrix simulation through specific doors. They then 
find themselves in an endless straight corridor. This corridor cannot possibly fit in 
the geometry of the space that the characters just left behind. The clearest example 
is the door Neo emerges from just before the fight sequence, the Burly Brawl; the 
corridor Neo comes from would cut straight through a brick wall besides the door, 
but does not.144 This apparently simple sign engages three different interpretants. 
The corridor is [outside] of the inside of the virtual world. The corridor also reveals 
that the main virtual world of the plot functions as a [world as a stage], since the 
corridor goes [behind-the-scenes] of this staged world. There is a very similar 
surreal mix of spaces in the dream worlds of Inception, where an elevator goes back 
and forth between different disconnected spaces, and even opens up onto a sand 
beach outdoors.145 These spaces, the corridor and the elevator, are fragments of 
spatiality that are only fleetingly connected to the other space of these virtual 
environments. These impossible spaces are example of the complex interrelations 
between super-signs. 
Topology #containment 
On a fundamental level, the virtual is a contained world, a contained space. As with 
television, the world is literally inside a box, at least if we consider conventional 
computers. This world-in-a-box aspect dominates our relation to the virtual. The 
real-life virtual reality CAVE that we hosted at the Chalmers Medialab from 1998 
to 2004 shared this world-in-a-box aspect. We used to call it “the cube”, and it was 
literally a cubic room inside another physical room. The virtual world was always in 
there. 
This topology of containment is strongly reflected in the fictive stories I have 
studied, often being a central part of the conflict of the plot, a super-sign carrying 
narrative clarity. Here, the virtual world is a contained environment into which you 
can be trapped, and when you are in there, you want to get out. The idea was used in 
the first feature film depicting the virtual world, Tron; the protagonist Kevin Flynn 
is brought into the electronic world when he tries to hack into its mainframe. One 
of his objectives becomes to escape via the so called I/O tower (short for 
Input/Output). The up and down hierarchy of this contained world was strongly 
emphasized. The transfer to the electronic world goes in a downward direction.146 
We see the electronic world from the outside, like a stylized asteroid worldlet with 
                                         
144 At 41:40. 
145 At 52:40. 
146 This sequence is often referred to as Flynn’s Ride, occurring at 29:20. 
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pixilated clouds floating above the curved hide of the world. In later movies, the 
concept of being captured inside the virtual world is repeated, often with the 
addition that characters are not aware they are imprisoned; The Matrix franchise, 
Life on Mars, The Thirteenth Floor, Abre los ojos, Vanilla Sky and Tron Legacy are all clear 
examples. In some cases, the confinement is signified by the world actually having 
an edge. This idea of an edge mirrors Michel Benedikt’s (1991) reminder that “we 
will nonetheless have to decide how cyberspace terminates. Will cyberspace have 
edges to blackness, walls of final data? Or will it be endless?” (p.152). In Life on 
Mars, the trapped Sam Tyler verbally refers to an attempt where he is “gonna walk 
until I can’t think up anymore faces or streets”,147 and in The Thirteenth Floor the end 
of the world is visually depicted as a landscape ending in a green glowing 
wireframe.148 The contained world can be very small. In The Matrix Revolutions, the 
protagonist Neo is initially trapped in a circular worldlet represented as a subway 
station.149 When Neo tries to escape by running out along one of the train tracks, 
he immediately comes running into the same station from the opposite direction. 
In The Matrix and a few of the Animatrix short films (Flight of Osiris and Program), 
the concept of a confined virtual world used for training is established. For 
example, the Sparring Program world is characterized by paper thin Japanese walls 
connoting screens that suggest that there is nothing outside (this assumption is 
confirmed when the worldlet collapses in Flight of Osiris150). In one of the Life on 
Mars episodes, Sam is trapped in a storage room where there is no door out.151 
Confinement is occasionally referenced verbally, for example, with the line “…in 
this little world of ours …” in eXistenZ.152 The concept of contained worldlets is 
taken to the extreme in a particular Matrix franchise super-sign; the [blank void 
room]. This is a virtual environment that is so contained that it does not even have 
proper walls; instead it has a blank empty nothingness around it. A memorable 
[blank void room] is the one used in The Matrix where Morpheus explains the 
digital illusion for Neo.153 The excerpt on the nect page (Figure 54) is taken from 
the movie Renaissance, showing the environment one of the characters finds herself 
locked into, a physical sphere that has an inside completely covered by a virtual 
reality projection display, so that she is completely surrounded by a white space. In 
the excerpt, the white void is temporarily filled with a swiftly growing, virtual 
forest. 
 
                                         
147 Season 1, episode 2, at 41:20. 
148 Svante Lovén (2010) notes that in the novel Simulacron 3 by Daniel Galouye – which the movie 
is based on – the end of the virtual world is depicted as a void of utter blackness. 
149 At 14:10. 
150 At 02:43. 
151 Season 2, episode 5, at 35:35. 
152 At 08:20. 
153 At 37:45. 
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Figure 54. Excerpt from Renaissance, showing a blank void room environment similar to the 
one in The Matrix. 
 
The holodeck of the TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation, described by Janet 
Murray (1997), is another example with its black void wrapped in a white grid. 
Computer art often work with virtual environments that seems to be highly 
confined, enclosed by an empty void. Some examples are works of Magnus Wallin 
(Formation 1-3 from 2002, and Colony and Mission from 2009) and Edgar Martin 
(National-Bank , 2010). I used two [blank void room] super-signs myself. The lab 
bench of the Environmental Science Investigation’s Virtual Gas Lab stands alone 
in a light grey non-space, and the fictive virtual character Ejahja in Astronaut stands 
in a black void. When designing the Virtual Gas Lab, I was directly inspired by the 
Matrix [blank void room]. However, the initial idea might have come from other 
sources. For example, the background of any empty scene in the 3d modeling 
software I use, Maya, has a grey shade similar to the one we used in the Virtual Gas 
Lab. These examples show that there are a few paradigmatic choices for which 
color is used for the void; white and black are the most common, and grey is 
occasionally used as well. However, no other hues are used, probably because the 
range from black to white is the most neutral, and featureless. It gives the strongest 
impression of a non-space, a space-less space, of not being there. 
The idea of the contained virtual world is also picked up in super-signs dealing 
with the spatial relationship between actual space and virtual space; these are the 
notions of being inside or outside, and the up/down hierarchy. One way to represent 
the inside/outside topology is that of looking into a world, and this also relates to 
the topology of #control. Interestingly, the virtual world is always signified as 
[inside], forming a strict syntagmatic code for how the spatial hierarchy is 
constructed. 
In the studied narratives there are explicit verbal signs representing 
inside/outside aspects as well, for example in eXistenZ (“I think we are still inside 
the game”154), The Matrix (“She got out”155), and The Lawnmower Man (“I see you on 
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the inside”156). The other spatial relationship – up/down – has also been 
represented verbally. In Inception the protagonist describes going down into layers of 
dream worlds when saying he “…wanted to go deeper and deeper… we could get 
trapped so deep that when we wound up on the shore of our own sub-conscious 
we lost sight of what was real…”157 and in The Thirteenth Floor it is literally spelled 
out when one of the characters asks “So what are you saying, that there is another 
world, on top of this?”.158 While saying this, characters inside the virtual often 
glance upwards, towards the sky or the ceiling.159 This subtle and every-day gesture 
becomes a representamen conveying the interpretant of a virtuality with a up/down 
hierarchy. The Thirteenth Floor is an example of how quite different sub-signs 
(verbal-spatial reference such as “down here” and “on top of this”, character 
glancing upwards, and power relations between characters) are combined in a 
seamless manner, subtly and coherently conveying the meaning that there is a 
vertical hierarchy. The actual world is always perceived as being above the virtual, 
and this connotes god-like power and control. The idea of the virtual being beneath 
the actual also corresponds with the narrative patterns described in Campbell’s 
monomyth (1949), where the world of the extraordinary is often an underworld, a 
cave or something similar (Palumbo, 2014; Vogler, 1985). 
The intriguing idea of several nestled worlds, simulations inside the simulation, 
has been mentioned by Michael Heim (1993), suggesting that “perhaps worlds 
should be layered like onion skins, realities within realities” (p.82). The idea has 
been thoroughly explored in movies such as eXistenZ, The Thirteenth Floor, and 
Inception – as noted by Lovén as well (2001). In all three movies, the logical 
conclusion – that you might not know how many layers there are and if you have 
reached the actual world on top – is confronted up-front in the final shot of each 
movie. In eXistenZ, a bewildered guard asks “…are we still in the game?”.160 In 
Inception, the final shot comes to an end just before a spinning top topples over (the 
protagonist uses this as a totem, believing that its realistic physical behavior 
distinguishes the real from the dream). And in The Thirteenth Floor, the last image – 
of the supposedly real world – ends in an effect mimicking that of a TV screen 
being shut down. The TV screen shut down connotes a lack of actuality, and one 
preferred reading is that at the end of the movie we still have not seen the actual 
world.  
When there is an inside and an outside, then many opportunities open up from a 
story-telling viewpoint for creating the conflict of [breaking out]. This is a strong 
recurrent theme, usually in the form of the protagonist being trapped, and trying to 
break out. In Life on Mars, Sam Tyler shouts “Get me out of here!” and looks up 
                                                                                                                               
155 At 06:00. 
156 At 52:05. 
157 At 01:11:40. See also (Paul 2010) for a longer discussions about layers of reality in Inception. 
158 At 01:04:31. 
159 The glance towards the ceiling have been used in Life on Mars, Sofies verden, Kid’s Story, Program, 
Tron, The Matrix and The Thirteenth Floor. 
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towards the ceiling.161 In Abre los ojos the protagonist desperately screams “I wan’t 
to wake up!”162 Occasionally, it is the vice-versa – the antagonist trying to break 
out. This is, for example, the conflict of Tron Legacy. The villain Clu, a virtual 
character, runs amok, and tries to break out of the stand-alone super-computer 
where he and his whole world are simulated. Another memorable example is The 
Lawnmower Man where Job – a former human who has become posthuman and 
post-physical by transforming himself to digital form – tries to break out of a 
stand-alone computer, containing the virtual environment where he resides, and 
onto the Internet.163 
There is an interesting contrast between the idea of the contained virtual world, 
and the idea of the unlimited possibilities of the virtual world (for example super-
human capabilities such as extreme strength, speed and agility, flying, telekinesis 
and clairvoyance). We seem to regard the actual as a universe being infinite in time 
and space but limited in possibilities, and, in contrast, our artificially created virtual 
universes are limited in space and time, but infinite in possibilities.164 Not only is 
the virtual literally contained in its boxes and seen through windows, it is also 
limited in scope because it is an artifact built by humans, and like all artifacts, it has 
limitations due to limited construction resources. A virtual environment is limited 
simply because it takes resources to build large virtual environments. This was an 
important lesson in the research project, Environmental Science Investigation. The 
Virtual Gas Lab we built was highly limited and this was frequently mentioned and 
criticized in the interviews and focus group discussions we had with students who 
had tested the virtual lab. This illustrates a close connection between our 
philosophical, cultural ideas about the virtual and the hands-on, production-
oriented aspects of its production. The real-life production of virtuality is limited, 
constrained by the availability of resources, and this is one of the motivations for 
representing fictive virtualities as like-wise limited in scope. 
Topology #engineered space 
And it was a weird thing, because if you looked up from what you were doing, there 
really wasn’t anything there; nothing in particular, anyway.165 
Constructing objects in an actual environment and in a virtual environment are 
fundamentally different. In the physical, actual world, the construction starts with 
an existing segment of the world – a geographical site, a few kilograms of metal and 
stone, a living organism. This is then transformed by force. Much of this 
production process is targeted at controlling or even suspending initial conditions; 
gravity is defied by building structures, wind is stopped by walls, sun light is 
                                         
161 Season 1, episode 5, at 27:50. 
162 At 01:39:15. 
163 The plot point of an artificial intelligence breaking out onto the Internet is more or less taken 
directly from William Gibson’s Neuromancer.   
164 It might be that cosmologically speaking, the universe is actually finite in both time and space, 
but for us humans, billions of years and light-years are in all practical considerations infinite. 
165 A virtual reality simulation in Gibson’s Virtual Light. 
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controlled by shades, and so on. It could be viewed as a kind of reverse 
engineering. From a physics viewpoint human manufacture is a matter of reversing 
entropy. In a virtual environment, the construction starts with an empty stage, a 
null space. In its core, a virtual object consists of data, of code, from which a 
simulation is done. All that data and all these algorithms have to be constructed 
from scratch. Benedikt (1991) refers to cyberspace as being “an invented world” 
(p.234). Even death has to be implemented, as illustrated by the different ways in 
which the death of an avatar is represented in computer game worlds (Klastrup, 
2007). All such fundamentals of the actual world like gravity, light and the rigidity 
of solid matter need to be added, not controlled. This is readily apparent when 
working with 3d modeling software. When a new file is started, it is like an empty 
stage filled with a grey non-descript background and a simple horizontal grid plane. 
The environment is without illumination, without gravity, geometries pass through 
each other like ghosts, and so on. Constructing the 3d model could be seen as a 
forward engineering; everything has to be chosen, brought forward, turned on, and 
adjusted to the correct settings. A new surface material is initially a smooth grey; 
more natural and realistic appearances such as dirt, wear and other defects must be 
added, often by extensive and meticulous artistic work. This is illustrated in the 
short film World Builder by Bruce Branit (2007), part science fiction story, part 
visualization of a concept for gesture based 3d modeling. The film starts with a 
man standing in an empty virtual environment, surrounded by a grey void. Then we 
see him build a whole city block from scratch using gestures. The sequence is also 
an illustration of the god-like control we can have in a virtual environment; it is 
reminiscent of the myth of God creating the world in seven days. Something that 
adds interest to the sequence is that the envisioned gesture based 3d modeling 
could be feasible to realize as real-life technology by the use of, for example, head-
mounted virtual reality displays and position tracking of gestures. 
N. Katherine Hayles (1999) writes about Platonic backhand and forehand. 
Platonic backhand “works by inferring from the world’s noisy multiplicity a 
simplified abstraction” (p.12), while Platonic forehand “starts from simplified 
abstractions and … evolves a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as 
a world of its own” (p.12). One way to conceptualize the difference between the 
actual world and a virtual world is that the virtual always lack attributes compared 
to the actual; it follows the Platonic forehand from simplicity to complexity, but 
always stops somewhere along the road, before reaching the fullest possible 
complexity. The actual is informationally inexhaustible (Borgmann, 2001), its level 
of detail essentially infinite. This contrasts the actual with the virtual; since the 
virtual is constructed, it always has a limitation in level of detail (Lanier, 2010) 
Therefore, the virtual can be represented by [reduction]; the virtual is less than the 
actual. My analysis of fictional representations of virtuality suggests that this aspect 
is important, but that it is used in a rather implicit and indirect manner. It is a sign 
working through other signs, through steps of representation. The things that you 
do not add to the virtual world become signs of the virtuality of that world. Sabine 
Heuser (2003) has also pointed out this and how this attaches to ideas about value 
and wealth. She describes how Neal Stephenson, in his novel Snow Crash, writes 
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about cheap avatars that are black and white, and expensive avatars that are solid 
and opaque. Actions such as floating and flying also denote a lack of something, a 
lack of gravity. Simple geometric shapes lack organic complexity. Darkness is lack 
of sunlight and smooth surfaces lack details. William Gibson repeatedly uses 
references to absence or emptiness when signifying virtuality in his fiction; he 
mentions “the non-place”, “the blank parts” in Count Zero, “the colorless non-
space”, “monochrome nonspace” in Burning Chrome, as well as “without color or 
shape” and “these gray fields of light” in All Tomorrow’s Parties. The empty, often 
black, environment of the virtual is so established that it seems completely obvious. 
The emptiness is just there without being prominent. 
The vacant world 
As well as being portrayed as empty of detail, the virtual world can also be empty 
of people. The [vacant] virtual environment is a common theme in fictional 
virtualities.166 The feeling of loneliness and emptiness resonates well with the film 
noirish cyberpunk style established by William Gibson’s early short stories and 
novels, as well as the movie Blade Runner. The melancholic sadness of vacant 
environments suggests a dystopian danger with technology, while also signifying 
virtuality. In Mona Lisa Overdrive, the virtual environment sports a “long straight 
empty highway”, a description corresponding to the climactic plot point in The 
Thirteenth Floor when a character takes a car and drives as far out from the city as he 
can get, and finally encounters the literal end of the world. The road he travels 
becomes more and more empty and he later describes it as “something wasn’t right. 
There was no movement, no life. Everything was still and quiet.”167 In this 
example, it is the natural landscape that is devoid of life. More often, however, it is 
cities that are portrayed as hauntingly vacant, a mise-en-scène that creates a strong 
visual contrast to the crowds of people that we usually associate with cities. The 
drained avenues of New York in Vanilla Sky, the empty Madrid streets in Abre los 
ojos, the vacant Swedish small town of Storm, and the unpopulated urban areas of 
the Matrix franchise, all share the same mise-en-scène. Not only is the vacant world 
empty of people and life, it is often decadent and worn down as well. A vacant 
world signifies virtuality because it lacks what the actual world has. The decadency 
of a world signifies virtuality through other and quite vague connotations. The 
syntagmatic connection of these two – vacancy and decadence – is not motivated 
by any aspect of virtuality per se. Rather, they are related by the logic of cause and 
effect; a vacant world will become worn down since no one is there to take care of 
it. 
Avalon’s two worlds, the insert virtual game world and the framing (apparently) 
actual world, give both the impression of Eastern Europe World War II battle 
fields and cold war Communist dystopic urbanity (Chung, 2012; Crogan, 2010; 
Ingram & Reisenleitner, 2006). The worlds are “drab, featureless” (Crogan, 2010, 
p.102), but instead of connoting a lack of something, they are “vaguely 
                                         
166 The vacancy of fictional virtual world stand in contrast to the worldliness and inhabitability 
that characterize real-life online game worlds. 
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authoritarian” (ibid., p.102) and suggest “inescapable surveillance and oppression” 
(Ingram & Reisenleitner, 2006, p31). So, even though the denoted object (vacancy 
and decadence) of these different super-signs are similar, the interpretants are 
different, with connotations that go in different directions; the mise-en-scène and 
visual style of Avalon connotes not only #engineered space but also the topology 
#control. 
Reduction through abstraction 
Looking further at other examples of reduction, of being less than real, the studied 
narratives are abundant with examples of abstraction and stylization. This is highly 
characteristic for the visual style in older cyberpunk movies where production 
crews used actual computer graphics to create the imagery of the fictional 
virtualities, as in Tron, Johnny Mnemonic and The Lawnmower Man. An example is the 
small, pet-like sidekick Bit in Tron. Bit appears early and is portrayed as a floating, 
geometrical, simple shape with a monochrome surface.168 It is as if the character is 
point-like, and unformed. The virtual environments of Tron have a likewise abstract 
and geometric visual style. In contrast to the reduced environments and objects of 
these early movies, later movies often showcase virtual environments that are less 
abstract and more realistic, as in The Matrix, The Thirteenth Floor, Avalon and 
eXistenZ. Why were the early fictional virtualities depicted as abstract and stylized, 
while the latter were portrayed as photorealistic? Maybe the audience was not ready 
to believe in fictive photorealistic virtual worlds until the late 1990s. If so, the idea 
of being fooled by a virtual reality environment was not believable until 1999 when 
The Matrix premiered.169 This development of the mise-en-scène and visual style, 
from abstraction to realism, is just general, though. Abstraction and stylization is 
common in later movies as well, for example in the Animatrix short movies and in 
the Ghost in the Shell anime. Tron Legacy provides an interesting mix. While Tron was 
stylized to the extreme, the sequel Tron Legacy is almost fully realistic in its portrayal 
of the virtual world. The director Joseph Kosinski has in several interviews 
(Duncan, 2010; Nathan, 2011; Pollack, 2011) claimed that the intention was to have 
the virtual world appear highly evolved visually. At the same time, the 
environments of the world are highly based on geometrical, simple shapes, and 
thereby they subtly signify virtuality. 
William Gibson’s stories are abundant with descriptions of abstract virtual 
environments, worlds that compared to the actual are reduced and less than the 
actual. When describing an online dialogue with an interactive agent he mentions 
that, “her teeth were very white and looked like a single unit” (Virtual Light). In 
Count Zero he refers to an avatar as being a “glowing cartoon-squiggle of a woman” 
and in Idoru he picks up the reference to cartoony appearances again when 
describing virtual trees in a virtual reality simulation as “perfectly cylindrical 
Crayola-brown trunks, each supporting an acid-green cotton ball of 
undifferentiated foliage”. In his first novels, Gibson uses poetic and metaphorical 
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169 There are early examples of fictive, fully realistic virtual environments, most notable the virtual 
reality children room in the 1951 short story The Veldt by Ray Bradbury, also filmed in 1969. 
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descriptions of cyberspace, offering evocative depictions of the virtual 
environments. In his later writings he uses more explicit and technical descriptions. 
It is interesting how this coincides with how Gibson’s fictions gradually catch up 
with real-life technology. He gradually depicts futures that are more and more 
similar to the time we live in, and as decades have passed by since the first 
publication of Neuromancer, technological development have gained on even the 
more futuristic scenarios Gibson initially depicted. For example, the augmented 
reality glasses of Virtual Light (1993) are quite similar to real-life products such as 
Google Glass (released 2013) and HoloLens (announced in 2015). 
Emphasizing engineering – the rotating display 
The super-sign [empty background] has been discussed previously. Adding to this, 
there is a specific super-sign that expounds on the empty void by adding an object 
on display, an apparently engineered object, displayed in the void. This is the 
[rotating display]. The typical syntagmatic construction of this super-sign is a virtual 
object displayed on a screen, rotating around its axis against a blank void. The 
affording rotation suggests that the object is on display for scrutiny, as if being a 
constructed object up for sale or manipulation, as in a ceramic vase on a turntable. 
In the visually influential 2001: A Space Odyssey, a faulty antenna is shown as a 
simplified schematic on a computer display.170 It is depicted as a wireframe rotating 
on empty blue.  The likewise influential Blade Runner is a cyberpunk story without 
virtuality, apart from one possible exception; the androids of the movie – replicants 
– are first seen on a display as motionless, rotating figures against an empty 
background. 171 These two examples are minor but I bring them up because they 
predate later examples, and they are used in two movies that have a production 
design and visual style that are among the most influential in the whole science 
fiction movie genre. Are these rotating displays virtual objects? How should we 
interpret them? The antenna display is used in an engineering context – two 
astronauts discuss a faulty piece of physical equipment; hence, the display could be 
interpreted as an advanced drawing, simply an engineering schematic. The replicant 
turntable displays connote both police arrest photographs and product display – 
the replicants are hunted by the police, and they are products of a company named 
Tyrell. But my argument for why these turntable displays are examples of early 
virtual objects is the revealing rotation. The rotation makes them more than a 
drawing, more than a simple portrait photograph. The meaning of the shots has to 
be considered in relation to the narrative context. The antenna shot is seen on a 
computer display and it is reasonable to assume that it is the artificial intelligence 
onboard – HAL 9000 – that is involved in showcasing the antenna. So the imagery 
could be a virtual object in the same way that a 3d model in a CAD software is a 
virtual object.172 The Blade Runner shot could be interpreted as just a video clip 
                                         
170 At 01:07:09 and 01:14:02. 
171 At 13:58. 
172 In the book Hal’s Legacy, David Stork (1997) interviews Marvin Minsky who recount that 
director Stanley Kubrick visited the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab and had a demonstration of 
 
 
 229 
showing the replicants for the protagonist Deckard, an indexical movie clip from 
an in-diegetic camera. But why are the replicants standing completely still with a 
fixed, absent facial expression while they rotate? Is it because they are supposed to 
be computer generated product visualizations, and thus similar to the 3d model of 
the antenna, just fully photorealistic? Similar rotating displays have been used over 
and over again in later movies, usually when a graphical representation of an object 
is shown on in-diegetic displays. In the 2007 Final Cut DVD:s commentary track, 
the art director of Blade Runner, David Snyder, claims that “…we shot this for the 
insert tapes, which of course now you’d do as a wireframe and computer generated, 
they were just basically standing on a turntable with a motor on it, spinning 
around…”.173 This does not resolve the question of how this display was intended, 
but it supports the idea that there is a connection to more contemporary computer 
generated versions, and it also indirectly connects the shot with the 2001: A Space 
Odyssey turntable shot (where a wireframe representation was used). 
Topology #artificial light 
Her eyes slid over an elusive darkness, deeper than the darkness inside her own skull. 
(Dante Dreams) 
The technology that so much characterized twentieth century urbanities – the 
artificial, electrical light – also characterizes virtuality. The difference between day 
and night is a deeply rooted aspect of our seeing, and since seeing is so important 
for humans, the day is our most natural surrounding. The day and the day lit 
landscape are natural for us. It is only with the help of artificially created light that 
we have been able to conquer the night. The glowing light in the night then 
becomes a symbol for artificiality, and artificiality then connects to virtuality, and 
this is why the virtual world is so often represented as an [urban city] and by its 
[city lights]. The city and city lights are one of the most prominent tropes of 
cyberpunk. Bukatman (1997) refers to the Gibsonian cyberspace as “a new 
conception of the urban” (p.45) and claims that in cyberpunk the urban is 
associated both with the dystopian and the electronic. Urban cyberspace has its 
predecessor in how science fiction stories tend to describe “new urban spaces” 
(ibid., p.46). Using the image of urbanity at night is a way to make the inherently 
invisible (and mundane) electronic world of the computer visible, spatial and 
kinetic. This is clear in Neuromancer where Gibson evokes images of “lattices of 
light”, “lines of light” and “city lights, receding…”. Heuser (2003) makes an explicit 
connection between the neon lit city of the night and the virtual with its black 
space and illuminated grids. She points out how Gibson explicitly describes the 
data ranges in cyberspace as taking the form of an urbanity, with glowing 
skyscrapers and towers. The structure of this virtual urbanity mimics the actual city, 
but the material is no longer steel and concrete, but light. William Gibson himself 
                                                                                                                               
the labs current computer graphics. The movie makers did not utilize any graphics directly 
though, since the graphics at MIT only had 512x512 pixel resolution.  
173 At 13:50. 
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claims in an interview that building the Internet is the equivalent of building the 
first cities (Adams, 2007). 
Heim (1993) also claims a connection between cyberspace and the giant urban 
sprawl of cities like Los Angeles, suggesting that the “appeal of seeing society’s data 
structures in cyberspace … is like the appeal of seeing the Los Angeles metropolis 
in the dark at five thousand feet” (p.85). Carr (2010) much later compares our 
actual Internet to the “endless, mesmerizing buzz of the urban street” (p.220). 
Benedikt (1991) goes even further, drawing parallels back into Christian legend. He 
suggests that Eden can be regarded as a metaphor for nature – a place where “the 
sun rose and set” (p.15) – while the Heavenly City – with its “crystalline gleam of 
its own lights” (p.15) – is a metaphor for knowledge and artifice, and thus a 
potential metaphor for information space. If so, the radiant city as a metaphor for 
disembodiment and immateriality is much older than Gibson’s urban cyberspace. 
The ancient dichotomy between Eden and the Heavenly City relates to how the 
virtual today is often signified by contrast to the actual, emphasizing it as being 
[opposed to the natural], as [being artificial]. The day is a basic property of our 
natural environment. The day is sunlight. Sunlight is thus the light that is associated 
with the actual. In contrast to this, darkness connotes the city at night, and 
cyberspace as well. In the night and in the virtual, artificial objects gain their 
presence by how they radiate light. Rows of car lights, the glowing grid lines of 
cyberspace. This motivates dense characterizing signs such as the suits worn by the 
virtual characters in Tron, and the perpetual night of the Tron world. The suits sport 
circuitry-like patterns of glowing lines. The world of Tron is cast in darkness; there 
is no sun in this simulated world. These observations correspond well to the 
comments made by Tron Legacy crewmembers on the behind-the-scenes 
documentary of the 2012 DVD release (Horton, 2012). VFX art director Ben 
Procter says, “the dominating light source is the self-lighting effect” (at 02:32) and 
production designer Darren Gilford claims that “I would say the most important 
element in the world of Tron is light. I think that transcends our film and the first 
film” (at 00:07). Similar claims are made concerning the first Tron movie as well, as 
in these quotes from the commentary track of the 2002 DVD release. Director 
Steven Lisberger says that 
the origin of Tron dates back to early work we did in animation experimenting with 
animated characters who would be made out of light.174 
Richard Taylor, the Computer Effects Supervisor, directly refers to the concept of 
a sunless world (Burnett, 2002, at 01:02:20). 
If you look at the stylization of Tron, there is several major conceptual decisions that 
we made. One was that there was no sun in the electronic world, everything had its 
own light. It was all made of energy. 
Leaving Tron aside, references to lights and urbanity are abundant in other fictional 
representations of virtuality. Textual and visual references to [glow], [lights] and 
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[neon] abound, amounting to about 250 sign types. References to a [city] are less 
frequent, around 25 sign types, but is used in significant ways. Ghost in the Shell 
director Mamoru Oshii explains why he chose the big city as backdrop for his 
cyberpunk anime (Hishida, 1995, at 01:30). 
Since the information network isn’t visible, I tried to think of how I could visually 
represent it. It would be pointless to show the monitor of a personal computer. 
However, if you think about Hong Kong, you imagine a city teeming with 
information. For example there are countless signs and a cacophony of voices and 
sounds, which flow through the city. 
The glow of the cityscape is mirrored by the typical glowing graphical interface in 
numerous science fiction movies, and Shedroff and Noessel (2012) suggest that 
glow is used to captivate us, and to connote both power and heavenly 
otherworldliness. 
Topology #immateriality 
The actual is what you can touch. If you can’t touch it, it isn’t real; it is a dream, an 
illusion, or maybe a virtuality. If you think you are dreaming you pinch yourself to 
feel. The materiality of pain proves that the actual is real. 
This is nonsense. You can dream that you feel pain; it does not prove anything. 
You can’t touch a laser beam or sunlight, yet both are actual enough to burn your 
skin. In a haptic display, you can even touch a virtual object. So the idea of the 
actual being material and virtual being immaterial is not correct. Nevertheless, it is a 
common concept in popular culture, to associate immateriality with virtuality 
(Heuser, 2003). The idea of the virtual as being immaterial is related to the 
discussion of information space and the fundamental concept of virtual being 
almost as if. Information space is not directly grounded in physical materiality, and 
the almost as if-ness of the virtual suggests that it must be almost material but not 
actually. However, the almost as if-ness does not exclude materiality from virtuality. 
Instead, it means that the virtual shares some aspects of the actual, but not others. 
It is taken for granted that the virtual is immaterial, but it does not have to be. A 
paradigmatic analysis suggests that there are several representamen that can form 
signs connoting immateriality, such as [semi-transparency], [floating], and 
[emptiness]. Also, different sorts of disconnectedness in space and time can convey 
immateriality. With disconnectedness I mean, for example, that two objects seem to 
share a common space but they can’t connect materially and causally; you can’t 
shake hands with a hologram. Some expressions of immateriality have strong 
connections to the previously discussed topology of #engineered space, the space 
that is initially empty. The unfulfilled world of the virtual might, for example lack 
textures, or gravity, or people, or rigidity; all four variants of lacking also suggest 
immateriality. 
Semi-transparency is an almost mandatory paradigmatic choice when giving 
gestalt to virtual objects projected into the actual world. Semi-transparency is also 
used inside virtual environments. The Game Grid arena in Tron Legacy is a good 
example; the huge arena floor and seemingly rigid structures such as ramps 
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between floor levels appear to be made out of glass. William Gibson frequently 
refers to transparency or translucence, especially in Neuromancer, as the following 
excerpts exemplify. 
Translucent planes of color shuffled like a trick deck. 
The Chinese virus was unfolding around them. Polychrome shadow, countless 
translucent layers shifting and recombining. Protean, enormous, it towered above 
them, blotting out the void. 
Case watched childhood symbols of evil and bad luck tumble out along translucent 
planes: swastikas, skulls and crossbones, dice flashing snake eyes. 
A few other signs that imply immateriality are interesting even if only one or a few 
sign types have been observed. The movies The Lawnmower Man and Johnny 
Mnemonic were produced at roughly the same time (1992 respectively 1995) and they 
both used the leading edge computer graphics of that time. The limited rendering 
capabilities give the imagery an impression of immateriality. The mise-en-scène of 
the environments are more a collection of colors and shapes than a realistic world 
built of textures and shadows. This is an example of how the representation of the 
virtual world engages several topologies; #surrealism, #engineered space, and 
#immateriality. It is also a representation involving a visual style and production 
design governed by the technical limitations of computer graphics at the time. 
Materiality is highly connected to touch. Touch cannot be directly represented in 
movies or literature, it has to be shown or told, for example showing objects that 
pass through each other. Stephen Baxter frequently describes in his novels how 
virtual objects pass through actual objects, often combined with descriptions of 
how the Virtual breaks up into pixels or voxels in a manner that is similar to how 
virtual characters fragment in Tron Legacy. In his fiction, Baxter also suggests that 
this kind of ghostly insubstantiality might be regarded as disturbing and should 
therefore be prohibited according to future etiquette protocols. This is hinted at in 
the following examples from The Siege of Earth.175 
One of the boys approached him, and Symat reached out a hand. But there was a 
soft chime, and his fingers passed through the boy's palm. The boy yelped and drew 
back, as if it had hurt.  
The wrestling boys fell to the floor and crashed through table legs. Pixels flew and 
protocol-violation warnings pinged, but the table didn’t so much as quiver.  
And they fled, sliding through the solid wall like spectres, accompanied by a soft 
pinging. 
Note that Baxter explicitly refers to the virtual projections with the metaphor 
spectre; references to ghosts are a common way to connote immateriality. 
                                         
175 As pointed out by Heuser (2003), Stephenson incorporates similar restriction – towards 
materializing from out of nowhere – in his fictional Metaverse. 
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Solid, material objects in our everyday life stay put. So, by contrast, an object 
that comes [in and out of existence] is conceived of as immaterial. Objects and 
characters that appear out of nowhere have been used frequently in the studied 
narratives, and, most notably, the objects flicker in and out of existence. A 
paradigmatic alternative is the object that changes, flicker, between different states. 
This is vividly described by Baxter in his short story Touching Centauri where the 
world around us is revealed to be an illusion, an illusion that gradually breaks down 
when humans try to reach the nearest star Alpha Centauri. Baxter describes how 
the whole night sky starts to change and disappear, and the breakdown creeps 
constantly closer to Earth until the characters of the story look up and see that 
“new Moons and Earths burst like silent fireworks”. Also, when he describes his 
common motif of Virtuals (a volumetric display of an artificial intelligences), Baxter 
indulges in emphasizing the immateriality of the virtual, both by references to 
flickering and to appearing out of nowhere, as if by magic. In the novel Proxima, 
Baxter describes how the [volumetric display of an artificial intelligences] 
“Earthshine flickered into existence, blinking, solidifying, clarifying in a whir of 
pixels”. 
Similar flickering between states are visually depicted in several movies, for 
example Sunshine and Magnetic Rose, and one of the most memorable examples 
comes from Chatroom.176 Much of the plot takes place in conventional text-based 
chat rooms, and these are visually and metaphorically depicted as virtual rooms. In 
one such chat room, an old man appears and asks whether “this is for teenage 
girls”, and then flickers between the form of himself and that of a young girl. This 
effectively emphasizes that he is an avatar in a virtual environment, and that he is a 
child groomer lurking with teenage girls. His young-girl appearance is his deceiving 
disguise, and the flickering and form-shifting establish that he is a virtual avatar. 
Ghosts and the haunted house 
Typical representations of ghosts depict them as [semi-transparent], [floating], 
haunting [vacant places], and [passing through walls]. All these are signs that signify 
virtuality as well. The connotations to ghosts are sometimes explicit. In Idoru, 
Gibson refers to “ghost-figures whipping past”, “some ghost-bastard thing on my 
site”, and “countless watching ghosts”. In the movie Avalon, a virtual game 
character manifests itself as a ghost-like young girl. The character Stunner describes 
her explicitly as a ghost.177 
You must have heard the stories of a hidden character in the Field-class A levels of 
the game. … Some people thinks she is an Eastern Egg planted by the programmers, 
some thinks she’s a bug in the system. They call her the Ghost. 
The Matrix Reloaded uses another, very explicit reference to horror stories. Persistent 
ghost twins that exhibit a collection of horror movie attributes hunt the 
protagonists; they walk through walls, have snaking Medusa-like hair, and a 
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mummified appearance.178 The Oracle gives the rationale for these horror movie 
characters.179  
Every time you heard someone say they saw a ghost, or an angel… Vampires, 
werewolf’s or aliens… that’s the system assimilating a program that is doing 
something it is not supposed to be doing. 
Brian McHale (1992) has mentioned the abundance of ghosts in cyberpunk 
narratives, making a connection to the posthuman dream of immortality where 
dead humans have their consciousness, personality and memories uploaded and/or 
simulated by the machine. McHale suggests that an artificial intelligence can be seen 
as a metaphorical ghost in the machine. Catherine Constable (2006) has also made 
similar arguments, and she mentions Baudrillard’s idea of the hyperreal as a 
haunted space. It might be that ghosts are used to signify virtuality not only 
because they are immaterial just as the virtual is immaterial, but also because ghosts 
share another aspect with virtual characters – they are thought of as being inferior. 
The relationship of the dead to the living is similar to the relationship of the virtual 
to the actual: an existence that is worth less. A ghost envies the living; it is an 
existence that lacks essential human experiences, such as eating and physical 
intimacy. The lonely and melancholic existence of ghosts has occasionally been 
depicted in fiction, as in for example The Sixth Sense by M. Night Shyamalan and 
The Others by Alejandro Amenábar. 
The haunted house is an integral part of a typical ghost story, and several fictive 
virtual environments in the analyzed narratives exhibit a distinctly haunted quality. 
The short film Beyond makes explicit dialogue reference to the faulty house 
simulation as a “haunted house”180 and the short Magnetic Rose throws its characters 
into a haunted house/virtuality simulation so mixed up that it is hard – or 
meaningless – to tell one from the other. The memories and recollections of a long 
dead opera songstress engulf the stranded astronauts, and it is not clear whether the 
apparitions of her are projected recordings or supernatural visitations. Here, the 
virtual allows for the technological fulfillment of old fantasies of the dead coming 
back as ghosts. 
Floating 
Along with semi-transparency, floating is one of the things that the archetypical 
ghost do, as well as the fictive holograms of Star Wars, The Wizard of Oz and 
numerous subsequent movie examples. The connection to lack of materiality is 
strong; if there is no matter, gravity has no effect. This is something that we know 
intuitively about clouds, light beams and flames from a fire, even if it is not 
accurate from a physics viewpoint. If it floats, we can put our hands through it. 
Gibson occasionally describes virtual objects as floating for example in Mona Lisa 
Overdrive – “They writhe above the ground like heat above a summer highway…”– 
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and Baxter repeatedly describes Virtuals as floating, as in this example from The 
Siege of Earth. 
He saw that their protocol respect was weakening; some of them drifted up from the 
floor, and others tilted sideways, reaching impossible angles. They were like floating 
spectres, not children.  
In the TV series Life on Mars, Sam Tyler has vivid nightmares blending in with his 
waking hours and the Test Card Girl often haunts him. She is a mysterious, 
threatening entity that seems to step out of the test card image displayed on the TV 
set that Sam often falls asleep in front of. She eerily floats across the floor towards 
Sam. This makes her seem strange and unnatural but it also signifies her status as a 
imaginary, illusionary entity. On the commentary track of the 2006 DVD release, 
director Bharat Nalluri claims that the sign was not planned in pre-production. 
On the day, we decided to float her around the room, it wasn’t an early decision… In 
fact I thought it was the camera operator who thought, well, that’s a good idea.181 
If this is correct it gives an interesting illustration of how intuitive and off-the-cuff 
decisions are sometimes made in the turbulent and complex process of producing a 
story for TV or feature film. 
Floating and flying are highly common characteristics of real-life virtual reality 
and virtual environments as well. It was a common way of moving about in Second 
Life and Active Worlds. Another example taken from the research group Digital 
Representation, is Magali Ljungar-Chapelon (2008) and her virtual reality arts play 
Le Beau, le Laid, le Bon et le Mauvais. Ljungar-Chapelon used audience response study 
to investigate the experience of the virtual environment; in many of the interview 
responses, the sensation of flying and floating was underlined as an important 
characteristic of the experience. 
Topology #control 
It might be Clu’s game here, but in my world I got him in one key stroke.182 
The word cyberspace, stemming from cybernetic, relates to systems of control. The 
sub-genre cyberpunk is saturated with themes investigating issues of control and 
power hierarchies. The line of dialogue above exemplifies the importance of 
#control as a topology of virtuality. The quote highlights the arena for fictional 
struggles over control – the virtual world. This arena was already firmly established 
in Tron, the first movie which told a story about a virtual world. In one of the first 
scenes we have a clear demonstration of how the user Kevin Flynn guides and 
controls his virtual alter ego, Clu.183 In subsequent scenes, we are gradually 
introduced – primarily via dialogue – to the power struggle within the virtual world; 
the tyrannical Master Control Program and his right-hand man Zarg have seized 
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total control over the virtual world and all its inhabitants (artificial intelligences, or 
as they are called programs). The driving conflict of the movie is the struggle to over-
throw this regime. The concept of control continued to play a dominant role in 
subsequent movies such as The Lawnmower Man, Tron Legacy and the Matrix 
franchise, as noted by Zagorac (2009). Sabine Heuser (2003) mentions Neal 
Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash as another example, and describes how the concept 
of taking control by writing code is emphasized in Snow Crash, and how this code 
writing can be compared to casting magic spells. The metaphor of magic spells 
echoes the myth of the golem, the mud creature brought to life by a spell written 
into its forehead. Predating Frankenstein’s monster, the golem became dangerous, 
and had its life force taken out of it again by “the removal of certain letters” 
(Menon, 2007, p.158). This connotes control through code, through language. 
Another way of expressing this is the term hacking, used in misguided or creative 
manners, depending on your viewpoint. Hacking has become shorthand for taking 
control, not through blunt physical violence – as in the archetypical action movie – 
but through mysterious sequences of key strokes on a keyboard. The archetypical 
action hero contorts his face into a mask of pain and anger, and fire weapons to 
unleash death. The hacker hero’s face expresses concentration and thinking, and 
her attack changes the world. These hacks are far removed from real-life coding 
and hacking. In the feature film Hackers (Softley, 1995), teenagers “hack the planet” 
and in the short film Kung Fury (Sandberg, 2015), time travel is made possible by 
simply hacking time. This hacking is not meant as logical explanations of the movie 
plot; rather, it a metaphor for taking control through cognitive skills rather than 
physical violence. 
Michael Benedikt (1991) relates our capabilities of controlling cyberspace – both 
in real-life virtual worlds and cyberpunk fiction – with the ancient “desire to will 
the world into action” (p.226). In the virtual, our capability for control is so 
profound that it reminds us of magic. There is also ideological discourse 
concerning control over the real-life Internet, illustrated by the essay Cyberspace and 
the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age in which Esther Dyson, 
George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler (1994) claim that life online 
should be beyond standardization, centralization and control. 
In fictional narratives, the issue of control is intertwined with the drama and 
conflict of the narrative. There are many forms of #control that relate to virtuality, 
and in order to demonstrate the range, I will discuss a number of these, starting 
with my own work with the Via Tecta production. In human-computer interaction, 
the concept of the user taking control is so taken for granted that it is usually not 
reflected upon at all. However, in the Via Tecta production, we built an interactive 
visualization and reconstruction of an ancient Roman temple, where we wanted to 
emphasize the users’ ability to take control over the visualization. Archeological 
visualizations are traditionally static, so by emphasizing user control we created the 
super-sign [taking control]. Our intention was that the sign [taking control] should 
connote that since the visualization was interactive, the reconstruction it showed 
could be quite uncertain and open for different interpretations. The concept of 
taking control was realized as a virtual heads-up display control interface. It slid 
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down on top of the visualization and made it possible for the user to change the 
content of the visualization. The user could for example switch between two 
different versions of a balustrade, or select to switch it off completely. In other 
words, we let the audience deconstruct the reconstruction and build her own 
version. What we needed to represent in this visualization was uncertainty, which is 
not the same as virtuality.  However, we reasoned that there is a conceptual 
connection between virtuality and uncertainty – both concepts having the 
connotation of almost being, almost existing. In a similar way to how the virtual 
can be perceived as a mental construct, the quite uncertain reconstructions of the 
ancient Roman temple can also be thought of as mental constructs. 
Breaking space-time 
I want to put the game on pause.184 
There are differences in how control is portrayed, based on what controls what. One 
often-used super-sign is that of a character [taking super-natural control over the 
world]. This act of taking control is sometimes portrayed as [stopping the world by 
a voice command]. Analyzing the sign’s syntagmatic construction, it is clearly an 
efficient sign; the sign obviously connotes the super-natural and artificiality since 
we all know that we can’t stop time by demanding it to stop; and it also combines 
the verbal (the dialogue line) with the visual (we see the world freeze). The sign 
was, for example, used in a scene in The Matrix where character Morpheus says 
“Freeze it!”, and the time of the virtual environment stops.185 This is yet another 
example of how a quite straightforward event is subtly loaded with sub-signs. When 
Morpheus gives his line he looks up, putting to use the super-sign of [up/down 
hierarchy], and earlier shots of the scene involves a [zombie-like crowd]. The idea 
of virtual characters being a zombie-like crowd, in combination with verbal 
commands used to freeze the world, is used in a similar scene both in Abre los ojos 
and the remake Vanilla Sky. The main character David is having a heated 
conversation with a strange man in a crowded and noisy bar. Finally he impatiently 
snarls “What I would love everyone to do is to shut up…” and he is shocked when 
everything around them grows quiet and still. Not every virtual world yields itself to 
commands as easily. In Life on Mars, there are several scenes where the protagonist 
Sam unsuccessfully tries to gain control over the illusory world he is caught in, for 
example, in the first episode when he snaps and starts to scream “Come on! Stop it 
now; enough!”186 He slams his hands against the walls and continues “Stop! End! 
Finish! Come on!” But he remains trapped and out of control. 
These scenes of achieving or not achieving control of the world are strong and 
memorable. Yet, they are surprisingly non-visual in their storytelling, relying heavily 
on dialogue, acting and plot events. They rely on diegesis rather than mimesis. The 
breaking of space-time can of course be seen in the bullet time effect of The Matrix, 
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but similar super-signs have been used in The Cell, Vanilla Sky, Abre los ojos, Sunshine, 
and Avalon.187 Often the space-time break is explicitly referred to in dialogue or in 
other ways. In Abre los ojos the virtual character Sofia freezes while being together 
with her lover César, and says: “If you want me to move, you have to put a coin 
into me”.188 The line is supposed to be a loving joke, but the sub-text is that she is a 
construct of Césars computer-assisted imagination. Built into this seemingly simple 
line of dialogue are three different signs. She is frozen in time, so space-time in the 
virtual environment is broken. She is controlled by another character, as if she is a 
mindless zombie. And, the notion of starting her up with a coin suggests her 
artificiality, as if she is an arcade game. 
Time in the virtual not only stops on commands, it can also run in different 
speeds compared to the actual outside. Gibson explicitly described this in 
Neuromancer: “You aren’t missing anything, back there. An hour here’ll only take 
you a couple of seconds.” Thirty years later – in Tron Legacy – the character Kevin 
Flynn explains that “hours here were just minutes at home”.189 One story taking the 
notion to its extreme, and making it an important part of the plot, is Inception. The 
events of this movie take place in up to four nestled layers of worlds – technology-
induced dream worlds – and time runs slower for each step down in world 
hierarchy. Two of the characters live a whole lifetime at the bottom while just a few 
weeks run by in the top-world. This is reminiscent of Nusselder’s (2009) claim 
about cyberspace in general, that “time and space seem to be dimensions of the 
world that we can compress by means of the computer: they lose their significance” 
(p.50). A real-life example of controlling time in virtual worlds is the control over 
time in simulations. For example, in sandbox games such as Minecraft and Spore, the 
time runs quickly; sunsets come and go swiftly in Minecraft, and in Spore millions of 
years sweep by while the game player controls the evolution of life.  
Power struggles 
Only human.190 
A fundamental aspect of a plot is the characters, and signs of virtuality related to 
characters are abundant in the analyzed narratives, usually represented by characters 
struggling for control. Control is, from a character design viewpoint, directly linked 
to the capabilities of the character. The capabilities characterize the character, and 
they can signify whether the character is inside a virtual world, or interacting with a 
virtual object. The characters’ capabilities can also signify that the character is a 
virtual character, an artificial intelligence. 
Control over computer systems and how this control relates to individual 
capabilities have an obvious correspondence to real-life virtual worlds: that of 
                                         
187 First introduced in The Matrix at 02:55, the Bullet Time is an effect where the characters move 
at super-human speed, but at the same time the camera moves freely while the action is almost 
frozen. 
188 At 01:03:43. 
189 At 52:15. 
190 Artificial intelligence Agent Jones to human Neo, at 01:42:20 in The Matrix. 
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administrative rights in real-life systems. Klastrup (2003a; 2003b) describes how 
players in multi-player worlds usually start with minor capabilities and then work 
on their levelling to become wizards, or whatever powerful players are referred to in 
each specific game. This increase in power and control comes with more 
capabilities (better health, intelligence, weapons and so on). In Active Worlds, a real-
life virtual world, a so called police department had the administrative rights to 
delete offensive objects created by other citizens (participants) and peacekeeper 
civilians were given the right to eject abusive citizens from the world (Schroeder, 
Huxor & Smith, 2001). In the virtual world, these users had superhuman 
capabilities beyond that of ordinary users. The attaining of power in fictional 
narratives such as The Matrix mimics this, for example in how the increased 
capabilities of Neo let him take over the virtual world. There have also been reports 
of real-life cyber-attacks paralleling how the fictive Agent Smith tries to take over 
the whole virtual world in The Matrix Revolutions. In Active Worlds, a user “was 
running riot in the world, placing numerous objects and looking as if he intended 
to overload the world server” (Hudson-Smith, 2002, p.5). The user had employed a 
code that automatically built 85,000 objects in the course of five hours. Even 
further back in the short history of online virtual worlds, Turkle (1995) made this 
description of a well-known example of abuse in the LambdaMOO world (p.251). 
Even when ejected from the room, Bungle was able to continue his sexual assaults. 
He forced various players to have sex with each other and then forced legba to 
swallow his (or her?) own pubic hair and made a character called Starsinger attack 
herself sexually with a knife. Finally, Bungle was immobilized by a MOO wizard who 
“toaded” the perpetrator (erased the character from the system). 
The event and its aftermath have also been chronicled and analyzed by Julian 
Dibbell (1996). It took place in a text based MUD, so the events where not visually 
represented, and it can be disputed whether anyone was forced to do anything; 
what happened was that the Bungle user employed a subprogram that published 
the verbal descriptions of the events, making it appear, in text, as if the users behind 
legba and Starsinger had written those descriptions themselves. However, the 
reaction to the offense was strong from other users. The deletion of the Bungle 
user account, that Turkle mentions, did not happen until after a long subsequent 
debate that persuaded a wizard, a system administrator with high-level access, to 
execute the verdict. Note how the term wizard echoes the magical spell control 
commands envisioned by Vernor Vinge in his 1981 story True Names, and how the 
themes of characters struggling for control – but finding themselves being 
controlled by a user with stronger capabilities – echo events in the Matrix trilogy, 
especially the scene where the Merovingian forces a virtual woman to orgasm 
(using code hidden in a virtual desert cake). Other super-human capabilities such as 
telekinesis, clairvoyance, strength, speed, agility or invulnerability often signify 
virtuality. The storytellers of The Matrix utilize the virtuality of their fictive world as 
an excuse for spectacular action scenes. But there are examples from other movies 
as well; the characters fly in The Lawnmower Man and characters have superhuman 
speed and agility in Tron Legacy and Storm. 
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Issues of control, power and empowerment run deep in the virtual, and provide 
a conceptual connection to how counterculture in the 1960s tried to deal with 
issues concerning technology, control, and empowerment. Individual 
empowerment was the original promise of the personal computer, and the promise 
offered by the frontier romanticism of the early real-life virtual worlds – to be 
anyone you want to be, to do anything you want to do. Nusselder (2009) describes 
it as an ancient longing to surpass the limits reality have set for us; that the virtual 
“offer(s) to relieve us of the burdens of reality. … What we cannot have in reality, 
we can have via the fantasy screen” (p.11). Our anticipations of the virtual seem to 
have matured now. Still, the capability to control a world might be one of the 
factors that draws players to the widely successful computer game worlds of The 
Sims, SimCity and Minecraft. In these simulators and sandboxes, the player feels 
empowerment and has control on a level that the actual world can’t offer. 
Surveillance, power and control 
In what has been claimed to be a commercial for the electronics giant LG, a smiling 
man spies on a woman sleeping in her bed, and snaps a photograph of her through 
the window with his smartphone.191 The man starts to manipulate the woman 
through the image he took. He touches the image of her, and she feels his caresses 
in her sleep. She smiles appreciatively in her sleep, accepting the violation only 
because she is in a semi-conscious state, still in the land of dreams. She is an object 
and she is only open for sexuality when she is taken. Apparently, dreams of 
technology take the dream of male sexist objectification to a new level, and in the 
following discussion, gender issues, surveillance and freedom will be intricately 
linked with the representation of virtuality. We will now investigate aspects of 
control and surveillance in the virtual. Surveillance is tightly linked with both 
photography and control, because, as Susan Sontag (1999) notes, photography 
redefines reality into “an item for exhibition, as a record for scrutiny, as a target for 
surveillance” and “photographic recording is always, potentially, a means of 
control” (p.82). 
The surveillance of a virtual world from an outer actual world is a common 
trope in the studied narratives, usually with the virtual portrayed as a contained 
world that is watched from the outside. The virtual is inside, the actual outside. 
This opens up interpretants situated both in the topology of #control and of 
#containment. One of the first descriptions of a virtual world is a memorable 
example. In the short story The Veldt from 1950, Ray Bradbury describes a virtual 
savannah projected inside a domestic virtual reality room, and finishes it off with 
the comment that “the only flaw to the illusion was the open door through which 
he could see his wife, far down the dark hall, like a framed picture, eating her 
dinner abstractedly”. This short line efficiently creates the image of two separate 
and independent, but linked worlds.192 The actual framing world and the virtual 
insert world have a relationship that is metaphorically similar to theater – the stage 
                                         
191 http://infontology.typepad.com/infontology/2008/06/ntligen-en-rikt.html 
192 Svante Lovén (2001) also highlights the metaphorical contrast between the high-tech actual 
world and the savage and pre-technological world of the virtual savannah. 
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is likewise an insert world surrounded by off-stage spaces, and by apparently 
hidden spectators.193 The dualism of a stage and spectators is emphasized 
repeatedly in the Matrix franchise. The protagonists of the story enter the virtual 
world to do heroic deeds like gladiators in a futuristic coliseum. Outside in the actual 
world, the operator surveys and guides the visitors to the virtual world. We see these 
operators seated in front of a bank of computer screens, screens that display 
enigmatic rows of green computer code. Obviously the operators can interpret this 
code and understand what happens inside the virtual world. They seem to have 
complete surveillance capabilities, and the concept of the operators looking into the 
virtual world to guide and manage the events calls to mind how stage people work 
around the stage during a play. It is almost as if the operator peeks behind a 
curtain. Hannah Higgins (2009) has pointed out that the word screen – nowadays the 
window through which we see from the actual to the virtual – has another meaning 
that instead suggests protection against exposure. The protection against gaze that the 
dressing screen provides has been replaced by the exposure mediated by the display 
screen. Baudrillard (2008) refers to our culture as a pornographic culture; it is not 
only the erotic body that is totally exposed in our visual culture, it is also every inch 
of our intestines, and in science shows everything is shown: from vibrating sub-
atomic strings, and long-dead dinosaurs, to far-away galaxy cores. We are obsessed 
with being able to see everything. Heim (1993) notes a similar idea, that in a virtual 
world – a simulation – everything is known, and everything could be counted. Take 
as an example the passage in Neuromancer where Case have omniscient knowledge 
of Wintermute’s virtual entrapment. 
The Kuang program spurted from tarnished cloud, Case’s consciousness divided like 
beads of mercury arcing above an endless beach the color of the dark silver clouds. 
His vision was spherical, as though a single retina lined the inner surface of a globe 
that contained all things, if all things could be counted. 
And here things could be counted, each one. He knew the number of grains of sand 
in the construct of the beach (a number coded in a mathematical system that existed 
nowhere outside the mind that was Neuromancer). He knew the number of yellow 
food packets in the canisters in the bunker (four hundred and seven). He knew the 
number of brass teeth in the left half of the open zipper of the salt-crusted leather 
jacket that Linda Lee wore as she trudged along the sunset beach, swinging a stick of 
driftwood in her hand (two hundred and two). 
Svante Lovén (2010) points out that Gibson’s description of omniscience in the 
virtual echoes that of Vernor Vinge in his True Names, published in 1981, three 
years before Neuromancer. 
But things would never be the same: the human that had been Mr. Slippery was an 
insect wandering in the cathedral his mind had become. There simply was more there 
than before. No sparrow could fall without his knowledge, via air traffic control; no 
check could be cashed without his noticing over the bank communication net. More 
than three hundred million lives swept before what his senses had become. 
                                         
193 Acknowledgement goes to my colleague Josef Wideström for our discussions about the 
connection between virtuality and theatre, and forthcoming PhD thesis investigating these issues. 
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Sometimes the surveillance portrayed in the studied narratives can be covert and 
have slightly sexual undertones to it, as when we, early in The Matrix, hear some 
one asking, “You like him don’t you? You like watching him?”194 The specific idea 
of a love interest being covertly observed is brought up in a similar fashion in The 
Thirteenth Floor when the actual woman Natasha tells the virtual character Douglas 
that “from the moment the simulation was created, I have watched you”. 
This slightly sexual voyeurism is portrayed as welcome, even as a romantic 
prelude to coming flirtation and love. We like to watch, and we often like being 
watched. We are fascinated and scared by the total surveillance of panopticon as 
well as the pleasurable watching of scopophilia, and this is reflected in fiction. 
Fictional cases of scopophilia have quite romantic connotations as in the examples 
above or as in the movie Déjà vu (Scott, 2006) where the male protagonist falls in 
love with a woman he watches through a wormhole device that lets him look into 
the past, anywhere in space. However, surveillance is sometimes represented as 
malignant. The archetypical example is, of course, Orwell’s 1984. Surveillance and 
scopophilia are connected to control, and a struggle for control (Mann, Nolan & 
Wellman, 2003). The watcher attempts to watch, while the watched either tries to 
hinder or allow it. When the watched allows the watcher to watch, the meaning 
becomes a sexual, romantic act – at least in the logic of a typical western movie 
narrative. One archetypical example is the scene in Witness (Weir, 1985) where the 
male protagonist happens to see his love interest Rachel half nude while she does 
her evening washing (the character Rachel belongs to the prudish Amish society). 
She allows him to watch. Erotic watching – and the male gaze that objectifies 
women (Mulvey, 1999) – are typically pushed into two opposites; either the 
romantic sexual act, or the malignant perverted act. When Rachel allows the male 
protagonist to watch her, her control over the situation makes her less of an object 
and more of a subject. Comparing the two fictional examples of watching – Déjà vu 
and Witness – they highlight that the difference between malevolent surveillance and 
benign watching is both a matter of control, and of information. In typical 
panopticon surveillance, the observed subject is objectified because the observer 
knows more than the observer (Foucault, 1999); in the case of Déjà vu, the woman 
does not know she is spied upon. In the case of Witness, the man and the woman 
share similar knowledge of the situation, and thus engage in communication with 
each other.  
Considering the intense debate on surveillance in real-life, it is surprising that 
fictional representations of virtuality fail to problematize the act of watching. Is 
surveillance so deeply integrated into our society that we regard it as an obvious 
aspect of an artificial environment? There have been many warnings put forward 
concerning the risk of a surveillance-based society, from Juvenal’s ancient quest195 
about who will guard the guardians to George Orwell’s Big-Brother, through 
Huxley’s chilling claim that “everyone belongs to everyone” in Brave New World 
                                         
194 At the very start of the movie at 00:56. Most likely it is Cypher asking Trinity since the later 
will finally confess a romantic interest in the hero Neo. 
195 The roman poet Juvenal coined the phrase, but Plato also discussed the general concept in his 
Republic. 
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(Huxley, 1932), to Donna Haraway’s (1991) warning against “the formation of a 
strongly bimodal social structure … controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses 
ranging from entertainment to surveillance” (p.169). In Postscript on the Societies of 
Control, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1992) claims that the idea of an 
institutionalized panopticon has expanded to include not only specific sites such as 
prisons or shops, but also the open public spaces between institutions, such as the 
street.196 There is broad modern debate about security cameras, online surveillance 
and such, see for example the essays in (Philips, 2010). In the large attitude survey 
Digital Life in 2025 (Anderson, Rainie & Duggan, 2014), frequent voices of concern 
brought up the issues related to increasing surveillance made possible by the 
Internet, and the loss of control over this surveillance. It might be that just as 
science fiction failed to anticipate the Internet, contemporary science fiction also 
fails to predict the full extent of future panopticons. 
Topology #virtual artificial intelligence 
Samuel Eriksson: “There is someone who plays us.” 
Thommy Eriksson: “How do you mean?”  
Samuel: “In the night the big guys stop playing us. That’s how it is inside the 
computer.”197 
I was amazed at this spontaneous conclusion from my five-year-old child; surprised 
that he could think of himself as a character inside a computer game. The idea of a 
god-like entity having control over the virtual world and being the creator of other 
sentient, virtual artificial intelligence is important in many of the studied narratives. 
This idea connects with one of the most common themes of science fiction: the 
struggle with the machines. Some of the most commercially successful and critically 
acclaimed science fiction movies tell stories concentrating on this conflict: 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, Blade Runner, The Matrix, and The Terminator. In literature, Frankenstein; 
or, The Modern Prometheus stands out as a story conflicting the artificial monster and 
its creator. The artificial entity is an efficient combination of the dangerous other 
and the dangerous technology, “a perfect exteriorization” (Pope, 2008, p.3). Looking 
at stories involving virtuality, the plot of for example Tron and Tron Legacy, as well 
as the Matrix franchise, indulge in the conflict between man and machine, between 
the maker and the made. 
The god-like control of the maker 
A specific kind of #virtual artificial intelligence, related to the topology #control, is 
the maker’s control over subordinate virtual artificial intelligence. The line between 
control and god-like control is a blurry zone of negotiation, but religious motifs 
                                         
196 The panopticon was originally an idea by Jeremy Bentham on how to monitor prison inmates, 
famously analyzed in Michel Foucault’s 1975 essay Surveiller et punir. 
197 July 14th, 2007. The exchange, which was a spontaneous everyday discussion, has been 
translated from Swedish by the author. The original wording was: “Det är nån som spelar oss”, 
”Hur då menar du?”, ” På natten slutar dom där stora gubbarna att spela oss. Så är det inne i 
datorn.” 
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obviously set them apart. Also, god-like control means an almost total control over 
the virtual world. The hero achieving god-like control, referred to as apotheosis, is 
one of the recurrent themes observed in western narratives according to 
Campbell’s monomyth (1949), and Palumbo (2014) uses the monomyth pattern to 
describe such transcendence in both Tron and The Matrix, even though the powers 
of the characters in these narratives seems super-human rather than god-like. 
Dramatic events portraying god-like control are signified in spoken dialogue, 
narrative events and the visual mise-en-scène. In Inception – where the story unfolds 
in artificial dreams – there is the astounding visual motif of a whole virtual city 
being bent in on itself like a folding piece of paper at the will of its creator, the 
architect student Ariadne.198 There is also the shot where Cobb and Mal build a 
sandcastle city at a virtual beach.199 Cobb’s voice-over narrates that “…we built a 
world for ourselves…” and behind them in the virtual world, at a distance across 
the sea, large city-structure reacts to their control. When a sandcastle city block is 
toppled, the enormous structure in the background topples as well. The shot is very 
short, but the concept – a dream world where the world is constructed by the 
inhabitants/dreamers via their construction of a model world within the world – is 
fascinatingly rich and complex. 
Another way to demonstrate that you are God in your own world is to say it…200 
Trainman: “Down here I make the rules. Down here, I am God.” 
Agent Smith: “This is my world, my world.” 
SID 6.7: “You’re in my world now.” 
…and then emphasize it by some kind of exertion of power and control. In The 
Matrix Revolutions, both Trainman and Agent Smith strike Neo down despite Neo’s 
own super-natural powers, and in Virtuosity, the whole world bends around the 
villain SID 6.7 in a manner reminiscent of the visual effects mentioned previously 
in Inception. 
The super-sign [god-like control] engages the concept of being a God, but it does 
so at various levels of pronounced religiosity. The dialogue examples above 
connote a general concept of God and of having total control, but they do not 
refer to religion per se. Other movies play much more directly on specific religious 
associations, making references to world religions. The Matrix franchise paints a 
virtual world inhabited by a menagerie of artificial intelligences that control 
different aspects of the world (for example the Merovingian, The Key Maker, The 
Oracle and The Architect). The idea is similar to the artificial intelligences 
populating William Gibson’s cyberspace in the novel Count Zero, directly fashioned 
after voodoo spirits.201 Both Scott Bukatman (1993) and James Kneale (1999) point 
                                         
198 At 28:40. 
199 At 01:11:40. 
200 The Matrix Revolutions at 13:10 and 01:46:37, and Virtuosity at 01:26:50, respectively. 
201 In an interview (McCaffery, 1991), Gibson claims that using Voodoo spirits was a 
serendipitous decision influenced by an article about Haitian voodoo in National Geographic. 
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out that the use of voodoo spirits for constructing signs of virtuality creates a 
destabilizing and undermining dichotomy between the rationality and perfection of 
cyberspace on one hand, and superstitious and religious beliefs on the other. The 
Matrix has been accused of being a mishmash of all sorts of religious associations 
(Ford, 2003; Žižek, 2002), and it clearly features biblical allusions: the character 
arch of Neo as a prophesized savior being the most obvious set of references 
(Fontana, 2003), as well as references to Buddhism and its claim that the world is 
an illusion (Brannigan, 2002; Ford, 2003).  In Count Zero just as in The Matrix, 
different religious systems are mixed together; one loa (spirit) manifests itself as a 
wooden cross. Furthermore, in the Matrix franchise, the following line of dialogue 
from The Oracles – referring to a flock of birds – clearly suggests the idea of a 
nature religion where all aspects of the virtual world are governed by their own 
specific god or spirit.202 
See those birds; at same point a program was written to govern them. 
In the narratives I have studied, it is not only simple birds that are written code. 
There is a strong emphasis on virtual artificial intelligence that are written, and thus 
created. In spoken dialogue, they are often referred to as programs, but it is more 
correct to think of them as virtual characters or artificial sentiences. Artificial 
sentience and a god-like maker were portrayed as early as the first Tron movie, as 
exemplified by the following lines of dialogue from two quite early scenes in the 
movie.203 
“If I don’t believe in users, who wrote me?” 
 
“I wrote you” 
“Yes sir.” 
In the sequel Tron Legacy, references to God in a religious sense are made into a 
more indirect part of the mise-en-scène. The creator of the virtual world – Kevin 
Flynn – is dressed in a white, kimono-styled robe and sports long hair and a beard. 
He has a Zen style bead bracelet, and he later refers to himself as having a “Zen” 
mindset. When we first see him, he is meditating.204 The Kevin character, with his 
connotations to hippies and Zen Buddhism, join together spirituality, 
counterculture and the early development of the personal computer. His figure 
mimics the archetypical image of Jesus as well. This becomes even more 
pronounced in scenes where he drops into a praying pose (before using his super-
natural control over the virtual environment, as if he uses the pose to gather his 
powers), or when a virtual character kneels to worship him. This worshiping 
character kneels with an expression of bliss in her face, and her shaven head is 
reminiscent of a Buddhist monk. When Kevin Flynn leads his son Sam and the 
                                         
202 In The Matrix Reloaded at 44:50. 
203 At 02:54 and 04:03, respectively. 
204 We first see Flynn at 46:58. 
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artificial intelligence Quorra away from a dangerous situation he holds his arms 
stretched out in a protective and benedictory gesture.205 
The religious notion of god-like control is also emphasized in real-life computer 
games, so called god games, to a varying degree. In The Sims and Spore, the player 
acts as an implicit god, controlling the development of simulated life (Ferdig, 2014; 
Lorentz, 2014). In some games, such as Populous, Black & White, Mega Lo Mania and 
Godus, the player is explicitly referred to as a god, at least in promotional texts 
(Wiemker & Wysocki, 2014). It is characteristic for these games that the player can 
exert supernatural powers over the world and its inhabitants, and sees the world 
from above, often from an isometric perspective. This is reminiscent of the 
up/down layering of virtual worlds discussed on page 223, as well as the Heavenly 
City of Christianity and the Mount Olympus of Greek mythology. Of course, 
computer games in general let the player control at least the game character in the 
game world, but typical for god games is the vast scale of control. Acting as a god 
in a game references religious motif via the gameplay. However, religion can also be 
a part of the game world itself, characterizing the settings and characters of the 
game just as in conventional, linear storytelling (Ferdig, 2014; Grieve & Campbell, 
2014; Heidbrink & Knoll, 2014). 
Enslaved artificial sentience and the zombie crowd 
I’m not in the business. I am the business. 
These words from Rachel in Blade Runner mark our shift in focus away from the 
programmer-God towards the subordinate artificial sentience. Characters such as 
Rachel is highly resonant with the typical cyberpunk protagonist, a subordinated, 
marginalized creature on the bottom of social hierarchies and on the fringe of 
society. In the words of Donna Haraway (1991), “the replicant Rachel … stands as 
the image of a cyborg culture’s fear, love, and confusion” (p.178). When uttering 
these words, Rachel is the artificial replicant with false implanted memories that 
just has realized that she is not a natural human. She is manufactured. Her words 
reflect her shift from being an active agent (a human) to a passive object (a 
replicant). This is a common theme in science fiction, and the concept can be 
applied to physical artifices such as Rachael, and to digital, virtual entities such as 
the ones encountered in virtual worlds. In real-life computer game worlds, these are 
referred to as NPC’s (Non-Player Characters) and even if they are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated they are not really artificial intelligences, nor sentient. In 
fiction, virtual artificial intelligences are numerous, ranging from the simpleminded 
workers/slaves in Tron to the superior enemy/masters of The Matrix. 
The idea of artificial life, an artificial entity created for the benefit of its creator, 
is very old and predates modern science fiction and virtuality (Grau, 2003). In 
Jewish mythology there is the golem – a creature formed out of clay and given life. 
The original description of the golem is pre-Christian, but the most well-known, 
modern golem myth describes how the rabbi Loew ben Bezalel created a golem in 
                                         
205 At 01:13:54. 
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Prague in the sixteenth century. Some versions of the story describe how the golem 
becomes violent, which is highly reminiscent of the later story about Frankenstein’s 
monster. In Greek mythology, Pygmalion was a sculptor who made a female statue 
of such beauty and lifelikeness that he fell in love with it. His desire was so strong 
that the goddess Athena gave the statue life. Her name became Galatea, which 
means she who is milk-white. So even if she became alive, her name suggests her 
artificiality by reminding us that she had the grey-white color of ivory. Her ivory 
skin predates the grey and featureless surfaces of virtual objects that we see today, 
as discussed on in the chapter The grey surface and the Virtual Gas Lab, see page 
185. Well known Pandora was also an artifact crafted out of mud by the Greek 
gods Hephaestus and Athena, and then sent to bring revenge on humanity (Austin, 
2001; Mulvey, 1995). It is interesting how ancient Pandora and Galatea have their 
modern equivalents in artificial females such as Blade Runner’s Rachael and 
Metropolis’ Maria (Lang, 1927), and many other androids and artificial sentient 
beings. Springer (1996) suggests there is a general trend in how male storytellers 
and engineers both in fiction and real-life strive for creating the artificially perfect 
female, and that narratives about robots and artificial intelligences reflect the fear of 
women’s liberation. Huyssen (1981) makes a similar observation, and specifically 
addressing Maria in Metropolis, he writes that “as soon as the machine came to be 
perceived as a demonic, inexplicable threat and as harbinger of chaos and 
destruction writers began to imagine the Maschinenmensch as woman” (p.226). 
In real-life computer game worlds and other virtual environments, the avatar is 
the user’s graphical embodiment, apparently fully controlled by the user. Both in 
real-life and in fiction, the relation between the user and her avatar can be 
problematized though. In the fictive virtual world of Tron, the “programs” are not 
avatars; they have a quite high degree of semi-autonomous artificial intelligence, but 
their relationship with their user is reminiscent of a highly subordinated 
worshipper’s relationship with God, as exemplified by one scene in Tron where 
program Tron confers with his user Alan via the I/O tower portal.206 The religious 
overtones of the scene are represented in several ways: the music, Tron’s praying 
pose, the architecture of the portal, and the light beam from above, as well as 
Alan’s disembodied, booming voice-of-God. The virtual Tron refers to the human 
Alan as “Alan One”. While giving the user Alan further god-like status, the term 
also suggests that there is an Alan Two. This is Tron. So Tron is second to Alan. 
He is the semi-autonomous embodiment of Alan, inside the virtual world. 
The idea of humans inhabiting the fleshless body of virtual characters is picked 
up in The Thirteenth Floor. In the layered hierarchy of simulated worlds of this 
narrative, characters from the world above jack-in to the world below, and appear 
to possess the subordinate characters in a manner that mimics the relation between 
users and programs in Tron. It is also reminiscent of the mythological idea of 
humans being possessed by demons or spirits. For example, the character Natasha 
– inhabiting the middle-level world, similar to Rachael in Blade Runner, believing she 
is an actual human – does not know the protagonist Douglas Hall with whom she 
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shares world. But when her upper-level equivalent Jane jack-in to the virtual world 
she becomes or possesses Natasha. When being Jane, the Natasha/Jane character 
pursues Douglas since Jane is in love with him. When Jane jacks-out, Natasha has 
no memory of what has been taken place. Jane wears Natasha as a mask or 
costume. Natasha is a sentient avatar, waiting for technological possessing; it is a 
chilling concept indeed. These processes are represented in different ways. It is 
mentioned in dialogue, for example in this line.207 
I know why you pass out some times. I know why you wake up some times and have 
no idea of where you are. 
It is also shown in acting, both in that the different characters behave (and dress) 
differently and that they seem surprised or confused when the possession ends, for 
example. 
In other narratives, there are twists that further complicate the idea of humans 
infesting/possessing/becoming an autonomous avatar. In eXistenZ, the control acts 
both ways; when humans jack-in to the virtual game world, they at first seems to be 
themselves, but, especially in one scene, it is revealed that the personality of the 
game character avatars actually execute control over the human player’s decision 
making. In this scene, to their surprise, the two characters Allegra Geller and Ted 
Pikul start to make-out, and Allegra explains that208 
the characters are obviously supposed to jump each other; it is most probably a 
pathetically mechanical event to heighten the emotion of the next game sequence. 
This enforced sexual encounter might seem farfetched. However, in real-life 
gameplay there are aspects of the game character that a player does not control, 
such as motion patterns, dialogue exchanges and even supposed behavior. Game 
characters often have a specific character and history of their own; this becomes 
obvious when considering games such as Grand Theft Auto where you are more or 
less supposed to act out the violent and criminal nature of the game character. To 
advance the game plot, many games occasionally take control of the game character 
and perform tasks or dialogue on its own before the control is given back to the 
player. In online role-playing games, you are supposed to stay in character, 
performing your part (Klastrup, 2003a). The fictional game world of eXistenZ 
mirrors this. 
The scene in eXistenZ is quietly unsettling and at the same time intriguing, 
framing questions regarding individuality, control and intimacy. The character 
Allegra seems to regard the sexual encounter she is having as something that is not 
real; it is just something her game character does. However, the game is portrayed 
as completely realistic and as incorporating all the senses. So, aren’t they actually 
kissing then? This merging of faked and real sex mimics that of prostitution. Sexual 
encounters in prostitution are actual, but at the same time they are staged and 
scripted. An important fantasy that drives sex buyers is also the urge to give over 
                                         
207 At 17:28. 
208 At 17:16. 
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control, to lose control and to lose the burden of responsibility (Månsson, 2005). 
At the same time, the purchase of a sexual encounter can be seen as the purchase 
of power over another human’s acts and body. It is interesting how these complex 
issues regarding intimacy and control are mirrored by the complexity and ambiguity 
of the encounter in eXistenZ. The dichotomy of having and losing control at the 
same time is brought into light.209 In other movies the aspect of control in relation 
to sexual services is subtly hinted at. Tron, The Matrix and Virtuosity all make fleeting 
portraits of these virtual sex slaves.210 William Gibson makes a subtle reference to 
the concept in his novel Virtual Light when a man enters a virtual simulation. 
She is waiting for him. He has long since come to prefer her in silence. 
Yet another very subtle, almost quaint, reference to sexual control comes in the 
American re-make of Life on Mars. The character Annie has an argument with Sam 
Tyler concerning whether she is real or just a figment of his imagination. She puts 
his hand on her chest.211 
You feel it; my heart beat? If I was a figment of your imagination, I would probably 
let your hand linger on my chest. However, I gotta go. 
Her control over herself and her choices make her real, at least according to her 
own logic. 
The concept of virtual artificial intelligences who can be controlled as slaves 
could raise important ethical issues, as have been done in Blade Runner (Scott, 1982). 
But besides the discussed scene in eXistenZ, the analyzed movies generally do not 
attempt any such ideological discussion. It is as if the movie makers’ primary 
concern has been to play with the concept of virtuality, to explore its nature, and 
not its problems. More chilling and fraught with ethical issues is Baxter’s 
description of artificial virtual children from his short story The Siege of Earth. 
And Virtual kids actually had advantages. You could back them up, rerun favorite 
moments. You could even wipe them clean if you really made a hash of raising them, 
though sentience laws discouraged this. 
As the quote reveals, the concept of a virtual artificial intelligences under total 
control does not have to invoke connotations of prostitution and sexuality. It can 
also be depicted as a human parent’s total control over a virtual child. 
One common logic seems to be that since virtual artificial intelligences are 
simulated, their existence is not worth anything even though they appear to exhibit 
                                         
209 Svante Lovén (2001) have pointed out that the novel City of the Living Dead by Laurence 
Manning and Fletcher Pratt already in 1930 described a simulated environment where the events 
are pre-determined and a machine provide the nerve impulses that convince the user that she is 
making the decisions. 
210 At 59:14, 54:49, and 21:37 respectively. I believe sex slave is more appropriate than prostitutes 
since these virtual characters do not appear to have a choice at all. They do not sell their sexual 
services. They offer them because they are programmed to. 
211 Episode 1 at 19:20. 
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sentience. This [lack of sentient value] is mentioned in Avalon, eXistenZ, Life on 
Mars, eXistenZ, The Thirteenth Floor, and Vanilla Sky/Abre los ojos, always via dialogue 
as exemplified by the following quotes.212 
Annie Cartwright: “What do you care; I am not real. As soon as I walk out that door, 
poff, I’m gone. Here I go; ready, steady.” 
Sam Tyler: “You’re just some dog crawl out of some dark pit in the back of my 
mind.” 
Abre los ojos visualizes the lack of sentient value in a dramatic scene where the 
human character repeatedly fires gun shots into an unconscious police officer,213 
and the American remake, Vanilla Sky, has the following dialogue emphasizing the 
value-less virtual character McCabe. 
Support Technician: “Don’t feel bad for him Dave, this whining man is your 
creation. It’s in his nature to fight for his existence. But he is not real.” 
McCabe: “I’m real. I have two daughters, you know that.” 
Support Technician: “What are their names?” 
McCabe: “Ehh… I’m real.”  
Using dialogue in this way to signify a virtual character’s status as an artificial 
sentience is a fruitful approach. I used it in my own production Astronaut when I 
wrote the dialogue for the artificial intelligence Ejahja. In Ejahja’s dialogue with the 
human character, Scott, I gave her a quite high status as a sentient being, the point 
being that her destruction would be a sad moment. Nevertheless one of the points 
was that she is forced into destruction since her existence is less valuable than the 
human astronaut of the story. 
Lacking value as an artificial sentience also logically leads to anonymity, as 
exemplified by the dialogue from Vanilla Sky above. Since McCabe and his 
daughters are presumably not real, he can’t even remember their names. Generally, 
anonymous and vegetative virtual characters have been used frequently in the 
studied narratives, a super-sign that I call the [zombie crowd]. This is a crowd 
where the virtual characters behave as if no one controls them, at all. They do not 
even exercise control over themselves. They are apparently ready for becoming 
controlled. One prominent example comes from The Matrix where human characters 
Neo and Morpheus enter a training program depicted as a busy city street, and Neo 
repeatedly bumps into the people of the crowd because they do not react to his 
presence.214 In eXistenZ, there are individual virtual characters behaving in a 
vegetative and zombie-like fashion. The following dialogue comments on a virtual 
character stuck in a repetitive cycle of meditative motions:215  
                                         
212 From Life on Mars episode one at 27:28 and 35:00 respectively. 
213 At 01:40:15. 
214 At 54:20. 
215 At 12:28. 
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He’s gone into a game move, he won’t come out of it until you give him a proper line 
of game dialogue. 
An example from my own work is once again Ejahja, discussed on page 180. One 
of the signs of her virtuality that was scripted but wasn’t realized was a zombie like 
behavior. On July 24th, 2003 I wrote the following directions to Rick Dunbar: 
Ejahja starts out with her usual neutral, half zoombie like drone when trying to get 
Scott to talk, but then suddenly alocate more processing power (other displays 
shuting down etc.) and suddebnly she is much more alive, emotional, almost as a real 
person, just to try to get across to Scott. I think I will change the image quality also, 
going from a stilized image of Ejahja (I will filter the Grace footage) to an almost 
non-filtered version. 
The quote reveals that I quite intentionally connected her virtuality to game 
characters and simulations. My rationale for the transformations was re-allocation 
of simulation resources. The detached voice and behavior is similar to signs used in 
other movies, for example, the female artificial intelligence in Johnny Mnemonic and 
the Red Queen in Resident Evil. 
These mindless behaviors also correspond to real-life virtual characters in 
computer games and virtual worlds. Due to programming limitations, the Non-
Player Characters of real-life computer games are not at all smart or sentient; game 
soldiers walk straight into the player’s fire and avatars in Second Life blink and look 
around in an obviously mindless manner. 
In the Matrix franchise, the malevolent artificial intelligences called Agents have 
the power to take over any character in the virtual world. The possession has a 
strong visual representation, once again making the Matrix franchise stand out 
from the other studied narratives in how it depicts abstract concepts in a highly 
visual manner. When Agent Smith infests another character the process starts with 
him slamming his hand into the body of the other character. An oozing of black 
creeps out from his hand, and envelops the other. The black ooze then withdraws 
and reveals a perfect copy of Agent Smith himself. The event is a virus attack; one 
artificial intelligence hacks the programming code of another artificial intelligence, 
overwriting part of the code with his code. Thus, the black ooze of the scene is 
actually a visual representation of computer code.216 
As with so many other signs of virtuality, the sign of [characters infesting others] 
was applied already in the original Tron movie, almost thirty years ago. During the 
climactic fight between protagonist Tron and antagonist Sark, the latter is given 
new life force and giant size from the tyrant MCP, explained in the MCP dialogue 
line:217 
 “All my functions are now yours.” 
                                         
216 The effect is first seen in The Matrix Reloaded at 31:51. 
217 At 01:21:12. 
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A similar line of dialogue in The Matrix Reloaded comment on the merging of Agent 
Smith and Neo, the two opponents of the plot.218 
Agent Smith: “Perhaps some part of you imprinted onto me, something overwritten 
or copied.”  
In the first movie of the trilogy, The Matrix, Neo overcomes Agent Smith by 
apparently diving into him and tearing him apart from within. In the sequel, The 
Matrix Reloaded, Agent Smith reappears, with new capabilities. He, a virtual artificial 
intelligence, has mutated into a spreading virus. The rational is that the computer 
code of Agent Smith has merged with Neo’s code. But, how can Neo, a human 
jacking-in to the virtual world, have a code? Regardless of the explanation, the 
merging of human code and artifice code evokes the concept of Neo as a cyborg 
made up of both his physical body and his virtual, coded corpus. This cyborg man 
merges with the artificial Agent Smith. This mimics the merging of female and male 
DNA taking place at the conception of a child. DNA is after all a natural, biological 
code defining the physical human, similar to how computer code defines a digital 
artifact. And all code can be rewritten, as stated by Donna Haraway (1991) in her A 
Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Access to your own code, cultural or genetic, gives both the risk of “a grid of 
control on the planet” and the promise of a utopian society where “people are not 
afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently 
partial identities and contradictory standpoints” (p.154). We are all controlled via 
code, either by others or by ourselves. 
                                         
218 At 49:18. 
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The design of cyberspace is, after all, the design of another life-world, a parallel 
universe, offering the intoxicating prospect of actually fulfilling – with a technology 
very nearly achieved – a dream thousands of years old: the dream of transcending the 
physical world, fully alive, at will, to dwell in some Beyond-to be empowered or 
enlightened there, alone or with others, and to return. 
Michael Benedikt’s claim in Cyberspace: First Steps (1991, p.131) now comes back, 
haunting us with its absurd techno-evangelism. The virtual is not a separate 
universe, and going there does not mean leaving the physical behind. On the 
contrary, the virtual seem to merge with, intertwine with and bleed into the actual. 
At the start of my study I asked how is virtuality represented in fiction, and what 
that says about our anticipations and fears related to what the virtual is and will be? 
The poetics I have presented is one answer to that question, and I will now 
summarize these results. While my poetics of virtuality has been primarily 
descriptive, I will now take a more normative stance, reflecting on the dream of 
virtuality and how it relates to real-life technological and cultural development. 
Combining autoethnography and film studies 
As described in the method sections, I have combined, and triangulated, a set of 
research methods that quite seldom are used together. I have used autoethnography 
to study my own media productions, together with extensive analyses of 
professionally produced narrative texts, primarily science fiction literature and 
feature films. Combining methods in this manner has had the advantage of giving 
different viewpoints and different empirical material, and has been highly fruitful. I 
set out to write a poetics, exploring the theory and practice of signifying virtuality 
in fiction; autoethnography and film studies gave extensive insights in both the 
process and the product. My analysis of fictional representations of virtuality gave 
insights into our dreams and fears concerning virtuality, and the analysis of 
production circumstances gave insights that supported my reflections on the 
observed signs of virtuality. 
However, two issues with the chosen combination of research methods is that it 
is a quite time-consuming approach, and it generates not only observations and 
insights that relate to the question of a poetics of the virtual. Concerning the latter, 
there has been quite extensive results which were outside the scope of this study. 
This now lies ready for forthcoming analysis and dissemination elsewhere. It could 
even be that the chosen combination of research methods generates too many 
results; the risk is that there will never be time to write it up and disseminate all 
results properly. Autoethnographic studies of movie production culture are in 
themselves a research method that is highly time consuming. The result is that quite 
small amounts of time is actually dedicated to observations of actual design 
processes at work, compared to all other production work involved. It is also highly 
time-consuming to achieve access to actual productions. Therefore, I do not 
recommend it if the sole purpose is to study media productions. In my case though, 
it was a matter of combining these research studies with my own professional 
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development as a computer graphic artist, and a matter of achieving synergy effects 
related to my teaching at the university (such as establishing industry contacts and 
gaining skills and insights that fed into my teaching practice). Another synergy 
effect was the agenda of popularizing the scientific content most of my media 
productions had, thus the projects had a meaning in themselves. And, for a 
practitioner as myself, there is a high satisfaction in itself to make stuff. The bottom 
line is that autoethnographic observations of movie productions makes sense as a 
piggyback research, but not as a stand-alone research effort with only a single 
intention. Combining media production practice and research is worth the time if 
you already are a practitioner and are working with media productions.  
Then there is the issue of differences between the study of my own productions 
and the analysis of the work of others. The autoethnographic part of the study gave 
an insider view on semi-professional, small-scale productions. The analysis of 
movies and literary works gave an outsider view on professional and often large-
scale productions. Concerning the results from these different studies, there were 
quite a number of design issues and text production cases where the scale and 
professionalism of the production did not matter so much, and common results 
could be found. The utilization of, for example color, transparency or dialogue is 
not dependent on a complex production apparatus, and therefore such cases 
became relevant in both of the research approaches. 
A problem though with some of the media productions was that they became 
peripheral to a study of virtuality. For example, the work I did in the Via Tecta 
production – visualizing levels of uncertainty – is not directly related to 
representation of virtuality; instead it gave indirect results that are only partially 
relevant for a poetics of virtuality. This relates again to the issue of 
autoethnographic research being time consuming, and potentially not worth the 
time. Since autoethnographic studies of media productions often involve 
collaborations with external partners and clients, the researcher engages in a 
dynamic and changing real-life field environment where years can be spent on 
accessing the setting and starting up a collaboration project. There is also the risk 
of seeing the project evolve to a stage where the initial research agenda cannot be 
explored. Autoethnographic studies of media productions should therefore be 
regarded as opportunistic and explorative research; the researcher should be 
prepared to analyze and disseminate other findings than the ones that were initially 
sought after. 
Technology and science fiction – crossbreeding fiction and 
real-life 
I have studied fiction, especially science fiction narratives, in order to understand 
more about our dreams and fears concerning real-life technology. When 
juxtaposing these two domains – real-life technology and science fiction – there is a 
risk of being allured by the ideas that science fiction on the one hand predicts the 
future, and, on the other hand, inspires technology developers. However, the first 
claim is a misunderstanding of most science fiction narratives, and the other claim, 
even though partly correct, is highly complex and it is outside the scope of my 
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study to suggest or try to prove direct influences between technology and science 
fiction. What I have had the intention of juxtaposing, however, is our fear and 
dreams about fictional technology and real-life technology. 
Connecting fictional and real-life technology 
Storytellers that connect the fictional virtualities in movies and literature to real-life 
virtuality tend to look in multiple directions for inspiration: backwards and 
sideways. 
As illustrated by the study of both professional productions and my own 
productions, storytellers look backward at old technology, infesting the 
representations of virtuality with the faulty technology of semiotic inertia: 
monochrome colors, pixelation, flickering, buzzing electricity. These examples of 
semiotic inertia can be explained as an attempt to be clear towards the audience; the 
green tint of The Matrix and the pixelation in Tron Legacy is unmistakable. But these 
design choices can also be interpreted as maturity towards technology; cyberpunk 
stories such as Blade Runner and Neuromancer emphasize that old and new 
technology co-exist and engage in remediation with each other. This mature vision 
of technology stands in contrast to earlier visions of the future such as the ones in 
the Star Trek franchise and Things to Come (Menzies, 1936) where the future was 
depicted as homogenously new, shiny and white.  
Storytellers also look sideways at existing technology. The semiotic inertia of old 
display technology and the Cartesian tool kit is not only nostalgia, it is also a way to 
ground fictional virtuality in real-life technology that is familiar to storytellers and 
audience alike. The hologram in popular culture is a striking example of 
remediation; the hologram is strongly fashioned on the aesthetics of the TV screen 
and the even older Pepper’s ghost projection. 
Through the years, fictional virtuality has at least partly gone hand-in-hand with 
the development of real-life computer graphics and virtual reality technology. The 
appearance of computer gloves, head-mounted displays, and gestural interfaces, to 
name a few, in movies, has been in step with what has been at the forefront in 
research labs. Both William Gibson and Steven Lisberger were inspired by arcade 
games when creating Neuromancer and Tron, respectively. The appearance of the 
fictional virtualities has to some extent been driven by production technology, 
because the tools to create the visual effects of these movies have been similar to 
the tools that are used to build real-life virtual worlds. The examples show a trend 
towards more and more advanced graphics, both in fiction and real-life. The first 
Tron movie had a blocky monochrome virtual city. Johnny Mnemonic, more than ten 
years later, showed complex shapes and textures. Fifteen years after that, the 
makers of Tron Legacy used photoreal rendering and complex fluid dynamics 
simulations to create their semi-physical, semi-material virtual city. 
Science fiction is not free 
I chose to study virtuality in fiction – and not real-life virtuality – because the 
seemingly unconstrained capabilities of designing fictional virtuality could reflect 
how we think about virtuality. This was a successful approach; there are substantial 
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and relevant differences between fictional and real-life virtuality. But, it is also clear 
that the representation of fictional virtuality is not free and unconstrained. Instead, 
it is enmeshed in a web of production circumstances and storytelling requirements, 
and this has been especially clear when juxtaposing the study of my own semi-
professional productions and my analysis of professional productions. A fictional 
text is not a freestanding reflection of our society and our attitudes and beliefs, with 
the luxury of expressing any commentary on the human condition. Instead, it is 
constrained and supported by a set of highly different influences. There are 
narrative and aesthetic demands. Often the storyteller strives for a plot that is 
dramatic, easy to understand and emotionally engaging. This fuels a tendency to 
emphasize conflict and spectacle. Consider themes such as breaking out of a virtual 
world, actions such as superhuman fights, and events such as the liquid, glowing 
death of virtual characters. Are these signs of virtuality which reflect our thoughts 
about the virtual? Or, are they purely a means of creating an engaging story? The 
answer cannot be generalized or simplified, and any interpretation of fictional 
virtuality needs to be highly aware of these influences from media production 
circumstances. Mundane and practical issues such as the efficiency of choosing and 
applying different signs of virtuality should not be overlooked either; the high 
frequency of easy to create signs – such as color tint and pixelation – suggests that 
the need for streamlined production affects representations of fictional virtualities. 
We should be careful in assigning too much meaning into easy to produce 
representamina such as color, semi-transparency, and dialogue. 
Storytellers have a troubling dichotomy in their work. Storytellers search for the 
new: new stories, new ways to tell stories, new fictional worlds. At the same time 
they are quite conservative, illustrated by the tendency to signify virtuality in the 
same way in text after text. This is most obvious when it comes to signs referencing 
old display technology (the flickering of the TV screen), and in how volumetric 
displays are represented (essentially a TV screen floating in thin air). This 
carefulness is driven by the urge to stay with the audience, to make the audience 
understand. There is a constant balance between surprising the audience and not 
losing the audience. With this viewpoint, it is obvious why the Star Wars hologram 
gained such impact. It’s a perfect blend of the familiar and the spectacular; a TV 
screen that floats in the air.  Another reason for this conservatism, this semiotic inertia, 
is not related to the audience but to the storyteller, and her tendency to use familiar 
expressions. This is an illustration of the shamanism that Roland Barthes (1977) 
writes about, that the writer repeats utterances that already exists our culture, and 
this constrains fiction into being quite conservative. 
Foreclosing the future 
In my introduction to this poetics of virtuality, I wrote that I saw a need to study 
“careless thoughts” concerning the virtual, because of the risk to “become 
entrapped” in “haphazard, accidental” (Lanier, 2010, p.22) designs. The future, or 
rather our technological and social development of our future, runs the risk of 
being “foreclosed” (Watts, 2006, p.35) too soon. What careless thoughts do we 
have about the virtual, as expressed in fiction? 
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The Princess Leia hologram and Stephen Baxter’s Virtuals 
Even though many of the fictional representations of virtuality fail to acknowledge 
the real-life spreading of the virtual into the actual, there is, however, one theme in 
fiction that expounds on this: the volumetric displays, popularized by the Princess 
Leia hologram from Star Wars. Stephen Baxter and others have expounded this 
trope, and Baxter use the terminology Virtuals for one specific kind of volumetric 
display; intelligent virtual agents displayed in mid-air. This vision is partly plausible, 
and partly problematic. What matches real-life technology and products is the 
spreading of the virtual into our everyday surroundings, breaking out from the 
already obsolete box-with-a-window computers at our desks. The possibility to 
project virtual objects as well as intelligent virtual agents in mid-air, seems inviting 
and useful. The issue is how the projection would be technically possible. What is 
hinted at in fictional stories is some kind of projection device. There is real-life 
development of volumetric displays, projecting glowing patterns in mid-air. But, 
these are still very crude, and it is highly uncertain if it ever will be technically 
possible to project a true mid-air volumetric display with high visual fidelity. We 
might be required to create volumetric display by means of augmented reality, and 
then we arrive at the question of how to feed these illusions into our eyes or the 
brain. So, in order to enjoy Stephen Baxter’s Virtuals, we would have to either 
penetrate our skull with technology, or have augmented reality glasses hanging in 
our face. Are consumers ready to pay for expensive augmented reality displays, and 
hang them on their face? We accepted the displays on our desk, in our lap, and in 
our palm. Will we accept them on our face? 
Movie makers promised us cute princesses floating in air, but did not say 
anything about technology pushing against our face and head. 
Signs of the contrary 
Images use a visual language, a code. This means there is a visual vocabulary, where 
specific signs represent specific things. A vocabulary means that the signs can be 
chosen, as Umberto Eco (1976) writes, “among a repertoire of established types” 
(p.152). Eco suggests that an important difference between written and visual 
language is that in written language, vocabulary is highly established and that using 
it is a matter of selecting existing signs, while in visual language the signs need to be 
created. This means extra work and it also means that the amount of visual signs 
“are not foreseeable” (ibid., p.214). 
My study partly supports Eco, and partly contradicts his claims. I contradict the 
idea that using a visual language is inherently a matter of constructing visuals freely 
and laboriously. Instead, it is to a large extent a matter of choosing from a 
repertoire. The repertoire for representation of virtuality is described in the poetics 
of virtuality I have presented. Eco exemplifies image production with the drawing a 
dog, and in that example there is apparently endless variety in how the shape of the 
dog can be drawn: from which angle, in which pose, and how the hair of the dog 
can be drawn, and so on. But instead of considering an artist with pen and paper, 
consider an artist working with computer graphics. Such an artist surely decides on 
shapes as well as the pen-drawing artist, but the work of the computer artist is to a 
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large extent a matter of choosing from a repertoire: choosing an amount of color 
saturation, choosing a mathematical, procedural code to generate hair, choosing a 
certain level of specularity in the dog’s eyes, and so on. This is a general aspect of 
image creation (even when doing a freehand drawing you can for example choose 
to represent a sun as a circle with radiating rays, an already existing sign for the 
sun). It is also a rather specific aspect of digital image creation, and it is an even 
more specific aspect of representation of virtuality. The latter is true because so 
many of the signs that represent virtuality are signs that are possible to choose from 
a repertoire – such as desaturation, color tint, flickering, and so on. My comparison 
between semi-professional and professional productions show that a large portion 
of the repertoire is technically and creatively simple to apply. Adjusting color tint or 
desaturation was as easy for me as for a professional movie maker. The difference 
between semi-professional and high-end productions was noticeable in complexity; 
large-scale productions such as the Matrix franchise and the Life on Mars TV series 
were highly intricate compared to for example my own productions Astronaut and 
Environmental Science Investigation. 
Considering “the thousand” and “not foreseeable” (Eco, 1976, p.214) ways to 
utter something visually, Eco is supported by my study. The diversity and multitude 
of ways to signify virtuality give the impression that anything could signify 
virtuality, and that movie makers and storytellers are apparently free to construct 
any kind of sign for representations of virtuality. The explanation to this apparent 
creative freedom of choice lies in our conceptual understanding of the virtual as 
being opposed to the actual. Since we envision virtuality as being something-else-
than-reality, almost any sign can be used to signify virtuality, given a context where 
the sign is turned against the actual. Green color tint can signify virtuality, because 
the actual world is not green tinted. The 1920s can signify virtuality, because the 
actual world is not the 1920s. Super-human agility can signify virtuality, because in 
the actual world we cannot dodge bullets. Virtuality thus becomes the extraordinary. 
Tell, don’t show 
When interacting with a computer, a huge part of the communication from the 
computer to the user is visual, going via the graphical interface. One of the most 
common cliché advices for movie makers is the mantra to show, don’t tell. When I 
approached this research on virtuality in fiction, one of my anticipations was that 
the visual would be very important: how the virtual world looks. When William 
Gibson wrote Neuromancer and established his concept of cyberspace, he envisioned 
a three-dimensional, spatial virtual world. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, it seems as if both Gibson and myself got it 
wrong. Gibson’s vision of a three-dimensional cyberspace was replaced by the flat, 
two-dimensional real-life World Wide Web. The fictional virtualities I have studied 
are indeed very visual – characterized as they are by color tint, glows, abstract 
shapes and so on – but they are dominated by dialogue and events as well. The 
virtual is to a high degree told. Action, narrative, and content seem to be as 
important as look, style, and surface. The importance of narrative connects closely 
to the importance of conflict and struggle, fundamental aspects of the plot. Real-
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life virtualities – online computer game worlds – are also governed by narrative. 
Virtual worlds such as Grand Theft Auto and World of Warcraft are dominated by 
stunning characters and plots with willful schemes. When players inhabit and play 
these worlds, stories emerge. The splendid visual representation of these worlds 
seems to have one major purpose and that is to be astoundingly realistic. These 
worlds are often portrayed as nostalgic pre-digital, ten-minutes-back-in-time 
American cities, or as pastoral medieval fantasies. The production design in these 
worlds are not the exciting exploration of a new aesthetic promised by the early 
computer artists. 
The conclusion is that the virtual is both existence and representation, and it is 
both visualized and told. 
Hopeless dreams and misguided fears 
Storytellers also look forward, of course, since most of these narratives about 
virtualities are science fiction, and thus they are stories about a more technically 
advanced future.219 Here we must remember that science fiction is not neceserily 
concerned with predicting the future; science fiction is about revealing what we fear 
and hope will come. These fears and hopes are often far-fetched fantasies, but 
nevertheless they influence our thinking. We must also remember that storytellers 
often tell about imaginary technology not because we want the technology, or need 
it, or fear it, but because it makes a good story. The risk is not storytellers being 
wrong; the risk is that real-life technology is advocated with rhetoric arguments that 
tap into these dreams. With this in mind, what is it that storytellers anticipate and 
fantasize about? What dreams are we sold? 
The revolt of the virtual artificial intelligences 
One common science fiction narrative involves the conflict with our (sentient) 
creation. This seems to be a deep anxiety since it is a very common theme in 
science fiction; it occurs over and over again in well-known science fiction stories, 
for example, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, 2001: A Space Odyssey, Blade 
Runner, The Terminator, The Matrix, and Tron. A war with the robots is of course an 
efficient way to create dramatic and spectacular conflict, but is there a deeper 
philosophical anxiety inspiring the popularity of these stories? Do we actually fear 
the possibility of our creations will turning against us? Considering real-life 
technology, we can safely conclude that the villainous artificial intelligence and/or 
robot is far away into the future. It might be that the AI-running-amok is a 
metaphor for a more general anxiety about losing control over and not managing 
technology. 
A more mundane fantasy about these artificial intelligences is that they will 
populate the virtual worlds we build for them. In The Matrix, Tron, The Thirteenth 
Floor and other stories, the virtual worlds are filled with crowds of programs, of more 
or less sentient, artificial intelligences. The anticipation of sentient, emotionally 
complex artificial intelligences is a huge assumption. It is highly uncertain if that 
                                         
219 Not that science fiction always is about advanced technology or the future, but it so often is. 
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level of technology will ever be possible. Interestingly, these artificial intelligences 
are portrayed as rather banal. They are often portrayed as pitiful lesser copies of 
ourselves. There are visions of god-like super minds, but they are few and mostly 
confined to literature. The notion of an artificial intelligence that behaves like an 
emotionally forsaken child or a romantic teenager (as Clu in Tron Legacy and Yori in 
Tron) might be proven as silly as the things we smile at today, such as the horse 
wagon with a car engine or the canon shooting spacecrafts to the Moon. Or, these 
lesser artificial intelligences might not be so farfetched. We actually might construct 
artificial intelligences that are caricatured versions of ourselves, for amusement 
purposes. The Non-Player Characters of games such as Grand Theft Auto and The 
Sims are essentially examples of this. After all, these and other games are populated 
by (very) simple artificial intelligences already, and they are quite silly and pitiful. 
The artificial intelligences of science fiction are to a large extent a plot device. 
They are there because it is the perfect way to embody technology. Artificial 
intelligence gives technology a voice, a face. It turns mindless technology into 
movie villains. The real danger with technology might be car crashes and carbon 
emitting engines. But from a storyteller viewpoint, the calm voice of HAL 9000 
saying “I am sorry Dave, I am afraid I can’t do that” or the emotionless Terminator 
saying, “I will be back” is so much more cinematic.220 
The perfect simulation and the complete immersion 
Another thing that seems to be taken for granted in fictions such as The Matrix and 
eXistenZ, and that seems to be under way in real-life games when looking at games 
such as Grand Theft Auto, is the completely realistic, perfect simulation of a 
believable, complex world. Real-time rendering of photorealistic virtual 
environments are not a possibility yet, but much progress is being made. Pre-
rendered computer graphics are already there, thanks to huge render farms and 
skilled artists, as proven by movies such as Dawn of the Planet of the Apes by Matt 
Reeves, featuring what might be the most convincing 3d-animated, computer 
graphics characters so far. The gap in photorealism between pre-rendered and real-
time graphics is closing quickly. However, perfect simulations and completely 
realistic virtual worlds are not only about visual fidelity. If total immersion and 
presence is the goal, there are huge obstacles on that path. The majority of gamers 
still use computer screens and simple game console controllers. The usage of head-
mounted displays – a technology that started being developed in the late 1960s – is 
only now on the verge of entering the consumer market. Tactile displays have also 
been in development for decades, but so far they are highly limited niche products. 
The problem of achieving advanced tactile feedback seems unsolvable due to quite 
simple practical, geometrical and physical circumstances. The problem is how to 
feed sensory stimuli into the human body. 
Storytellers – as well as researchers – fantasize about feeding sensory directly 
into the brain, circumnavigating the messy, complex system of muscles and nerves 
that our body is full of. This seems fine in fiction. In The Matrix, it seems so easy to 
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just slide that neural interface probe into your brain and dive into a perfect 
simulation. But in real-life, even though neural interfaces are being developed, this 
technology is still in its infancy. No one knows if it will be practically possible to 
stimulate enough points in the brain that would be needed to create a perfect 
sensory feed of another world, nor how to find all those points, nor whether the 
average consumer would ever be willing to undergo brain surgery just to play 
games or what ever we would do in a perfect immersive simulation. 
Another issue with the fantasy about an immersive perfect simulation is that it 
contradicts the real-life development that we see right now with the virtual breaking 
the screen and saturating the actual world with its ubiquitous, augmented reality 
presence. So, on one hand we have the idea of the virtual being another, fully 
rendered world, a world we transcend into, leaving our bodies behind. The gateway 
into this virtuality goes via direct stimulation of the brain, at least in fictional 
narratives. This view pervades many of the film narratives I have investigated, and 
it was also called upon by the cyber evangelists of the late 1980’s and early 1990s. 
On the other hand, we have the idea of the virtual spreading like a layer on top of 
the actual. This shows a deep dichotomy between fictional representations of 
virtuality and real-life virtuality technologies. 
A post-physical existence 
A recurrent theme concerning virtuality is the idea of transcending into the virtual, 
and the virtual being another world, another, post-physical existence. This 
transcendence has on one end of a spectrum been heralded as an evangelic heaven 
for digital souls, and on the other end of the same spectrum it has been dramatized 
as a prison for our minds. The lesson that cyberpunk narratives try to teach is that 
real-life usually falls somewhere between utopia and dystopia. The real-life 
development of augmented reality now reconceptualize the virtual from being 
another world to being a layer supplementing the actual. The idea of transcending 
to the virtual is revealed as a modern variant of older myths: for example, the 
frontier myth of North America, and the Heavenly City myth of Christianity. 
The virtual as a lesser copy 
Fictional virtualities are portrayed as having a value only in relation to the actual, 
encouraging the idea of the actual as a yardstick to benchmark against. The virtual 
environments are then either lesser copies – reductions – or exciting 
enhancements. This reduction relates to the roots virtuality has in the ancient 
history of illusion technologies. The reduction is often related to the appearances of 
the virtual, and to the status of the virtual as a constructed artifact. It is 
characterized by artificiality; the virtual does not look as real or natural as the actual. 
Concerning the reduction of appearances, it is rather unfortunate that the virtual 
is still conceived as a lesser copy, as not being real at all. The sooner we accept that 
the virtual is different, and not less, the sooner we will accept it as being as important 
as the actual. The sooner the term IRL (In Real Life) falls out of grace, the better. 
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Grand Theft Auto is real life, gives real feelings, and involves real ethics.221 The 
virtual can be interacted with and it can be inhabited, and the worldliness it gains 
from this makes it not actual, but real. 
There are also enhancements in the virtual, often related to action and 
capabilities; in the virtual you can do superhuman deeds. Concerning the enhanced 
capabilities in the virtual, there is a similarity between science fiction and real-life. 
Real-life virtualities – from simple examples such as the Environmental Science 
Investigation virtual lab and ViaTecta visualization, to the huge virtual worlds of 
Grand Theft Auto and World of Warcraft – actually make you powerful. You can die 
and re-spawn, you can cast magic spells to kill dragons. The personal computer was 
originally conceptualized as an augmentation of the human mind, and this idealistic 
stance still echoes in fictional representations of virtuality. However, for better or 
for worse, real-life virtualities are extensively geared towards entertainment and 
amusement, and not primarily concerned with augmentation of mind, body and 
society. 
Another example of how the virtual is measured against the actual is how virtual 
worlds are designed as nostalgic retrospectives. This is true for fictional virtualities; 
consider, for example, the five-minutes-into-the-past environments of The Matrix 
and eXistenZ, or the 1970s and 1920s of Life on Mars and The Thirteenth Floor. It is 
also true for real-life computer game worlds, where medieval fantasy worlds have 
been popular even since the first MUDs. Many virtual worlds – fictional and real-
life alike – mimic the actual not due to necessity, but due to romantic convenience. 
Why should virtual architecture have roofs, when it does not rain in the virtual 
world? This question has been asked before, and there is still no obvious answer, 
besides a general nostalgia for the past and a demand for the virtual worlds to 
simulate actual worlds. Might this romantic convenience, this technological 
nostalgia, also be an echo from the origins of the personal computer, an origin with 
connection to counterculture and its off-the-grid, back-to-nature idealism. 
There has been experimentation with true virtual architecture, a liquid 
architecture, constructed not as a nostalgic copy of physical architecture, but based 
on its own possibilities and principles. A successful example could be the computer 
sandbox game Minecraft. Granted, Minecraft has nostalgia (a frontier, mine digging, 
homesteading backstory of being left out in the wild and having to build yourself a 
house, a castle or even a city), but the appearance of the Minecraft virtual world 
embraces its virtuality (although with a nostalgic nod towards vintage pixel 
graphics). 
Breaking out stories 
If the virtual is a lesser copy, then of course you have to break out of it. If you need 
to break out but cannot, you have a conflict. If you have a conflict, you have a 
story. The virtual becomes a prison, a battleground. This idea, so deeply related to 
the need of good storytelling, pervades fictional narratives about the virtual; it 
                                         
221 But real-life is not the same as actual. Therefore, a murder in Grand Theft Auto involves real-life 
events and emotions to some extent, but not to the extent that it is reasonable to charge a Grand 
Theft Auto player with murder! 
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pervades The Matrix, The Thirteenth Floor, Tron, Life on Mars, eXistenZ, and others. We 
seem to fear being trapped by technology. Do we actually fear that, or is it just 
providing good storytelling? In real-life, the risk of ever being actually trapped in a 
virtual world seems very farfetched. Could fictional stories about the escape from 
the virtual be a metaphor for a feeling of being trapped by technology in general, of 
being trapped by the lure of the screen, in a way similar to how early twentieth 
century dystopias – for example Forster’s The Machine Stops, Huxley’s Brave New 
World and Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 – alluded to being trapped by television. Ray 
Bradbury’s The Veldt actually is a bridge between narratives about being trapped by 
television and virtuality, respectively; it depicts the members of a family being 
seduced into a CAVE like virtual reality system, but it is also quite clearly a critique 
towards mass media and especially television. In the early 1980s, the cyberpunk 
sub-genre was characterized by a boredom with the nuclear apocalypse. The time 
has come to be equally bored with the fear of being trapped in the virtual. 
Another metaphorical meaning of the breaking-out narrative could be the virtual 
breaking out into the actual, as dramatized in movies such as The Lawnmower Man, 
The Thirteenth Floor, The Matrix, Tron Legacy and Virtuosity. In these narratives, 
malevolent artificial intelligences attempt to embody themselves, transcending from 
the virtual to the actual world. In real-life, the virtual is now breaking out of its 
confinement – both technically (with numerous screens, augmented reality and 
ubiquitous computing) and in how it saturates more and more of our daily routines. 
There is no escape 
A potential problem with the fictional breaking-out narratives is that they promise 
that escape is possible, while in real-life, there is hardly any escape from technology. 
Many narratives about the danger of technology – such as Fahrenheit 451 (Bradbury, 
1953), THX 1138 by George Lucas, and the theatrical release of Blade Runner – 
ends in similar fashion, with the protagonists leaving the city and technology 
behind, fleeing into the wild, the natural, the pastoral. The passage rite of entering 
or leaving the virtual worlds in fiction also promise that there is a clear line between 
what is actual and what is virtual. Yank out the neural brain jack, pull off the VR 
goggles, or rise from the bed or seat where you let your body rest while your mind 
entered the virtual world. Everything will be fine, and you will be free. Technology 
is over there, you are here. 
In real-life, it is not that simple. The virtual is highly embedded in our society 
and our lives. We can turn away from smartphones and tablets, but they remain just 
an arm’s length away, soon to be raised again. Social media is constantly calling on 
our attention. We willingly allow Wikipedia, Google and other online services to 
become our externalized memory. Of course, we can leave the digital, even the city, 
behind, and some people do, but the technological society into which we are 
embedded is too comfortable to break free from. Stephen Baxter puts word on the 
ever-presence and inescapability of virtuality, when having one of his artificial 
intelligence Virtuals give the following warning in the short story The Siege of Earth. 
We can come to you in the night. We can hide in walls, in your clothes, even in your 
body, human. You’ll never sleep again. 
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Things I would like to know more about 
I have devoted eight years to the study that underlies this poetics of virtuality. Still, 
I am curious about a few things. 
 
I would like to know how movie makers and writers reason about how they 
represent virtuality. Such an interview study would be yet another text to analyze, 
and such an analysis must consider the extent to which storytellers don’t remember, 
make over-rational after constructions, and market themselves. It would give 
further details and validity to the study I have done. 
 
I would like to know how the audience reacts to these stories about virtuality, a 
question investigated through an audience response study. Such a study would 
investigate what it is that many people react to and notice in these stories, and it 
would also explore what the audience takes with them from these movies. Such a 
study could tell us something about whether these stories actually influence our 
general cultural understanding of virtuality, or if it is primarily a reflection of 
existing cultural understanding. 
 
I would like to know how volumetric displays, augmented reality and heads-up 
displays continue to evolve. How far will the development of this technology reach, 
and how will these different technologies overlap? Is my assumption correct, that 
volumetric displays will primarily be realized through the use of augmented reality? 
 
And finally, I would like to know if the general consumer will accept the 
augmented reality displays that are in development. How physically close will we 
allow the display technology to come? 
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Appendix 01: A primer to computer graphics 
imagery 
Computer graphics and visual effects are important ingredients in the sign making 
process of film making, and especially so in the science fiction movies I have 
studied. Therefore, it is important to understand these tools and their underlying 
concepts. 
 
To have a starting point, we can consider the general idea of manipulated 
indexicality in photography. When working with photographic images, we start 
with a profilmic scenery and end up with a photograph. Everything we do in the 
process of creating this photograph manipulates the final result. 
It is common, at least in movie production, to talk about preproduction, 
shooting and postproduction. It is also common to think of different types of 
image manipulation as “belonging to” these different steps of movie production. 
For example, visual effects are usually thought of as being done in postproduction. 
However, visual effects work is often a part of the preproduction work process 
also, since you often plan and prepare visual effects in preproduction (Swartz, 
2005). However, it is convenient to use the categorization of before, during and 
after the capturing of the image. 
Introduction to image manipulation concepts 
In movie productions, image manipulation is often referred to as [visual effects], 
abbreviated [vfx]. The term visual effects easily bring to mind large-scale, epic 
imagery such as in The Lord of the Rings or The Matrix movies. But visual effects can 
also be small and subtle, such as changing details in a cityscape or adding a 
fluttering butterfly. Visual effects can be summarized as being any kind of extensive 
change, addition or subtraction of content in the footage. The reason why I use the 
term [footage] instead of images or photographs is that visual effects usually refer 
specifically to moving imagery and not still photographs. The corresponding term 
for a still photograph would be [image editing], [re-touching] or just [image 
manipulation]. I also say that it is [content] that is manipulated, in order to stress 
that it is usually objects of different sorts – cars, dinosaurs, buildings – that are 
changed, added or subtracted. There is no sharply drawn line between visual effects 
and minor changes such as re-touching. Consider wire-removal for example, or 
replacing modern day street signs in footage for a period drama. Such changes 
could be called either visual effects or retouching. Re-touching could be defined 
with a re-phrasing of the visual effects definition: any kind of minor changes, 
addition or subtraction of content in the image. Note that I also changed to [image] 
since re-touching can be used in relation to still photographs as well. Actually, the 
term re-touching is not often used when it comes to moving imagery. 
Minor changes to the image, such as wire-removal, sometimes fall under another 
category of work: [compositing]. Compositing is the work of combining two or 
more image sources into a final image. A typical example is adding an actor shot 
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against green screen into a new background, or adding computer graphics into a 
live action shot. However, successful compositing involves much more than just 
slapping images on top of each other. Often extensive work - adjustments to the 
multiple images – is needed to combine them into a believable single image. 
The terms discussed above would not hold up as categories, since they are 
cutting the cake in different ways. Visual effects is a process that often starts in pre-
production with planning and research work, continues during shooting with, for 
example, a green screen shot, and then is finalized in post-production using, for 
example, computer graphics and compositing. Compositing is a confined part of 
the work, but can also be seen as included in the general visual effects pipeline. To 
confuse the matter even more, the work that is done in compositing is often more 
than simply merging different images. Often re-touching is done during 
compositing, and compositing is not only a matter of simply adding a visual effect 
to a live action shot; the artist also has to do many changes to the imagery in order 
for the compositing to work. Compositing is where all the ingredients of a visual 
effect shot come together, and the visual effect is finalized.  
Even though much of the preparatory work for a visual effects shot might be 
done in preproduction and during shooting, visual effects are deeply connected to 
post-production. In contrast, [special effects] are done during shooting. Examples 
of special effects are artificial rain effects, controlled explosions, or radio controlled 
animatronics (mechanical “puppets”). It is fake events or objects in front of the 
camera. 
A form of image manipulation that is almost always done in movie is changing 
the colors of the image, usually quite subtly. A common term is [color grading], but 
[color timing] and [coloring] are also used frequently, as well as the short forms 
[grading] and [timing]. Color grading is the adjustment of the colors (hue, 
saturation, brightness and so on) of the image, in order to create the final look of 
the image (Svanberg, 2004; Swartz, 2005). Often the intention is to help create 
continuity in editing, and to make the images more aesthetically attractive, or more 
readable (the images might have been, for example, exposed too dark so the 
audience have difficulties seeing a face). Color grading is also an important part of 
visual storytelling. 
Color grading is done in postproduction. But it is inseparable from the creative 
decisions made during preproduction and production. All the decisions that the 
cinematographer (director of photography) is responsible for – selecting to shoot 
on digital or on film, deciding on type of camera, type of film stock or digital 
camera settings, lenses, lens filters, lights, lighting set-up, and so on – have an 
impact on how colors are depicted in the captured images, and thus on the colors 
that will be adjusted in color grading. 
Concepts in computer graphics 
Computer-generated Imagery (CGI) 
CGI [computer-generated images] is more specific than general CG (computer 
graphics), even though they are often used interchangeably. CGI often refers to 
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photorealistic, computer rendered images that are used in a movie. The concept of 
CGI is very closely related to 3d-animation, even though CGI refers to the general 
imagery, while 3d-animation is focused on the process of building and animating 
3d-models which are then used to create the CGI. CGI can be more or less 
photoreal; in movies such as Toy Story from 1995, the images have a stylized, 
cartoony look, while CGI can be fully photorealistic when it is used to create visual 
effects. Sometimes the term all-CGI is used to indicate that a shot or even a whole 
movie was done solely with computer graphics, and this is often suggested as 
something good and impressive. It is often used in marketing interviews before the 
movie’s release. It is important to note, though, that visual effects are normally 
done with a collection of techniques, very often combining special effects, physical 
models, 3d-models and CGI. And even though the image is directly created with 
the computer, it is very common that parts of the image actually originate from 
manual craftwork (such as painting textures in Photoshop) and from heavily 
retouched photographic material. Human artists almost always have a strong 
creative presence, steering, couching and controlling the computer. 
2d graphics (2D) 
2d graphics is a (computer based) image, a visual representation, with two 
dimensions. There is a tendency to relate 2d and 3d graphics to CG and CGI. The 
term CG covers both 2d and 3d computer graphics, while CGI usually is related to 
3d graphics only. 
One problem with the term 2d graphics is that it is very broad; it can refer to the 
production of images, the images themselves, or their display. At the same time, 
some types of digital imagery such as digital photographs and digital video are 
usually not referred to as being 2d graphics, event though they per definition are 2d 
graphics. 
3d graphics (3D) 
The term 3d graphics is more elusive than 2d graphics. At first, it is a contradiction 
of terms. Images are always two-dimensional, whether they are prints, photocopies, 
oil on canvas or glowing dots on a computer screen. Even 3d graphics become 
two-dimensional eventually, at least when displayed, if not sooner. 
The thing that is “three-dimensional” in 3d graphics are not really the images 
that are produced, but the production process of these images. When we talk about 
3d graphics, we can, for example, mean images rendered from a 3d model. As an 
example, a virtual cube is defined in a mathematical space by the position of its 
corners, and if the computer software simulates a light and a viewpoint in this 
virtual space, then the computer software can calculate – render – how an image of 
this cube would look. 
However, often the lines between 3d and 2d graphics blur. The 3d model can, 
for example, have a bump map, a two-dimensional image wrapped over its surface 
as a texture, controlling the rendering of highlights and shadows in order to 
simulate small-scale bumps, groves or any small-scale topography on the surface. 
Not all 3d-graphics are actually modeled in 3d space; a computer script executed by 
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the rendering software might provide algorithms for how hair or bird feathers 
covers a 3d model of an animal. These feathers do not “exist” as a 3d model; you 
can’t identify their xyz positions in the 3d space as you can with the cube. They 
only appear when rendered, and thus immediately become pixels in the rendered 2d 
graphics. 
Note that in everyday language, stereoscopic imagery (a display method that use 
binocular vision to creates the illusion of depth in images) is often called “3d”. This 
is only partially related to the 3d graphics discussed here. What is called a “3d 
movie” in everyday language can be entirely shot as live footage, with no use of 3d 
graphics. 
Virtual cinematography 
Virtual cinematography is a very broad and elusive concept, very much so because 
it is quite new and used by different people in different meanings. The advantage 
with the term is that it is free from the often cumbersome and irrelevant division 
between 2d graphics and 3d graphics, or between pre- and postproduction. The 
concept of virtual cinematography recognizes that there is a mélange of digital 
techniques which can be put to use in order to create a movie. Virtual 
cinematography usually refers to advanced production methods, for example using 
3d graphics to pre-visualize a shot, or complex blending of live action and 
computer graphics, or extensive use of virtual sets (digitally generated 
backgrounds). Virtual cinematography is a general term for shooting a movie with a 
virtual set and/or a virtual camera. In some movies, the intention is to create 
apparently photorealistic visual effects, hide the digital production methods, and 
persuade the audience that what they see is “real”. In other movies, this production 
process has been allowed to merge with the aesthetics of the movie, so that the 
audience experiences a world hovering on the boundary between what looks real 
and what looks artificial. The properties of the world are blurred with how it is 
presented (examples include Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow as well as Sin 
City). Note that virtual cinematography and fictional representations of virtuality 
are fundamentally two different things. In some cases – most notably the Matrix 
franchise – the movie production methods of virtual cinematography are used to 
tell stories about virtualities. But, stories about virtualities can be told with very 
conventional production techniques, without digital visual effects or virtual 
cinematography. 
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Appendix 02: Examples of complete super-sign 
structures 
The super-sign structures which signify virtuality are in some cases very complex 
and are difficult to grasp in a static figure. The mind map tool Mind42 was used to 
create interactive online representations. They are to be considered works-in-
progress and illustrations of complexity, and not final models. 
The Thirteenth Floor 
http://mind42.com/pub/mindmap?mid=c9dbea84-fbb1-4fae-8523-1dee570cd21f  
Avalon 
http://mind42.com/pub/mindmap?mid=455fa5d7-f78b-4cc3-a1ce-26e957efe3a5  
The Matrix 
http://mind42.com/pub/mindmap?mid=89f1e17a-b77b-4fc7-9c79-6615a0f3dc95  
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Appendix 03: Additional publications 
These are the additional publications from this study of fictional representations of 
virtuality, published elsewhere. Sorted by publication year. 
 
Eriksson, T. (2015). The floating screen; a fictional device and its possible origin. 
Paper presented at the 27th Australian Conference on Human-Computer Interaction 
(OzCHI). Melbourne, Australia. 
 
Eriksson, T. (2015). Fictional Volumetric Displays; plausibility and design choices. 
Paper presented at the 27th Australian Conference on Human-Computer Interaction 
(OzCHI). Melbourne, Australia. 
 
Karlsson G., Eriksson T., Sunnerstam M., Axelsson M. (2013). Joint reasoning 
about gas solubility in water in virtual laboratory experiments. Paper presented at 
the 10th International Conference on Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning, Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
 
Eriksson, T. and J. Westin (2010). “Imaging the Sanctuary of Hercules Victor”. 
Archeomatica(2). p. 58-62. 
 
Eriksson T. (2010). “Being native – distance, closeness and doing auto/self-
ethnography”. ArtMonitor(8). p. 91-100. 
 
Eriksson, T., M. Sunnerstam and G. Karlsson (2010). Environmental Science 
Investigation using a virtual lab. Paper presented at the Engineering Education in 
Sustainable Development, Göteborg, Sweden. 
 
Eriksson T. (2010). A poetic of virtuality – inventing, spawning, establishing and 
stabilizing new visual signs through intertextuality. Paper presented at the World 
Congress on Communication and Arts (WCCA), Guimarães, Portugal. 
 
Eriksson T. (2010). Self- and auto-ethnography – a methodology for observing, 
analyzing and writing on the personal creative practice. Paper presented at the 
World Congress on Communication and Arts (WCCA), Guimarães, Portugal. 
 
 
 276 
 
 
 
 
 277 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 278 
References 
Aarseth, E. (2007). “Doors and Perception: Fiction vs. Simulation in Games.” 
intermédialités 9. p. 35-44. 
Adams, T. (2007). “Space to Think.” The Observer. August 12th, 2007. 
Agre, P. (1998). Designing Genres for New Media: Social, Economic, and Political 
Contexts. Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. S. 
Jones. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
AIST. (2006). True 3D Display using Laser Plasma in the air. 
http://www.aist.go.jp/Portals/0/resource_images/aist_e/aist_today/2006_21/pdf
/2006_21_p13.pdf. 
Allen, J. F., D. K. Byron, M. Dzikovska, G. Ferguson, L. Galescu and A. Stent 
(2001). “Toward Conversational Human-Computer Interaction.” AI Magazine 
22(4). p. 27-37. 
Alvesson, M. (1999). Methodology for close up studies : struggling with closeness 
and closure. Working paper series / Institutet för ekonomisk forskning, Lunds universitet, 
1999:4. Lund,: 23 bl. 
Anderson, J., L. Rainie and M. Duggan (2014). Digital Life in 2025. Pew Research 
Center. 
Andersson, S. (1986). Hermeneutikens två traditioner - om skillnaden mellan 
Schleiermacher och Gadamer. Kunskapens villkor. S. Selander. Lund, 
Studentlitteratur. 
Andrew, D. (1984). Concepts in Film Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Aristotle and S. H. Butcher (1961). Poetics. New York, Hill and Wang. 
Arnman, A. (2005). Hellraiser Om Clive Barkers film. Lund, Ellerströms förlag. 
Artaud, A. (1958). The Alchemical Theater. The Theater and Its Double. A. Artaud. 
New York, Grove Press. 
Atkinson, P. (1992). Understanding Ethnographic Texts. London, Sage. 
Atkinson, P. (1997). “Narrative turn or blind alley.” Qualitative Health Research 7(3). 
p. 325-344. 
Atkinson, P. and M. Hammersley (1989). Ethnography: principles in practice. London, 
Routledge. 
Austin, A. (2001). “Frankie and Johnny: Shelley, Gibson, and Hollywood’s Love 
Affair with the Cyborg.” Romanticism on the Net 21. 
http://www.erudit.org/revue/ron/2001/v/n21/005958ar.html 
Badmington, N. (2004). Alien chic: Posthumanism and the other within. London, 
Routledge. 
 
 
 279 
Bardzell, J., J. Bolter and J. Löwgren (2010). “Interaction Criticism: Three Readings 
of an Interaction Design, and What They Get Us.” Interactions 17(2). p. 32-37. 
Barlow, J. P. (1996). A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
Barsalou, L. (2008). “Grounded Cognition.” Annual Review of Psychology 59(1). p. 
617-645. 
Barthes, R. (1977). Image Music Text. London, FontanaPress. 
Barthes, R. (1981). Camera lucida : reflections on photography. New York, Hill and Wang. 
Barthes, R. (1999a). Rhetoric of the image. Visual culture; the reader. J. Evans and S. 
Hall. London, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Barthes, R. (1999b). Myth today. Visual culture; the reader. J. Evans and S. Hall. 
London, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Baudrillard, J. (1981). Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press 
Baudrillard, J. (1983). Simulations. New York, Semiotext(e). 
Baudrillard, J. (1990). Seduction. London, Macmillan. 
Baudrillard, J. (1993a). Symbolic Exchange and Death. London, Sage Publications. 
Baudrillard, J. (2002). Screened Out. London, Verso. 
Baudrillard, J. (2008). Fatal Strategies. New York, Semiotext(e). 
Baxter, S. (2012). The Science of Avatar. New York, Orbit. 
Baym, N. (1998). The Emergence of On-Line Community. Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting 
Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. S. Jones. Thousand Oaks, SAGE 
Publications. 
Behar, R. (1996). The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart. Boston, 
Beacon. 
Belkom, E. v. (1998). William Gibson Interview. Northern Dreamers: Interviews with 
Famous Science Fiction, Fantasy and Horror Writers. E. v. Belkom. Kingston, Quarry 
Press. 
Benedikt, M. (1991). Cyberspace: First Steps. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Bethke, B. (1997). The Etymology of “Cyberpunk”. 
http://www.brucebethke.com/articles/re_cp.html. 
Bethke, B. (1998). Foreword to Cyberpunk: a short story by Bruce Bethke. 
http://www.infinityplus.co.uk/stories/cpunk.htm. 
Bingham, N. (1999). Unthinkable complexity? Cyberspace otherwise. Virtual 
Geographies - bodies, space and relations. M. Crang, P. Crang and J. May. London, 
 
 
 280 
Routledge. 
Biocca, F. (1997). “The Cyborg’s Dilemma: Progressive Embodiment within 
Virtual Environments.” Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 3(2). 
jcmc.indiana.edu/vol3/issue2/biocca2.html 
Bjurbom, M. (2005). Några råd till dig som skriver långfilmsmanus. Trollhättan, Film i 
Väst. 
Bochner, A. and C. Ellis (2000). Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity: 
Researcher as Subject. Handbook of qualitative research. N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Bochner, A. and C. Ellis (2006). Communication as autoethnography. 
Communication as ... : Perspectives on theory. G. Shepherd, J. S. John and T. Striphas. 
Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
Boda, D., L. Brohult, E. Mörner, T. Nilsson and R. Pixell (2009). “Uppkopplade 
prylar En rapport om Internets framtid och hur apparaterna går online.” .SE:s 
Internetguide. 19. 
Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age. London, 
Duckworth. 
Bolter, J. D. (2000). Remediation and the Desire for Immediacy. Convergence 6(1). p. 
62-71. 
Bolter, J. D. and R. Grusin (2000). Remediation Understanding New Media. Cambridge, 
Mass., The MIT Press. 
Boorstin, D. (1962). The image: a guide to pseudo-events in America. New York, 
Athenaeum. 
Borer, M. I. (2002). The Cyborgian Self: Toward a Critical Social Theory of 
Cyberspace. Reconstruction. 
Bordwell, D. (1985). Narration in the Fiction Film. London : Methuen. 
Bordwell, D. (2006). Historical Poetics of Cinema. 
https://archive.org/stream/Historical_Poetics_of_Cinema_d_Bordwell/Historical
_Poetics_of_Cinema_d_Bordwell_djvu.txt. 
Bordwell, D. (2007). Poetics of cinema New York, Routledge. 
Bordwell, D. and K. Thompson (2003). Film Art: An Introduction. New York, 
McGraw–Hill. 
Borgmann, A. (2001). Information, Nearness, and Farness. The Robot in the Garden: 
Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. Goldberg. Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press. 
Boşnak, M. (2001). “The Nocturnal Future as Alienated Existence: Blade Runner.” 
Journal of Economic and Social Research 3(2). p. 73-97. 
 
 
 281 
Bould, M. (2003). “What Kind of Monster Are You?, Situating the Boom””Science 
Fiction Studies 30(3). p. 394-416. 
Brand, S. (1995). “We owe it all to the hippies.” TIME Magazine Domestic. 145(12). 
http://members.aye.net/~hippie/hippie/special_.htm 
Brannick, T. and D. Coghlan (2014). “In Defense of Being “Native”: The Case for 
Insider Academic Research.” Organizational Research Methods 17(3). p. 59-74. 
Brannigan, M. (2002). There Is No Spoon: A Buddhist Mirror. The matrix and 
philosophy : welcome to the desert of the real. W. Irwin. Chicago, Open Court. 
Branzell, A. (1992). The searching picture. The International Conference on Theories and 
Methods of Design. Göteborg, Sweden. 
Bricken, M. (1991). “Virtual reality learning environments: potentials and 
challenges.” ACM SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics. Computer Graphics 25, p. 178-
184. 
Bring, S., R. McKenzie and D. Sutton. (2007). The state of the real - aesthetics in the 
digital age. London, I.B. Tauris. 
Broderick, D. (1995). Reading by Starlight. London, Routledge. 
Brooks, K. (2009). There is Nothing Virtual About Immersion: Narrative Immersion for 
VR and Other Interfaces. Motoral Labs/Human Interface Labs. 
Bruner, E. (1993). Introduction: the ethnographic self and the personal self. 
Anthropology and Literature. P. Benson. Urbana, University of Illinois Press. 
Bruno, G. (1987). “Ramble city: postmodernism and Blade Runner.” October 41. p. 
61–74. 
Bryant, A. and G. Pollock (2010). Digital and other virtualities - renegotiating the image. 
London, I. B. Tauris. 
Bryx, A. and G. Genosko (2004). “The Matrix Decoded:  Le Nouvel Observateur 
Interview With Jean Baudrillard.” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 1(2). 
http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol1_2/genosko.htm 
Buchanan, R. (1989). Declaration by Design: Rhetorics, Argument, and 
Demonstration in Design Practice. Design Discourse: History, Theory, Criticism. V. 
Margolin. Chicago, University Of Chicago Press. 
Buckland, W. (2006). Directed by Steven Spielberg: poetics of the contemporary blockbuster. 
New York, Continuum, 
Bukatman, S. (1993). Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction. 
Durham, Duke University Press. 
Bukatman, S. (1997). Blade Runner. London, Brittish Film Institute. 
Burnett, R. M. (2002). The Making of Tron. (dvd) Buena Vista Home Entertainment. 
 
 
 282 
Butz, A, C. Endres and M. Schmitz (2008). A survey of human-computer 
interaction design in science fiction movies. Proceedings of the 2nd international 
conference on Intelligent Technologies for interactive entertainment. Brussels, Belgium. 
Caldwell, J. T. (2008). Production culture: industrial reflexivity and critical practice in film and 
television. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press Books. 
Caldwell, J. T. (2009a). Production Studies: Cultural Studies of Media Industries. New 
York, T & F Books US. 
Caldwell, J. T. (2009b). Audiovisuality in the Era of Digital Convergence. (lecture) 
Copenhagen. 
Campanella, T. (2001). Eden by Wire: Webcameras and the Telepresent Landscape. 
The Robot in the Garden: Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. 
Goldberg. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Campbell, D. and D. Fiske (1959). “Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitraitmultimethod matrix.” Psychological Bulletin 56. p. 81-105. 
Campbell, J. (1949). The Hero with a Thousand Faces. New York, Pantheon Books. 
Canny, J. and E. Paulas (2001). Tele-Embodiment and Shattered Presence: 
Reconstructing the Body for Online Interaction. The Robot in the Garden: Telerobotics 
and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. Goldberg. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT 
Press. 
Card, O. S. (1988). Characters & Viewpoint. Cincinnati, Writer’s Digest Books. 
Carlshamre, S. (2005). På spanning efter berättelsen. Om narratologi, Propp och 
undersagans morfologi. Berättarboxen. M. Valentin. Göteborg, Fabel Förlag. 
Carlsson, S. (1999). Interview with Dane Davis, Sound Designer, “The Matrix”. 
http://www.filmsound.org/editorsnet/matrix1.htm. 
Carlsson, W. (2003). A Critical History of Computer Graphics and Animation. 
https://design.osu.edu/carlson/history/lessons.html. 
Carr, N. (2010). The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains. New York, W. 
W. Norton & Company. 
Carravetta, P. (1998). The Reasons of the Code: Reading Eco’s A Theory of 
Semiotics. Cultural Semiosis: Tracing the Signifier. H. Silverman. New York, Routledge. 
Castronova, E. (2007). Exodus to the virtual world : how online fun is changing reality. New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chan, M. (2008). “Virtually Real and Really Virtual: Baudrillard’s Procession of 
Simulacrum and The Matrix.” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 5(2). 
http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-5_2/v5-2-melanie-chan.html 
Charmaz, K. and R. Mitchell (1996). “The Myth of Silent Authorship: Self, 
Substance, and Style in Ethnographic Writing.” Symbolic Interaction 19(4). p. 285-302. 
 
 
 283 
Chion, M. (1994). Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen. New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
Chung, H. J. (2012). “Media Heterotopia and Transnational Filmmaking: Mapping 
Realand Virtual Worlds.” Cinema Journal 51(4). p. 87-109. 
Clarke, A. (1972). The Lost Worlds of 2001. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. 
Clark, A. (2003). Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human 
Intelligence. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Cleland, K. (2009). Intimate Encounters: the Mixed Reality Paradigm and Audience 
Responses. Proceedings of the Digital Arts and Culture Conference. Irvine, California. 
Clifford, J. (1986a). Introduction: Partial Truths. Writing culture : the poetics and politics 
of ethnography : a School of American Research advanced seminar. J. Clifford and G. Marcus. 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Clifford, J. (1986b). An Ethnographic Allegory. Writing culture : the poetics and politics 
of ethnography : a School of American Research advanced seminar. J. Clifford and G. Marcus. 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Clifford, J. and G. Marcus (1986). Writing culture : the poetics and politics of ethnography : 
a School of American Research advanced seminar. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Clute, J. (1995). Science Fiction the Illustrated Encyclopedia. London, Dorling Kindersley. 
Coate, J. (1992). Cyberspace Innkeeping: Building Online Community. Reinventing 
Technology, Rediscovering Community: Critical Explorations of Computing as a Social Practice. 
P. Agre and D. Schuler. Greenwich, Conn.,Ablex. 
Codognet, P. (2003). Artificial Natura and Natural Artifice. The Cinematic Imagery 
after Film. P. W. Jeffrey Shaw. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Cody, M. J., P. Wendt, D. Dunn, J. Pierson, J. Ott and L. Pratt (1997). Friendship 
formation and creating communities on the Internet: Reaching out to the senior 
population. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication 
Association. Montreal, Canada. 
Coffey, P. (1999). The ethnographic self. London, Sage. 
Cohen, A. P. (1994). Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity. London, 
Routledge. 
Cole, S. (1992). Anthropological lives: the reflexive tradition in a social science. 
Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice. M. Kadar. Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press. 
Collins, K. (2005). Dead Channel Surfing: Cyberpunk and industrial music. Popular 
Music 24(2). p. 165-178. 
Constable, C. (2006). “Baudrillard reloaded: interrelating philosophy and film via 
The Matrix Trilogy.” Screen 47(2). p. 233-249. 
 
 
 284 
Corrington, R. S. (1992). Nature and Spirit: An Essay in Ecstatic Naturalism. New 
York, Fordham University. 
Corrington, R. S. (2000). A Semiotic Theory of Theology and Philosophy. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Corso, J. (2014). What Does Greimas’s Semiotic Sqaure Really Do? Mosaic 47(1). p. 
69-89. 
Crang, M., P. Crang and J. May (1999). Virtual Geographies - bodies, space and relations. 
London, Routledge. 
Creswell, J. (2003). A Framework for Design. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, 
and Mixed Methods Approaches. J. Creswell. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
Crogan, P. (2010). “Simulation, History and Experience in Avalon and Military-
Entertainment Technoculture.” Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central 
European New Media 4. p. 99-113. 
Csicsery-Ronay, I. (1992). “The sentimental futurist: Cybernetics and art in William 
Gibson’s Neuromancer.” Critique 33(3). p. 221-240. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Finding flow - the psychology of engagement with everyday life. 
Basic Books. 
Culkin, F. J. (1967). A Schoolman’s Guide to Marshall McLuhan. The Saturday 
Review (March 18th, 1967). p. 51-53. 
Dahlkvist, J. (2010). Babylon 5: Förändrade förväntningshorisonter. Möjliga världar: 
tekniken, vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe and J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson 
bokförlag. 
Damer, B., S. Gold and J. d. Bruin (1999). Steps toward Learning in Virtual World 
Cyberspace: TheU Virtual University and BOWorld. Proceedings of The Fifteenth 
Twente Workshop of Language Technology. Enschede, The Netherlands. 
Danet, B. (1998). Text as Mask: Gender, Play, and Performance on the Internet. 
Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. S. Jones. 
Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
Davis, E. (1998). TechGnosis: Myth, Magic, and Mysticism in the Age of Information. New 
York : Three River Press. 
Debord, G. (1967). La Société du spectacle. Paris, Buchet-Chastel. 
Deleuze, G. (1968). Difference and Repetition. New York, Columbia University Press. 
Deleuze, G. (1992). “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October 59. p. 3-7. 
Denzin, N. (1978). The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. 
New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Denzin, N. K. (1989). Interpretive Biography. Newbury Park, CA, Sage. 
 
 
 285 
Dery, M. (1996). Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End of the Century. New York, 
Grove Press. 
Dibbell, J. (1996). A Rape in Cyberspace; or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian 
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a 
Society. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace. P. Ludlow. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Dick, P. K. (1978). How to Build a Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later. 
http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm 
Diggle, A. (2014). William Gibson Interview. Conversations with William Gibson. P. 
Smith. Mississippi, University Press of Mississippi. 
Diggle, A. and I. Ball (2014). An Interview with William Gibson: Virtual Light 
Tour. Conversations with William Gibson. P. Smith. Mississippi, University Press of 
Mississippi. 
Dijk, J. v. (1997). The Reality of Virtual Communities. Trends in Communication I. J. 
Groebel. Amsterdam, Boom Publishers. 
Disch, T. (1998). The dreams our stuff is made of. New York, The Free Press. 
Djurcilov, S., K. Kim, P. F. J. Lermusiaux and A. Pang (2001). Volume rendering 
data with uncertainty information. Data Visualization ‘01. D. Ebert, J. Favre and R. 
Peikert. Berlin, Springer-Verlag. 
Doel, M. and D. Clarke (1999). Virtual worlds: simulation, suppletion, seduction 
and simulacra. Virtual Geographies - bodies, space and relations. M. Crang, P. Crang and 
J. May. London, Routledge. 
Doyle, D. (2009). Embodied Presence: The Imaginary in Virtual Worlds. 
Proceedings of the Digital Arts and Culture Conference. Irvine, California. 
Dreyfus, H. (2001). Telepistemology: Descartes’s Last Stand. The Robot in the Garden: 
Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. Goldberg. Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press. 
Duncan, J. (2010). “Legacy System.” Cinefex 124. p. 28-57. 
Dyson, F. (1998). “Space”, “Being,” and other Fictions in the Domain of the 
Virtual. The Virtual Dimension: Architecture, Representation, and Crash Culture. J. 
Beckmann. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. 
Dyson, E., G. Gilder, George Keyworth and A. Toffler (1994). Cyberspace and the 
American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age. The Progress & Freedom 
Foundation. http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html 
Eco, U. (1973). Il costume di casa. Milano, Bompiani. 
Eco, U. (1976). A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, Indiana U.P. 
Eco, U. (1982). Critique of the Image. Thinking Photography. V. Burgin. London, 
 
 
 286 
Macmillian Publishers Ltd. 
Eco, U. (1985). Articulations of the Cinematic Code. Movies and Methods: volume 1. B. 
Nichols. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Educause (2006). 7 things you should know about... Virtual Worlds. 
http://www.educause.edu/library/resources/7-things-you-should-know-about-
virtual-worlds 
Educause (2008). 7 things you should know about... Second Life. 
http://www.educause.edu/library/resources/7-things-you-should-know-about-
second-life 
Ehlschlaeger, C., A. Shortridge and M. Goodchild (1997). “Visualizing Spatial Data 
Uncertainty Using Animation.” Computers & Geosciences 23(4). p. p. 387-395. 
Ellis, C. (2004). The Ethnographic I. Walnut Creek, CA, AltaMira. 
Ellis, C. (2007). “Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives Relational Ethics in Research 
With Intimate Others.” Qualitative Inquiry 13(1). p. 3-29. 
Epperson, K (1995). Patterns of social behavior in computer-mediated communications. Rice 
University. 
Eriksson, D. (2013). Fair Use och citaträtten: En komparativ studie av svensk och 
amerikansk upphovsrätt. Lunds Universitet. 
Eriksson, T. (2003). The Virtual Film Crew. In the proceedings of the 6th Annual 
International Workshop on Presence. Aalborg, Denmark. 
Eriksson, T. and M. Spante (2004a). The Computer Mediated Movie Producer – 
leadership in Online collaborative communities. In the proceedings of the Winter 
International Symposium on Information and Communication Technologies. Cancun, Mexico. 
Eriksson, T. and M. Spante (2004b). Desktop VR and Filmmaking – a case study of 
how web3D models and chat can be used in the product design process. In the 
proceedings of the Winter International Symposium on Information and Communication 
Technologies. Cancun, Mexico. 
Eriksson, T. and M. Sunnerstam (2008). Environmental Science Investigation – 
Challenges and opportunities. Paper presented at All our futures - Education Waking to 
Threat, Hope and Possibility. Plymouth, UK. 
Eriksson, T., M. Sunnerstam and G. Karlsson (2010). Environmental Science 
Investigation using a virtual lab. Paper presented at the Engineering Education in 
Sustainable Development. Göteborg, Sweden. 
Eriksson, T., S. Sundström and E. Thelander (2004). The Virtual Film Crew Project 
– work in progress on Film Making Using Online Communities, Computer 
Mediated Communication and Collaborative VR. In the proceedings of the 8th 
World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics. Orlando, Florida. 
 
 
 287 
Erion, G. and B. Smith (2002). Skepticism, Morality, and The Matrix. The matrix and 
philosophy: welcome to the desert of the real. W. Irwin. Chicago, Open Court. 
Evans, J. and S. Hall (1999). Visual culture; the reader. London, SAGE Publications 
Ltd. 
Farnell, R. (1998). “Posthuman Topologies: William Gibson’s ‘Architexture’ in 
Virtual Light and Idoru.” Science-Fiction Studies 25(3). p. 459-480. 
Farstad, B. (2010). Sf-litteratur som “vetandet om det möjliga” och heuristisk 
metod. Möjliga världar: tekniken, vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe and J. 
Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Fauer, J. (2006). Cinematographer Style. (dvd) T-Stop Productions. 
Favro, D. (2006). In the eyes of the beholder. Imaging Ancient Rome: Documentation, 
Visualization-imagination. L. Haselberger., J. Humprey and D. Abernathy. 
Proceedings of the 3rd Williams Symposium on Classical Architecture, Rome. 
Ferdig, R. (2014). Developing a Framework for Understanding the Relationship 
Between Religion and Videogames. Online - Heidelberg Journal for Religions on the 
Internet 5. p. 68-85. 
Fernandez, J. and M. Herzfeld (1998). In search of meaningful methods. Handbook 
of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. B. H. Russell. Walnut Creek. CA, AltaMira. 
Fernie, E. (1995). Art History and its Methods: A critical anthology. London, Phaidon. 
Fielding, J. (2009). “Reassessing The Matrix/Reloaded.” The Journal of Religion and 
Film 7(2). https://www.unomaha.edu/jrf/Vol7No2/matrix.matrixreloaded.htm 
Flichy, P. (2007). The Internet Imaginaire. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Flick, U. (2009). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London, Sage. 
Flueckiger, B. (2008). Digital Bodies. Visual Effects. Filmbilder aus dem Computer. B. 
Flueckiger. Marburg, Schueren. 
Fontana, P. (2003). Finding God in The Matrix. Taking the red pill : science, philosophy 
and religion in the matrix. G. Yeffeth. Chichester, Summersdale. 
Ford, J. (2003). Buddhism, mythology, and The Matrix. Taking the red pill : science, 
philosophy and religion in the matrix. G. Yeffeth. Chichester, Summersdale. 
Foucault, M. (1975). Surveiller et punir. Paris, Gallimard. 
Foucault, M. (1999). Panopticism. Visual culture; the reader. J. Evans and S. Hall. 
London, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Frasca, G. (2003). Simulation versus Narrative: Introduction to Ludology. 
Video/Game/Theory. M. J. P. Wolf and B. Perron. New York, Routledge. 
Freitas, N. d. (2002). “Towards a definition of studio documentation: working tool 
and transparent record.” Working Papers in Art and Design Studies 2. 
 
 
 288 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/research/ssahri/research-areas/art-design/research-into-
practice-group/production/working-papers-in-art-and-design-journal/volume-2-
research-into-practice-2002 
Fren, A. d. (2009). Disarticulating the Artificial Female. Proceedings of the Digital 
Arts and Culture Conference. Irvine, California. 
Friedberg, A. (2006). The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft. Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press. 
Friedman, N. (1990). “Autobiographical sociology.” The American Sociologists 21(1). 
p. 60-66. 
Friehs, G. M., V. A. Zerris, C. L. Ojakangas, M. R. Fellows and J. P. Donoghue 
(2004). “Brain–Machine and Brain–Computer Interfaces.” Stroke 1. p. 2702-2705. 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). Truth and method. London, Sheed and Ward. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures; selected essays. New York, Basic Books. 
Geertz, C. (1998). “Deep hanging out.” New York Review of Books. 45. 
Geimer, P. (2007). “Image as Trace Speculations about an Undead Paradigm.” d i f f 
e r e n c e s : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18(1). p. 7-28. 
Gelernter, D. (1992). Mirror Worlds. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Genette, G. (1980). Narrative discourse : an essay in method. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell U.P. 
Genette, G. (1997). Paratexts: Thresholds of interpretation. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Genuth, I. (2006). The Return of the 3D Crystal Ball. The Future of Things. 
http://thefutureofthings.com/3029-the-return-of-the-3d-crystal-ball/ 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity und Self-Identity:  Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. 
Giger, H. R. (1979). Giger’s Alien. London, Titan Books. 
Godhe, M. (2010a). “Literature of estrangement”: Några linjer i feministisk utopi- 
och sf-forskning. Möjliga världar: tekniken, vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe and 
J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Godhe, M. and J. Ramsten (2010b). Introduktion. Möjliga världar: tekniken, 
vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe and J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson 
bokförlag. 
Goldberg, K. (2001). Introduction: The Unique Phenomenon of a Distance. The 
Robot in the Garden: Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. Goldberg. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Gombrich, E. (1998). Style. The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology. D. Preziosi. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 289 
Gombrich, E. (2002). Art and illusion: a study in the psychology of pictorial representation. 
London, Phaidon. 
Gordon, A. (2002). The Matrix: Paradigm of Post-Modernism or Intellectual 
Poseur? (Part II). Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and the Religion in the Matrix. G. 
Yeffeth. Chichester, Summersdale. 
Gordon, J. (1992). Joe Haldman: Cyberpunk Before Cyberpunk Was Cool? The 
Celebration of the Fantastic. D. Morse, M. Tymn and C. Bertha. Westport, Greenwood 
Press. 
Glaser, B. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis: emergence vs forcing. Mill Valley, CA, 
Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B. and A. Strauss (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
research. Chicago, Aldine. 
Glowski, J. M. (2006). Charles A.Csuri - Beyond Boundaries, 1963 – present. College of 
the Arts, The Ohio State University. 
Grant, G. (1990). “Transcendence Through Detournement in William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer.” Science Fiction Studies 17(1). p. 41-49. 
Grau, O. (2001). History of Telepresence: Automata, Illusion, and Rejecting the 
Body. The Robot in the Garden: Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. K. 
Goldberg. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Grau, O., Ed. (2003). Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion. Cambridge, Mass., The 
MIT Press. 
Grieve, G. P. and H. Campbell (2014). “Studying Religion in Digital Gaming: A 
Critical Review of an Emerging Field.” Online - Heidelberg Journal for Religions on the 
Internet 5. p. 51-67. 
Gross, T. (1989). National Public Radio: Fresh Air: February 1989 Terry Gross interviews 
author William Gibson. 
http://artlung.com/smorgasborg/William_Gibson_Interview.shtml. 
Gunn, J. (2003). The reality paradox in The Matrix. Taking the red pill : science, 
philosophy and religion in the matrix. G. Yeffeth. Chichester, Summersdale. 
Gunnarsson, M. (2002). En plats vid sidan av. University of Gothenburg. 
Gunning, T. (2007). “Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of 
Reality.” Brown University and d i f f e r e n c e s : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 
18(1). p. 29-52. 
Gupta, S. and H.-W. Kim (2004). Virtual Community: Concepts, Implications, and 
Future Research Directions. Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on 
Information Systems, New York. 
Guynup, S. (2002). A Critique on ‘Cyberspace: Proposals’ / ‘Digital Sensations’. 
 
 
 290 
http://www.infoamerica.org/documentos_pdf/benedikt_hillis.pdf 
Hafner, K. and M. Lyon (1996). Where Wizards Stay up Late. New York, 
Touchstone. 
Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in 
Cultural Studies. S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis. Birmingham, Routledge. 
Handyside, F. (2004). “The Auteur as Imposter.” Film-Philosophy 10(1). p. 15-20. 
Hanson, M. (2005). Building sci-fi moviescapes. Oxford, Focal Press. 
Hansson, G. (2004). Columbi enkrona. Årsbok för konstnärligt FoU.  Stockholm, 
Vetenskapsrådet. 
Haraway, D. (1991). A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention 
of Nature. D. Haraway. New York, Routledge. 
Hardwick, C. (2012). The Wachowskis and Tom Tykwer. (podcast) Nerdist 
(October 26th, 2012). http://nerdist.com/nerdist-podcast-the-wachowskis-and-
tom-tykwer/ 
Harold, J. (2015). Literature, Genre Fiction, and Standards of Criticism. 
nonsite.org(3). http://nonsite.org/article/literature-genre-fiction-and-standards-of-
criticism 
Harris, R. (1987). Reading Saussure: A Critical Commentary on the ‘Cours de linguistique 
générale’. London, Duckworth. 
Haselberger, L. (2006). Imaging Ancient Rome: Documentation, Visualization-
imagination. Journal of Roman Archaeology 61. 
Hayano, M. D. (1979). “Auto-ethnography: Paradigms, problems, and prospects.” 
Human Organization 38. p. 113-120. 
Hayles, N. K. (1993a). “Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers.” October 66. p. 69-
91. 
Hayles, N. K. (1993b). The Seductions of Cyberspace. Rethinking Technologies. V. A. 
Conley. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
Hayles, N. K. (1996). Embodied virtuality, or how to put bodies back into the 
picture. Immersed in Technology: Art and Virtual Environments. M. A. Moser and D. 
MacLeod. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Hayles, N. K. (1999). How We Became Post human: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and informatics. Chicago, Chicago University Press. 
Heidbrink, S. and T. Knoll (2014). “Let’s Talk Video Games! Introduction to the 
Special Issue on Religion in Digital Games.” Online - Heidelberg Journal for Religions on 
the Internet 5. p. 1-4. 
 
 
 291 
Heim, M. (1993). The metaphysics of virtual reality. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Heuser, S. (2003). Virtual geographies : cyberpunk at the intersection of the postmodern and 
science fiction. Amsterdam, Rodopi. 
Higgins, H. (2009). The Grid Book. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Hileman, R. (1998). Design Methods: seeds of human futures. 
http://www.smsys.com/pub/dsgnmeth.pdf 
Hillis, K. (1999). Toward the light ‘within’. Virtual Geographies - bodies, space and 
relations. M. Crang, P. Crang and J. May. London, Routledge. 
Hishida, M. (1995). Ghost in the Shell Interviews. (dvd) Kodansha Ltd. 
Hollinger, V. (1991). Cybernetic Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and Postmodernism. 
Storming the Realiry Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodernism. L. McCaffery. 
Durham, Duke University Press. 
Holmberg, J.-H. (2010). Äventyret verkligheten. Möjliga världar: tekniken, vetenskapen 
och science fiction. M. Godhe and J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Holmquist, L. E. (2000). Breaking the Screen Barrier. University of Gothenburg. 
Holt, N. L. (2003). “Representation, Legitimation, and Autoethnography: An 
Autoethnographic Writing Story.” International Journal of Qualitative Methods 2(1). p. 
18-28. 
Honigmann, J. J. (1976). “The personal approach in cultural anthropological 
research.” Current Anthropology 17(2). p. 243-251. 
Horton, R. (2012). Visualizing Tron. (dvd) Walt Disney Studios Home 
Entertainment. 
House, H. (1956). Aristotle’s Poetics. London, Rupert Hart-Davis. 
Hudson-Smith, A. (2002). 30 Days in ActiveWorlds – Community, Design and 
Terrorism in a Virtual World. The Social Life of Avatars. R. Shroder. London, 
Springer-Verlag. 
Hughes, J., V. King, T. Rodden and H. Andersen (1994). Moving Out from the 
Control Room: Ethnography in System Design.  Proceedings of the 1994 ACM 
conference on Computer supported cooperative work, New York. 
Hurley, K. (1995). Reading like an alien: Posthuman identity in Ridley Scott’s Alien 
and David Cronenberg’s Rabid. Posthuman bodies. J. H. I. Livingston. Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press. 
Huyssen, A. (1981). “The Vamp and the Machine: Technology and Sexuality in 
Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.” New German Critique (24/25). p. 221-237. 
Ingram, S. and M. Reisenleitner (2006). “Polarizing Avalon: The European 
 
 
 292 
Virtuosity and Global Virtuality of Mamoru Oshii’s Filmic Imaginary.” New 
Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film 4(2). p. 129-138. 
Irwin, W. (2002). The matrix and philosophy : welcome to the desert of the real. Chicago, 
Open Court. 
Iversen, O. S. (2005). Participatory Design Beyond Work Practices – Designing with 
Children. University of Aarhus. 
Jick, T. (1979). “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in 
Action.” Administrative Science Quarterly 24. P. 602-011. 
Joe, S. K. (1997). Socioemotional use of CMC: Self-disclosure in computermediated 
communication. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Communication Association, Montreal, Canada. 
Johannisson, B. (2002). Enacting Entrepreneurship - Using Auto-Ethnography to 
Study Organization Creation. Paper presented at the conference Ethnographic 
Organizational Studies, St. Gallen, Switzerland. 
Johnson, C. (2004). “Top Scientific Visualization Research Problems.” IEEE 
Computer Graphics and Applications 24(4). p. 13-17. 
Johnston, A. (1999). “William Gibson: Waiting for the Man.” Spike (August 1, 
1999). http://www.spikemagazine.com/0899williamgibson.php 
Jones, S. (1998). Information, Internet, and Community: Notes toward an 
Understanding of Community in the Information Age. Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting 
Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. S. Jones. Thousand Oaks, SAGE 
Publications. 
Jonsson, B. (2002). “Sketching Now.” International Journal of Art & Design Education 
21(3). p. 246-253. 
Juul, J. (2005). Half-Real: Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Kaveney, R. (2005). From Alien to the Matrix - Reading Science Fiction Film. New York, 
I.B.Tauris. 
Kearney, R. (1998). Poetics of imagining : modern and postmodern. New York, Fordham 
University Press. 
Keegan, R. (2009). The futurist: the life and films of James Cameron. New York: Crown 
Publishers. 
Kelle, U. (2005). ““Emergence” vs. “Forcing” of Empirical Data? A Crucial 
Problem of “Grounded Theory” Reconsidered.” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 
6(2). http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/467 
Kellner, D. (2009). Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007): A Critical Overview. Baudrillard 
Now Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies. R. Bishop. Cambridge, Polity. 
 
 
 293 
Kellner, D., F. Leibowitz and M. Ryan (1984). “Blade Runner A diagnostic 
critique.” Jump Cut 29. p. 6-8. 
Kerman, J. (1992). Virtual Space and its Boundaries in Science Fiction Film and 
Television: Tron, “Max Headroom” and WarGames. The Celebration of the Fantastic. 
D. Morse, M. Tymn and C. Bertha. Westport, Greenwood Press. 
Knight, D. (1956). In Search of Wonder: Essays on Modern Science Fiction Chicago, 
Advent. 
Klastrup, L. (2002). A virtual world aesthetics: theorising multi-user textuality. 
Paper presented at the Net/Work/Theory – Association of Internet Researchers Conference 
3.0, Maastricht, the Netherlands. 
Klastrup, L. (2003a). Towards A Poetics of Virtual Worlds - Multiuser Textuality and The 
Emergence of Story. Copenhagen University. 
Klastrup, L. (2003b). A Poetics of Virtual Worlds. In proceedings of the Fifth 
International Digital Arts and Culture Conference, RMIT, Melbourne, Australia. 
Klastrup, L. (2007). “Why Death Matters: Understanding Gameworld Experience.” 
Journal of Virtual Reality and Broadcasting 4(3). https://www.jvrb.org/past-
issues/4.2007/1022 
Klastrup, L. and S. Tosca (2004). Transmedial Worlds – Rethinking Cyberworld 
Design. In proceedings of the International Conference on Cyberworlds 2004. Los 
Alamitos, California. 
Kneale, J. (1999). The virtual realities of technology and fiction: Reading William 
Gibson’s cyberspace. Virtual Geographies - bodies, space and relations. M. Crang, P. 
Crang and J. May. London, Routledge. 
Kolko, B. and E. Reid (1998). Dissolution and Fragmentation: Problems in On-
Line Communities. Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communication and 
Community. S. Jones. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
Knudsen, C. J. S. (2004). Presence Production. Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan. 
Kramarae, C. (1998). Feminist Fictions of Future Technology. Cybersociety 2.0: 
Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. S. Jones. Thousand Oaks, 
SAGE Publications. 
Krauss, R. (1985). Grids. The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. 
R. Krauss. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Kress, G. and T. v. Leeuwen (1996). Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design. 
London, Routledge. 
Klynne, A. (1998). “Reconstruction of Knossos: Artsists’ Impressions, 
Archaeological Evidence and Wishful Thinking.” Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology 
11(2). p. 206-229. 
 
 
 294 
Kristeva, J. (1998). Psychoanalysis and the Imaginary. Cultural Semiosis: Tracing the 
Signifier. H. Silverman. New York, Routledge. 
Krämer, S. (2005). Was eigentlich ist eine Spur? Zur Genealogie von Kulturtechniken. 
Berlin. 
Lacey, N. (2000). Blade Runner. London, York Press. 
Lamantia, J. (2009). “Inside Out: Interaction Design for Augmented Reality.” 
UXmatters 8. http://www.uxmatters.com/mt/archives/2009/08/inside-out-
interaction-design-for-augmented-reality.php 
Landon, B. (1992). There’s Some of Me in You: Blade Runner and the Production 
Realities of Adapting Science Fiction Literature into Film. The Aesthetics of 
ambivalence: rethinking science fiction film in the age of electronic (re)production B. Landon. 
Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press. 
Lanier, J. (2010). You are not a gadget: a manifesto. London, Allen Lane. 
Lanier, J. and F. Biocca (1992). “An insider’s view of the future of reality.” Journal of 
Communication 42(4). p. 150-172. 
Laurel, B. (1993). Computer As Theatre. Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Professional. 
Lauzirika, C. d. (2007). Dangerous Days: The Making of Blade Runner. (dvd) Warner 
Home Video. 
Lavery, D. (2001). “From Cinescape to Cyberspace: Zionists and Agents, Realists 
and Gamers in The Matrix and eXistenZ.” Journal of Popular Film and Television 28(4). 
p. 150-157. 
Lavie, S., K. Narayan and R. Rosaldo (1993). Creativity/Anthropology. Ithaca, NY, 
Cornell University Press. 
Lee, F., D. Vogel and M. Limayem (2002). Virtual Community Informatics: What We 
Know and What We Need to Know. Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, Hawaii. 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. 
Lennon, B. (2000). “Screening a Digital Visual Poetics.” Configurations 8(1). p. 63-85. 
Levy, P. (1998). Becoming virtual : reality in the digital age. New York, Plenum Trade. 
Liljefors, M. (2006). I overklighetens gränsmarker: Om normala och speciella 
effekter i bilder. Virtualiteter - Sex essäer. R. Willim. Lund, Lunds Universitet. 
Lincoln, Y. (1995). “Emerging criteria for quality in qualitative and interpretive 
research.” Qualitative Inquiry 1. p. 275-289. 
Ljungar-Chapelon, M. (2008). Actor-Spectator in a Virtual Reality Arts Play: Towards 
new aristic experiences in between illusion and reality in immersive virtual environments. 
University of Gothenburg. 
 
 
 295 
LoBrutto, V. (1992). By design - Interviews with film production designers. Westport, 
Conn., Praeger. 
Lombard, M. and T. Ditton (1997). “At the Heart of It All: The Concept of 
Telepresence.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 3(2). p. 6-21. 
Lorentz, P. (2014). “Socialization of Teenagers Playing The Sims: The Paradoxical 
Use of Video Games to Re-enchant Life.” Online - Heidelberg Journal for Religions on 
the Internet 5. p. 279-300. 
Lotman, J. (1976). Semiotics of Cinema. Michigan, No. 5 Ann Arbor. 
Lovén, S. (2001). “Even Better than the Real Thing - Counterfeit realities and 
twentieth century dystopian fiction.” Human IT(2-3). 
http://etjanst.hb.se/bhs/ith/23-01/sl.htm 
Lovén, S. (2010). Also make the heavens: virtual realities in science fiction. Uppsala: Section 
for Sociology of Literature at the Department of Literature, Uppsala University. 
Lundequist, J. (1998). Projekteringens teori och metod - en introduktion till designteorin. 
Stockholm, Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan. 
Lundström, C., P. Ljung, A. Persson and A. Ynnerman (2007). “Uncertainty 
Visualization in Medical Volume Rendering Using Probabilistic Animation.” IEEE 
Transactions on Visulaization and Computer Graphics 13(6). p. 1648-1655. 
Lye, J. (2000). The ‘Death of the Author’ as an Instance of Theory. 
http://www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/author.php. 
Maanen, J. V. (1988). Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Malcolm, P. (2009). The Craft Association. Production Studies - Cultural Studies of 
Media Industries. M. J. B. Vicki Mayer, John T Caldwell. London, Routledge. 
Mandelbaum, D. G. (1973). “The study of life history: Gandhi.” Current Anthropology 
14(3). p. 177-206. 
Mann, S., J. Nolan and B. Wellman (2003). “Sousveillance: Inventing and Using 
Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments.” 
Surveillance & Society 1(3). p. 331-355. 
Manovich, L. (2001). The Language of New Media. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Marcus, G. E. and M. M. J. Fischer (1986). Anthropology as cultural critique : an 
experimental moment in the human sciences. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Marder, E. (1991). “Blade Runner’s Moving Still.” Camera Obscura 27. p. 88-107. 
Markoff, J. (2005). What the Dormouse Said. New York, Penguin Books. 
McCaffery, L. (1990). Across the Wounded Galaxies: Interviews with Contemporary 
American Science Fiction Writers. Urbana, University of Illinois Press. 
 
 
 296 
McCaffery, L. (1991). Storming the Reality Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and 
Postmodernism. Durham, Duke University Press. 
McCloskey, D. N. and A. Megill (1987). The Rhetoric of History. The Rhetoric of the 
Human Sciences: Languages and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs. J. S. Nelson, 
A. Megill and D. N. McCloskey. Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press. 
McHale, B. (1992). “Elements of a poetics in cyberpunk.” Critique 33(3). p. 149-
175. 
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, London, 
Routledge. 
Menon, E. (2007). Virtual Realities, Techno-aesthetics and Metafictions of Digital 
Culture. The state of the real - aesthetics in the digital age. D. Sutton, S. Brind and R. 
McKenzie. London, I.B. Tauris. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. London, Routledge. 
Merrin, W. (2001). “To play with phantoms : Jean Baudrillard and the evil demon 
of the simulacrum.” Economy & Society 30(1). p. 85-111. 
Merrin, W. (2003). ““Did You Ever Eat Tasty Wheat?”: Baudrillard and The 
Matrix.” Scope (May). http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/scope/documents/2003/may-
2003/merrin.pdf 
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York, Free Press. 
Metz, C. (1974). Film language; a semiotics of the cinema. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Metz, C. (1985). On the Notion of Cinematographic Language. Movies and Methods: 
volume 1. B. Nichols. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Miramax Films. (2003). Avalon SFX. Miramax Films. 
Milgram, P., H. Takemura, A. Utsumi and F. Kishino (1994). “Augmented Reality: 
A class of displays on the reality-virtuality continuum.” Telemanipulator and 
Telepresence Technologies 2351. p. 282-292. 
Mitchell, T. (1996). New Thinking in Design: Conversations on Theory and Practice. New 
York, Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Mitchell, W. (1998). Antitectonics: the Poetics of Virtuality. The Virtual Dimension: 
Architecture, Representation, and Crash Culture. J. Beckmann. New York, Princeton 
Architectural Press. 
Moere, A. V. (1998). The Language of Cyberspace: An Architectural Approach. 
K.U.Leuven University. 
Moere, A. V., H. Neuckermans and A. Heylighen (1998). “VR/search : An 
Architectural Approach to Cyberspace.” International Journal of Design Sciences and 
Technology 7(1). p. 23-39. 
 
 
 297 
Montfort, N., P. Baudoin, J. Bell, I. Bogost and J. Douglass (2012). 10 PRINT 
CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 10__. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Moravec, H. (1988). Mind children: the future of robot and human intelligence. Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Morie, J. F. (2008). Ontological implications of Being in immersive virtual 
environments. SPIE Electronic Imaging: The Engineering Reality of Virtual Reality 6804. 
p. 1-12. 
Mossberg, F. (2006). Virtualitet som musikens gränssnitt: Om förändrade sätt att 
skapa musik. Virtualiteter - Sex essäer. R. Willim. Lund, Lunds Universitet. 
Moustakas, C. (1990). Heuristic research: Design, methodology, and applications. Newbury 
Park, CA, Sage. 
Mulvey, L. (1995). The Myth of Pandora: A Psychoanalytical Approach. Feminism in 
the Cinema. L. Pietropaolo, A. Testaferri. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
Mulvey, L. (1999). Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. Film Theory and Criticism : 
Introductory Readings. L. Braudy, M. Cohen. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Murch, W. (2001). In the blink of an eye : a perspective on film editing. Los Angeles, 
Silman-James Press. 
Murphy, G. (2008). “Considering Her Ways: In(ter)secting Matriarchal Utopias.” 
Science Fiction Studies 35(2). p. 266-280. 
Murray, J. (1997). Hamlet on the Holodeck: the future of narrative in cyberspace. New York, 
The Free Press. 
Mykhalovskiy, E. (1996). “Reconsidering table talk: Critical thoughts on the 
relationship between sociology, autobiography, and self-indulgence.” Qualitative 
Sociology 19(131-151). 
Månsson, S.-A. (2005). Men’s practices in prostitution and their implications for 
social work. Social Work in Cuba and Sweden. Prospects and Achievements. S.-A. Månsson, 
C. Cervantes. Göteborg: Department of Social Work, University of Gothenburg. 
Määttä, J. (2006). Raketsommar – science fiction i Sverige 1950–1968. Uppsala, 
Ellerströms. 
Määttä, J. (2010). Kognitiv marknadsföring: tre definitioner av science fiction. 
Möjliga världar: tekniken, vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe, J. Ramsten. 
Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Naremore, J. (2007). On Kubrick. London, British Film Institute. 
Nash, D. and R. Wintrob (1972). “The emergence of self-consciousness in 
ethnography.” Current Anthropology 13(5). p. 527-542. 
Nathan, I. (2011). “Tron: Regeneration.” Empire. (January). p. 66-76. 
 
 
 298 
Neale, M. (2000). No Maps for These Territories. (dvd) Mark Neale Productions. 
Negru, T. (2007). “Gadamer-Habermas Debate and Universality of Hermeneutics.” 
Cultura International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology(7). 
Nelson, T. (1980). “Interactive Systems and the Design of Virtuality.” Creative 
Computing 6(11). p. 94–106. 
Neumann, D. (1999). Film Architecture. Munich, Prestel. 
Newton, E. (1993). “My best informant’s dress: the erotic equation in fieldwork.” 
Cultural Anthropology. 8(1). p. 3-23. 
Nichols, B. (1985). Style, Grammar, and the Movies. Movies and Methods: volume 1. B. 
Nichols. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Nielsen, J. (1998). 2D is Better Than 3D. http://www.nngroup.com/articles/2d-is-
better-than-3d/. 
Nielsen, J. (2006). Usability in the Movies: Top 10 Bloopers. Jakob Nielsen’s 
Alertbox. https://www.nngroup.com/articles/movies-usability-top-10-bloopers/ 
Nilsson, L. (2010). Säljande teknik i Hollywood: Sf-film som konsumptionsprodukt 
och arena för religiös reflektion. Möjliga världar: tekniken, vetenskapen och science fiction. 
M. Godhe, J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Nixon, N. (1992). “Cyberpunk: Preparing the Ground for Revolution or Keeping 
the Boys Satisfied?” Science Fiction Studies 19(57). p. 219-235. 
Nordin, S. (2012). Drottningen och filosofen: mötet mellan Christina och Descartes. 
Stockholm, Atlantis. 
Norman, D. (2002). The Design of Everyday Things. New York, Basic Books. 
Novak, M. (1991). Liquid Architectures in Cyberspace. Cyberspace: First Steps. M. 
Benedikt. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Nusselder, A. (2009). Interface Fantasy - a Lacanian Cyborg Ontology. Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press. 
Olivier, M. (2011). “Civilization Inoculated: Nostalgia and the Marketing of 
Emerging Technologies.” The Journal of Popular Culture 44(1). p. 134-157. 
Olsen, L. (1992). William Gibson. San Bernardino, Calif., Borgo Press. 
Ortner, S. (2009). Studying Sideways: Ethnographic Access in Hollywood. 
Production Studies - Cultural Studies of Media Industries. V. Mayer, M. Banks, J. Caldwell. 
London, Routledge. 
Palumbo, D. (2014). The Monomyth in American Science Fiction Films: 28 Visions of the 
Hero’s Journey. Jefferson, McFarland & Company. 
Patterson, R. (1982). The Making of Tron. American Cinematographer 63(8). 
 
 
 299 
Paul, I. A. (2010). “Desiring-Machines in American Cinema: What Inception tells 
us about our experience of reality and film.” senses of cinema 56. 
www.sensesofcinema.com/2010/feature-articles/desiring-machine 
Peirce, C. S. (1868). “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man.” 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2. p. 103-114. 
Peirce, C. (1902). Virtual. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. J. M. Baldwin. Bristol, 
Thoemmes. 
Peirce, C. S. (1931-58). Collected Writings (8 Vols.). Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press. 
Pelias, R. J. (2003). The academic tourist: An autoethnography. Qualitative Inquiry 
9(3). p. 369-373. 
Pellerin, M. (2002). Digital Imagery in Tron. Tron special features. (dvd) Walt Disney 
Productions. 
Peterson, L. (2011). Values in Play Interactional Life with the Sims. University of 
Gothenburg. 
Pierce, J. (1993). “The Literary Experience of Hard Science Fiction.” Science Fiction 
Studies 20(2): 176-183. 
Piercey, R. (2004). “Ricoeur’s Account of Tradition and the Gadamer–Habermas 
Debate.” Human Studies 27. p. 259-280. 
Philips, S. (2010). Exposed - Voyeurism, Surveillance, and the Camera since 1870. San 
Francisco, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 
Pollack, N. (2011). Tron: remastered. Wired UK (January). 
Poole, S. (2000). Trigger Happy : Videogames and the Entertainment Revolution. New 
York, Arcade Publishing. 
Pope, R. (2008). “A Cyborg’s Testimonial: Mourning Blade Runner’s Cryptic 
Images.” Film-Philosophy 12(2). p. 1-16. 
Popper, K. (1979). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Prasad, A. (2002). “The Contest Over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an Interpretive 
Methodology for Understanding Texts.” Organizational Research Methods 5(12). p. 12-
33. 
Pratt, M. L. (1986). Fieldwork in Common Places. Writing culture : the poetics and 
politics of ethnography : a School of American Research advanced seminar. J. Clifford, G. 
Marcus. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 
 300 
Rakkolainen, I. (2008). Mid-air Displays Enabling Novel User Interfaces. 1st ACM 
international workshop on Semantic ambient media experiences. 
Ramsten, J. (2010). SF-litteraturens gestaltningsproblematik. Möjliga världar: tekniken, 
vetenskapen och science fiction. M. Godhe, J. Ramsten. Stockholm, Carlsson bokförlag. 
Ransdell, J. (2003). Passages from Peirce on: Collateral Observation. 
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/archive?id=57101. 
Raggett, D. (1994). Extending WWW to support Platform Independent Virtual 
Reality. First International Conference on the World-Wide Web. Switzerland. 
Reed-Danahay, D. (2001). Autobiography, Intimacy and Ethnography. Handbook of 
Ethnography. P. Atkinson. London, Sage Publications. 
Reid, R. A. (2000). Ray Bradbury: a critical companion. Westport, Conn., Greenwood 
Publishing Group. 
Rheingans, P. and S. Joshi (1999). Visualization of Molecules with Positional Uncertainty. 
Joint EUROGRAPHICS - IEEE TCVG Symposium on Visualization. 
Rheingold, H. (1991). Virtual Reality. London, Mandarin Science. 
Rheingold, H. (1993). The Virtual Community. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Ricœur, P. (1971). From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics. London, Athlone. 
Ricœur, P. (1978). The rule of metaphor : multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning 
in language. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Ricœur, P. (1984). Time and narrative 1. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Riemer, J. (1977). “Varieties of opportunistic research.” Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 5(4). p. 467-477. 
Robinett, W. (1992). “Synthetic Experience: A Proposed Taxonomy.” Presence 1(2). 
p. 229-247. 
Rosell, G. (1990). Anteckningar om designprocessen. Stockholm, Tekniska högskolan. 
Rovira, J. (2005). “Subverting the Mechanisms of Control: Baudrillard, The Matrix 
Trilogy, and the Future of Religion.” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 2(2). 
http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_2/rovira.htm 
Russ, J. (1975). “Towards an Aesthetic of Science Fiction.” Science Fiction Studies 
2(6). p. 112-19. 
Russell, K. (2000). “Poetics and practice: studio theoria.” Working Papers in Art and 
Design Studies 1. http://www.herts.ac.uk/research/ssahri/research-areas/art-
design/research-into-practice-group/production/working-papers-in-art-and-
design-journal/volume-1-research-into-practice-2000 
Ryan, M.-L. (1999). Cyberspace, Virtuality and the Text. Cyberspace Textuality: 
Computer Technology and Literary Theory. M.-L. Ryan. Bloomington, Indiana University 
 
 
 301 
Press. 
Ryang, S. (2000). “Ethnography or Self-cultural Anthropology?: Reflections on 
Writing About Ourselves.” Dialectical Anthropology 25. p. 297-320. 
Sangren, S. P. (1988). “Rhetoric and the authority of ethnography.” Current 
Anthropology 29(3). p. 405-435. 
Saussure, F. d. (1983). Course in General Linguistics. London, Duckworth. 
Schacter, D., D. Addis and R. Buckner (2007). “Remembering the past to imagine 
the future: the prospective brain.” Nat Rev Neurosci 8(9). p. 657-661. 
Schneider, E. (1996). alt.cyberpunk Frequently Asked Questions list. 
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cyberpunk-faq/. 
Schroeder, R., A. Huxor and A. Smith (2001). “Activeworlds: geography and social 
interaction in virtual reality.” FUTURES 33. p. 569–587. 
Seale, C. (1999). The Quality of Qualitative Research. London, Sage. 
Sebeok, T. (1999). Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press. 
Shapiro, M. (1998). Style. The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology. D. Preziosi. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Shedroff, N. and C. Noessel (2012). Make It So: interaction design lessons from science 
fiction. Rosenfeld. 
Sheridan, T. (1992). “Musings on Telepresence and Virtual Presence.” Presence: 
Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 1(1). p. 120-126. 
Sikov, E. (2010). Film Studies: An Introduction. New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
Silverman, K. (1985). The Subject of Semiotics, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Silverman, H. (1998). Cultural semiosis : tracing the signifier. New York, Routledge. 
Siner, L. (1992). “Skating across cyberpunk’s brave new worlds: An interview with 
Lewis Shiner.” Critique 33(3). p. 177-196. 
Sjölie, D. (2013). Human brains and virtual realities: Computer-generated presence in theory 
and practice. Umeå University. 
Skagestad, P. (1998). Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic. Twentieth World Congress of 
Philosophy. Boston, Massachusetts. 
Slater, M. (2002). “Presence and the sixth sense.” Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual 
Environments 11(4). p. 435-439. 
Slouka, M. (1995). War of the Worlds. New York, BasicBooks. 
Smejkal, F. (1974). Surrealist Drawings. London, Octopus Books Limited. 
 
 
 302 
Smith, P. (2014). Introduction. Conversations with William Gibson. P. Smith. 
Mississippi, University Press of Mississippi. 
Sonesson, G. (2001). “Iconicity strikes back : the third generation - or why Eco still 
is wrong.” VISIO 9(3-4). p. 247-270. 
Sorensen, P. (1982). “Tronic Imagery.” Cinefex 8. p. 4-35. 
Spante, M., M. Sunnerstam, C. H.-d. Voss, T. Eriksson and M. Axelsson (2009). 
The need for efficient and flexible educational imagery – when ambitious 
visualization products meet the context of actual learning environments. Paper 
presented at the International Conference on Information Communication Technologies in 
Education. Corfu, Greece. 
Spante, M., M. Sunnerstam, C. H.-d. Voss, T. Eriksson and M. Axelsson (2010). 
“Unlock the rigidity and design for flexibility.” US-China Education Review 7(11). 
Sparkes, A. C. (2000). “Autoethnography and narratives of self: Reflections on 
criteria in action.” Sociology of Sport Journal 17. p. 21-43. 
Springer, C. (1996). Electronic Eros: Bodies and Desire in the Postindustrial Age. Austin, 
University of Texas Press. 
Sontag, S. (1999). The image-world. Visual culture; the reader. J. Evans, S. Hall. 
London, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Stefik, M. (1996). Internet Dreams: Archetypes, Myths, and Metaphors. Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press. 
Sterling, B. (1987). Preface by Bruce Sterling. Burning Chrome. W. Gibson New 
York, Ace Books. 
Sterling, B. (1991). Preface from Mirrorshades. Storming the Realiry Studio: A Casebook 
of Cyberpunk and Postmodernism. L. McCaffery. Durham, Duke University Press. 
Steuer, J. (1994). Defining virtual reality: Dimensions determining telepresence. 
Communication in the age of virtual reality. F. Biocca, M. Levy. Hillsdale, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Stivers, C. (1993). “Reflections on the role of personal narrative in social science.” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 18(2) p. 408-425. 
Stone, R. A. (1991). Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?: Boundary Stories about 
Virtual Cultures. Cyberspace: First Steps. M. Benedikt. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT 
Press. 
Stork, D. (1997). Hal’s Legacy. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Strathern, M. (1987). “Out of context: the persuasive fictions of anthropology.” 
Current Anthropology 28(3). p. 251-281. 
Sundstedt, K. (1999). Att skriva för film. Stockholm, Ordfront förlag. 
 
 
 303 
Sutherland, I. (1965). The Ultimate Display. Information Processing Techniques 
Office, ARPA. 
Sutton, R. and B. Staw (1995). “What Theory is Not.” Administrative Science Quarterly 
40. p. 371-384. 
Suvin, D. (1979). Metamorphoses of Science Fiction. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
Svanberg, L. (2004). The EDCF Guide to Digital Cinema Production. Elsevier, Focal 
Press. 
Swartz, C. S. (2005). Understanding Digital Cinema - A Professional Handbook. Elsevier, 
Focal Press. 
Tarkovsky, A. (1986). Sculpting in Time. Austin, University of Texas Press. 
Tatsumi, T. (1986). “Eye to Eye: An Interview with William Gibson.” Science Fiction 
Eye 1(1). p. 6-17. 
Taylor, G. D. (2004). The machine that made science art : the troubled history of computer art 
1963-1989. University of Western Australia. 
Tedlock, B. (1991). “From participant observation to the observation of 
participation: the emergence of narrative ethnography.” Journal of Anthropological 
Research 47(1). p. 69-94. 
Thomas, R. (1993). “Interviewing important people in big companies.” Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 22(1). p. 80-96. 
Thompson, K. (1999). Storytelling in the new Hollywood : understanding classical narrative 
technique. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
Todorov, T. (1977). The Poetics of Prose. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Toffoletti, K. (2007). Cyborgs and Barbie Dolls: Feminism, Popular Culture and the 
Posthuman Body London, I B Tauris. 
Tomas, D. (1991). Old Rituals for New Space: Rites de Passage and William 
Gibson’s Cultural Model of Cyberspace. Cyberspace: First Steps. M. Benedikt. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Trier, L. v. (1995). Dogme95. http://www.dogme95.dk. 
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the Screen Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York, Simon 
& Schuster. 
Vogler, C. (1985). A Practical Guide to Joseph Cambell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces. 
http://www.thewritersjourney.com/hero%27s_journey.htm. 
Wachowski, L. and A. Wachowski. (1999). Chat with the Wachowski Brothers. (log 
from online chat session) 
http://forums.thelastfreecity.com/viewtopic.php?f=46&t=6635. 
Wagner, K. (2003). Fotografi som digital bild: narration och navigation i fyra nordiska 
 
 
 304 
konstverk. University of Gothenburg. 
Wall, S. (2006). “An Autoethnography on Learning about Autoethnography.” 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods 5. p. 1-12. 
Wallace-Wells, D. (2011). “William Gibson: The Art of Fiction No. 211.” Paris 
Review. http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/6089/the-art-of-fiction-no-211-
william-gibson 
Walther, B. K. (2003). Cinematography and Ludology: In Search of a 
Lucidography. Paper presented at the spilforskning.dk Conference, University of 
Southern Denmark. 
Watkins, C. and S. Marenka (1994). Virtual Reality Excursions with Programs in C. 
Cambridge, Academic Press. 
Watts, L. (2012). “Reconstructing the Future of the Mobile Telecoms Industry.” 
The Fibreculture Journal(20). p. 33-57. 
Watts, L. (2006). The Future is Boring and other tales from a Future Archaeologist. 
Performed at the EASST Annual Conference, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
Weber, S. (2010). A Virtual Indication. Digital and other virtualities - renegotiating the 
image. A. Bryant, G. Pollock. London, I. B. Tauris. 
Wershler-Henry, D. (1989). “Queen Victoria’s Personal Spook, Psychic 
Legbreakers, Snakes, and Catfood: An Interview with William Gibson and Tom 
Maddox.” Virus(23). p. 28–36. 
Wertheim, M. (1998). The Medieval Return of Cyberspace. The Virtual Dimension: 
Architecture, Representation, and Crash Culture. J. Beckmann. New York, Princeton 
Architectural Press. 
Wertheim, M. (1999). The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the 
Internet. New York, Norton. 
Westin, J. and T. Eriksson. (2010). “Imaging the Sanctuary of Hercules Victor.” 
Archeomatica(2). p. 58-62. 
Whittle, D. (1996). Cyberspace: The Human Dimension. New York, W.H.Freeman & 
Co Ltd. 
Whitwam, R. (2014). Pulse laser used to create 3D display in mid-air. 
http://www.geek.com/science/pulse-laser-used-to-create-3d-display-in-mid-air-
1608487/. 
Wiemker, M. and J. Wysocki (2014). “‘When people pray, a god is born... This god 
is you!’: An Introduction to Religion and God in Digital Games.” Online - Heidelberg 
Journal for Religions on the Internet 5. p. 197-223. 
Willim, R. (2006a). Under ytan: Om digitala föreställningsvärldar och dold 
komplexitet. Virtualiteter - Sex essäer. R. Willim. Lund, Lunds Universitet. 
 
 
 305 
Willim, R. (2006b). HEX. Virtualiteter - Sex essäer. R. Willim. Lund, Lunds 
Universitet. 
Vinge, V. (2006). Austin Game Conference keynote (lecture). Austin Game Conference, 
September 7-8, 2006, Austin, Texas. 
Winograd, T. (1996). Bringing Design to Software. San Francisco, Addison-Wesley. 
Winter, S. and P. Johansson (2009). Digitalis filosofi Människor, modeller och 
maskiner. .SE:s Internetguide 13. 
Witmer, B. and M. Singer (1998). “Measuring Presence in Virtual Environments: A 
Presence Questionnaire.” Presence 7(3). p. 225-240. 
Wooley, B. (1992). Virtual Worlds: A Journey in Hype and Hyperreality. Massachusetts, 
Blackwell. 
Wåhlström, O. (1990). “Skissmetoden.” Tidskrift för arkitekturforskning 3(12). p. 166-
176. 
Zagorac, A. (2009). “A Splinter in Your Mind”: Subjectivity, Hyperreality, and Religion in 
The Matrix. Universität Wien. 
Zeltzer, D. (1992). “Autonomy, interaction and presence.” Presence 1. p. 127-132. 
Žižek, S. (2002). Welcome to the desert of the real!: five essays on 11 September and related 
dates. London, Verso. 
Ödman, P.-J. (2007). Tolkning, förståelse, vetande: Hermeneutik i teori och praktik. 
Norstedts Akademiska Förlag. 
Özcan, O. and A. A. Ünlüer (2012). Re-reading String for Designing Interfaces in 
Animated Movies. Paper presented at the Scandinavian Student Interaction Design 
Research Conference, Göteborg, Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 306 
Fictional movies 
This list includes movies that I have analyzed, as well as fictional movies that have 
informed the analysis. 
 
Amenábar, A. (1997). Abre Los Ojos. Lionsgate. 
Anderson, P. (2002). Resident Evil. Constantin Film. 
Anderson, P. (2010). Resident Evil: Afterlife. Sony Pictures. 
Blomkamp, N. (2009). District 9. TriStar Pictures. 
Boyle, D. (2007). Sunshine. 20th Century Fox. 
Branit, B. (2007). World Builder. Branit FX. 
Cameron, J. (1984). The Terminator. MGM. 
Cameron, J. (2009). Avatar. 20th Century Fox. 
Carpenter, J. (1981). Escape from New York. AVCO Embassy Pictures. 
Chung, P. (2003). Matriculated. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Clegg, T. (1976). Journey to Where. Space: 1999. Group 3. 
Cronenberg, D. (1999). eXistenZ. Buena Vista. 
Crowe, C. (2001). Vanilla Sky. United International Pictures. 
Ephron, N. (1998). You’ve Got Mail. Warner Bros. Pictures. 
Eubank, W. (2011). Love. Angels and Airwaves. 
Favreau, J. (2008). Iron Man. United International Pictures. 
Fleming, V. (1339). The Wizard of Oz. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. 
Graham, M., T. Jordan and A. Pharoah (2006). Life on Mars. BBC. 
Gustavson, E. (1999). Sofies verden. Svensk Filmindustri. 
Jones, A. (2003). Flight of Osiris. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Kamiyama, K. and M. Tachibana (2002). The Man Who Dwells in the Shadows of 
the Net - Chat! Chat! Chat! Ghost in the Shell - Stand Alone Complex. Bandai Visual 
Company 
Katleman, M., D. Martin and A. Zakrzewski (2008). Life on Mars (US). 20th Century 
Fox Television. 
Kawajiri, Y. (2003). Program. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Kershner, I. (1980). Star Wars: Episode V - The Empire Strikes Back. 20th Century 
Fox. 
Koike, T. (2003). World Record. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Kosinski, J. (2010). Tron Legacy. Walt Disney Pictures. 
 
 
 307 
Kubrick, S. (1968). 2001: A Space Odyssey. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. 
Lang, F. (1927). Metropolis. Universum Film. 
Leonard, B. (1992). The Lawnmower Man. New Line Cinema. 
Leonard, B. (1995). Virtuosity. Paramount Pictures. 
Lisberger, S. (1982). Tron. Walt Disney Productions. 
Longo, R. (1995). Johnny Nmemonic. Columbia TriStar. 
Lucas, G. (1977). Star Wars: Episode IV - A New Hope. 20th Century Fox. 
Lucas, G. (1999). Star Wars: Episode I - The Phantom Menace. 20th Century Fox. 
Lucas, G. (2002). Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones. 20th Century Fox. 
Lucas, G. (2005). Star Wars: Episode III - Revenge of the Sith. 20th Century Fox. 
Maeda, M. (2003). The Second Renaissance Part I. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, 
Warner Bros. 
Maeda, M. (2003). The Second Renaissance Part II. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, 
Warner Bros. 
Marquand, R. (1983). Star Wars: Episode VI - Return of the Jedi. 20th Century Fox. 
McG (2009). Terminator Salvation. Sony Pictures Home Entertainment. 
Menzies, W. C. (1936). Things to Come. London Film Productions. 
Morimoto, K. (1995). Magnetic Rose. Studio 4°C. 
Morimoto, K. (2003). Beyond. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Mulcahy, R. (2007). Resident Evil Extinction. Sony Pictures. 
Mårlind, M. and B. Stein (2005). Storm. Breidablick Film AB. 
Nakata, H. (2010). Chatroom. Ruby Films 
Neveldine, M. and B. Taylor (2009). Gamer. Lionsgate. 
Nielsen, T. B. (1998). Skyggen. Zeitgeist. 
Nolan, C. (2010). Inception. Warner Bros Pictures. 
Oshii, M. (1995). Ghost in the Shell. Bandai Visual Company. 
Oshii, M. (2001). Avalon. Miramax Films. 
Ratner, B. (2006). X-Men: The Last Stand. 20th Century Fox. 
Rusnak, J. (1999). The Thirteenth Floor. USA, Columbia Pictures. 
Sandberg, D. (2015). Kung Fury. Laser Unicorn. 
Scott, R. (1979). Alien. Twentieth Century-Fox Productions. 
Scott, R. (1982). Blade Runner. Warner Bros. Pictures. 
Scott, T. (2006). Déjà Vu. Touchstone Pictures. 
 
 
 308 
Singh, T. (2000). The Cell, New Line Cinema. 
Softley, I. (1995). Hackers. United Artists. 
Spielberg, S. (2001). A.I. Artificial Intelligence. DreamWorks SKG. 
Spielberg, S. (2002). Minority Report. Twentieth Century Fox. 
Snyder, Z. (2013). Man of Steel. Warner Bros. 
Turner, J. and L. Campbell (2001). Space. BBC. 
Usborne, T. (2007). Atom. BBC. 
Volckman, C. (2006). Renaissance. Pathé. 
Wachowski, A. and L. Wachowski (1999). The Matrix. Warner Bros. Pictures. 
Wachowski, A. and L. Wachowski (2003). The Matrix Reloaded. Warner Bros. 
Pictures. 
Wachowski, A. and L. Wachowski (2003). The Matrix Revolutions. Warner Bros. 
Pictures. 
Watanabe, S. (2003). A Detective Story. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Watanabe, S. (2003). Kid’s Story. The Animatrix. W. Brothers, Warner Bros. 
Weir, P. (1985). Witness. Paramount Pictures. 
Wilcox, F. (1956). Forbidden Planet. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. 
Wiseman, L. (2012). Total Recall. Columbia Pictures. 
Zemeckis, R. (1997). Contact. Warner Bros. Pictures. 
 
 
 
 
 309 
Fictional literature 
This list includes fictional literature that I have analyzed, as well as fictional 
literature that have informed the analysis. 
 
Baxter, S. (1994). Ring. London, HarperCollins. 
Baxter, S. (1998). Darkness. Traces. London, HarperCollins. 
Baxter, S. (2000). Reality Dust. Harrogate, PS Publishing. 
Baxter, S. (2002). Dante Dreams. Phase Space. London, Harper Collins. 
Baxter, S. (2002). Touching Centauri. Phase Space. London, HarperCollins. 
Baxter, S. (2006). The Siege of Earth. Resplendent. London, Gollancz. 
Baxter, S. (2005). Transcendent. London, Gollancz/Orion. 
Baxter, S. (2013). Proxima. London, Gollancz. 
Bradbury, R. (1951). The Veldt. The Illustrated Man. R. Bradbury. New York, 
Doubleday & Company. 
Bradbury, R. (1953). Fahrenheit 451. New York, Ballantine Books. 
Carroll, L. (1865). Alice in Wonderland. London, Macmillan. 
Cline, E. (2011). Ready Player One. London, Arrow books. 
Gibson, W. (1984). Neuromancer. New York, Ace. 
Gibson, W. (1986). Burning Chrome. Burning Chrome. London, Harper Collins. 
Gibson, W. and M. Swanwick (1986). Dogfight. Burning Chrome. London, Harper 
Collins. 
Gibson, W. (1986). Fragments of a Hologram Rose. Burning Chrome. London, 
Harper Collins. 
Gibson, W. (1986). Count Zero. London, Victor Gollancz. 
Gibson, W. (1988). Mona Lisa Overdrive. London, Victor Gollancz. 
Gibson, W. (1993). Virtual Light. London, Penguin Books. 
Gibson, W. (1996). Idoru. New York, Viking Press. 
Gibson, W. (1999). All Tomorrow’s Parties. New York, Viking Press. 
Hamilton, P. (2007). The Dreaming Void. London, PanMacmillan. 
Huxley, A. (1932). Brave New World. London, Chatto & Windus. 
Nilsson, P. (2013). Stjärnvägar : en bok om kosmos. Stockholm, Norstedts. 
Reynolds, A. (2002). Redemption Ark. London, Gollancz. 
Shelley, M. (1818). Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus. London, Lackington, 
Hughes, Harding, Mavor, & Jones. 
 
 
 310 
Stephenson, N. (1992). Snow Crash. New York, Bantam Books. 
Vinge, V. (1981). True Names. Round Rock, Texas, Dell. 
 
 
  
 
